Motion for a resolution - B10-0077/2025Motion for a resolution
B10-0077/2025

MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on Russia’s disinformation and historical falsification to justify its war of aggression against Ukraine

20.1.2025 - (2024/2988(RSP))

to wind up the debate on the statement by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
pursuant to Rule 136(2) of the Rules of Procedure

Bernard Guetta, Petras Auštrevičius, Malik Azmani, Dan Barna, Olivier Chastel, Karin Karlsbro, Ľubica Karvašová, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Michał Kobosko, Jan‑Christoph Oetjen, Urmas Paet, Marie‑Agnes Strack‑Zimmermann, Eugen Tomac, Hilde Vautmans, Sophie Wilmès, Lucia Yar, Dainius Žalimas
on behalf of the Renew Group

See also joint motion for a resolution RC-B10-0074/2025

Procedure : 2024/2988(RSP)
Document stages in plenary
Document selected :  
B10-0077/2025
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B10-0077/2025
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Texts adopted :

B10‑0077/2025

European Parliament resolution on Russia’s disinformation and historical falsification to justify its war of aggression against Ukraine

(2024/2988(RSP))

The European Parliament,

 having regard to its previous resolutions on Russia and Ukraine,

 having regard to its previous resolutions on historical remembrance,

 having regard to its declaration of 23 September 2008 on the proclamation of 23 August as European Day of Remembrance for Victims of Stalinism and Nazism[1],

 having regard to Resolution 1481 of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe of 26 January 2006 on the need for international condemnation of crimes of totalitarian communist regimes,

 having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas Russia systematically uses disinformation and historical falsification to justify its illegal war of aggression against Ukraine;

B. whereas the Kremlin manipulates historical narratives to incite imperial nostalgia, legitimise aggression and deny the sovereignty of Ukraine and other neighbouring states;

C. whereas the ‘Russkiy mir’, or ‘Russian world’, political doctrine, reinforced by the established structures, is used to promote the Russian world view, to expand Russia’s domination in neighbouring countries and worldwide, and to justify its war of aggression against Ukraine;

D. whereas, shortly after February 2022, Russian state propaganda began focusing on indoctrinating Russian schoolchildren by producing rewritten history textbooks in which the war of aggression is presented as a ‘mission to liberate Ukraine’, with no mention of atrocities committed by the Russian military; whereas, furthermore, basic military training has been reintroduced in secondary schools and teachers who oppose state propaganda and provide objective information about the war in Ukraine are subject to criminal investigation;

E. whereas Russian state propaganda portrays the Soviet Union’s actions during World War II solely as liberation efforts, while disregarding its collaboration with Nazi Germany through the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and its secret protocols, which enabled the division of Europe and was the last step towards the outbreak of the war, and downplaying the atrocities committed by the Soviet forces, including mass deportations, executions, mass rapes and repression in occupied territories; whereas Poland was one of the primary victims of this collaboration, suffering the Katyn massacre, the forced deportation of hundreds of thousands of Poles to Siberia, crimes committed during the incursion of the Red Army into Upper Silesia in 1945, known as the Upper Silesian Tragedy, and widespread repression and terror aimed at destroying Polish identity; whereas this demonstrates that Russia is repeating history, with Ukraine now being the victim of Russian aggression;

F. whereas Russia has failed to acknowledge its role in starting World War II and to assume its responsibility for atrocities committed in territories occupied by the Soviet Union; whereas, contrary to the crimes committed by the Nazi regime, the crimes committed by communist dictatorships in Europe in the 20th century have not been the subject of a full international legal and political assessment and condemnation and this has contributed to the instrumentalisation of history under Putin’s rule in Russia;

G. whereas 2025 marks the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II; whereas the Russian Federation, as the state claiming to continue the international legal personality of the USSR, is attempting to monopolise the victory over Nazism and has created a cult of ‘victory’ to ideologically mobilise Russians to continue the aggressive war against Ukraine;

H. whereas Putin’s regime manipulates history to foster loyalty among the Russian population by glorifying the Soviet Union, falsifying the history of Russia and Ukraine, and rejecting past Russian efforts to acknowledge Stalinist crimes;

I. whereas Russia’s celebration of Victory Day on 9 May, one day later than Western allies’ celebration of it, carries with it strong propaganda of liberation, which completely ignores the occupation of the Baltic states that lasted until the 1990s;

J. whereas Russian state-controlled media and official rhetoric propagate false claims about the causes of the war in Ukraine, including by accusing Ukraine and its leadership of Nazism; whereas similar accusations have been made against the EU Member States that have strongly supported Ukraine, as well as accusing them of being Russophobic;

K. whereas the Kremlin denies Ukraine’s distinct national identity, falsely claiming it as part of the ‘Russian world’ (‘Russkiy mir’), a narrative rooted in imperialistic ideology; whereas Russia is demolishing Holodomor memorials and restoring decommunised monuments to Lenin in the occupied territories of Ukraine;

L. whereas the Russian Federation has enacted legislation criminalising the truthful portrayal of Soviet and Russian crimes, targeting historians, journalists and civil society actors who challenge official narratives or investigate past and present crimes; whereas Russia obstructs historical research by denying access to Soviet archives and persecuting those who seek to reveal crimes committed by the Soviet Union or the current Russian regime; whereas throughout history, Russia has repeatedly distorted historical facts to serve its political agenda, as exemplified by its long-standing denial of responsibility for the Katyn massacre, where thousands of Polish officers, intellectuals and elites were systematically executed by the NKVD (Soviet secret police) in 1940 – a crime falsely attributed to Germany for decades by Soviet propaganda; whereas the Nobel Peace Prize laureate, Memorial, is among the targeted and dissolved organisations that examined, documented and exposed Soviet crimes and human rights violations in Russia;

M. whereas Russian disinformation campaigns actively seek to exploit divisions within European societies by spreading false historical narratives, particularly regarding NATO’s role and the accession of new members, the US, EU enlargement and Western support for Ukraine;

N. whereas disinformation and historical falsifications are integral to Russia’s hybrid warfare strategy aimed at undermining European unity and democracy; whereas the distortion of history and disinformation campaigns pose a threat to historical truth, democratic values and peace in Europe;

O. whereas Russia continues to claim an exclusive sphere of influence over neighbouring states; whereas Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine was preceded by demands for the US and NATO to recognise its exclusive interests in Ukraine, Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus and Central Asia;

P. whereas Russia has on several occasions threatened EU and NATO countries with military and nuclear aggression, particularly the territorial integrity of the Baltic states, carried out attacks on individuals on EU soil and launched hybrid operations targeting EU Member States and democratic institutions;

Q. whereas in some Member States, communist and Nazi ideologies and symbols, as well as the symbols of Russia’s ongoing aggression, are prohibited by law;

1. Reiterates its condemnation of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, its occupation and attempted annexation of Ukrainian territory, the war crimes and crimes against humanity committed during this aggression and the Kremlin’s policy of denial of Ukrainian national identity, including forced passportisation in occupied territories and the abduction of Ukrainian children in order to erase their family history and cultural identity;

2. Denounces Russia’s systematic falsification and distortion of history to justify its war of aggression against Ukraine, promote imperial nostalgia among the Russian population and secure support for its actions internationally, and destabilise the EU; highlights the Kremlin’s efforts to erase Ukraine’s cultural and historical identity, including the destruction of monuments, archives and religious sites in occupied territories, and stresses the importance of documenting these acts;

3. Condemns the Kremlin’s nationalist ideology and policies, which foreground Russia’s military aggression, promote imperial nostalgia and threaten European security; stresses their incompatibility with international law and firmly rejects the practices of and claims to establishing zones of exclusive interest at the expense of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of other states;

4. Denounces the Putin regime’s glorification of Stalinist totalitarianism and the falsification of historical events, including attempts to justify the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and refusal to acknowledge the Soviet Union’s responsibility for the outbreak of World War II and for Soviet-era crimes such as the Holodomor, the Great Terror and mass deportations;

5. Condemns the suppression of independent historical research and the denial of access for EU citizens to the gravesites of forcibly deported relatives and to Soviet archives; condemns further the persecution of civil society organisations investigating Soviet crimes or the crimes of the current regime, including the liquidation of the International Memorial, the Memorial Human Rights Centre and the Moscow Helsinki Group, as well as forcing the Sakharov Center to cease its work;

6. Condemns Russia’s use of disinformation, propaganda and hybrid influence technologies to destabilise the EU and justify its aggression against Ukraine and neighbouring states; condemns Russia’s attempts to use disinformation to undermine support for Ukraine and weaken international solidarity against its aggression;

7. Categorically rejects, in particular, Putin’s false claim that Ukraine committed ‘genocide’ against the Russian-speaking population of the Donbas region, resulting in over 14 000 civilian casualties, which is used to justify Russia’s open military aggression against Ukraine;

8. Categorically rejects the Kremlin’s false narrative equating Ukraine’s democratic government with Nazism, which aims to delegitimise Ukraine’s sovereignty and independence;

9. Calls for enhanced coordination among the EU institutions, the Member States and international partners to counter Russia’s disinformation campaigns and prevent the spread of false historical narratives; calls for the EU to intensify research on hybrid influence technologies used by Russia and urges the EU institutions and Member States to oppose the spread of Russian-style foreign agent legislation in Europe, which is being used to crack down on media, academics and civil society essential for exposing Kremlin disinformation;

10. Urges the EU to promptly and rigorously apply existing legislative tools when cases of disinformation are suspected or confirmed, particularly when the integrity of elections is at risk of being influenced; calls on the Commission to include in its annual rule of law report a specific subsection on the protective measures implemented against disinformation, especially on online platforms;

11. Calls for the EU and its Member States to support initiatives exposing and countering Russia’s historical falsifications through EU-funded research projects and cross-border educational programmes; calls for support for Russian civil society organisations such as Memorial and Radio Sakharov so that they can continue their important work in this regard; underlines that confronting historical falsifications is essential to preserving European unity, defending democracy, the rule of law and ensuring lasting peace in Europe;

12. Calls for an effective education and information campaign rejecting the celebration of 9 May as a day of liberation and victory, and calls on the leadership of the Member States to refuse any participation in such celebrations;

13. Reiterates the importance of integrating education on the crimes of Nazi and communist regimes into school curricula across all EU Member States; encourages the Member States to integrate media literacy and critical thinking skills into education curricula in order to counter disinformation and promote democratic resilience;

14. Calls for the establishment of a special international tribunal to prosecute the crime of aggression against Ukraine and supports the International Criminal Court’s efforts to prosecute war crimes and crimes against humanity; regrets instances of non-cooperation with the International Criminal Court in executing arrest warrants;

15. Regrets the continued use of symbols of totalitarian regimes in public spaces and calls for an EU-wide ban on both Nazi and Soviet communist symbols, and symbols of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine; expresses its support for building a pan-European memorial for the victims of 20th century totalitarian regimes in Brussels;

16. Commends legislative, civil society and academic efforts to raise awareness of totalitarian crimes, especially those committed by Nazi and communist regimes, as well as Russian-made symbols, particularly in relation to its aggression against Ukraine, and its national symbols at public events; encourages further research into Eastern European and Russian history and culture;

17. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the relevant EU institutions, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the Council of Europe and the Russian authorities.

 

 

Last updated: 21 January 2025
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