MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the Commission delegated regulation of 10 June 2025 amending Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/1675 to add Algeria, Angola, Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, Laos, Lebanon, Monaco, Namibia, Nepal and Venezuela to the list of high-risk third countries which have provided a written high-level political commitment to address the identified deficiencies and have developed an action plan with the FATF, and to remove Barbados, Gibraltar, Jamaica, Panama, the Philippines, Senegal, Uganda and the United Arab Emirates from that list
2.7.2025 - (C(2025)03815 – 2025/2740(DEA))
Damien Carême, Jussi Saramo
on behalf of The Left Group
B10‑0316/2025
European Parliament resolution on the Commission delegated regulation of 10 June 2025 amending Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/1675 to add Algeria, Angola, Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, Laos, Lebanon, Monaco, Namibia, Nepal and Venezuela to the list of high-risk third countries which have provided a written high-level political commitment to address the identified deficiencies and have developed an action plan with the FATF, and to remove Barbados, Gibraltar, Jamaica, Panama, the Philippines, Senegal, Uganda and the United Arab Emirates from that list
(C(2025)03815 – 2025/2740(DEA))
The European Parliament,
– having regard to the Commission delegated regulation (C(2025)03815),
– having regard to Article 290 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
– having regard to Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Commission Directive 2006/70/EC[1], in particular Article 9(2) and Article 64(5) thereof,
– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1624 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 2024 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing[2],
– having regard to Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/1675 of 14 July 2016 supplementing Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council by identifying high-risk third countries with strategic deficiencies[3], in particular the Annex thereto,
– having regard to its resolution of 23 April 2024 on the Commission delegated regulation of 14 March 2024 amending Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/1675 as regards adding Kenya and Namibia to the table in point I of the Annex and deleting Barbados, Gibraltar, Panama, Uganda and the United Arab Emirates from that table[4],
– having regard to Rule 114(3) of its Rules of Procedure,
A. whereas the Union must ensure a high level of protection of the Union financial system from money laundering and terrorist financing risks;
B. whereas the 2020 methodology for identifying high-risk third countries under Directive (EU) 2015/849, set out in the Commission Staff Working Document of 7 May 2020, should be objective, transparent, and autonomous, reflecting specific Union concerns and priorities;
C. whereas it is all the more important for the Commission to retain full autonomy and responsibility in carrying out an autonomous assessment that addresses anti-money laundering risks through its own transparent and evidence-based methodology;
D. whereas the Commission continues to propose changes to the list en bloc, rather than assessing each country individually; whereas this approach prevents Parliament from assessing each country on its own merits and implies that some countries would be unfairly affected by an objection to the delegated act;
E. whereas the Commission’s continued practice of proposing changes to the list as a package prevents Parliament from voting on each jurisdiction individually; whereas that approach limits democratic scrutiny and undermines Parliament’s ability to target jurisdictions of particular concern; whereas Parliament would, for instance, strongly support the addition of Monaco to the list of high-risk third countries, if separate votes on individual jurisdictions were allowed;
F. whereas lower-income countries continue to be disproportionately affected by the Union listing of high-risk third countries, even in cases where they have demonstrated measurable progress in strengthening their anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing (AML/CFT) frameworks, as exemplified by Côte d’Ivoire; whereas, in those countries, existing shortcomings are often the result of administrative and institutional capacity constraints linked to limited resources, rather than a reflection of the jurisdiction’s actual role in facilitating money laundering or terrorist financing; whereas similar concerns have been raised in relation to the Union list of non-cooperative jurisdictions for tax purposes, where lower-income countries are also overrepresented despite limited global impact;
G. whereas the Commission proposes to remove the United Arab Emirates (UAE) from the list based largely on the Financial Action Task Force (FATF)’s decision to delist the country;
H. whereas Parliament expects the Commission to conduct its own assessment taking into account the specific vulnerabilities of the internal market and not to rely solely on the assessment conducted by the FATF, taking into consideration that the degree of exposure of the internal market to the UAE may only increase should the bilateral free trade agreement come into effect;
I. whereas the UAE is a major global financial and trading hub which, due to its geographical position and service-based economy attracting significant trade and foreign investment, poses significant risks; whereas the UAE is an increasingly important economic partner for the Union, being the Union’s main export destination and investment partner in the Middle East and North Africa region; whereas the UAE also serves as an important regional trade and logistics hub for Union operators;
J. whereas the Commission delegated regulation does not provide sufficient evidence or clear indications that the UAE has effectively implemented reforms resulting in tangible and verifiable improvements in the prevention and enforcement of AML/CFT measures;
K. whereas there is still no evidence that the UAE authorities have taken concrete and effective action to address potential money laundering activities in the real estate sector, particularly those involving politically exposed persons and individuals subject to credible allegations of financial crime, as documented by investigative journalists and supported by submissions from civil society organisations;
L. whereas improving judicial and law enforcement cooperation with Member States and Union bodies and agencies is welcome; whereas, however, attention should also be paid to securing strong, verifiable commitments for improving real estate and beneficial ownership transparency, implementing an effective framework against financial crimes;
M. whereas some progress was reported by Member States in enhancing their judicial and law enforcement cooperation with the UAE; whereas, however, more ambitious measures still need to be implemented; whereas the list of commitments provided by the UAE remains vague, lacking both concrete enforcement mechanisms and deadlines; whereas loopholes in the exchange of information between competent authorities on real estate and beneficial ownership information remain;
N. whereas despite legislative progress and stated commitments by the UAE to strengthen its AML/CTC framework, concerns persist regarding the role of the UAE as a jurisdiction used to conceal assets by individuals subject to international sanctions, ongoing criminal investigations, or credible allegations of corruption; whereas, given the rise in sanctions due to the geopolitical landscape, the FATF expressed its growing concerns regarding the financial connectivity of countries targeted by sanctions and jurisdictions subject to FATF countermeasures;
O. whereas serious and persistent deficiencies remain in the transparency of the real estate sector in the UAE, where transactions can take place without the mandatory involvement of any of the professionals subject to anti-money laundering obligations, and where real estate developers can directly sell properties without any obligation to screen clients and report suspicious activity; whereas longstanding and repeated evidence, including numerous journalistic investigations, has confirmed that the Dubai real estate market serves as a favoured destination for corrupt and criminal cash from around the world; whereas evidence from recent scandals has highlighted that such financial opacity has been exploited for money laundering, exposing important weaknesses in the UAE’s AML/CTF framework;
P. whereas the Commission’s proposal to remove the UAE from the list of high-risk third countries coincides with the relaunch of negotiations on a free trade agreement between the Union and the UAE; whereas, although there is no formal evidence that the delisting was directly requested by the UAE as part of the trade talks, the timing and context raise legitimate concerns that commercial or political considerations may have influenced a process that should remain strictly technical and risk-based;
Q. whereas the recent commitments made by the UAE are welcome; whereas, however, they remain insufficient to ascertain whether those reforms have been adequately implemented in practice and are producing tangible results;
R. whereas improvement in the AML/CFT legislative framework in the UAE is undeniable and very welcome, taking into consideration the elements outlined above; whereas, however, a delisting of the UAE from the Union’s list of high-risk third countries may not yet, however, properly ensure the protection of the integrity of the Union financial system, given the high exposure of the internal market to the UAE as a financial and trading hub; whereas a more thorough assessment of the risks and effective reforms carried out by the UAE is required before delisting the country;
1. Objects to the Commission delegated regulation;
2. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission and to notify it that the delegated regulation cannot enter into force;
3. Calls on the Commission to submit a new delegated act which takes account of the concerns set out above;
4. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and to the governments and parliaments of the Member States.
- [1]OJ L 141, 5.6.2015, p. 73, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2015/849/oj.
- [2] OJ L, 2024/1624, 19.6.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1624/oj.
- [3] OJ L 254, 20.9.2016, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_del/2016/1675/oj.
- [4] Texts adopted, P9_TA(2024)0291.