MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on reinforcing EU’s unwavering support to Ukraine against Russia’s war of aggression and the increasing military cooperation between North Korea and Russia
25.11.2024 - (2024/2940(RSP))
pursuant to Rule 136(2) of the Rules of Procedure
Joachim Stanisław Brudziński, Adam Bielan, Rihards Kols, Mariusz Kamiński, Bogdan Rzońca, Alexandr Vondra, Veronika Vrecionová, Michał Dworczyk, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Roberts Zīle, Małgorzata Gosiewska, Aurelijus Veryga, Assita Kanko, Ondřej Krutílek, Marlena Maląg, Charlie Weimers
on behalf of the ECR Group
See also joint motion for a resolution RC-B10-0191/2024
B10‑0200/2024
European Parliament resolution on reinforcing EU’s unwavering support to Ukraine against Russia’s war of aggression and the increasing military cooperation between North Korea and Russia
The European Parliament,
– having regard to its previous resolutions on Ukraine and Russia since 1 March 2022, in particular its resolution of 19 September 2024 on continued financial and military support to Ukraine by EU Member States[1],
– having regard to the Charter of the United Nations, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the Hague Conventions, the Geneva Conventions and the additional protocols thereto, and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,
– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/792 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 February 2024 establishing the Ukraine Facility[2],
– having regard to the joint security commitments between the European Union and Ukraine of 27 June 2024,
– having regard to NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept,
– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,
A. whereas 19 November 2024 marked 1 000 days of resilience and unwavering determination by Ukrainian soldiers and citizens in defending their country against Russia’s war of aggression, despite Russia’s barbaric crimes causing immense civilian and military losses;
B. whereas Russia’s forces have systematically and indiscriminately attacked residential areas and civilian infrastructure, causing the deaths of thousands of Ukrainian civilians and the destruction of public and private property; whereas Russian forces are responsible for forced deportations, disappearances, including of children, illegal imprisonments, torture, executions of civilians, soldiers and prisoners of war, and acts of terror, including the use of sexual violence and mass rape as weapons of war, and they continue to alter the ethnic composition of the occupied territories of Ukraine;
C. whereas millions of Ukrainians remain displaced both inside and outside their country, having fled the violence and destruction caused by Russia’s aggression;
D. whereas in November 2024, Russia intensified its bombing campaign against Ukraine, targeting critical energy infrastructure and residential areas, including a devastating missile and drone strike on Odesa on 18 November, which killed at least 10 civilians and injured 44 others, including children; whereas these attacks have severely damaged key energy facilities, leaving millions of Ukrainians without electricity and heat as winter approaches and creating the risk of a catastrophic humanitarian crisis; whereas such deliberate attacks on civilians and critical infrastructure constitute war crimes under international law;
E. whereas on 21 November 2024, Russian forces escalated their aggression by launching an ‘Oreshnik’ medium-range, hypersonic ballistic missile at the Ukrainian city of Dnipro;
F. whereas Russia continues to escalate its nuclear rhetoric, employing it as a tool of intimidation against Ukraine and the broader international community, threatening global stability and undermining decades of efforts toward nuclear disarmament; whereas the reckless use of nuclear rhetoric not only contravenes the principles of international law but also endangers the framework of global non-proliferation treaties, including the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;
G. whereas President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, in his address to the Verkhovna Rada on 19 November 2024, presented Ukraine’s Internal Resilience Plan, comprising ten key points: unity, front, armament, money, energy, security, communities, human capital, cultural sovereignty, and heroes policy; whereas this plan is aimed at fortifying Ukraine’s defence capabilities, ensuring social and economic stability, and fostering national unity and cultural identity amid ongoing challenges;
H. whereas Russia has increased the number of its military personnel deployed in Ukraine by almost 100 000 and plans to raise the total number to 690 000 by the end of 2024;
I. whereas the US, France and the UK have lifted bans on Ukraine’s use of long-range weapons against legitimate military targets on Russian territory, recognising Ukraine’s sovereign right to self-defence and its need to counter ongoing Russian aggression, including attacks on civilian infrastructure and population centres; whereas Ukraine has already used MGM-140 Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) and Storm Shadow missiles against targets within the territory of Russia; whereas Germany, despite international calls, still uphold restrictions on using German-produced weapons, while other countries delivering weapons to Ukraine have never introduced any bans or restrictions on their use;
J. whereas the US remains by far the largest contributor of aid to Ukraine; whereas, within the EU, the largest government allocations measured as the percentage of gross domestic product have come from Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Finland and Sweden, while large economies such as Germany and France are in 17th and 23rd position respectively;
K. whereas in May 2024, the EU Member States approved the use of financial proceeds generated by immobilised Russian sovereign assets held within the EU, estimated at around EUR 210 billion, to support Ukraine, with the aim of providing up to EUR 3 billion per year in support of Ukraine’s reconstruction and resilience efforts; whereas Russia is spending almost 41 % of its total expenditure on defence and security; whereas budget revenues are still primarily supplied through oil and gas exports, with income coming increasingly from gas-derived fertilisers, an issue that has not been properly addressed by the EU or the G7;
L. whereas EU Member States continue to purchase fossil fuels and uranium from Russia, contributing to the Russian economy and bolstering its war chest; whereas sales of Russian fossil fuels to the EU since the outbreak of the full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine have exceeded EUR 200 billion, which is double that of the total funding provided to Ukraine over the same period; whereas the EU has granted an exemption for Russian crude oil imported through the Druzhba pipeline to Hungary, Slovakia and Czechia; whereas Azerbaijan’s increased Russian gas imports are a cause for concern as to whether Azerbaijan can replace Russia as a gas supplier, as Baku, unable to meet European demand, may relabel Russian gas as Azerbaijani for European consumption; whereas a shadow fleet of environmentally hazardous and uninsured Russian oil tankers is still operating in the Baltic Sea and circumventing the sanctions regime;
M. whereas Russia signed a strategic partnership treaty in June 2024 with North Korea, the most notorious totalitarian regime on the planet, which establishes a military alliance between the countries; whereas Pyongyang has entered the war on the side of Russia, having already sent – according to various estimates – between 10 000 and 15 000 military personnel to participate in it, including 500 officers and three generals;
N. whereas North Korea, in exchange for supplying ammunition and troops, receives much-needed food, oil and money from Russia, and expects to receive further assistance in developing nuclear weapons and missile technology know-how;
O. whereas both dictatorships have no regard for the value of human lives;
P. whereas Pyongyang and Moscow initially denied that North Korean troops were being sent to fight in the Russia-Ukraine conflict; whereas, to conceal their presence, North Korean soldiers were reportedly issued forged identification documents resembling those of residents from Siberia’s Yakutia and Buryatia regions;
Q. whereas, with North Korea entering the war, Putin is trying to avoid a politically unpopular general mobilisation and seeking a replacement for the almost exhausted resource of Russian prisoners and ethnic minorities of the Russian Federation;
R. whereas North Korea, whose armed forces number 1.3 million servicemen (with another 560 000 in reserve), is a significant additional source of personnel and an alternative to Russian conscripts, who have not demonstrated a high level of motivation, surrendering en masse during the Ukrainian Kursk offensive;
S. whereas North Korea’s involvement in the war helps reduce domestic political risks for Putin and lowers military personnel costs by his sending soldiers who, in exchange for basic provisions, will fight under any conditions;
T. whereas, as of the start of 2024, Pyongyang has abandoned the idea of peaceful unification with South Korea, which had been the cornerstone of North Korean ideology, further increasing global instability;
U. whereas, even at the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Russian ultra-nationalist ideologues appealed to the Government of North Korea to consider sending its troops to participate in the war, motivated, among other things, by the need to gain practical experience for a future war against the ‘Western imperialists’;
V. whereas, since 2012, Russia has been implementing a ‘besieged fortress’ strategy, isolating itself from the outside world, curtailing democracy, inciting anti-Western sentiment, militarising society, and shifting from the relatively mild authoritarianism of ‘sovereign democracy’ to the Russian analogue of North Korean Juche ideology;
1. Reiterates its strongest condemnation of Russia’s continued war of aggression against Ukraine, and the involvement of Belarus in this war, and demands that Russia immediately terminate all military activities in Ukraine, unconditionally withdraw all forces and military equipment from the entire internationally recognised territory of Ukraine and compensate Ukraine for the damage caused to its people, land, nature and infrastructure;
2. Expresses its undivided solidarity with the people of Ukraine, along with its full support for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognised borders, and underlines that this war of aggression constitutes a blatant and flagrant violation of the UN Charter and the fundamental principles of international law; reiterates its support for the commitments of the international community, including NATO, the EU and its Member States, to provide humanitarian assistance, military support, economic and financial aid and political support in every possible way until Ukraine’s victory, in order to ultimately stop Russia’s war of aggression and allow Ukraine to liberate all its people and re-establish full control within its internationally recognised borders; stresses that the ultimate goal remains to achieve a just and lasting peace in Ukraine on Ukraine’s terms, ensuring the safety and dignity of its people within a peaceful and stable Europe;
3. Urges the EU and its Member States to provide Ukraine with more long-range weapons, advanced air defence systems, including Patriots and SAMP/T, ammunition, as well as MANPADS, artillery systems and shells, electronic warfare systems in sufficient volumes, engineering equipment, drones and anti-drone capabilities;
4. Underlines the continued need for enhanced air defence cooperation, including the deployment of modern air defence systems to intercept Russian missiles and drones targeting Ukraine, ensuring protection from threats that extend into EU and NATO airspace; welcomes the commitment by a consortium of European countries, including Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway, to supply F-16 fighter jets to Ukraine and to train Ukrainian pilots, which marks a significant shift in military support for Ukraine and offers the Ukrainian Air Force a robust platform capable of performing various roles, including air superiority, ground attack and reconnaissance;
5. Urges the Member States to immediately provide Ukraine with other advanced fourth-generation aircraft, or better, as well as missiles with long-range strike capabilities such as Taurus, including means for their maintenance, in sufficient volume and without restrictions, to bolster Ukraine’s defensive efforts, strategic and operational interests, and long-term deterrence capabilities against Russian aggression;
6. Welcomes the decision by the US, French and UK authorities to lift bans on Ukraine’s use of long-range weapons against legitimate military targets on Russian territory and urges any other countries supplying such weapons to follow suit;
7. Strongly condemns Russia’s use of sexual violence, mass deportations, forced disappearances, torture and summary executions as weapons of terror, including the illegal deportation and imprisonment of Ukrainian children, and calls for those responsible to be held accountable through international mechanisms;
8. Denounces Russia’s reckless escalation of nuclear rhetoric, which violates international law, undermines global non-proliferation frameworks and threatens international stability, while urging all states to reject the normalisation of nuclear intimidation;
9. Supports Ukraine’s Internal Resilience Plan, as presented by President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, which outlines 10 strategic pillars to bolster the nation’s defence, economic stability and social resilience, and calls for the EU and its Member States to provide targeted support for the implementation of this plan (as well as the Victory Plan);
10. Reiterates the EU’s commitment to Ukraine’s European integration, emphasising that Ukraine’s resilience in defending its sovereignty and values aligns with the principles of democracy, the rule of law and human rights, which are central to the EU;
11. Recalls that Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine is part of a broader set of objectives against the West, the rules-based international order and its democracy, security, interests and values, as openly declared by Putin in the weeks preceding the full-scale invasion; reiterates its belief that Ukraine is on an irreversible path to EU and NATO membership; underlines that a lack of more decisive and substantial military aid from the West will only encourage Russia to continue its aggression; notes that Russia’s aggression has clearly shown that NATO has the role of primary guarantor of European security; underlines that, following Sweden’s and Finland’s accession, only four EU Members are not NATO allies, namely Ireland, Cyprus, Malta and Austria;
12. Reiterates its firm conviction that Russia must provide financial compensation for the massive damage it has caused in Ukraine; welcomes, therefore, the Council’s recent decision to direct extraordinary revenues stemming from immobilised Russian assets to support the Ukrainian war effort; welcomes, further, the G7 decision to offer Ukraine a USD 50 billion loan secured through immobilised Russian state assets; calls for the EU, together with like-minded partners, to establish a sound legal regime for the confiscation of Russian state-owned assets frozen by the EU; calls, likewise, for a mechanism to be established to compel Russia to pay long-term reparations to Ukraine;
13. Calls on the Council to maintain and extend its sanctions policy against Russia and Belarus, while monitoring, reviewing and enhancing its effectiveness and impact; calls on the Council to systematically tackle the issue of sanctions circumvention by EU-based companies, third parties and non-EU countries, and to adopt and strictly implement restrictive measures against all entities facilitating the circumvention of sanctions and providing the Russian military complex with military and dual-use technologies and equipment; underlines the need to prevent critical components produced in EU countries from reaching the Russian military industry; considers it essential to strengthen controls on the export and maintenance of high-tech equipment produced in the EU, as well as to increase law enforcement measures and cooperation to prevent sanctions circumvention; invites the Council and the Member States to address, in particular, the issue of western-designed components being used in Russian weapons; calls for further limitations on Russian citizens accessing the EU, especially through more stringent security screenings, including the presentation of military service records during the Schengen visa application process;
14. Calls for further sanctions against sectors of special economic importance for Russia (the metallurgical, nuclear, chemical and agricultural sectors), Russian raw materials such as aluminium, steel products, uranium, titanium and nickel, as well as a full liquefied natural gas embargo and sanctions against Gazprom and Russian oil companies; underlines the need to cease any cooperation with Russia in the nuclear energy sector; highlights that Russia is shifting from reliance on gas exports to gas-derived fertilisers, which provide a major source of revenue and foreign currency earnings for the Russian state, directly fuelling its war machine, while simultaneously compromising EU economies and threatening food security; calls for the EU to address this challenge properly and urgently and with strong, decisive actions;
15. Underlines that there can be no impunity for the crime of aggression and that the instigators and perpetrators of the war of aggression against Ukraine – the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, the President of Belarus, Aliaksandr Lukashenka, the Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation, Sergey Lavrov, the former Minister of Defence of the Russian Federation, Sergei Shoigu, and the current Minister of Defence of the Russian Federation, Andrey Belousov – as well as all those involved in the planning, preparation, initiation or waging of the war against Ukraine, should be brought to international justice and are not entitled to personal immunity; calls for sanctions also to be applied to those countries that willingly fuel the Russian war machine, supply equipment and ammunition to the aggressor or facilitate the circumvention of sanctions;
16. Condemns the continuous military support provided to Russia by Iran, including transfers of ballistic missiles, and calls for strengthening restrictive measures against Iran and all those involved in the Iranian missile programme;
17. Strongly condemns the increasing military collaboration between North Korea and Russia, and considers the deployment of North Korean troops, along with millions of artillery shells, KN-23 ballistic missiles, and thousands of special forces troops from the 11th Corps of the Korean People’s Army to the Ukrainian front, to be a violation of several UN Security Council resolutions, all contributing to Russia’s aggression;
18. Highlights that the deepening of military-technical cooperation between Russia, North Korea and Iran poses grave security threats, not only for Ukraine and Europe, but also for the Korean Peninsula and the Middle East;
19. Considers the participation of North Korean servicemen in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as the internationalisation of the war and its expansion beyond the borders of the two states;
20. Considers the new military alliance of autocracies to be a serious challenge to the rules-based international order, which requires a strong and clear response from the Western world; calls for closer cooperation with like-minded countries, in particular the US, Japan and South Korea, in order to increase assistance to Ukraine and tighten sanctions against both notorious regimes in Moscow and Pyongyang, and to re-evaluate their strategic postures, including North Korea’s access to Russian military technology;
21. Calls for closer cooperation with allies, particularly Japan and South Korea, and emphasises the need for greater dialogue with like-minded partners in the Indo-Pacific;
22. Urges China to put pressure on North Korea to pull back its troops, given North Korea’s dependency on China;
23. Notes with concern that Russia is actively recruiting individuals from distant regions, including Africa, the Middle East and Latin America, using deception or coercion, in order to send them to fight in the war against the people of Ukraine; calls on the UN, the African Union, as well as countries whose populations are targeted by Moscow, to take active measures to counter this recruitment;
24. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the President, Government and Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, the United Nations, the US Government and Congress, NATO, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the African Union and China.
- [1] Texts adopted, P10_TA(2024)0012.
- [2] OJ L, 2024/792, 29.2.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/792/oj.