MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION
8.2.2006
pursuant to Rule 103(2) of the Rules of Procedure
by Michał Tomasz Kamiński, Konrad Szymański and Ģirts Valdis Kristovskis
on behalf of the UEN Group
on Iran and the international community
B6‑0099/2006
European Parliament resolution on Iran and the international community
The European Parliament,
– having regard to its previous resolutions on Iran, notably that of 13 October 2005,
– having regard to the Council conclusions on Iran, notably those of 16 March 2005, 3 October 2005 and 18 January 2006,
– having regard to the agreement of the Foreign Ministers of China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States of America and the High Representative of the European Union of 30 January 2006,
– having regard to the resolution adopted by the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on 4 February 2006,
– having regard to Rule 103(2) of its Rules of Procedure,
A. whereas 1 August 2005 the Islamic Republic of Iran (hereinafter referred to as Iran) decided to resume uranium conversion activities in contravention of the Paris Agreement obligations and restarted some research activities, including experimental uranium enrichment,
B. whereas Iran broke the seals at its pilot uranium-enrichment plant at Natanz and at two other facilities on 12 January 2006, announcing that it planned to resume its atomic energy programme and effectively breaking its deal with the EU-3,
C. whereas the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) decided on 4 February 2006 to report Iran to the UN Security Council over concerns that the country was trying to develop nuclear weapons,
D. whereas, on 12 January 2006, the EU-3 stated that talks with Iran had reached a 'dead end' after two years of negotiations,
E. whereas IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei has repeatedly asked Iran for access to additional documents, people and sites in an attempt to confirm the peaceful nature of Iran's programme,
F. whereas once full-scale enrichment activities start, it does not take much time to produce fissile material well enough to surmount the biggest obstacle to bomb-making,
G. whereas Iran has not effectively responded to a Russian proposal to enrich uranium on its behalf,
H. whereas Iran warns that the threat of sanctions could result in higher oil prices, thus intimidating the West and displaying a willingness to use oil as a weapon in the battle over its nuclear programme,
1. Is seriously concerned about Iran's partial resumption of its nuclear programme;
2. Calls on Iran to restore in full the suspension of enrichment-related activity, including R&D, under the supervision of the IAEA;
3. Welcomes the decision of the Foreign Ministers of China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States of America and the High Representative of the European Union meeting in London on 30 January 2006 to recommend that an extraordinary IAEA Board meeting should report to the Security Council its decision on the steps required from Iran, and should also report to the Security Council all IAEA reports and resolutions adopted relating to this issue;
4. Supports the decision of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) taken on 4 February 2006 to report Iran to the UN Security Council over concerns that the country was trying to develop nuclear weapons;
5. Takes note of reports which suggest that, during the 16-month pause in research and development at the Natanz site, while Iran engaged in protracted talks with the West (the EU-3) over its intention to develop nuclear power, work on the building of the Natanz facilities progressed;
6. Praises the EU-3 for their attempts to find a negotiated solution to the nuclear dispute with Iran over a prolonged period of time and understands their sense that negotiations have now reached a 'dead end';
7. Calls on the EU-3 and the Council to cooperate closely with the UNSC, the US, Russia and China over this issue;
8. Stresses that, in the event of a referral to the UNSC, the UNSC is likely to require this cooperation, with the possibility of sanctions to follow;
9. Supports, therefore, the very graduated approach foreseen by the EU whereby some sanctions may be seen as necessary, starting with the application of a much stricter policy towards, for example, the export by the EU of dual-use goods and progressing from there on the basis of Iran's response;
10. Regrets that Iran is unilaterally putting an end to the negotiation process; reiterates, therefore, its earlier call for Iran to restart talks with the EU-3 in good faith, free of duress and devoid of threats, and points out that it is now up to Iran to reassure the international community about its intentions;
11. Is seriously concerned that, if Iran were to obtain the technology for uranium enrichment, there would be no possible future control over Iran's acquiring military capacity;
12. Repeats its call to the Council to launch an initiative on a security dimension for the whole region in order to prevent proliferation and any sources of conflict;
13. Recommends working with NGOs and the private sector in Iran to strengthen Iranian civil society;
14. Is very concerned about continuing violations of basic human rights in Iran and calls on the Iranian authorities to recommence the human rights dialogue with the EU;
15. Urges all parties concerned to continue to work for a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue;
16. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the governments and parliaments of the Islamic Republic of Iran and of the countries referred to in this resolution, the Director General of the IAEA and the UN Secretary-General.