Motion for a resolution - B10-0166/2024Motion for a resolution
B10-0166/2024
European Parliament

MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on EU actions against the Russian shadow fleets and ensuring a full enforcement of sanctions against Russia

6.11.2024 - (2024/2885(RSP))

to wind up the debate on the statement by the Commission
pursuant to Rule 136(2) of the Rules of Procedure

Adam Bielan, Alexandr Vondra, Reinis Pozņaks, Rihards Kols, Mariusz Kamiński, Jadwiga Wiśniewska, Veronika Vrecionová, Michał Dworczyk, Assita Kanko, Roberts Zīle, Cristian Terheş, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Charlie Weimers, Aurelijus Veryga, Joachim Stanisław Brudziński
on behalf of the ECR Group

See also joint motion for a resolution RC-B10-0161/2024

Procedure : 2024/2885(RSP)
Document stages in plenary
Document selected :  
B10-0166/2024
Texts tabled :
B10-0166/2024
Debates :
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Texts adopted :

B10‑0166/2024

European Parliament resolution on EU actions against the Russian shadow fleets and ensuring a full enforcement of sanctions against Russia

(2024/2885(RSP))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/2874 of 18 December 2023 amending Decision 2014/512/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine[1],

– having regard to Council Regulation 2024/1745 of 24 June 2024 amending Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine[2],

– having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/1744 of 24 June 2024 amending Decision 2014/512/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine[3],

– having regard to the G7 Leaders’ Statement of 6 December 2023,

– having regard to the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (‘the Civil Liability Convention’ – CLS) of the International Maritime Organization (IMO),

– having regard to the conclusions of the 110th session of the IMO Legal Committee of 27-31 March 2023, entitled ‘Addressing ship-to-ship oil transfers and tankers in the “dark fleet“’,

–  having regard to its previous resolutions on Ukraine and Russia, in particular that of 17 July 2024 on the need for the EU’s continuous support for Ukraine[4],

– having regard to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea,

– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas Russia launched its illegal and unjustifiable war of aggression against Ukraine in 2014, and 10 years later, the Kremlin’s war aims remain unchanged; whereas this has led to a rapidly deteriorating security environment throughout the Euro-Atlantic region, largely financed by Russia’s energy sector, which, in order to evade sanctions, relies heavily on a large-scale network of tankers, considered a ‘shadow fleet’, which has the sole purpose of providing financing to continue Russia’s war of aggression;

B. whereas since February 2022 the EU has adopted 14 packages of sanctions aimed at undermining Russia’s ability to wage its illegal war of aggression, having recently, together with the G7+ Price Cap Coalition, introduced price caps on seaborne crude oil, petroleum oils and oils obtained from bituminous minerals which originate in or are exported from Russia;

C. whereas since the imposition of the price caps, Russia has heavily invested in building up its shadow fleet, which consists of vessels that are not ostensibly owned, managed or insured by an entity subject to the sanctions imposed by the G7+ Price Gap Coalition and are thus exempted from the price cap;

D. whereas this tactic has already been used by hostile countries such as Iran, Venezuela and North Korea; whereas, however, the scale and sophistication of Russia’s operations set it apart as Russia’s shadow fleet is estimated to operate around 160-200 tankers monthly to transport oil, with an estimated total fleet of 600 vessels that play a key role in sustaining Russian crude exports;

E. whereas some owners and managers of the shadow fleet tankers and gas carriers are also registered in the Member States, most notably Greece and Cyprus;

F. whereas despite the fact that the sanctions reduced Russian tax revenue from oil by approximately 30 % in 2023, Russia continues to finance its war effort by evading sanctions through a combination of tactics, such as manipulating documents and certifications that obscure the origin of its oil and the ownership of its vessels, establishing shell companies to launder the proceeds of energy sales, engaging in ship-to-ship (STS) transfers in international waters to deny the oil’s true origin and operating in maritime zones known for lax regulatory enforcement;

G. whereas despite sanctions, approximately EUR 80 billion worth of crude oil is being transported in older tankers largely deemed unseaworthy due to poor maintenance, unclear ownership, the evasion of obligatory Automatic Identification System (AIS) navigation and a severe lack of insurance; whereas these tankers operate in and near European waters, risking oil spills and accidents and presenting major ecological and safety risks that, in the event of an oil spill or similar environmental disaster, would require an emergency response from a Member State, for which Russia could evade responsibility and accountability;

H. whereas Russia’s shadow fleet relies heavily on the complicity and collaboration of several countries to bypass sanctions, especially China, India, Türkiye, Panama, Liberia, Gabon and the Marshall Islands;

I. whereas EU restrictive measures, being an essential tool of the EU’s common foreign and security policy against Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, are not directed at EU-flagged vessels; whereas the Russian shadow fleet represents a critical component of Russia’s broader hybrid warfare strategy against the Member States, while aiding its illegal war of aggression and simultaneously undermining European solidarity politically, financially, operationally and logistically;

1. Condemns in the strongest possible terms Russia’s use of its shadow fleet; considers the shadow fleet a key financial lifeline for Russia in its illegal and unjustifiable war of aggression against Ukraine and a major tool created to circumvent the sanctions regime; considers STS transfers in the high seas to be high-risk activities that undermine international maritime safety and environmental protection;

2. Considers those unregistered and underinsured or uninsured vessels, and their frequent violations of relevant standards and requirements for ship communication and navigation, to be a threat to maritime security and a violation of international maritime law, particularly as they navigate through European seas and waters, especially the Baltic sea, presenting an enormous threat to nature and marine life that could lead to environmental catastrophe;

3. Stresses that inaction against or complicity with Russia’s shadow fleet severely undermines the impact of existing sanctions, weakening and demoralising the EU’s political, financial and military support for Ukraine; calls for the EU and the Member States to introduce a full ban on re-exported Russian refined oil products, in order to close all loopholes used by Russia to repackage and sell its oil, in a manner that results in a full cessation of Russian fossil fuel imports to the Member States, and ensures that no new agreements are signed with Russian energy companies, its leadership or subsidiaries;

4. Calls for the strict implementation of the IMO assembly resolution to combat illegal maritime operations adopted in December 2023, notably the obligation for vessels to report all STS transfers to flag states and enhanced inspections at ports for suspicious ships known to have switched off their vessel-tracking systems;

5. Calls for the EU and its Member States to take more effective actions and concrete measures to ensure maritime safety and to avoid environmental hazards or ecological disasters in European waters, and in particular, to continue and expand the vessel designation campaign, which has proven to be extremely successful in removing shadow fleet tankers from operations;

6. Calls for countries with international straits to require tankers to demonstrate proof of protection and indemnity insurance and adherence to minimum safety standards, as this would help to mitigate shadow fleet operations and drive up costs for non-compliant vessels; calls on all Member States to require the disclosure of oil spill insurance coverage from all vessels passing through or near their waters, to ensure transparency regarding insurance arrangements;

7. Calls for restrictions on vessel sales to be broadened and enforced to limit Russia’s ability to acquire tankers from the ‘white fleet’ – fully legally recognised vessels whose paperwork may remain temporarily valid despite being under new ownership;

8. Urges the Member States in which the companies acting as owners or managers of the Russian shadow fleet’s oil and gas carriers are registered to take immediate action, in order to stop them from enabling the circumvention of sanctions;

9. Condemns the behaviour of states, legal service providers, other entities and individuals that are helping Russia to evade or mitigate EU sanctions; calls for the Member States and the EU institutions to step up their efforts to limit the evasion and circumvention of EU sanctions against Russia, and to take concrete measures that will ensure maritime safety and avoid environmental hazards or ecological disasters in European waters;

10. Encourages the Member States to enhance their surveillance capabilities, especially satellite monitoring for STS transfers, in order to expand the real-time monitoring and tracking of Russia’s shadow fleet; encourages the allocation of resources to Member States with major shipping sectors, enabling targeted enforcement and reducing legitimate disconnections of automatic identification systems;

11. Urges the Member States to collaborate with environmental agencies to hold violators responsible for ecological damage, especially concerning unseaworthy vessels, and to better enforce existing oil spill insurance requirements to address the significant and rising environmental threat stemming from the use of ageing and uninsured shadow fleet tankers;

12. Recommends that the Member States impose secondary sanctions on non-EU financial entities that indirectly support the Russian oil trade, in order to further close financial loopholes currently exploited by Russia;

13. Encourages global transparency standards in vessel registration to reduce reliance of vessel owners on shell companies and flags of convenience, in order to improve vessel ownership transparency; urges measures that ensure that shadow fleet vessels, once identified, are communicated to all the Member States to ensure they are denied safe harbour;

14. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the governments and parliaments of the Member States.

 

Last updated: 7 November 2024
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