MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the escalation of violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo
10.2.2025 - (2025/2553(RSP))
pursuant to Rule 136(2) of the Rules of Procedure
Marc Botenga, Rudi Kennes
on behalf of The Left Group
See also joint motion for a resolution RC-B10-0102/2025
B10‑0102/2025
European Parliament resolution on the escalation of violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo
The European Parliament,
– having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and to other UN human rights treaties and instruments,
– having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
– having regard to the UN Charter, the Hague conventions and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,
– having regard to the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949 and the additional protocols thereto,
– having regard to the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women of 18 December 1979),
– having regard to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child of 20 November 1989,
– having regard to the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the region, signed in Addis Ababa on 24 February 2013,
– having regard to UN Security Council Resolution 2738 (2024) of 27 June 2024 on renewal of measures on arms embargo against the Democratic Republic of the Congo imposed by Security Council resolution 2293 (2016) and extension of the mandate of the Group of Experts Established pursuant to Resolution 1533 (2004) until 1 Aug. 2025,
– having regard to the UN Security Council Midterm report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, submitted in accordance with paragraph 6 of UN Security Council Resolution 2738 (2024), of 27 December 2024,
– having regard to the UN Security Council press statement on the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo of 26 January 2025,
– having regard to the statement of UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk on the human rights situation in the east of the Democratic Republic of the Congo of 7 February 2025,
– having regard to the Nairobi Process, launched in April 2022, aimed at facilitating a peaceful solution to the conflict in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) through inclusive dialogue and negotiations,
– having regard to the Luanda Process, launched in July 2022, aimed at finding peace between the DRC and Rwanda under Angolese mediation,
– having regard to the conclusions of the Joint Summit of the Heads of State and Government of the East African Community (EAC) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) of 8 February 2025,
– having regard to the Social Pact for Peace and Living Well Together in the DRC and the Great Lakes Region, launched by the Catholic and Protestant churches of the DRC,
– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,
A. whereas the advance, since 2022, of the March 23 Movement (M23) rebel group, in cooperation with the politico-military Alliance Fleuve Congo, has led to the occupation of large parts of the province of North Kivu, and they are presently advancing towards Bukavu, the capital of South Kivu;
B. whereas, by 30 January 2025, the M23 rebels had taken the city of Goma, capital of North Kivu, and at least 3 000 people had been killed in the city’s streets; whereas the present situation causes a humanitarian crisis and the M23 group has in the past been accused of various and numerous war crimes, including the use of rape as a weapon of war;
C. whereas this is the fifth wave of war that has destabilised the DRC since the 1997 fall of Mobutu Sese Seko – following, specifically: 1) the five-year occupation (1998–2003) of large parts of the DRC by the armies of Rwanda and Uganda, 2) the occupation of Bukavu (May–June 2004) by the rebels led by Jules Mutebutsi and Laurent Nkunda, 3) the attack on Goma (October 2008) by the National Congress for the Defence of the People, 4) the occupation of Goma by M23 in November 2012;
D. whereas three decades of systematic interference and destabilisation of the region have claimed millions of lives, as well as causing the forcible displacement of 7 million people within the DRC;
E. whereas on 21 January 2025, the UN reported 52 cases of rape since the resurgence of the open conflict;
F. whereas several soldiers from the UN peacekeeping mission in the DRC (MONUSCO), the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the SADC Mission in the DRC (SAMIDRC) have lost their lives in the conflict against the Rwanda-backed M23;
G. whereas peace, stability and sustainable economic progress in Africa are impossible without peace and stability in the DRC;
H. whereas the 80 million hectares of agricultural land available in the DRC could feed approximately two billion people, but as a result of the ongoing war, many Congolese people now go hungry;
I. whereas a report by the UN Group of Experts on the DRC dated 12 October 2012 already noted that ‘the Government of Rwanda continues to violate the arms embargo by providing direct military support to the M23 rebels, facilitating recruitment, encouraging and facilitating desertions from the armed forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and providing arms, ammunition, intelligence and political advice’ and that ‘the.de facto chain of command of M23 includes Gen. Bosco Ntaganda and culminates with the Minister of Defence of Rwanda, Gen. James Kabarebe’;
J. whereas following its military defeat in 2013, M23 signed a pledge on 12 December 2013 to renounce the rebellion and transform itself into a political party; whereas in 2017, however, several hundred armed members of M23 surreptitiously returned from Rwanda and Uganda to Congolese territory, and from June 2022 they launched an intense offensive in North Kivu after capturing the border town of Bunagana;
K. whereas no fewer than six reports by the UN Group of Experts on the DRC were published between 2022 and 2024 with detailed information about the support from Rwanda to M23 of more than 4 000 soldiers, armoured vehicles, drones, surface-to-air missiles and equipment;
L. whereas despite three decades of destabilisation, violations of international law including of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the DRC, the EU and the United States continue to treat Rwanda as a privileged partner, fostering military and trade cooperation as well as ensuring high amounts of foreign aid;
M. whereas the Rwandan Government claims that the root cause of the M23 rebellion is the continued presence in the eastern DRC of the remnants of the genocidal forces of 1994, the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), and discrimination against Tutsis in the DRC;
N. whereas although experts highlight that hate speech and violence against the Congolese Tutsi community are real and need to be dealt with firmly, they have found little evidence of either a sudden increase in such violence or of an imminent threat to Rwanda from the FDLR just before the re-emergence of M23 in November 2021;
O. whereas the DRC is rich in natural resources, and notably possesses up to 60 % of the world’s cobalt reserves and 60 to 80 % of the world’s coltan reserves, and the World Bank has described the DRC as potentially one of the richest economies on the continent and an engine of economic growth in Africa;
P. whereas the Congolese rainforest is the second-largest tropical rainforest in the world after the Amazon rainforest, and is of crucial importance due to its unique biodiversity, its role in global carbon storage and its influence on the climate;
Q. whereas the Commission has repeatedly emphasised the importance of securing access to African critical raw materials in order to support Europe’s green transition, reflecting an EU strategy to ensure a sustainable and diversified supply of essential minerals, crucial for EU multinational corporations;
R. whereas under the EU’s Global Gateway initiative, Rwanda is set to receive over EUR 900 million in investment, part of which will be allocated to initiatives on critical raw materials;
S. whereas already in April 2022, non-governmental organisation Global Witness quoted mining industry sources estimating that smuggled minerals account for up to 90 % of certain minerals, like tantalum, exported from Rwanda;
T. whereas since the re-emergence of M23, the UN Group of Experts on the DRC noted, in their letter to the President of the UN Security Council of 31 May 2024, an unprecedented rise in coltan exports recorded by Rwanda, including a 50 % increase from 2022 to 2023;
U. whereas consequently, Rwanda exported more coltan than the DRC in 2023;
V. whereas nevertheless on 19 February 2024 the Commission announced that it had concluded a Memorandum of Understanding on Sustainable Raw Materials Value Chains with the Government of Rwanda, with the objective of ensuring a sustainable supply of raw materials for the EU and to mobilise ‘funding for deployment of infrastructure required for the development of raw material value chains’;
W. whereas approximately two months after the conclusion of the Memorandum of Understanding, M23 rebels occupied the largest coltan mine in the Great Lakes region in Rubaya;
X. whereas the UN Group of Experts on the DRC observed, in their mid-term report of 27 December 2024, that M23 has established ‘a parallel administration controlling mining activities, trade, transport and the taxation of minerals produced’ and that ‘at least 150 tons of coltan’ were fraudulently exported to Rwanda monthly and mixed with Rwandan production, leading to the largest contamination of mineral supply chains with ineligible ‘3T’ minerals – tin, tantalum and tungsten – recorded in the Great Lakes region;
Y. whereas equally, in February 2024, the Government of Poland concluded controversial agreements on the provision of advanced military technology, including military drones and anti-drone systems, to Rwanda in an apparent violation of the criteria laid down in the Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008 defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment;
Z. whereas the Rwandan Defence Force (RDF) has so far obtained EUR 40 million from the European Peace Facility supporting its deployment in Mozambique, notwithstanding allegations of the involvement of the RDF in violations of international law and human rights, and notwithstanding concerns that this money may be used to wage war in the DRC or to reinforce RDF capacities to do so, as part of the money finances the purchase of equipment;
AA. whereas recent developments and the presence of Rwandan soldiers in DRC territory seems to indicate that international support for, and cooperation with, the Rwandan armed forces and the government have encouraged Rwandan involvement in the plunder of the DRC’s critical raw materials;
AB. whereas without foreign support, Rwanda would lack the military and economic power to durably destabilise the DRC;
AC. whereas the current crisis therefore needs to be seen as part of a long series of attempts by foreign powers, including the United States and European countries, to lay their hands on the strategic resources of the region at the behest of their multinational corporations and geostrategic interests;
AD. whereas sustainable peace and stability in the region will be brought about by the African countries and peoples themselves, including the involvement of regional organisations; whereas the Catholic and Protestant Churches of the DRC have launched an initiative called the ‘Social Pact for Peace and Living Well Together in the DRC and the Great Lakes Region’, which aims to bring peace to the region; whereas regional organisations are setting up processes such as the Luanda Process, the Nairobi Process and the roadmap proposed at the recent SADC-EAC Summit;
1. Strongly condemns the ongoing violations of international law, international humanitarian law and human rights by M23 and the RDF in the eastern provinces of the DRC;
2. Expresses its full solidarity with the people in the DRC, especially in the North Kivu and South Kivu provinces, suffering from the ongoing violations;
3. Reiterates its support for the principles of the UN Charter including respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, which are principles of international law applicable everywhere and must be respected by all;
4. Urges Rwanda to immediately withdraw all its forces from the DRC and stop supporting the M23 rebels; calls for a halt to EU imports of minerals labelled as of Rwandan origin, until the RDF and M23 withdraw from DRC territory;
5. Reiterates that peace, stability and economic progress in the DRC is not only of crucial importance to the Congolese people, but to all peoples in Africa and the world; recalls that the first victims of conflict are women and girls, victims of rape and sexual violence as weapons of war;
6. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to deliver on commitments in regard to the security and safety of internally displaced people in the DRC, including their access to healthcare and basic services in a rapidly deteriorating situation;
7. Calls for the EU-Rwanda Memorandum of Understanding on Sustainable Raw Materials Value Chains to be rescinded immediately, as well as for all military cooperation with Rwanda to be halted, including through the European Peace Facility, until Rwanda ends its illegal support of armed groups and fully respects the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the DRC;
8. Calls for a reassessment of planned investments in critical raw materials under the EU’s Global Gateway to ensure that these does not contribute to or facilitate the plunder of natural resources from the DRC;
9. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to fully support national and regional initiatives, such as the initiative of the Congolese Catholic and Protestant churches and the Luanda Process;
10. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to work on investment strategies with the DRC that empower both the country and its people to tackle current challenges and to foster peace, infrastructure, education and self-determination;
11. Calls on the Commission to rethink its investment initiatives in the Global South, developing an approach that is responsible, transparent and focused on addressing the region’s challenges rather than focusing on the interests of EU multinational corporations;
12. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to reinforce their support of UN-led or UN-backed initiatives promoting the transparency of global supply chains, as well as supporting countries in harnessing their extractive industries for a people-centred and sustainable development process;
13. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the European External Action Service, the African Union, the ACP-EU Council of Ministers, the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Government and Parliament of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Government and Parliament of Rwanda.