MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the Commission delegated regulation of 10 June 2025 amending Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/1675 to add Algeria, Angola, Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, Laos, Lebanon, Monaco, Namibia, Nepal and Venezuela to the list of high-risk third countries which have provided a written high-level political commitment to address the identified deficiencies and have developed an action plan with the FATF, and to remove Barbados, Gibraltar, Jamaica, Panama, the Philippines, Senegal, Uganda and the United Arab Emirates from that list
2.7.2025 - (C(2025)03815 - 2025/2740(DEA))
Luděk Niedermayer, Javier Zarzalejos, Fernando Navarrete Rojas, Isabel Benjumea Benjumea, Maravillas Abadía Jover, Carmen Crespo Díaz, Francisco José Millán Mon, Rosa Estaràs Ferragut, Gabriel Mato, Pilar del Castillo Vera, Esther Herranz García, Borja Giménez Larraz, Raúl de la Hoz Quintano, Susana Solís Pérez, Alma Ezcurra Almansa, Dolors Montserrat, Elena Nevado del Campo, Adrián Vázquez Lázara, Juan Ignacio Zoido Álvarez, Antonio López‑Istúriz White, Marco Falcone, Esteban González Pons, Pablo Arias Echeverría, Nicolás Pascual de la Parte, Danuše Nerudová, David Casa, Tomáš Zdechovský, Kinga Kollár, Gabriella Gerzsenyi, Herbert Dorfmann, Christophe Gomart, Ondřej Kolář, Jan Farský, Michalis Hadjipantela, Siegfried Mureşan, Dan‑Ştefan Motreanu, Virgil-Daniel Popescu, Iuliu Winkler, Gheorghe Falcă, Mircea‑Gheorghe Hava, Daniel Buda, Paulius Saudargas, Maria Walsh, Loucas Fourlas, Verena Mertens, François-Xavier Bellamy, Karlo Ressler, Laurent Castillo, Sirpa Pietikäinen, Andrzej Halicki
B10‑0318/2025
European Parliament resolution on the Commission delegated regulation of 10 June 2025 amending Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/1675 to add Algeria, Angola, Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, Laos, Lebanon, Monaco, Namibia, Nepal and Venezuela to the list of high-risk third countries which have provided a written high-level political commitment to address the identified deficiencies and have developed an action plan with the FATF, and to remove Barbados, Gibraltar, Jamaica, Panama, the Philippines, Senegal, Uganda and the United Arab Emirates from that list
(C(2025)03815 - 2025/2740(DEA))
The European Parliament,
– having regard to the Commission delegated regulation (C(2025)03815),
– having regard to Article 290 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
– having regard to (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Commission Directive 2006/70/EC, in particular Article 9(2) and Article 64(5) thereof,
– having regard to Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/1675 of 14 July 2016 supplementing Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council by identifying high-risk third countries with strategic deficiencies, in particular the Annex thereto,
– having regard to Rule 114(3) of its Rules of Procedure,
A. whereas Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/1675, the Annex thereto and the amending Commission delegated regulation of 14 March 2024 identify high-risk third countries with strategic deficiencies as regards anti-money laundering and countering terrorist financing (AML/CTF), which represent a threat for the Union financial system and for which enhanced customer due diligence measures are to be applied by Union obliged entities under Directive (EU) 2015/849;
B. whereas, according to the 2020 methodology for identifying high-risk third countries under Directive (EU) 2015/849, set out in the Commission Staff Working Document of 7 May 2020 (the ‘2020 methodology’), the Commission can largely rely on the assessments of third countries carried out by international bodies, such as the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), since the assessment by the FATF follows due process based on objective criteria and the specific thresholds for being listed permit identification of countries presenting very material and profound strategic deficiencies; whereas, in principle, any third country representing a risk to the international financial system, as identified by the FATF, is presumed to represent a risk to the internal market;
C. whereas the Commission’s assessment is, however, an autonomous process which has to be carried out in a comprehensive and unbiased manner, assessing all third countries based on the same criteria that are set out in Article 9(2) of Directive (EU) 2015/849;
D. whereas Parliament expects the Commission to conduct its own assessment attending to the specific vulnerabilities of the internal market and not to rely solely on the assessments conducted by the FATF;
E. whereas, under the 2020 methodology, once a third country is delisted by the FATF, that third country is retained on the Union list of high-risk third countries until it has been established that that third country meets the Union criteria for removal; whereas that autonomous process implies that the delisting by the Union entails concrete assurances that that third country no longer poses a high risk to the integrity of the Union internal market specifically; whereas the thoroughness of the Commission’s assessment should be commensurate with the deficiencies identified, on the one hand, and the degree of exposure of the internal market to the third country in particular, on the other;
F. whereas, on 10 June 2025, the Commission adopted a Commission delegated regulation amending Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/1675 by adding Algeria, Angola, Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, Laos, Lebanon, Monaco, Namibia, Nepal and Venezuela to the table in point I of the Annex and deleting Barbados, Gibraltar, Jamaica, Panama, the Philippines, Senegal, Uganda and the United Arab Emirates from the table;
G. whereas it is the view of Parliament that the list of criteria set out in Article 9(2) of Directive (EU) 2015/849 is non-exhaustive (‘in particular’) and that predicate offences to money laundering, such as the evasion of sanctions, may fall under those criteria and should be duly taken into account in the autonomous assessment process of the Commission;
H. whereas the current Union listing process for high-risk third countries in the field of AML/CFT fails to address jurisdictions that pose serious systemic risks but are not included in the FATF list; whereas this includes countries that are no longer FATF members or have been suspended, that show persistent unwillingness to cooperate with international AML/CFT bodies, that are subject to wide-ranging Union or international financial sanctions, or that regularly violate international legal norms and international law; whereas the Commission has so far refrained from listing such jurisdictions, citing political and legal concerns, which undermines the credibility and effectiveness of the Union’s AML framework; whereas relying exclusively on FATF classifications is insufficient and overly restrictive, and additional criteria should be taken into account, such as enforcement of sanctions, transparency of beneficial ownership, cooperation with Union authorities, and compliance with international obligations;
I. whereas Russia is a clear example of a jurisdiction that warrants assessment under those broader criteria, given its suspension from FATF, its ongoing illegal war of aggression against Ukraine, and the widespread circumvention of Union sanctions; whereas similar situations are likely to occur in the future, and the Commission should be requested to submit a written proposal clarifying how it will address jurisdictions that are suspended from FATF, subject to sanctions, non-cooperative, or in breach of international law;
J. whereas the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing is a continuous process, financial innovation is opening new routes and illicit flows can be quickly redirected; whereas more countries that are not on the list or are delisted must be closely observed, especially if there is potential for a steep increase in transactions; whereas while the Commission is responsible for performing this continuous work, Parliament believes that continuous dialogue with co-legislators is essential for keeping the framework functional and reacting quickly to possible threats;
K. whereas voting on all countries in a single act entails the risk that countries rightly proposed for delisting may not be removed from the list, and vice versa, if the co-legislators disagree with the Commission’s assessment, even when such disagreement concerns only one country;
L. whereas, pursuant to Article 9(1) of Directive (EU) 2015/849, the Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts to identify high-risk third countries whose deficiencies in AML/CFT systems pose a significant threat to the Union’s financial system; whereas Article 1(3), point (b), of Regulation (EU) 2024/1620[1] provides that the Authority for Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism (AMLA) is to contribute to the identification and assessment of money laundering and terrorist financing risks and threats, including those originating from third countries that may affect the functioning of the internal market; whereas, therefore, reports, assessments or opinions issued by AMLA concerning third countries should be taken into account by the Commission pursuant to Article 9(4) of Directive (EU) 2015/849 when drawing up the list of high-risk third countries; whereas AMLA may exercise its role under Article 1(3), point (b), of Regulation (EU) 2024/1620 and thereby influence the drawing up of such a list by: (i) issuing opinions or technical advice, (ii) directly influencing the listing or delisting of countries by the FATF, and (iii) concluding administrative arrangements with the FATF that do not prejudice the respective competences of the Commission and the Member States;
M. whereas, according to the EU TE-SAT 2025 and EU SOCTA 2025 reports by Europol, there is a growing and concerning nexus between organised crime, terrorist financing and money laundering; whereas criminal networks increasingly exploit emerging technologies, such as cryptocurrencies and digital financing systems, to launder illicit proceeds and fund violent extremist activities; whereas this convergence of threats undermines the integrity of the Union’s financial system and reinforces transnational criminal structures; whereas the instrumentalisation of young people and the use of advanced digital tools further exacerbate risks to the security and stability of the internal market;
1. Objects to the Commission delegated regulation;
2. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission and to notify it that the delegated regulation cannot enter into force;
3. Calls on the Commission to submit a new delegated act which takes account of the concerns set out above and of the following recommendations:
(a) reconsider the listing review procedure due to its shortcomings in addressing jurisdictions that pose serious systemic risks but are not included in the FATF list;
(b) avoid relying solely on FATF classifications, which are insufficient and overly restrictive, and take into account the role of AMLA;
4. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and to the governments and parliaments of the Member States.
- [1] Regulation (EU) 2024/1620 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 2024 establishing the Authority for Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism and amending Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010, (EU) No 1094/2010 and (EU) No 1095/2010 (OJ L, 2024/1620, 19.6.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1620/oj).