Motion for a resolution - B8-1132/2016Motion for a resolution

MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on nuclear security and non-proliferation

19.10.2016 - (2016/2936(RSP))

to wind up the debate on the statement by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
pursuant to Rule 123(2) of the Rules of Procedure

Urmas Paet, Petras Auštrevičius, Dita Charanzová, Gérard Deprez, Fredrick Federley, Ivan Jakovčić, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Valentinas Mazuronis, Louis Michel, Javier Nart, Jozo Radoš, Marietje Schaake, Pavel Telička, Hilde Vautmans on behalf of the ALDE Group

See also joint motion for a resolution RC-B8-1122/2016

Procedure : 2016/2936(RSP)
Document stages in plenary
Document selected :  
Texts tabled :
Texts adopted :


European Parliament resolution on nuclear security and non-proliferation


The European Parliament,

–  having regard to its resolution of 10 March 2010 on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons[1],

–  having regard to its resolution of 17 January 2013 on the Recommendations of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference regarding the establishment of a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction[2],

–  having regard to the EU Strategy against proliferation of WMD, adopted by the European Council on 12 December 2003,

–  having regard to the failure to agree on a Final Document at the 2015 NPT Review Conference,

–  having regard to the Council conclusions on the Ninth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (8079/15),

–  having regard to the documents adopted in spring 2016 at the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington,

–  having regard to UN Security Council resolution 2310 (2016) on the 20th anniversary of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT),

–  having regard to the Tbilisi Declaration of 1977 adopted by consensus by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe,

–  having regard to the G7 statement of 11 April 2016 on non-proliferation and disarmament issued in Hiroshima, Japan,

–  having regard to the UN General Assembly resolution of 13 December 2011 on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East (A/RES/66/61),

–  having regard to Council Decision 2012/422/CFSP of 23 July 2012 in support of a process leading to the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East[3],

–  having regard to UN General Assembly resolution A/RES/70/33 of 7 December 2015 on taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament, and to the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) report to the UN General Assembly adopted on 19 August 2016 (A/71/371),

–  having regard to Rule 123(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.  whereas the security environment in the European Union neighbourhood has deteriorated considerably and has become less predictable; notes that the nature of the threats is both conventional and unconventional and that they are generated by both states and non-state regional and global actors;

B.  whereas international peace, security and stability are being seriously challenged by various developments, including deteriorating relationships between nuclear-armed states such as the Russian Federation, the United States, India, Pakistan, and Israel, and the further development of nuclear capabilities by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK);

C.  whereas the proliferation of biological and chemical forms of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) is being minimised and progressively halted through effective international application of the prohibition and obligations contained in the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) of 1972 and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC); whereas, however, the proliferation of nuclear WMDs and their means of delivery remains one of the most serious concerns for the global community;

D.  whereas as of January 2016 nine states – the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, China, India, Pakistan, Israel and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea – possessed a total of approximately 15 395 nuclear weapons, compared with some 15 850 in 2015;

E.  whereas blocking terrorist organisations and any additional states from obtaining or using nuclear weapons, reducing and eliminating all nuclear arsenals, and moving towards a world without nuclear weapons is a priority;

F.  whereas no progress has been made regarding the concrete steps towards nuclear disarmament agreed at the 2010 NPT Review Conference; whereas the 2010 NPT Review Conference brought renewed focus on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons;

G.  whereas priority must continue to be given to further reinforcing the core non‑proliferation and disarmament objectives of the three pillars of the NPT, namely non-proliferation, disarmament and cooperation on the peaceful use of nuclear energy;

H.  whereas nuclear-weapon states that are signatories to the NPT are modernising and enhancing their nuclear-weapon arsenals and delaying action to reduce or eliminate their nuclear arsenals and to decrease their adherence to a military doctrine of nuclear deterrence;

I.  whereas Russia and the United States continue to implement the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) which will expire in 2021; whereas the United States’ formal proposal to engage in post-New START Treaty negotiations has not been reciprocated by the Russian Federation, and no follow-on to the New START Treaty has as yet been negotiated to address reductions in non-strategic as well as strategic nuclear weapons with a view to their elimination;

J.  whereas nuclear-weapon test explosions and/or any other nuclear explosions represent a threat to international peace and security and undermine the global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime; whereas the test ban treaty is the most effective formal way to prohibit nuclear-weapon tests and any other nuclear detonations; whereas 2016 marks the 20th anniversary of the opening for signature of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) on 24 September 1996;

K.  whereas, despite all efforts to convene it, the Conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction by December 2012, in accordance with consensus agreements of NPT State Parties at the 2010 Review Conference, has not taken place;

L.  whereas the safety and security of US nuclear weapons deployed in Turkey has come under increased scrutiny as a result of the armed conflict in Syria;

M.  whereas arms control and non-proliferation agreements are an important part of Europe’s post-Cold War security system, which now looks increasingly fragile in the face of Russian aggression in Ukraine;

N.  whereas 5 December 2015 marked the 20th anniversary of the signing of the Budapest Memorandum; whereas Ukraine has respected all of its provisions and has taken proactive positions on the issues of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, in contrast with the Russian Federation, which has violated its commitments by occupying part of Ukraine’s territory (Crimea) and by launching an armed attack in the east of Ukraine; whereas this situation has created a dangerous precedent whereby a state which had guaranteed Ukraine’s security in response to Ukraine’s decision to join the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state, violated Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and undermined and seriously damaged not just the credibility of the instrument as a whole but also the negative security assurances provided by the nuclear weapon state, as well as the NPT itself and the idea of advancing global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation on the basis of international law and multilateral treaties;

O.  whereas Russia has deployed nuclear-capable Iskander short-range missiles to Kaliningrad in order to conduct exercises and overflights involving nuclear-capable systems, and whereas Russia’s decision to suspend the Plutonium Disposition and Management Agreement concluded with the United States in 2000 has increased concerns about increased reliance on nuclear weapons by Russia;

P.  whereas the EU plays an important role as a party to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action agreed with Iran, including its role as a full member of the Joint Commission overseeing implementation of the agreement;

Q.  whereas on 9 September 2016, the DPRK conducted its 5th nuclear test only months after the test of 6 January 2016; whereas this test, which the DPRK claimed was a ‘successful hydrogen bomb test’, clearly violates its international obligations under the UN Security Council resolutions and the 1992 Joint Declaration of South and North Korea on the Denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula, which states that the two countries will not develop or hold any nuclear weapons; whereas the proliferation of any WMD, but in particular nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, represents a threat to international peace and security; whereas the DPRK announced its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 2003, has been conducting nuclear tests since 2006 and officially declared in 2009 that it had developed a nuclear weapon for deterrence, which means that its threat to its neighbours in North-East Asia, and to regional and international peace and security, has been amplified;

R.  whereas the 2003 European Security Strategy stated that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is potentially the greatest threat to our security, including the possibility of a WMD arms race, and that the EU is committed to achieving universal adherence to multilateral treaty regimes, and to strengthening the treaties and their verification provisions; whereas the 2016 EU Global Strategy omits any language on WMDs, non-proliferation and arms control;

S.  whereas, regrettably, the EU, in the run-up to the 2015 NPT Review Conference, was unable to agree on a joint position on nuclear disarmament, acknowledging for the first time that ‘different views’ were being expressed about the consequences of maintaining nuclear weapons, and that the 2015 NPT Review Conference was unable to adopt a Final Document as a result of disagreements on pursuing regional efforts to create a zone free of WMD in the Middle East;

T.  whereas the EU has committed itself to making use of all instruments at its disposal to prevent, deter, halt and, if possible, eliminate proliferation programmes causing concern at global level, as clearly expressed in the EU Strategy against Proliferation of WMD adopted by the European Council on 12 December 2003;

1.  Is deeply concerned about the deterioration of regional and international security, the re-emergence of the role of nuclear weapons in that context and the lack of implementation of effective disarmament and non-proliferation steps;

2.  Calls on all nuclear-weapon states to take concrete interim measures to reduce the risk of nuclear-weapon detonations, including reducing the operational status of nuclear weapons and moving nuclear weapons away from deployment into storage, diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in military doctrines and rapidly reducing all types of nuclear weapons;

3.  Expresses deep concern at the potential violations of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty;

4.  Supports the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit, recognising that the unauthorised trade in and use of nuclear materials is an immediate and serious threat to global security, and looks forward to achieving the complete tracking and physical securing of all weapons-grade materials;

5.  Welcomes the completion of the work of the UN Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations, pursuant to UN General Assembly resolution A/RES/70/33; welcomes the recommendation to the UN General Assembly, contained in the final report of the OEWG (A/71/371) and adopted with widespread support on 19 August 2016, to convene a conference in 2017, open to all states, to negotiate a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total elimination; recognises that this will reinforce the non-proliferation and disarmament objectives and obligations contained in the NPT and help to create the conditions for global security and a world without nuclear weapons;

6.  Invites the EU Member States to support the convening of such a conference in 2017 and to participate constructively in its proceedings, and invites VP/HR Federica Mogherini and the European External Action Service to contribute constructively to the proceedings of the 2017 negotiating conference;

7.  Recalls the 20th anniversary of the opening for signature of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) on 23 September 1996, and underlines that a universal, internationally and effectively verifiable test-ban treaty is the most effective way of banning nuclear-weapon test explosions and any other nuclear explosions;

8.  Urges the remaining states listed in Annex II of the CTBT, ratification by whom is required for its entry into force, to sign and/or ratify the CTBT as a matter of urgency in order to bring this crucial international instrument into full legal effect without further delay, and welcomes in this respect the adoption of UN Security Council resolution 2310 (2016);

9.  Expresses its appreciation for the significant progress that has been achieved by the Preparatory Commission of the CTBT in completing and operating its effective International Monitoring System, which, even without the entry into force of the Treaty, contributes to regional stability as a significant confidence-building measure, strengthens the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime and brings additional scientific and civil benefits to states; expresses its conviction that for the continued operation of the monitoring system, the CTBTO Preparatory Commission will continue to rely on states’ funding contributions;

10.  Urges nuclear-armed states to cease any future strategic planning based on the use of nuclear capabilities; calls for a deepening of the dialogue with all nuclear-armed states with a view to pursuing a common agenda aimed at progressive reductions of nuclear warhead stockpiles; supports, in particular, the steps taken by the US and Russia to reduce their deployed nuclear weapons as agreed in the New START Treaty;

11.  Recognises that removing short-range, theatre and designated sub-strategic nuclear-weapon warheads from European territory could contribute positively to creating the conditions for the construction of further nuclear-weapon-free zones, thereby contributing to the fulfilment of the non-proliferation and disarmament obligations contained in the NPT, and, in the meantime, setting a precedent for further nuclear disarmament;

12.  Commends the establishment of nuclear-free zones as a positive step towards a nuclear-free world; takes the view, in this regard, that a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East would be of fundamental importance for the achievement of lasting and comprehensive peace in the region; expresses, in this context, grave disappointment at the failure to hold the NPT-mandated 2012 conference on the establishment of a WMD-free zone in the Middle East;

13.  Supports further efforts to strengthen the mandate of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), including the generalisation of the Additional Protocols to the IAEA Safeguard Agreements and other steps designed to develop confidence-building measures;

14.  Believes that the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), otherwise known as the Iran Nuclear Deal, was a notable achievement for multilateral diplomacy, and for European diplomacy in particular, which should not only make a substantial improvement in EU-Iran relations possible but also help to promote stability across the whole region; believes all sides are now responsible for ensuring its strict and full implementation; welcomes the establishment of the Joint Commission composed of representatives of Iran and the E3/EU+3 (China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States), with the VP/HR; fully supports the VP/HR in her role as coordinator of the Joint Commission established under the JCPOA, and believes that strict and full implementation of the JCPOA continues to be of utmost importance;

15.  Condemns the latest nuclear tests conducted by the DPKR and the rejection by that country of the various UN Security Council resolutions, including the most recent of 2 March 2016 (2070); urges the DPRK to refrain from further provocative actions by abandoning its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner, to cease all related activities and to comply immediately with all its international obligations, including the resolutions of the UN Security Council and the IAEA Board of Governors, as well as other international disarmament and non-proliferation norms and to return to the negotiating table; calls on the DPRK to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty without delay; affirms its desire for a diplomatic and political solution to the DPRK nuclear issue; urges China in its role as a permanent member of the UN Security Council to exert consistent pressure on the DPRK;

16.  Welcomes the inclusion of non-proliferation of WMD clauses in the EU’s agreements with third countries and action plans; points out that such measures must be implemented by all the EU’s partner countries without exception;

17.  Welcomes the presentation of the EU Global Strategy and urges the EEAS, as a follow-up measure, to update and expand the 2003 EU Strategy against proliferation of WMD and the 2009 New Lines of Action, taking into account the issues and problems described above, with a view to making the EU a driving force in strengthening and taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation agreements;

18.  Welcomes regular engagements with these topics via the EU Non-Proliferation Consortium and other civil society organisations and think tanks, and invites the EU Non-Proliferation Consortium to broaden its agenda and include disarmament considerations on an equal footing;

19.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Member States, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council, the Commission, the UN Secretary-General, the UN High Commissioner for Disarmament Affairs, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation and the Director-General of the IAEA.