MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the Commission delegated regulation of 10 June 2025 amending Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/1675 to add Algeria, Angola, Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, Laos, Lebanon, Monaco, Namibia, Nepal and Venezuela to the list of high-risk third countries which have provided a written high-level political commitment to address the identified deficiencies and have developed an action plan with the FATF, and to remove Barbados, Gibraltar, Jamaica, Panama, the Philippines, Senegal, Uganda and the United Arab Emirates from that list
2.7.2025 - (C(2025)3815) – 2025/2740(DEA))
Rasmus Andresen, Kira Marie Peter‑Hansen
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group
Murielle Laurent, Brando Benifei, Kathleen Van Brempt, Francisco Assis, Raphaël Glucksmann, Aurore Lalucq, Cecilia Strada, Christophe Clergeau, Eric Sargiacomo, Nora Mebarek, Chloé Ridel, Claire Fita, Thomas Pellerin‑Carlin, Birgit Sippel, Gabriele Bischoff, Lucia Annunziata, Sandro Ruotolo, Emma Rafowicz, Pina Picierno, Alessandra Moretti, Pierre Jouvet, Annalisa Corrado, Evelyn Regner, Jean‑Marc Germain, Marco Tarquinio, Udo Bullmann, Alessandro Zan
B10‑0315/2025
European Parliament resolution on the Commission delegated regulation of 10 June 2025 amending Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/1675 to add Algeria, Angola, Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, Laos, Lebanon, Monaco, Namibia, Nepal and Venezuela to the list of high-risk third countries which have provided a written high-level political commitment to address the identified deficiencies and have developed an action plan with the FATF, and to remove Barbados, Gibraltar, Jamaica, Panama, the Philippines, Senegal, Uganda and the United Arab Emirates from that list
(C(2025)3815) – 2025/2740(DEA))
The European Parliament,
– having regard to the Commission delegated regulation (C(2025)3815),
– having regard to Article 290 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
– having regard to Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Commission Directive 2006/70/EC[1], in particular Article 9(2) and Article 64(5) thereof,
– having regard to Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/1675 of 14 July 2016 supplementing Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council by identifying high-risk third countries with strategic deficiencies[2], in particular the Annex thereto,
– having regard to Rule 114(3) of its Rules of Procedure,
A. whereas Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/1675, the Annex thereto and the amending Commission delegated regulation of 10 June 2025 identify high-risk third countries with strategic deficiencies as regards anti-money laundering and countering terrorist financing (AML/CTF) which represent a threat for the Union financial system and for which enhanced customer due diligence measures are to be applied by Union obliged entities under Directive (EU) 2015/849;
B. whereas, according to the 2020 methodology for identifying high-risk third countries under Directive (EU) 2015/849, set out in the Commission Staff Working Document of 7 May 2020 (the ‘2020 methodology’), the Commission can largely rely on the assessments of third countries carried out by international bodies, such as the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), since the assessment by the FATF follows due process based on objective criteria and the specific thresholds for being listed permit identification of countries presenting very material and profound strategic deficiencies; whereas, in principle, any third country representing a risk to the international financial system, as identified by the FATF, is presumed to represent a risk to the internal market;
C. whereas the Commission’s assessment is, however, an autonomous process which has to be carried out in a comprehensive and unbiased manner, assessing all third countries based on the same criteria that are set out in Article 9(2) of Directive (EU) 2015/849;
D. whereas Parliament expects the Commission to conduct its own assessment attending to the specific vulnerabilities of the internal market and not to rely solely on the assessments conducted by the FATF;
E. whereas, under the 2020 methodology, once a third country is delisted by the FATF, that third country is retained on the Union list of high-risk third countries until it has been established that that third country meets the Union criteria for removal; whereas that autonomous process implies that the delisting by the Union entails concrete assurances that that third country no longer poses a high risk to the integrity of the Union internal market specifically; whereas the thoroughness of the Commission’s assessment should be commensurate with the deficiencies identified, on the one hand, and the degree of exposure of the internal market to the third country in particular, on the other;
F. whereas the violation of Union restrictive measures is a predicate offence under Directive (EU) 2024/1226[3];
G. whereas the United Arab Emirates (UAE) is a major global trading and financial hub, plays an increased geopolitical role, and is an important economic partner of the Union; whereas the Union and the UAE have launched free trade talks with the goal of signing a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement, with the prospect of intensifying trade, investment and financial relationship that would increase the exposure of the Union internal market to the UAE;
H. whereas the UAE has made significant improvements to its anti-money laundering legal framework and, on 23 February 2024, the FATF removed the UAE from its list of countries under enhanced monitoring, citing significant progress by the UAE in improving its AML/CFT regime;
I. whereas the Commission and the UAE have jointly engaged in different rounds of ‘Structural Dialogues on Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT)’, which led to the adoption of a list of joint commitments in the field of cooperation in judicial and law enforcement matters on 16 April 2025;
J. whereas the UAE has committed to implementing a list of measures to further improve judicial and law enforcement cooperation, notably by improving the cooperation with Member States, the European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation (Eurojust), the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO); whereas the written agreement between the UAE and the Commission, while providing a positive advancement in cooperation in dialogue, does not contain specific Union benchmarks that the UAE must fulfil in order to be delisted; whereas this list of commitments remains vague, in particular on the exchange of information between competent authorities on suspicious cash declarations, real estate or beneficial ownership; whereas this list of commitments does not address the gold trade in UAE and its potential exposure to conflict zones; whereas it is unclear how the Commission would be able to monitor progress on the list of commitments by UAE and what action it could take in the case of non-compliance;
K. whereas the Commission has not provided concrete evidence that the recent UAE reforms have been effectively implemented and translated into major progress in the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing activities; whereas major loopholes in the UAE money-laundering framework remains, notably regarding the lack of public access to the real estate register and the weak beneficial ownership requirements; whereas although the UAE has introduced a beneficial ownership register, major loopholes remain as companies in financial free zones such as the Abu Dhabi Global Market and the Dubai International Financial Centre are exempted and the register remains hardly accessible to third parties;
L. whereas recent media and civil society organisations (CSOs) reports showed that the UAE remains a major hub for illicit financial flows and that reforms made so far by the UAE have been insufficient taking into account the risks identified in the real estate sector; whereas structural loopholes highlighted, among others, by ‘The Dubai Unlocked investigations’, released in May 2024, continue to make the UAE an attractive destination for criminals and a major hub for illicit financial flows, with 200 people, including alleged criminals, fugitives, political figures, and sanctioned individuals, owning more than 1,000 properties in Dubai;
M. whereas the Commission has not provided concrete figures on the number of extraditions requested by Member States to the UAE and the number of extraditions effectively carried out and has only be able to communicate on one case to the Parliament, showing that although there is progress, extraditions carried out by the UAE remain the exception rather than the rule; whereas there are credible indications that the UAE still lacks sufficient efforts in addressing, or even facilitates the evasion of, sanctions imposed on Russia, following Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine, including through offering a safe haven for persons subjected to targeted financial sanctions;
N. whereas a report by the UN Panel of Experts on the Sudan S/2024/65 of 15 January 2024 alleged that entities based in the UAE play a role in laundering proceeds from conflict zones such as from Sudan’s gold mines; whereas the mandate for the Panel has been renewed in 2025; whereas, in 2023, the UAE was reported to have imported 17 tons of gold from Sudan, with a value in excess of USD 1 billion; whereas the Central Bank of Sudan reported that in 2024 almost 97 % of official gold exports (from areas held by the Sudanese Armed Forces) were to the UAE, earning USD 1,52 billion; whereas a study from SwissAid claims that, between 2012 and 2022, 2596 tons of gold not declared for export were imported from Africa to the UAE; whereas the Commission claims to be closely following developments in the UAE regarding the measures taken to tackle risks of money laundering through the gold trade;
O. whereas Parliament acknowledges and welcomes the clear improvements in the AML/CFT framework in the UAE; whereas those improvements have accelerated since last year, in particular regarding the political willingness to improve the cooperation and exchange of information between competent authorities, but those may, however, not be sufficient to ensure that the delisting of UAE from the Union’s list of high-risk third countries would not threaten the integrity of the Union financial market; whereas a more thorough assessment of the risks and effective reforms carried out by the UAE is required before delisting the country; whereas additional Union benchmarks – as used by the Commission with regards to other jurisdictions – should be applied before delisting the UAE;
P. whereas, following the Russian full-scale invasion over Ukraine, there have been discussions regarding listing Russia in the FATF; whereas, in 2023, the FATF took the unprecedented step of suspending Russia’s membership; whereas, in 2024, the FATF expressed its concerns regarding the growing financial connectivity between Russia and jurisdictions subject to FATF countermeasures, risks of proliferation financing, and malicious cyber activities and ransomware attacks’; whereas since the beginning of the war against Ukraine, there has been no meaningful cooperation with Russian competent authorities;
Q. whereas Parliament deplores that, despite substantial evidence of the strategic deficiencies of the Russian AML/CTF framework and reported endemic levels of corruption and state-embedded organised crime in Russia, the Commission has still not decided to put Russia on the list; while a significant part of the Russian financial sector is subject to Union financial sanctions;
R. whereas the Commission has decided to bundle countries to be listed and unlisted in a single delegated act; whereas that approach prevents the Parliament from assessing each country on its own merits and implies that some countries would be unfairly affected by a rejection of the delegated act; whereas Parliament recommends to the Commission to consider the option of, instead of putting forward delegated actions amending Regulation (EU) 2016/1675 by listing/delisting several countries ‘en bloc’, changing towards a country-by-country approach for the future updates of the list;
1. Objects to the Commission delegated regulation;
2. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission and to notify it that the delegated regulation cannot enter into force;
3. Calls on the Commission to submit a new delegated act which takes account of the concerns set out above;
4. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and to the governments and parliaments of the Member States.
- [1] OJ L 141, 5.6.2015, p. 73. ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2015/849/oj
- [2] OJ L 254, 20.9.2016, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_del/2016/1675/oj
- [3]OJ L, 2024/1226, 29.4.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1226/oj