

# EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

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B5-0505/2000

## MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION

further to Oral Questions B5-0315/2000 and B5-0475/2000

pursuant to Rule 42(5) of the Rules of Procedure

by Catherine Lalumière

on behalf of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common  
Security and Defence Policy

on the establishment of a common European security and defence policy with a  
view to the European Council in Feira

**European Parliament resolution on the establishment of a common European security and defence policy with a view to the European Council in Feira**

*The European Parliament,*

- having regard to the Amsterdam Treaty and, in particular, the articles thereof which refer to the European security and defence identity,
- having regard to the UN Charter and, in particular, the articles thereof concerning peace-keeping and the ability to intervene in the settlement of national and international conflicts,
- having regard to its resolution of 14 May 1997 on the formulation of perspectives for the common security policy of the European Union<sup>1</sup>, which contains a definition of security that has lost none of its relevance,
- having regard to its resolution of 15 May 1997 on the Commission Communication on the challenges facing the European defence-related industry, a contribution for action at European level (COM(96)0010 – C4-0093/96)<sup>2</sup>,
- having regard to its resolution of 14 May 1998 on the gradual establishment of a common defence policy for the European Union<sup>3</sup>, concentrating on the Petersberg tasks,
- having regard to its resolution of 28 January 1999 on the Commission Communication on implementing European Union strategy on defence-related industries (COM(97)0583 – C4-0223/98)<sup>4</sup>,
- having regard to its recommendation of 10 February 1999 on the European Civil Peace Corps<sup>5</sup>,
- having regard to the Declaration of the Cologne European Council (3 and 4 June 1999) on strengthening the common European policy on security and defence, and its aim to take the necessary decisions by the end of the year 2000,
- having regard to the Declaration by the Helsinki European Council (10-11 December 1999) on the common European policy on security and defence and the two Presidency reports on developing the Union's military and non-military crisis management capability,
- having regard to the conclusions of the Lisbon European Council (23 and 24 March 2000), particularly those relating to the common European security and defence policy and, in this connection, the objectives set for the European Council in Feira,

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<sup>1</sup> OJ C 167, 2.6.1997, p.99.

<sup>2</sup> OJ C 167, 2.6.1997, p. 115 and p.137.

<sup>3</sup> OJ C 167, 1.6.1998, p.172.

<sup>4</sup> OJ C 128, 7.5.1999, p. 15 and 86.

<sup>5</sup> See minutes of that date.

- having regard to its resolution of 13 April 2000 containing the European Parliament's proposals for the Intergovernmental Conference<sup>6</sup>,
  - having regard to the meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers held in Oporto on 15 and 16 May 2000,
- A. whereas Article 11 of the Treaty on European Union has given impetus to the CESP with a view to promoting peace, international security and the upholding of democracy and human rights,
  - B. whereas, following the crises in the Balkans, the European Union has shown its resolve to play a direct role in the management of crises threatening its security, interests and values, through decisions taken in application of the Cologne and Helsinki Declarations,
  - C. pointing out that the Kosovo war and its aftermath highlighted the lack of a conflict-prevention policy and the gaps and deficiencies in the outreach military and policing assets and capabilities of the Member States of the Union, and that these gaps and deficiencies were also revealed in the WEU audit,
  - D. stressing that the Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP) being put in place by the European Union is a further step towards European political integration, that it is geared to the carrying out of Petersberg-style tasks and that it will involve the use of a combination of civil and/or military resources, depending on the nature of the crisis in question and the way it develops,
  - E. pointing out that collective defence, which falls outside the field of the CESDP, is at present the responsibility of NATO and that this new policy is not aimed at establishing a permanent European army,
  - F. emphasising, that common security is the prime function of CESDP and covers the entire range of responses, from completely unarmed to the substantial deployment of forces,
  - G. recognising that in Kosovo alone, European governments have had great difficulty in deploying some 4 000 of the police that they pledged to the UN administration there,
  - H. stressing that it is desirable to resolve crises first by non-military means, but not ruling out the use of armed force in accordance with the founding principles of the European Union and of the Member States' Constitutions and with the principles of the United Nations Charter and of the OSCE, when the limits of diplomacy have been reached,
  - I. wishing to send a message to the European Council in Feira concerning the matters to be considered there in the context of the CESDP, without prejudice to other aspects of this policy on which it may subsequently adopt a position,
1. Welcomes the debate on European security and defence policy which began in Portschach in October 1998, as well as the guidelines set out in the Cologne and Helsinki

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<sup>6</sup> See minutes of that date.

Declarations, and notes the Member States' determination to implement these two declarations;

2. Stresses that priority must be given to non-military crisis management but that the availability of a military instrument composed of well-trained and fully equipped personnel to be deployed and able to conduct the whole range of responses (military, policing and unarmed) will broaden the Union's options in carrying out its foreign policy;

## **I. NON-MILITARY CRISIS MANAGEMENT**

3. Notes that the European Union already has several instruments available for non-military crisis prevention and management, including:
  - (a) financial instruments (ECHO, PHARE, TACIS, etc.) which make it possible to carry out urgent operations and structural or reconstruction operations,
  - (b) preventive diplomacy measures (stability pacts),
  - (c) PPEWU<sup>7</sup>, which must enable crises to be identified at an early stage, and this unit will undoubtedly need to be strengthened in terms of manpower and resources, by bringing under its authority the WEU's Satellite Centre and Institute for Security Studies,
  - (d) democratisation measures, which can be carried out jointly with the Council of Europe and OSCE (monitoring of elections, legal assistance, etc..)
  - (e) intervention operations like the ECMM<sup>8</sup>,
  - (f) operations to assist with mine-clearing, policing, surveillance of conflict zones, monitoring of sanctions, with the assistance of the WEU where appropriate,
  - (g) guaranteed access to natural resources and the elimination of poverty as important elements of conflict prevention;
4. Notes that the CPN (Conflict Prevention Network) has been set up to advise Parliament and the Commission with a view to improving the European Union's capacity for an effective transition from early warning to early action and to properly inform the Institutions about non-military crisis prevention and management; requests that the Commission guarantee the continuity of its activities;
5. Points out that these resources, however useful they may be, are not always sufficient; welcomes, therefore, the Commission's initiatives, which are designed to give it a more

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<sup>7</sup> Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit

<sup>8</sup> European Community Monitoring Mission

active role in the field of crisis prevention and management, and also those undertaken by the Council with a view to developing a European Union non-military crisis management capacity based on:

- (a) a rapid reaction facility with adequate budgetary funding,
  - (b) appropriate bodies such as a non-military crisis management committee and a mechanism for coordination between the Council and Commission,
  - (c) a database on the Member States' capabilities as regards public security and maintaining law and order,
  - (d) a crisis management unit within the Commission and the Council, alongside the existing interim Situation Centre,
  - (e) an understanding of the capabilities of the non-governmental organisations in the field of conflict prevention and management;
6. Notes that the European Union's capacity for rapid and effective intervention, particularly in humanitarian situations or when lives are at risk, needs to be enhanced; recommends that greater co-ordination and coherence be introduced between all the relevant departments within the European Commission and between the Commission and the Council; considers that the proliferation of situation centres, crisis-management units and committees in Brussels should be avoided and that urgent attention should be given to the establishment of minimal structures that are designed to facilitate decisions by the international community and meet practical needs in a timely and efficient manner;
7. Believes that these measures could usefully be supplemented by the setting of major common objectives (*headline goals*) as a counterpart to those set in the military field;
8. Believes in particular that one of the headline goals should be in the field of civil protection, so that the Member States have adequate manpower and equipment and are able to coordinate their efforts in the event of disasters;
9. Calls also on the Member States to set a headline goal concerning the establishment of a European public security force that can be rapidly mobilised and deployed in law and order operations for which military units are not suited; calls on the European Council to consider whether part of this headline goal could be met by a fully trained, professional and permanent EU-financed public security force to ensure that the EU always has a guaranteed minimum number of personnel available to be deployed irrespective of the burdens on national resources at any given time;
10. Calls on the Union to adopt a coordinated and global approach to its interventions, which could include the involvement of NGOs and civil society so as to forge links between its military and non-military actions and make them as effective as possible; calls on the Council in this connection to follow up the European Parliament's recommendation on the European Civil Peace Corps as a matter of urgency;

## **II. DEVELOPING THE MILITARY ASSETS AND CAPABILITIES OF THE MEMBER STATES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION**

11. Supports the idea put forward at the informal meeting in Sintra on 28 February 2000 that a force generation conference could be held before the end of 2000, so as to put into effect the undertakings given at the European Council in Helsinki to establish by 2003 a rapid reaction force of 50 000 – 60 000 men that can be mobilised within 60 days and deployed for a period of one year, with all the necessary support;
12. Notes that an ambitious objective of this kind will require a firm political commitment on the part of all Member States, because they will have both to restructure and modernise their armed forces; therefore supports the idea of seeking cohesion indicators for military expenditure and equipment;
13. Stresses that the credibility of the CESDP will be measured by its ability to implement the necessary resources, in terms of both manpower and equipment, particularly if the European Union is to carry out operations independently, as indicated in the Cologne and Helsinki Declarations;
14. Calls therefore on the Member States to make provision for the necessary funds for implementing the CESDP; considers it necessary, in particular, to strike a balance in the defence budgets of most Member States between expenditure on research and development, expenditure on equipment and expenditure on operation; calls on all Member States to carry out an analysis of the cost-effectiveness of their military spending vis-à-vis the objectives of the CFSP and the CESDP so as to make optimum use of the funds available;
15. Calls on the Member States to base their expenditure on research, development and equipment on the guidelines laid down in the WEU audit and in NATO's Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI);
16. Requests that, in their defence spending, the Member States seek to ensure interoperability or, better still, standardisation through joint equipment purchases, together with complementarity;
17. Believes in short that an increase in the defence budgets of some Member States cannot be completely ruled out and that this would be made easier by a resumption of growth in the European Union;
18. Notes that the CESDP, by acting as a complement to the CFSP, will enable the Union gradually to assume greater responsibilities on the international stage and will provide a better balance with regard to the burdens and responsibilities borne by Europe and the United States within the Atlantic Alliance, thereby contributing also to the development of a European security and defence identity (ESDI);
19. Points out that the Cologne and Helsinki Declarations stipulate that the Union may carry out crisis management operations using the assets and capabilities of NATO when the

latter organisation does not wish to become involved in its own right; notes that this possibility would require the Union to negotiate an agreement with NATO on the basis of Article 24 of the Treaty on European Union on the use of its capabilities and assets; notes that an agreement of this kind could include arrangements for associating European allies which are not members of the European Union and states taking part in the Partnership for Peace;

20. Stresses that, in the context of this EU/NATO agreement, care must be taken to preserve the European Union's decision-making autonomy, something which would be in line with the objectives of securing consultation, cooperation, non-duplication and transparency between the two organisations;
21. Requests that, when undertaking the Petersberg tasks with its own assets and capabilities, the European Union should take account of the WEU legacy with a view to associating European States which are members of NATO but not of the EU and the applicant countries it deems necessary for the effective performance of the tasks concerned; calls on it therefore to negotiate an agreement with these states based on Article 24 of the Treaty on European Union laying down the arrangements for them to participate in these tasks; notes that, with reference to Petersberg tasks, the difference in status between WEU associate partner states and associate members is no longer justified;
22. Calls on the Member States to cooperate more closely on armaments in accordance with Article 17(1) of the EU Treaty and recalls the objective of setting up a European Armaments Agency by merging OCCAR and WEAO as advocated in its resolution of 28 January 1999; calls on the Commission and Council also to create the conditions for a single market in the defence industry, notably by making the provisions of Article 296 of the EC Treaty more flexible;
23. Calls, furthermore, on the Council, the Commission and the Member States to undertake to ensure that this closer cooperation on armaments is accompanied by a determined effort in the application of the Code of Conduct on arms exports as regards monitoring the final destination of weapons manufactured in Europe;

### **III. ESTABLISHMENT OF DECISION-MAKING STRUCTURES**

24. Approves the decisions taken by the Council on 14 February 2000 setting up the interim Political and Security Committee and interim Military Body and concerning the secondment of national military experts to the Council Secretariat;
25. Calls for the definitive bodies (Political and Security Committee, Military Committee and Military Staff) to be established as soon as possible and for the capabilities still available to the WEU, including the Satellite Centre and Institute for Security Studies, to be swiftly transferred to the European Union; calls in addition for the creation of a specialist body responsible for data collection and analysis;
26. Requests that the interim Political and Security Committee be chaired by the High

Representative for the CFSP/Secretary-General of the WEU, so that he can fully exercise his political authority over the interim Military Body and, subsequently, over the Military Committee and Military Staff;

27. Believes it essential that the Ministers of Defence should be able to participate in the General Affairs Council in the event of a crisis involving the use of military assets, in order to improve decision-making;
28. Calls on the Council to make provision for formal meetings of the Ministers of Defence alone when the matters discussed are technical or operational, such as the joint purchasing of military equipment, standardisation of equipment or the establishment of forces for carrying out Petersberg tasks decided on by the Union;
29. Suggests that, in cases where the European Union still needs to have recourse to the WEU, the decision-making process of the two organisations should be simplified in the way described in Decision 1999/404/CFSP, so as to improve the Union's ability to respond whilst preserving the European Union's decision-making autonomy;
30. Welcomes the agreement reached by the EU Foreign Ministers at their informal meeting on 7 May 2000 in the Azores to back plans for joint working groups between the EU and NATO looking at security issues, military capabilities, arrangements for the EU to use NATO military assets and the definition of more permanent arrangements between the EU and NATO;
31. Considers that interparliamentary contact should be developed between the European Parliament and the NATO Parliamentary Assembly;

#### **IV. THE PARLIAMENTARY DIMENSION OF THE CESDP**

32. Regrets that the parliamentary dimension of the CESDP is not mentioned in any of the declarations adopted since October 1998 and stresses that the introduction of this new policy must not be accompanied by a decline in democracy;
33. Notes therefore that there is a serious democratic deficit with regard to the CESDP as long as European decision-making is not being controlled by a directly-elected European people's representation;
34. Notes in particular that the national parliaments, which are responsible for adopting defence budgets, are not able to obtain a global and coherent view of the CESDP;
35. Considers that, in this connection, the existing institutional framework (and, in particular, the powers conferred on the European Parliament under Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union) should be clarified;
36. Calls therefore, for the parliamentary dimension of the CESDP to be developed in the context of the European Union and for the European Parliament, which represents the peoples of the Union, to be fully involved at all stages in the development of this new



policy on the basis of the responsibilities assigned to it by the Treaty on European Union with regard to the CFSP;

37. Considers it vital, nevertheless, to maintain a link between the level at which decisions on the CESDP are taken and the level at which the appropriations are adopted, so that democracy can be guaranteed, in anticipation of a progressively increasing profile of the European Parliament in the field of the CESDP;
38. Proposes, therefore, that, within the framework of the CESDP and on the basis of the COSAC's experience, a 'European interparliamentary forum on security and defence' should be set up, comprising European and national MPs responsible for security and defence issues and possible also representatives from the parliaments of the applicant countries and the WEU associate countries;
39. Proposes also that Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union, which requires the European Parliament to hold an annual debate on the CFSP, should be amended to include specific reference to the CESDP;

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40. Calls on the Commission, the Council and the Member States to adopt without delay and within the existing framework of the Treaties the decisions necessary to establish the CESDP, including both its civil and military dimensions, so as to capitalise on the momentum that has been built up;
41. Calls also on the European Council to include in the forthcoming IGC the Treaty amendments that will still be required to enable the CESDP to be finally established and operate efficiently;
42. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the European Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the associate partners and the associate members of the WEU, the parliamentary assembly and Secretary-General of NATO, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the United States Congress.