MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on EU 2020 – Follow-up of the informal European Council of 11 February 2010
4.3.2010
pursuant to Rule 115(5) of the Rules of Procedure
Ilda Figueiredo, Patrick Le Hyaric, Kyriacos Triantaphyllides, Nikolaos Chountis on behalf of the GUE/NGL Group
B7‑0165/2010
European Parliament resolution on EU 2020 – Follow-up of the informal European Council of 11 February 2010
The European Parliament,
– having regard to the Commission working document of 24 November 2009 entitled ‘Consultation on the future “EU 2020” strategy’ (COM(2009)0647),
- having regard to the Commission staff working document of 2 February 2010 entitled ‘Lisbon Strategy evaluation document’ (SEC(2010)0114),
- having regard to the Statement of 11 February 2010 by the Heads of State and Government of the European Union on Greece,
– having regard to the question of 23 February 2010 to the Commission on Agriculture and the future ‘EU 2020’ Strategy (O-0023/2010 – B7‑0000/2010),
– having regard to Rules 115(5) and 110(2) of its Rules of Procedure,
. I. On the evaluation of the Lisbon Strategy (2000 - 2010) and the consultation on the future ‘EU 2020’ strategy
1. Takes note of the Commission’s evaluation document on the Lisbon Strategy (2000 - 2010), but deplores the fact that there has been no thorough public debate on this, and also that there are no conclusions by the Council on the assessment of the Lisbon Strategy;
2. Considers, however, that a broad public consultation and a thorough assessment of the results of the Lisbon Strategy are necessary in order to draw conclusions for a new EU 2020 strategy which reasonably reflects the failures and achievements of the approaches taken in the past decade, with a view to formulating approaches for the next decade;
3. Deplores the fact that the public consultation on the Commission communication on the future EU 2020 Strategy ended already on 15 January 2010, leading to complaints from civil society actors that there was not sufficient time to respond properly to the complex questions under discussion;
4. Highlights the statements by social and environmental NGOs and trade unions that their views and contributions to the public consultation were misrepresented by the Commission’s first overview of responses to that consultation;
5. Points out that the informal meeting of the European Council on 11 February 2010 was originally convened to have a broad debate about a ‘vision’ for the EU up to 2020 including economic strategy and climate change, but in the end barely touched upon the follow-up to the global climate conference held in Copenhagen in December 2009, which should be a major issue for the development of the EU, and instead focused mainly on the deficit procedure against Greece;
6. Considers that another, broader and more inclusive public consultation is needed on the Commission’s new proposal on the EU 2020 Strategy presented in March 2010, in order to improve the active participation of civil society in shaping the new agenda;
II. On the EU ‘exit strategy’ and its consequences – not only for Greece
7. Warns against the abuse of ‘exit strategies’ to renew the agenda of structural deregulation of labour markets and welfare; points out that policies to cut welfare, wages, unemployment benefits, pensions, public services and job protection, and also policies to increase the retirement age, social security contributions of employees and VAT, are undermining public investment and internal demand and will thus prolong the recession; strongly criticises the fact that these neo-liberal policies are now being applied again in many EU Member States in the framework of the EU exit strategy and are being imposed especially upon Hungary, Latvia and Romania as part of joint EU-IMF rescue packages, with devastating economic and social consequences;
8. Is concerned that the global economic crisis is going on to hit the EU economies and notes that some Member States, such as Greece, are particularly affected and are suffering from high debt, a high unemployment rate and a deterioration of living standards;
9. Criticises the EU’s insistence on the deficit criteria and on measures established within the Maastricht Treaty and confirmed by the Lisbon Treaty, which is tending to sink the Greek economy into a deep recession and to create very negative implications not only for the Greek people, but also for the other European economies; underlines that the speed of the demanded reduction in Greece’s public deficit is irresponsible and will only deepen the crisis;
10. Considers that the European Council’s recent decision (11 February 2010) based on Article 126(9) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union implies that this is the last step before a decision on sanctions against Greece, which is an unprecedented measure; points out that the imposed oversight of the Greek economy by the Commission, the ECB and the IMF, and the austerity policy that was promoted by the ECOFIN Council, is leading the Greek economy into a deep recession;
11. Underlines that while the Greek level of indebtedness is high (12.7% for 2009), this is also true for other countries, such as the UK (12%), Ireland (14.7%) and Spain (10%); stresses that almost every country in the euro zone has overrun the criteria imposed by the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), leading to the obvious conclusion that the SGP has been ineffective; highlights the fact that huge financing to bail out the banks, economic recovery programmes, and declining tax revenues leave deep dents in budgets everywhere;
12. Condemns the introduction of the IMF into the economic reality of the euro zone and states that this action leads to a stricter implementation of the SGP as well as creating a negative institutional precedent;
13. Is concerned about speculative attacks on Greek government bonds by investment banks (Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan etc), hedge funds and credit rating agencies; calls for a common and co-ordinated response from the whole EU and its Member States to these attacks; stresses in this context the need to firmly control hedge funds and private equity inside the EU and to prohibit so called ‘over-the-counter’ businesses;
14. Is strongly concerned about the unprecedented campaign against Greece and the Greek people in which the country’s difficult situation is being used to reignite old prejudices; is also concerned that Greece is being targeted in the media and politics, because together with Portugal, Italy, Ireland and Spain, Greece is condemned as one of the "PIIGS"; underlines that this campaign is contrary to fundamental principles of European solidarity;
15. Criticises the fact that the complicated situation in Greece is being exploited by the financial markets, the Commission and neoliberal EU governments in order to push for welfare cuts; sees that the general goal of these attacks is to significantly weaken the Greek labour movement, to facilitate the imposition of wage cuts and to increase the retirement age;
16. Stresses the need to address the enormous imbalances inside the EU at macro level; underlines that some EU Member States such as Germany with big surpluses must boost their domestic demand, while companies in these countries must abandon their aggressive export strategies; reiterates that that the G-20 summit in Pittsburgh has already adopted an obligation for surplus countries to minimise imbalances by boosting their domestic demand;
III. On the economic and social situation of the EU and the requirements for a new EU strategy up to 2020
17. Underlines the fact that the current economic and social crisis is also the result of the European Union’s neoliberal policies – enshrined in the Lisbon Treaty and in the old ‘Lisbon Strategy’ – of promoting de-regulated financial markets, of liberalised markets in products and services and the increasing financialisation of the economy, of reducing public investment, of increasing exploitation through massive wage depression and the deregulation of labour relations, and of pushing for the liberalisation and privatisation of public services;
18. Points out that such policies promoted the accumulation of colossal profits by the big economic and financial groups and the formation of big oligopolies during boom phases, profits that were not reinvested in the ‘real economy’, but further drove speculation on liberalised financial markets until the speculative bubbles collapsed; considers, therefore, that a deep-seated problem of distributive justice is at the core of the present economic crisis;
19. Considers that the focus on ‘competitiveness’ and ‘cost-cutting’ underlying the Lisbon Strategy also aggravated the severe economic imbalances within the euro zone (countries with large export surpluses against countries with large current account deficits) and within the EU more generally, undermining the EU’s economic, social and territorial cohesion;
20. Points out that the Commission’s optimistic expectations of a self-sustaining recovery starting in the fourth quarter of 2009 and gaining further momentum in 2010 has not so far materialised; underlines, therefore, that further fiscal stimulus measures are necessary to counter the current trend towards stagnation if not deflation within the EU, as the private sector (households and companies) is still deeply indebted and not capable of taking the lead in investments; also considers it necessary to establish budgetary support measures to countries in a more serious situation, particularly by the advancing of Community funds without the need for national counterparts;
21. Strongly criticises the fact that there is no real European coordination of the different national recovery plans, but instead a ‘beggar-my-neighbour’ policy of competing national schemes; calls on the Commission and the Council to draw up an additional ‘European Investment Programme for Sustainable Development, Employment and Social Inclusion’ of at least 1 % of EU GDP as an emergency measure, by using European-level instruments (EIB, EBRD, EU budget, etc.) which should be complemented by similar Member State public investment programmes in order to stabilise the economy, counter climate change and promote full employment with quality jobs and social rights;
22. Considers that a new Strategy is needed which promotes economically, socially and environmentally sound EU-wide sustainable development and its contribution to dealing with global problems: an integrated EU strategy for Social Justice, Sustainability and Solidarity based on mutually supportive economic, social and environmental pillars which must be steered by a democratic and participatory process of socio-economic governance;
23. Points out that at the core of the new strategy there needs to be an alternative programme, reshaping and strengthening the economic recovery programmes of the Member States and co-ordinating them with a systemic European Recovery Initiative for equity, full employment with ‘good work’, greening the economy, social welfare, eradicating poverty and social exclusion and creating improved social and territorial cohesion across the EU –a programme which is also gender-equality streamlined in all of its components;
24. Highlights that the new integrated Strategy will not only need an internal dimension (EU and Member States), but also an external one (foreign policy, trade, neighbourhood policy) streamlined toward the same goals as its internal dimension – the neo-liberal ‘Global Europe’ agenda must be abandoned;
25. Underlines the need to set ambitious targets, benchmarks and indicators for the different components of the new strategy: it will need indicators that go beyond GDP, including multiple indicators on well-being, the eradication of poverty and social exclusion, gender equality, equity and equality for all (including between the regions, and seeking to overcome inequality based on income and wealth), and energy, natural resource use and ecosystem pressures; and it will need to use the legislative capacities of the EU towards its ends and the re-shaping and re-focusing of its instruments (e.g. financial regulation, Structural Funds etc.) instead of relying solely on voluntary procedures such as the Open Method of Co-ordination;
26. Stresses that this new strategy for the EU requires a macro-economic framework that is supportive of sustainable development, strengthened environment-friendly internal demand based on progressive wages, full employment with rights and social and economic cohesion; asks, in this context, for growth- and employment-supportive monetary and fiscal policies that lead to a combined, flexible and coordinated expansionary fiscal policy for the EU and its Member States, based on:
(i) a relaxation of monetary policy by the ECB and its institutional reform, based on democratic accountability, political control and economic and social concerns, translated in specific growth and employment-targeting to be introduced in parallel with a change in its overarching objective of price stability,
(ii) the revocation of the Stability and Growth Pact in parallel with the establishment of an Employment and Growth Pact which will foster public investment, boost internal demand, support micro-, small and medium-sized enterprises and set specific economic, social and environmental criteria tailor-made to the particular needs of each Member State, in particular targeting unemployment and poverty reduction,
(iii) the creation of a monetary compensation fund in the euro area to react to asymmetric economic shocks;
27. Calls for a new social policy agenda whose objectives should be the following:
(i) the development of an inclusive and cohesive society, which presupposes measures in favour of stable employment and respect for workers’ rights,
(ii) the promotion of a society based on gender equality and the combating of all forms of discrimination,
(iii) distribution of the wealth created so as to enhance the wellbeing of everyone, which presupposes publicly-provided universal welfare systems and guaranteed universal access to high-quality public services, including health, education and housing,
(iv) a social policy which takes account of all groups,
(v) participatory democracy as a component of the various social and employment policies;
28. Calls for a new environment policy agenda whose objectives should be the following:
(i) decoupling economic growth from the parallel growth of energy, natural resources and raw materials consumption while reducing the latter,
(ii) support for Member States’ regulatory frameworks and monitoring systems that prevent economic environmental externalities, in particular pollution and greenhouse gas emissions,
(iii) support for investment that promotes reduction of waste, the re-use and recycling of materials, as well as the reduction and treatment of hazardous industrial and toxic waste,
(iv) the promotion of cleaner and safer transport systems, with investment in quality public transport,
(v) investment in eco-technologies, eco-innovation and eco-efficiency;
29. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments.