MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on continued financial and military support to Ukraine by EU Member States
16.9.2024 - (2024/2799(RSP))
pursuant to Rule 136(2) of the Rules of Procedure
Helmut Brandstätter, Petras Auštrevičius, Dan Barna, Benoit Cassart, Olivier Chastel, Bart Groothuis, Karin Karlsbro, Ľubica Karvašová, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Nathalie Loiseau, Urmas Paet, Eugen Tomac, Marie‑Agnes Strack‑Zimmermann, Hilde Vautmans, Lucia Yar, Dainius Žalimas, Malik Azmani
on behalf of the Renew Group
See also joint motion for a resolution RC-B10-0028/2024
B10‑0033/2024
European Parliament resolution on continued financial and military support to Ukraine by EU Member States
The European Parliament,
– having regard to its previous resolutions on Ukraine and Russia, in particular those adopted since the escalation of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine in February 2022,
– having regard to the statement by the foreign ministers of France, Germany and the United Kingdom of 10 September 2024 on Iran’s transfer of ballistic missiles to Russia,
– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/792 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 February 2024 establishing the Ukraine Facility[1],
– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,
A. whereas Russia has been carrying out an illegal, unprovoked and unjustified full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine since 24 February 2022, continuing what it started in 2014 with the annexation of Crimea and the subsequent occupation of parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions; whereas, through this war of aggression, Russia is seeking the complete destruction and extinction of the state of Ukraine, as well as the deprivation of the Ukrainian people of their identity and future;
B. whereas Russia’s forces have been carrying out indiscriminate attacks on residential areas and civilian infrastructure, resulting in the deaths of thousands of Ukrainian civilians, forced deportations and disappearances, including of children, the illegal imprisonment and torture of Ukrainian citizens in Russia and Russian-occupied territories of Ukraine, the execution of Ukrainian civilians, soldiers and prisoners of war, and acts of terror throughout the country, including the use of sexual violence and mass rape as a weapon of war; whereas millions of Ukrainians continue to be displaced inside and outside Ukraine, having fled from Russia’s aggression;
C. whereas the International Criminal Court (ICC) has issued several arrest warrants for Russian officials responsible for the war crimes of directing attacks against civilian objects, unlawfully deporting the population and unlawfully transferring the population from occupied areas of Ukraine to the Russian Federation, to the detriment of Ukrainian children; whereas in September 2024, Mongolia failed to execute the ICC’s arrest warrant against Vladimir Putin;
D. whereas, in recent weeks, Russia has intensified its brutal attacks on residential areas in Ukraine, including in Kharkiv, Kyiv, Poltava, Sumy, Lviv and Odesa; whereas such indiscriminate attacks have claimed the lives of many civilians, including three staff members of the International Committee of the Red Cross, who were killed while delivering life-saving humanitarian assistance; whereas these attacks constitute war crimes;
E. whereas the humanitarian situation in Ukraine, especially near the front lines, remains critical; whereas the provision of medical, infrastructural and other types of assistance is paramount; whereas, according to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, recent Russian attacks on critical civilian infrastructure have left tens of thousands of Ukrainians without access to essential services;
F. whereas Ukraine and its citizens have shown unwavering determination in resisting Russia’s war of aggression, despite the high cost in civilian and military casualties; whereas Russia has been intentionally perpetrating large-scale and systematic atrocities in the occupied territories, and indiscriminately attacking residential areas and civilian infrastructure;
G. whereas Russia continues to have a clear advantage over Ukraine in terms of both troop numbers and the quantity of military equipment at its disposal; whereas Russia substantially increased its own military spending and production to an estimated 8 % of its GDP in 2024; whereas Russia relies on military support from several countries, primarily Iran and North Korea; whereas there are reports indicating that China is providing Russia with substantial assistance to bolster its military capabilities, extending beyond dual-use technologies;
H. whereas since February 2022, the EU has adopted 14 packages of EU sanctions primarily aimed at limiting as far as possible the Kremlin’s ability to finance the war it has unleashed; whereas the EU has decided to use the windfall profits from frozen assets of the Central Bank of Russia to support Ukraine, in particular for additional military assistance;
I. whereas numerous European and US officials have warned that Russia is waging a reckless campaign of sabotage across Europe; whereas an FBI affidavit, declassified on 4 September 2024, unveiled the ‘Doppelganger’ campaign; whereas this campaign included attempts to destabilise the US and Europe in order to divide Ukraine’s allies and undermine support for Ukraine by creating domains impersonating legitimate and authoritative news websites; whereas, following this affidavit, the US Department of Justice seized 32 internet domains used by actors who were in close cooperation with the Russian Government, in particular the Presidential Administration;
J. whereas the Ukrainian President, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, announced that a Russian missile had hit a cargo ship carrying wheat in the Black Sea, bound for Egypt, on 12 September 2024, just after it had left Ukrainian territorial waters, making food security a renewed target;
K. whereas the French, German, British and US governments have condemned Iran’s export and Russia’s procurement of Iranian ballistic missiles, which amounts to an escalation by both Iran and Russia and represents a direct threat to European security; whereas these governments have either imposed or have announced their intention to impose new sanctions on Iran; whereas on 13 September 2024, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) condemned Iran’s supply of ballistic missiles to Russia and announced future sanctions;
L. whereas Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has left Ukraine with a significant budget deficit of approximately EUR 37 billion for 2024; whereas Ukraine will face a similar budget deficit for 2025; whereas the EUR 12.5 billion already allocated by the EU for 2025 will cover part of this deficit;
M. whereas the EU and its Member States have thus far contributed more than EUR 100 billion in financial, humanitarian, refugee and military assistance to Ukraine; whereas public opinion in some Member States is shifting against this aid and assistance, with negative sentiments sometimes being fuelled by national governments; whereas the EU’s overall military support to Ukraine – provided through the European Peace Facility and by Member States directly – amounts to around EUR 43.5 billion; whereas the EU has mobilised the first tranche of EUR 1.4 billion in windfall profits from frozen assets of the Central Bank of Russia through the European Peace Facility, to support more military assistance for Ukraine;
N. whereas the Hungarian Government continues to abuse its veto power in order to block essential EU aid to Ukraine, in particular the opening of a new tranche of expenditure to support Ukrainian forces, the release of previous repayment tranches and the establishment of the new assistance fund for Ukraine via the European Peace Facility;
O. whereas Ukraine’s allies have been providing weapons systems to support its legitimate defence; whereas some of these partners have also introduced restrictions on the use of some of these weapons systems, such as long-range missiles, in attacking targets on Russian territory; whereas the EU Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine (EUMAM Ukraine) has so far trained almost 60 000 Ukrainian soldiers; whereas a further 15 000 soldiers will be trained so as to reach a target of 75 000 by the end of 2024; whereas the EU has opened a Defence Innovation Office in Kyiv to support Ukrainian defence innovation stakeholders in accessing EU programmes and possible funding options and to strengthen cooperation between the EU and Ukrainian defence industries;
1. Reiterates its solidarity with and pays tribute to the brave people of Ukraine, who are courageously continuing to defend their country’s sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity; acknowledges and commends Ukraine’s invaluable contribution to the security of the EU, NATO members and their allies and its defence of its values by resisting Russia’s war of aggression;
2. Reiterates its strong condemnation of Russian’s war of aggression against Ukraine and its attempt to illegally annex several regions of Ukraine; reaffirms its position on the continued support for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognised borders; calls for the EU and its Member States to actively work towards maintaining and achieving the broadest possible international support for Ukraine;
3. Reiterates that Ukraine, as a victim of aggression, has the legitimate right to self-defence in line with Article 51 of the UN Charter; recalls that the financial and military assistance provided by the EU, the US and like-minded partners is designed to allow Ukraine to effectively defend itself against an aggressor state and to re-establish full control over its entire internationally recognised territory;
4. Recalls that the only way to achieve the sustainable and long-term recovery of Ukraine is to ensure that its reconstruction goes hand in hand with Ukraine’s EU accession process and the EU’s continuous support; underlines the responsibility of Ukraine’s partners to commit to long-term and sustained military and financial support for Ukraine; calls, furthermore, on the Commission to propose long-term financial assistance for the reconstruction of Ukraine, building on the experience of the newly established Ukraine Facility and including military support for as long and intensively as needed;
5. Calls on the Commission to engage in strategic communication in the Member States to explain the importance of Ukraine’s defence for Europe’s broader stability and to ensure that EU citizens are well informed about the significance of this assistance, both for Ukraine’s sovereignty and for peace and security across the EU; welcomes and applauds the public effort and citizen crowdfunding initiatives in some Member States, ensuring a steady supply of weapons for Ukraine; further encourages similar initiatives across the EU to foster solidarity and public involvement in this critical cause;
6. Reiterates its firm conviction that Russia must provide financial compensation for the massive damage it has caused in Ukraine, which is estimated at nearly EUR 500 billion; calls for swift progress in implementing the G7 decision to offer Ukraine a USD 50 billion loan, secured through immobilised Russian state assets, to ensure the timely disbursement of funds to Ukraine; urges the EU and its Member States to find, without delay, a sound solution on the use of the frozen Russian state assets to fund Ukraine’s defence and deliver reparations to it; acknowledges the added value of the use of windfall profits though the European Peace Facility and encourages the EU to continue channelling part of the profits through this Facility;
7. Calls for the EU and its Member States to increase their military and humanitarian support to Ukraine so that the country can effectively defend itself and provide medical care and other essential services to its people; underlines that the insufficient or delayed delivery of weapons and ammunition risks undermining the efforts made so far; urges the Member States, therefore, to substantially increase and accelerate their military support and to boost the capacity of their military industries; stresses the importance of cooperation with the Ukrainian defence industry and its integration, in the long term, into the EU’s Defence Technological and Industrial Base; calls for the EU and its Member States to expedite the implementation of the EU’s joint plan to supply one million rounds of artillery ammunition to Ukraine; calls on the Member States to further expand training operations while adapting them to the real needs of the Ukrainian Armed Forces; calls on the Member States and their military industries to honour their commitment to establishing military production on Ukrainian territory;
8. Urges the countries supplying defence systems to Ukraine to lift restrictions on the use of weapons systems delivered for the legitimate self-defence of Ukraine in line with Article 51 of the UN Charter, in order to allow strikes on legitimate targets within Russian territory; recalls that these restrictions hinder Ukraine’s ability to effectively counter Russian attacks on its cities and infrastructure, which increases the already staggering civilian death toll;
9. Calls for the EU and its Member States to take the necessary measures to make the Ukraine Assistance Fund under the European Peace Facility operational as soon as possible; denounces, in the strongest possible terms, Hungary’s veto of EU aid to Ukraine via the European Peace Facility and calls on the Council to find ways of overcoming this deadlock as quickly as possible;
10. Reiterates its support for the Peace Formula presented by the Ukrainian President, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, and welcomes the first Summit on Peace in Ukraine, which took place from 15 to 16 June 2024 in Switzerland; underlines the importance of reaching a just and sustainable peace agreement on terms acceptable to Ukraine;
11. Calls on the Council to maintain and further expand its sanctions policy against Russia and Belarus, while monitoring, reviewing and enhancing its effectiveness and impact; calls on the Council to systematically tackle the issue of sanctions circumvention by EU-based companies, third parties and third countries, and to adopt and strictly implement restrictive measures against all entities facilitating the circumvention of sanctions and providing Russia’s military complex with military and dual-use technologies and equipment; calls for the EU and its Member States to strengthen cooperation in identifying entities involved in sanctions circumvention by establishing multinational joint investigation teams and by increasing support for NGO-based research and investigative journalism;
12. Condemns Iran’s recent transfer of ballistic missiles to Russia; urges the Member States to further broaden and strengthen the sanctions regime against Iran and North Korea in view of these countries’ military support for Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, and to add additional Chinese entities and individuals to the EU sanctions list for their support of Russia’s defence and security sector;
13. Calls for the EU and its Member States to strengthen their efforts in preventing critical components produced in EU countries from reaching Russia’s military industry and to tighten controls on the sale and servicing of EU-made high-tech equipment;
14. Calls for the EU and its Member States to actively support efforts to ensure accountability for war crimes within existing international courts and institutions, and for the crime of aggression through the establishment of a special international tribunal; deplores Mongolia’s refusal to arrest Vladimir Putin under the ICC arrest warrant and calls on the VP/HR to take proportionate action to deter other countries from similar behaviour;
15. Calls on the G7 countries to more effectively enforce the price cap imposed on Russian seaborne oil and to crack down on the loopholes used by Russia to repackage and sell its oil at market prices; calls for the EU and its Member States to exercise strict control over Russia’s ‘shadow fleet’, which, in addition to violating EU and G7 sanctions, poses an immense ecological threat to the ecosystem as a result of its technical deficiencies and frequent breakdowns;
16. Recalls that Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, given its ideological background and the aims pursued, also threatens European security, our democracies and our values; condemns the increasing number of hybrid attacks carried out by Russia against the EU, its Member States and candidate countries, aimed at weakening European support for Ukraine through information manipulation, sabotage, covert destabilisation attempts and corruption; calls for the EU and its Member States to work strategically and proactively so as to counter hybrid threats, strengthen EU strategic communication and prevent Russia’s interference in political, electoral and other democratic processes in the EU and its neighbourhood; recalls Parliament’s position on the need to combat Russian disinformation and propaganda in the Global South;
17. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the President, Government and Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Russian authorities and the other governments concerned.
- [1] OJ L, 2024/792, 29.2.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/792/oj.