MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on democratic decision making in the EMU
10.6.2013 - (2013/2672(RSP))
pursuant to Rule 110(2) of the Rules of Procedure
Derk Jan Eppink on behalf of the ECR Group
The European Parliament,
– having regard to the Commission communications on ‘Ex ante coordination of plans for major economic policy reforms’ (COM (2013) 166) and on ‘The introduction of a Convergence and Competitiveness Instrument’ (COM (2013) 165),
– having regard to the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union of 2 March 2012, hereinafter referred as the ‘Fiscal Compact’,
– having regard to the conclusions of the European Council of 13 and 14 December 2012,
– having regard to the Commission Blueprint for a Deep and Genuine Economic and Monetary Union of 28 November 2012,
– having regard to the report by the President of the European Council on ‘Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union’ of 5 December 2013,
– having regard to Regulations (EU) No 1176/2011 and 1175/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011, hereinafter referred to as the ‘6‑pack’,
– having regard to Regulation (EU) No ... 2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council on common provisions for monitoring and assessing draft budgetary plans and ensuring correction of excessive deficit of the Member States of the euro area and having regard to Regulation (EU) No .../2013 on the strengthening of economic and budgetary surveillance of Member States in the euro area experiencing or threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their financial stability, hereinafter referred to as the ‘2-pack’,
– having regard to Articles 5, 6 and 7 of the Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality annexed to the Treaty on European Union and to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
– having regard to Rule 110(2) of its Rules of Procedure,
A. whereas a closer European integration should necessarily involve efficient institutional checks and balances to ensure greater democratic legitimacy, accountability, transparency and citizen’s endorsement;
B. whereas a closer European integration should provide for a greater parliamentary involvement at both the national and EU level;
C. whereas there is need to enhance democratic legitimacy with regards to the Commission’s project of a ‘deep and genuine economic and monetary union’ as highlighted in the Blueprint by closely involving through the appropriate legal procedure both the national parliaments, especially those of the euro area, and the European Parliament, in the ongoing legislative process well as in the drafting of any future amendment to the Treaties;
D. whereas the crisis revealed considerable democratic deficits in economic and financial policies, areas of European policy of particular significance for the citizens; whereas some Member States now see themselves subject to austerity policies which their parliaments would never have decided on their own, while other Member States see themselves forced to grant sizeable loans or guarantees in order to avoid a breakup of the euro; whereas, because of the spill over effects of national economic and fiscal policy decisions on the economies of other Euro area Member States, their national parliaments are thus effectively deprived of their budgetary autonomy;
E. whereas due consideration should be given to the mutual spill-over effects of the EMU and non-euro area members;
F. whereas progress towards a deep and genuine EMU should respect the will of the Member States that have an opt-out from having to introduce the euro to retain their respective national currencies;
G. whereas Union and national policy makers and parliamentarians should continuously explain to their citizens the benefits and possible downsides of a single currency, including the costs and risks linked to a break-up of the euro area;
H. whereas the Union institutions and the Heads of State and Government of the Member States in general and of the euro area Member States in particular hold the key to working in a credible way on the much-needed restoration of confidence by ensuring greater transparency and democratic legitimacy of, and parliament involvement in, the policy decisions proposed in Commission’s Blueprint;
I. whereas, to mitigate the economic and financial crisis and in response to structural shortcomings in the architecture of the economic and monetary union, national governments and European institutions took a wide range of measures to safeguard financial stability and improve economic governance;
J. whereas part of these efforts only concern the euro area Member States, such as some specific rules regarding financial sanctions in the six-pack, the creation of the ESM and the two-pack; whereas the euro area and six non-euro area Member States adopted the Euro Plus Pact, and the euro area and eight non-euro area Member States concluded the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union; whereas two Member States have opt-outs from the introduction of the euro;
K. whereas Article 123 TFEU prohibits the monetary financing of governments; whereas there is no public support for establishing a formal system of fiscal transfers within the Economic and Monetary Union;
1. Reaffirms that EMU governance must not infringe on the prerogatives of the national parliaments and the European Parliament, especially whenever any transfer of sovereignty is envisaged; underlines that proper legitimacy and accountability require democratic decisions and must be ensured at the appropriate national and EU levels by national parliaments and the European Parliament, respectively; to increase democratic legitimacy, encourages the use of referenda in Member States where constitutional provisions allow it;
2. Takes note of the Commission communication on ‘Ex ante coordination of plans for major economic policy reforms’ (COM (2013) 166); deplores that the Commission foresees only a very limited parliamentary accountability of decisions taken; asks for a diligent design of the process by which the Commission should present its opinion on major economic policy reforms to the Parliament of the Member State concerned at its request and justify all its recommendations for adjustments of the proposed reforms before the Parliament of the Member State concerned takes a simple majority vote on this opinion to adopt or reject it;
3. Takes note of the Commission communication on ‘The introduction of a Convergence and Competitiveness Instrument’ (COM (2013) 165) as a means to enhance ownership and effectiveness of economic policy; underlines that participation to any such instrument should be on a strictly voluntary basis, both for euro area and non-euro area Member States; suggests Article 352 TFEU as a legal basis for any financial support mechanism for any such instrument;
4. Calls on the Commission to list the future institutional developments which it deems necessary in the next twelve months in order to establish a stronger EMU architecture, and to inform the legislators about them without delay, so that national parliaments’ enhanced right of scrutiny of these proposals’ compliance with the subsidiarity and proportionality principles be ensured;
5. Underlines that the implementation of already approved measures must have precedence over any new proposal; urges the Commission to justify with an independent external impact assessment the added value of any new proposal in the area of economic governance, especially whenever any transfer of sovereignty is envisaged;
6. Notes that the Eurogroup of Finance Ministers has become less effective as a forum for economic policy coordination as its working methods have been formalized with the acquisition of a permanent secretariat and a fixed term presidency; therefore opposes further formalization, including the proposal of creating a permanent full-time President for the Eurogroup;
7. Considers that the EU and the EMU cannot be democratically sustainable without a decentralisation of powers towards national parliaments; in addition to the existing ‘yellow card’ system, suggests a ‘red card’ system for national parliaments to make the European Commission withdraw unwanted legislative proposals;
8. Welcomes the on-going creation of a single supervisory mechanism covering the euro area and open to all other EU Member States; considers that, to overcome the structural deficiencies inherent in the economic and monetary union and to effectively curb the pervasive moral hazard, the proposed ‘banking union’ should draw on the earlier reform of the Union financial services sector, including the creation of EBA, ESMA, EIOPA and the ESRB, as well as the strengthened economic governance, especially in the euro area, and the new budgetary framework of the European Semester, to ensure greater resilience and competitiveness of the Union banking sector, increased confidence in it, and enhanced capital reserves to prevent Member States’ public budgets having to bear the costs of banks’ bail-outs in the future;
9. Considers that, where a Member State whose currency is the euro is unwilling to further surrender its budgetary sovereignty, it should be given the option of leaving the euro area; invites the Commission and the Eurogroup – acting in liaison with the ECB – to assist in such a scenario the Member State concerned with practical steps to make a withdrawal from the euro area feasible and as smooth as possible;
10. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.