Procedure : 2016/2936(RSP)
Document stages in plenary
Document selected : B8-1129/2016

Texts tabled :


Debates :

PV 26/10/2016 - 17
CRE 26/10/2016 - 17

Votes :

PV 27/10/2016 - 8.7
Explanations of votes

Texts adopted :

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to wind up the debate on the statement by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy

pursuant to Rule 123(2) of the Rules of Procedure

on nuclear security and non-proliferation (2016/2936(RSP))

Sabine Lösing, Javier Couso Permuy, Takis Hadjigeorgiou, Marie-Christine Vergiat, Paloma López Bermejo, Marina Albiol Guzmán, Neoklis Sylikiotis, Stelios Kouloglou, Kostadinka Kuneva, Tania González Peñas, Xabier Benito Ziluaga, Estefanía Torres Martínez, Miguel Urbán Crespo, Lola Sánchez Caldentey on behalf of the GUE/NGL Group

European Parliament resolution on nuclear security and non-proliferation (2016/2936(RSP))  

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to its resolution of 17 January 2013 on the Recommendations of the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference regarding the establishment of a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction(1),

–  having regard to its resolution of 10 March 2010 on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons(2),

–  having regard to the Council conclusions on the Ninth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) (8079/15),

–  having regard to the Nuclear Security Summit held in Washington DC from 31 March to 1 April 2016,

–  having regard to the UN General Assembly resolution of 13 December 2011 on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East (A/RES/66/61),

–  having regard to Council Decision 2012/422/CFSP of 23 July 2012 in support of a process leading to the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East(3),

–  having regard to UN General Assembly decision A/RES/70/33 establishing an Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) on taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament in Geneva in 2016, and to the OEWG’s report to the UN General Assembly adopted on 19 August 2016 (A/71/371),

–  having regard to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) and the 2010 renewal of the START agreement (New START),

–  having regard to the final document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, in particular to the Action Plan with 64 concrete follow-on actions,

–  having regard to Rule 123(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.  whereas, unfortunately, the possession and use of nuclear weapons are still playing a preponderant role in the military policy of nuclear-weapon states, both acknowledged and unacknowledged; whereas the possession and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), such as nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, represent one of the most serious threats to international peace and security;

B.  whereas the process of multilateral disarmament was interrupted for years and there has been a lack of political will to revitalise it; whereas some of the pressing security priorities are to prevent terrorists or additional states from obtaining or using nuclear weapons, to reduce global stockpiles, to stop modernisation in this field and to move towards a world without nuclear weapons;

C.  whereas the conclusions and the Action Plan of the 2010 NPT Review Conference were key agreements to establish a real nuclear disarmament process; whereas there has been a distinct lack of progress and political will in achieving the concrete implementation objectives of the NPT, such as the 64 concrete measures in the agreed 2010 Action Plan;

D.  whereas there is a need to further reinforce all three pillars of the NPT, namely non-proliferation, disarmament and the right to cooperation on the civilian use of nuclear energy;

E.  whereas the EU has committed itself to preventing, deterring, halting and if possible eliminating proliferation programmes causing concern at global level; whereas there is a need for the EU to step up its efforts to counter proliferation flows and financing, to sanction acts of proliferation and to develop measures to prevent intangible transfers of knowledge and know-how via multilateral treaties, verification mechanisms, nationally and internationally coordinated export controls and cooperative threat-reduction programmes;

F.  whereas 2016 marks the 20th anniversary of the opening for signature of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty on 24 September 1996; whereas this treaty has not entered into force, since some non-NPT and NPT parties have not signed or ratified it;

G.  whereas four of the nine nuclear-weapon states are not members of the NPT and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has withdrawn its membership; whereas the Council of the European Union and the UN Security Council condemned what the DPRK claimed to have been a ‘successful hydrogen bomb test’ conducted on 6 January 2016; whereas on 9 September 2016, the DPRK conducted its fifth nuclear test, which clearly violates its international obligations under the UN Security Council resolutions;

H.  whereas the EU has been involved in the international negotiations and mediation process of the E3/EU+3 and Iran negotiations in order to find a diplomatic and peaceful resolution for the Iranian nuclear programme; whereas the EU plays an important part as a party to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action agreed with Iran in overseeing the implementation of the agreement;

I.  whereas under NATO nuclear sharing and bilateral arrangements, an estimated 150 to 200 sub-strategic nuclear weapons continue to be deployed in five NATO non-nuclear states (Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey), without democratic debate and discussion in these countries, let alone confirmation about the presence or absence of WMDs on their territory;

J.  whereas NATO’s 2010 Strategic Concept and the 2012 Defence and Deterrence Posture Review commit NATO to the goal of creating the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons;

K.  whereas Russia and the United States continue to implement the New START treaty, which will expire in 2021 unless extended by both parties;

L.  whereas there is a need for close coordination and cooperation between the EU and its neighbours, in particular between the United States and Russia, with a view to restarting and continuing the reduction of nuclear warheads and the non-proliferation regime;

1.  Expresses its serious concern about the danger of a renewal of a nuclear arms race; stresses, therefore, that strengthening the NPT as the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation and disarmament regime is of vital importance and urgently needed in order to reaffirm the validity of the grand bargain at the heart of the NPT; urges that every effort should therefore be made to implement the NPT in all its aspects and reinforce the agreements, treaties and agencies that make up the existing non-proliferation regime, in particular the CTBT and the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements; affirms that for multilateral efforts to be effective they must be set within a well-developed vision of achieving a nuclear-weapon-free world at the earliest possible date;

2.  Reminds the EU and the Member States that nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation are substantively interrelated and mutually reinforcing; takes the view that for the survival and enforcement of the NPT a road map with a schedule of nuclear disarmament steps and deadlines is needed; urges the nuclear-weapon states to live up to their commitment under Article 6 of the NPT to ‘pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament’; stresses that the nuclear-weapon states have not sufficiently lived up to this commitment, although it is vital for the continued relevance of the whole non-proliferation system;

3.  Calls on the EU and its Member States to make nuclear disarmament a priority of the foreign and security policy and to overcome the deadlock in the nuclear disarmament negotiations at bilateral and global levels;

4.  Welcomes the inclusion of clauses on non-proliferation of WMDs in the EU agreements with third countries and action plans since 2003; points out that such measures must be implemented by all EU partner countries without exception and incorporated into all EU agreements, including mixed agreements;

5.  Welcomes the growing awareness of the public and politicians; supports the ‘Mayors for Peace’ Campaign for nuclear disarmament and a world free of nuclear weapons by 2020, and the ‘Global Zero’ initiative; underlines the responsibility of parliaments and parliamentarians to promote nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament and welcomes the efforts of the global Parliamentary Network on Nuclear Disarmament (PNND);

6.  Urges those EU Member States which are nuclear-weapon states to stop immediately the qualitative improvement, development, production and stockpiling of nuclear warheads and their delivery systems; calls on these states to undertake new initiatives with a view to starting negotiations between the nuclear power states on further sharp reductions and finally the elimination of nuclear weapons;

7.  Calls for strict adherence to the nuclear testing moratorium pending the entry into force of the CTBT, as there are still ratifications needed; urges the remaining states listed in Annex II to the CTBT whose ratification is required for its entry into force to sign/ratify the Treaty rapidly, as this universal and internationally verifiable test-ban treaty is the most effective way to ban nuclear weapon test explosions and any other nuclear explosions;

8.  Supports further efforts to strengthen the mandate of the IAEA, including the generalisation of the Additional Protocols to the IAEA Safeguard Agreements and other steps designed to develop confidence-building measures; seeks to ensure that sufficient resources are made available to that organisation to enable it to fulfil its vital mandate in making nuclear activities secure;

9.  Deplores that nuclear-weapon states which are signatories to the NPT are modernising their arsenals and delaying action to reduce or eliminate their nuclear arsenals and adherence to a military doctrine of nuclear deterrence;

10.  Calls on all nuclear-weapon states to grant negative security assurance and to refrain from any use, or the threat of use, of nuclear weapons;

11.  Strongly supports the steps being taken by Russia and the USA to substantially reduce their nuclear weapons as agreed in the START and SORT agreements; deplores, in this regard, the absence since the entry into force of New START in 2011 of further negotiations on an urgently needed reduction of the deployed and non-deployed nuclear warheads, including, for the first time, sub-strategic nuclear weapons; urges, therefore, the ratification of the CTBT and the continuation of the New START agreement;

12.  Condemns the latest nuclear tests conducted by the DPRK, including the test of a hydrogen bomb, as a serious threat to peace and stability in the Korean Peninsula and the North-East Asian region; supports, nevertheless, the framework of the Six-Party Talks, calls for their resumption in pursuit of denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula and notes that China plays an important role in this regard, and also supports recent initiatives for the first bilateral talks between the two states sharing the Korean Peninsula; affirms its support and commitment for a peaceful and diplomatic solution to the DPRK nuclear issue; calls on the DPRK to re-engage constructively with the international community, and in particular the members of the Six-Party Talks, in order to work towards lasting peace and security on a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula; stresses that it would help the denuclearisation talks tremendously if they were paralleled with talks on replacing the 1953 Korean Armistice with permanent peace arrangements, as has been proposed by the DPRK but rejected several times;

13.  Welcomes the UN General Assembly resolutions of December 2011 and 2012 on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and the Council conclusions of July 2012 supporting this process; takes the view that the negotiations on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, the Mediterranean and North-East Asia is a crucial step to meet the security concerns of the countries of the region; deplores the postponement of the planned 2012 conference on the establishment of this WDM-free zone; asks for the immediate initiation of this conference;

14.  Calls on all countries in the region, pending the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone, not to develop, produce, test or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or permit the stationing on their territories, or territories under their control, of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices;

15.  Calls for the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in Europe; urges in particular the French and British Governments to rid themselves of their nuclear weapons; urges the US Government to remove tactical nuclear weapons from Europe and the Government of the Russian Federation not to deploy its nuclear weapons, or to withdraw them from the western part of its territory; calls for the dissolution of all nuclear sharing arrangements between EU Member States and the USA/NATO;

16.  Welcomes the completion of the work of the OEWG, pursuant to UN General Assembly resolution A/RES/70/33, and the recommendation to the UN General Assembly, contained in the final report of the OEWG (A/71/371) and adopted with widespread support on 19 August 2016, to convene a conference in 2017, open to all states, to negotiate a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total elimination; recognises that this will reinforce the non-proliferation and disarmament objectives and obligations contained in the NPT and help to create the conditions for global security and a world without nuclear weapons;

17.  Calls on the EU and its Member States to support and substantially contribute to the recommendations of the OEWG, in particular to the aim of a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, in a process which is guided by the principles of transparency, irreversibility and verifiability, taking due account of both the security dimension and the humanitarian dimensions of nuclear weapons;

18.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Member States, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council, the Commission, the UN Secretary-General, the UN High Commissioner for Disarmament Affairs, the President of the 2015 NPT Review Conference and the Director-General of the IAEA.



OJ C 440, 30.12.2015, p. 97.


OJ C 349E , 22.12.2010, p. 77.


OJ L 196, 24.7.2012, p. 67.

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