MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework and own resources
25.5.2018 - (2018/2714(RSP))
pursuant to Rule 123(2) of the Rules of Procedure
Younous Omarjee on behalf of the GUE/NGL Group
B8‑0241/2018
European Parliament resolution on the 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework and own resources
The European Parliament,
– having regard to Articles 311, 312 and 323 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),
– having regard to Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 1311/2013 of 2 December 2013 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2014-2020[1] and its subsequent amendment by Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 2017/1123 of 20 June 2017[2],
– having regard to Articles 106a and 171 of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community,
– having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 2 December 2013 between the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary matters and on sound financial management[3],
– having regard to Council Decision 2014/335/EU, Euratom of 26 May 2014 on the system of own resources of the European Union[4],
– having regard to Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 608/2014 of 26 May 2014 laying down implementing measures for the system of own resources of the European Union[5],
– having regard to Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 609/2014 of 26 May 2014 on the methods and procedure for making available the traditional, VAT and GNI-based own resources and on the measures to meet cash requirements[6],
– having regard to its resolution of 6 July 2016 on ‘Preparation of the post-electoral revision of the MFF 2014-2020: Parliament’s input ahead of the Commission’s proposal’[7],
– having regard to the Commission’s Reflection Paper of 28 June 2017 on the Future of EU Finances (COM(2017)0358),
– having regard to its resolution of 24 October 2017 on the Reflection Paper on the Future of EU Finances[8],
– having regard to UN General Assembly Resolution 70/1 of 25 September 2015, entitled ‘Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development’,
– having regard to the ratification of the Paris Agreement by the European Parliament and the Council on 4 October 2016[9],
– having regard to its resolution of 19 January 2017 on a European Pillar of Social Rights[10],
– having regard to the Commission communication of 17 October 2017 on ‘A stronger and renewed strategic partnership with the EU’s outermost regions’ (COM(2017)0623),
– having regard to the Commission communication of 21 September 2017 entitled ‘A Fair and Efficient Tax System in the European Union for the Digital Single Market’ (COM(2017)0547),
– having regard to its resolution of 29 March 2007 on the future of the European Union’s own resources[11],
– having regard to its resolution of 8 June 2011 entitled ‘Investing in the future: a new Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) for a competitive, sustainable and inclusive Europe’[12],
– having regard to its resolution of 15 April 2014 entitled ‘Negotiations on the MFF 2014‑2020: lessons to be learned and the way forward’[13],
– having regard to its resolution of 16 April 2014 on the draft Council decision on the system of own resources[14],
– having regard to its resolution of 17 December 2014 on the system of the European Communities’ own resources[15],
– having regard to its resolution of 6 July 2016 on the preparation of the post-electoral revision of the MFF 2014-2020[16],
– having regarding to the report of December 2016 entitled ‘Future financing of the EU – final report and recommendations of the High Level Group on Own Resources’,
– having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgets and the opinions of the Committee on International Trade, the Committee on Budgetary Control, the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety, the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development and the Committee on Constitutional Affairs (A8-0041/2018),
– having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgets, the opinions of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Development, the Committee on Budgetary Control, the position in the form of amendments of the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs, and the opinions of the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety, the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy, the Committee on Transport and Tourism, the Committee on Regional Development, the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development, the Committee on Fisheries, the Committee on Culture and Education, the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, the Committee on Constitutional Affairs and the Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (A8-0048/2018),
– having regard to Rule 123(2) of its Rules of Procedure,
A. whereas the effects of the economic and social crisis which hit the Member States in 2007/2008 are still being felt, and whereas social, economic and territorial inequalities and differences persist between Member States; whereas the EU budget should promote public investment by supporting productive and strategic sectors (including their modernisation and sustainability), public services, the creation of jobs that protect workers’ rights, the fight against poverty and against social exclusion and inequalities, the protection of the environment and the full use of the potential of each country and region, as well as the pursuit of external relations based on solidarity, cooperation, mutual respect and peace;
B. whereas the 2014-2020 MFF quickly proved its inadequacy in addressing the established needs, in particular, those arising from the massively disproportionate debt burden, which is a consequence of, and has been exacerbated by, the asymmetric policies and nature of the integration process, whereby some countries profit while others have been forced into serious economic depression; whereas the debt burden has been used as a pretext for imposing austerity, which in turn has deepened the recession and undermined the social function of the state, as well as peoples’ and workers’ rights, and subsequently led to rising unemployment, poverty, deep wage cuts, a higher pension age and lower public spending in areas such as education, culture and health; whereas the 2014-2020 MFF has been drawn on to address a series of emerging crises and challenges in areas which had not been accounted for, such as the extremely uneven economic development and debt burden, high unemployment, declining social and labour rights, and rising socio-economic inequalities, and has failed to make a break with the policies currently pursued by the EU and shift towards policies – at both national and EU level – which strengthen the Member States’ efforts to create prosperity for all, a fair distribution of wealth, sustainable economic growth, full employment, employment security and social protection, the provision of quality, universal and free public services, environmental well-being residing in a healthy natural environment, investment in education and infrastructure, a life of dignity for elderly people, and affordable housing, energy and communications; whereas, to achieve such objectives, holistic policies to combat poverty, social exclusion and income inequalities, namely through redistributive policies, and job-creating public investment, would be vital at both EU and Member State level;
C. whereas the multiannual financial framework of the Union echoes the neoliberal and austerity-oriented policies which have been imposed through the economic governance framework, widened the socio-economic inequalities within and between the Member States, and increased the number of people at risk of poverty and social exclusion; whereas labour market deregulation and regressive tax systems have contributed to the transfer of wealth from the workers to the large capitalists and exacerbated the income and wealth gap; whereas the economic governance framework has removed policy choices from the hands of democratically elected governments and national parliaments, preventing the peoples of Europe from exerting democratic control, and leading to institutionalised austerity; whereas the growing opposition to this kind of European integration reflects the urgent need for a different integration process, one which serves social and democratic progress in the EU, fair and peaceful solutions to international challenges, and worldwide cultural dialogue, and which is firmly based on cooperation between countries on an equal footing;
D. whereas unanimity rule should remain as a guarantee of a positive MFF for all Member States and not just for some; advocates increasing the autonomous and flexible management capacity of the new MFF for each Member State by rejecting greater centralisation and excessive bureaucracy as regards the common rules of its application;
E. whereas the Commission presented its package of proposals on a Modern Budget for a Union that Protects, Empowers and Defends: The Multiannual Financial Framework for 2021-2027, including future own resources, on 2 May 2018, while Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 1311/2013 stipulated that the proposals should have been delivered before 1 January 2018; whereas the values proclaimed as the basis for EU solidarity, sustainable growth and integration – namely democracy and participation, equality, social justice, and respect for the rule of law and human rights – are undermined in this proposal; whereas the budgetary choices proposed by the Commission do not reflect the priorities needed to stimulate sustainable, qualitative and socially balanced growth, nor do they take account of the need for solidarity and economic and social cohesion between Member States;
F. whereas the Commission’s proposals on a Modern Budget for a Union that Protects, Empowers and Defends: The Multiannual Financial Framework for 2021-2027, including future own resources, do not address the Union’s extremely uneven economic development and debt burden, high unemployment, declining social and labour rights, and rising socio-economic inequalities; whereas it is essential that there be a break with the policies currently pursued by the EU and a shift towards policies – at both national and EU level – which strengthen the Member States’ efforts to create prosperity for all, a fair distribution of wealth, sustainable economic growth, full employment, employment security and social protection, the provision of quality, universal and free public services, environmental well-being residing in a healthy natural environment, investment in education and infrastructure, a life of dignity for elderly people, and affordable housing, energy and communications;
G. whereas the Commission’s package of proposals on a Modern Budget for a Union that Protects, Empowers and Defends: The Multiannual Financial Framework for 2021-2027, including future own resources, insists on keeping and supporting the current tax structures, which favour large capitalists rather than the working class and the people; whereas harsh fiscal discipline measures and heavy losses of government revenue resulting from tax evasion and avoidance put further pressure on Member States’ budgets and undermine the interests of the people and workers;
H. whereas the climate crisis, as well as loss of biodiversity, continue to pose a threat to the stability, health and livelihood of societies all over the world, as well as to animal welfare; whereas the commitments made at the COP 21 UN Climate Change Conference, although ambitious on the surface, should be extensively enhanced in the right direction;
I. whereas European migration policies, instead of encouraging solidarity between the Member States and the countries most affected by the world refugee crisis, i.e. the poorest countries in the world, create double standards for migration between nationals of the North and those of the South, worsening the situation in the poorest countries, and are increasingly marked by racist and xenophobic criteria;
For a truly progressive social, peaceful, inclusive, ecological and feminist Europe
1. Recalls that the EU’s next MFF should be embedded in a strategy of economic, social and territorial cohesion and support to sustainable agriculture, so as to benefit all its people; considers that the next MFF should contribute to an environmentally sound and socially fairer Europe; rejects in this regard the proposal put forward by the Commission on 2 May 2018 for a new MFF which heralds the decline of cohesion policy and endorses a Fortress Europe removed from the concerns of its citizens;
2. Emphasises that the goals and policies of the MFF should be agreed before figures are assigned to them, and stresses that Parliament and the Council should hold fully fledged negotiations on all MFF-related aspects prior to assigning figures and making final adjustments to the entire MFF package; recalls that, in accordance with Articles 312(5) and 324 TFEU, Parliament must be properly involved in the process of negotiating the next MFF; calls on the Commission and the European Council to conduct transparent negotiations with it in good faith; stresses that it is the only parliament that has a say on the expenditure side but not on the revenue side, and reiterates its call for this democratic anomaly to be corrected;
3. Rejects the cuts to cohesion policy and the common agricultural policy (CAP); calls, therefore, for continuous and increased support for the objective of redressing the wealth gap between richer and poorer regions, as well as income disparities between various social groups in the context of the next programming period;
4. Opposes any nominal or relative decrease in the volume of the EU budget in the next MFF; believes that a substantial increase in the EU budget is necessary, with the aim of strengthening its redistributive role, and thus contributing to the implementation of the principle of economic and social cohesion; considers that this reinforcement should be achieved by increasing Member States’ contributions on the basis of their gross national income (GNI) by strengthening, through redistribution, the key principle that Member States with the highest GNI should contribute proportionately more, contributing to effective economic and social cohesion, and not to wider disparities in the European Union;
5. Defends the need for an adequate redistribution of EU budget resources among the Member States, taking into account their respective levels of economic and social development; rejects the increased centralisation of EU budget spending by the Commission and supports an increase in the resources managed at national level in accordance with each country’s needs;
6. Calls for a strong and new socio-ecological public investment plan at EU level, in order to contribute to a fair transition in social and environmental terms; considers that the structural funds and the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAFG), among others, should be included in this new investment plan, that programmes such as Horizon 2020 should be orientated to research, innovation and technological change in order to make the production model more sustainable, and that COSME should guarantee that aid reaches the social economy, which is independent of big companies, given that, in the framework of interconnected companies, many SMEs are tools of core companies (being subsidiaries, subcontractors, franchises or auxiliary companies);calls for any EU resources used as a guarantee or as a public partial contribution to be clearly identified as such, including in the case of the European Stability Mechanism, which should be reviewed in the sense of it becoming a core financial instrument for this new socio-ecological public investment plan, with the aim of reinforcing direct public investment;
European strategic investments
7. Considers that some specific MFF ceilings must be increased significantly, i.e. those which have the potential for turning the MFF into a flexible and organised system of EU programmes designed to address specifically the lack of real economic convergence, reduce the inequality gap, foster investment in changing the production model, address the climate challenge, and improve cooperation among the peoples of Europe;
8. Believes that the increase in the Community budget should result in stronger public investment and increased support to the productive sectors, a reduction in countries’ multiple structural dependencies, the creation of jobs that protect workers’ rights, quality public services, and full use of countries’ potential; stresses that any conditionality in the application of Community funds should be rejected;
9. Urges the Commission to recognise the detrimental impact of Brexit on the rights and economic security of citizens, and to use the opportunity of the 2021-2027 MFF to address the potential harmful effect by putting in place resources to mitigate the impact on Member States and regions most effected;
10. Considers that the necessary resources must be earmarked in the next MFF to bring about economic, social, and territorial cohesion in the EU’s outermost regions, as well as to implement the specific measures for those regions laid out in Article 349 TFEU (and never fully implemented), in keeping with the aims and principles set out in Parliament’s resolution of 6 July 2017 on ‘promoting cohesion and development in the outermost regions of the EU: implementation of Article 349 of the TFEU’[17], as well as in the Commission communication on ‘a stronger and renewed strategic partnership with the EU’s outermost regions’; insists that no programmes or funds benefiting the outermost regions be subject to cuts in the next MFF but that, on the contrary, they be reinforced;
11. Considers that the weight of cohesion policy in the total EU budget should be considerably strengthened in the post-2020 period, as the Cohesion Fund and structural funds should play an effective role in combating asymmetries between and within Member States;
12. Welcomes the commitment in the Commission’s MFF proposal to continue essential European Regional Development Funds for Ireland, north and south, post-Brexit; recognises that this represents a substantial demonstration of the European Union’s commitment to the Good Friday Agreement;
Economic and monetary issues
13. Believes that there is a consensus which accepts that the MFF has been overcome by the facts; understands that the MFF has had a clear role in limiting and restraining expenditure, considering its volume and restriction to within the headings of the EU budget for the seven years of its duration, with little room for manoeuvre; believes that spending ceilings, small margins of flexibility among budget headings and the deficit ban contribute to making the MFF a pro-cyclical economic mechanism instead of a countercyclical one which, in the event of recession, would allow the EU budget to reactivate the EU economy and gain compensation in the prosperity cycle; is of the opinion that the MFF must play a countercyclical role from now on;
14. Strongly criticises the overarching direction of the Commission’s MFF proposal for 2021-2027; observes that new priorities have clearly been given precedence over traditional, socially beneficial programmes, despite the lack of detailed information regarding the restructuring of the European budget and directly comparable figures; deeply deplores the continuing trend towards an ever greater use of financial instruments at the expense of grants, despite the broadly recognised lack of accountability and transparency inherent to their use;
15. Rejects the priority given to financial instruments and investment in public-private partnerships; considers that the future MFF should instead promote the strengthening of public investment by supporting strategic productive sectors, their modernisation and sustainability, the creation of jobs that protect workers’ rights, the fight against poverty and against social exclusion and inequalities, the protection of the environment and the achievement of the full potential of each country and region;
16. Strongly rejects the subordination of cohesion policy to the structural reforms imposed under EU economic governance, as cohesion policy should not be used as an instrument of financial punishment for Member States or regions that reject policies of deregulation and privatisation;
17. Calls for the creation of support programmes for Member States wishing to negotiate an exit from the euro on the grounds that participation has become unsustainable and unbearable; considers that these programmes should provide for adequate compensation for the social and economic damage caused by joining the single currency;
People, social cohesion and values
18. Believes that Europe has a responsibility to offer the prospect of a better future to the younger generation, which will suffer from the disastrous impact of the economic policies adopted in the Union in recent decades; is determined to substantially scale up its flagship programme Erasmus+, which should benefit all young Europeans and not mainly those students who can afford to spend time abroad, this being a programme which at present cannot satisfy the very high demand from top-quality applicants because of its very low level of funding under the current budget; proposes that the budget for Erasmus+ should at a minimum be tripled in the next MFF and that at least half of this funding should be earmarked for young people from the poorest social classes;
19. Firmly rejects any kind of macroeconomic conditionality in the application of EU funds; highlights the risks associated with the creation of forms of political conditionality and rejects them as well;
20. Calls for increased funding for programmes to promote employment with rights and for the social inclusion of young people, ensuring that EU funds do not contribute to the creation of unpaid internships, precarious working conditions or the replacement of permanent jobs with temporary work or unremunerated internships;
Natural Resources and Environment
21. Firmly calls for an agriculture and fisheries policy to be increased in financial terms, changing the model of grants in favour of landlords; stresses that this entails the development of a new policy for promoting food sovereignty, local agriculture and cooperatives, and a change towards a more sustainable agricultural model, guaranteeing the supply of food to consumers through public companies and avoiding the subordination of small farmers to the large distribution sector; believes that the fisheries policy should take into account the exhaustion of the oceans and incorporate self-containment into the exploitation of seas;
Agriculture
22. Emphasises the need for a public CAP that prioritises the internal market, that places remunerative prices at the heart of the agricultural policy and that establishes instruments for the regulation of markets and production; rejects any attempt to renationalise CAP costs; stresses the need for mechanisms for the public regulation of production and markets in order to ensure fair prices for producers and a stable and fair income for farmers;
23. Calls for a renewed focus on one of the founding principles of the CAP, ‘to ensure a fair standard of living for farmers’, in order to combat the increased concentration of production, the reduction of small-scale farming and the increase in regional asymmetries and the dependence on foreign goods, which favour the biggest EU economies and large agri-businesses; regrets the fact that this phenomenon is putting at risk agricultural and rural heritage of global importance, while large agri-businesses are expanding their margins and imposing their model of a global food system, with destructive environmental consequences; emphasises the central role of farmers in agricultural and food policy;
24. Takes the view that since the inception of the CAP the policy has not delivered on one of its founding principles: ‘to ensure a fair standard of living for those working the land’; believes that in the upcoming reform there must be a renewed focus on this core principle in order to combat the increased concentration of production and the reduction of small-scale farming, which exacerbates the depopulation of the countryside; strongly opposes the market domination and unfair price-setting by large agri-food businesses at the expense of food safety, quality and sovereignty, human and animal health, animal welfare and the environment; stresses the importance fighting inequality in rural economies and facilitating generational renewal in the agricultural sector; calls on the Commission, on the eve of the upcoming CAP reform, to shift the focus of the current CAP, which is dominated by intensive farming and extensive monocultures, towards a sustainable agriculture and food policy, by taking into account the various economic, social, environmental, nutritional and health issues and challenges; regrets, therefore, the cuts to the agriculture budget; deeply regrets that the cuts are focused on vital rural development and agri-environment spending, rather than on less-targeted direct payments, believes these disproportionate cuts and the removal of ring-fenced money (so called ‘greening’) for the environment in Pillar 1 demonstrate that despite the rhetoric, there is a general move away from agri-environmental innovation and towards the embedding of long-term behaviours that cause agri-environmental problems; calls on the Commission to put in place measures to increase the visibility and enhance the role of women in the agricultural sector; strongly condemns land-grabbing and demands swift action from the Commission and the Member States; reaffirms that water is a universal right that should be guaranteed for every human being and should not be subject to privatisation; calls on the Commission to forbid all forms of seed patenting, in order to protect farmers from the pressures of competition caused by multinationals producing seeds, and to protect local varieties and our genetic and cultural heritage; calls on the Commission, in cooperation with the Member States, to forbid the authorisation, cultivation and marketing of GMOs and to include integrated pest management (IPM) as a conditionality in the new CAP to reduce the use of pesticides;
Maritime policy
25. Deplores the decrease in funding for the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund (EMFF) in the Commission’s 2021-2027 MFF proposal; urges the Commission to release more detailed and comparable figures to allow for more accurate assessment of the support being provided and the better targeting of future actions; urges the Commission to recognise the importance of the EMFF and to ensure it is well equipped financially to meet the expectations of coastal communities and the people affected, improve environmental sustainability and face the challenges arising from the depletion of stocks and the loss of biodiversity;
26. Calls for a reinforcement of the EMFF, which is primarily aimed at: supporting small-scale, coastal and artisanal fisheries; improving fleet security, working conditions, health and hygiene on board; ensuring future fish stocks; improving knowledge of state resources; and contributing to the scientific and technical capacity building of Member States’ R&D institutions; defends the creation of compensation and support mechanisms for fishermen’s incomes due to the instability associated with fishing activities; advocates the creation of a programme geared to the specific needs and difficulties of the outermost regions, recovering POSEI-fisheries and creating new POSEI transport links;
Migration
27. Considers, in light of the humanitarian emergency linked to the challenges with regard to the reception of migrants and refugees, that another policy is needed, focused on the protection of individuals, access to basic rights and services, humanitarian assistance and rescue operations; is deeply concerned, from this point of view, by the transfer of funds earmarked for the integration of the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) into the European Social Fund (ESF);
28. Is against any increase of funds for Frontex, especially in view of this agency’s involvement in return polices, border control and security measures; proposes, instead, the reallocation of these funds to an agency with the sole mandate of humanitarian support and search and rescue operations;
29. Reiterates its belief that EU funding for the reception and integration of migrants and asylum seekers should be substantially increased, in a shift from today’s priorities of border control and other costly security measures, such as administrative detention and large border control IT systems, which have not shown their effectiveness and often contravene the rights of migrants; calls on the Commission to allocate additional resources earmarked for specific actions primarily to Member States that volunteer for actions geared towards the reception and integration of migrants and asylum seekers, as proposed in the LIBE opinion for the 2016 budget;
30. Believes the positive impact of EU migration funds relies on processes at national and EU level which ensure transparency, effective monitoring and accountability; stresses the imperative to introduce monitoring and evaluation mechanisms, in itinere and not only ex post, which secure effective expenditure and assess whether the EU is attaining its policy objectives; calls therefore on the Commission to ensure that result indicators and measurable targets based on the activities undertaken are defined at policy and project levels; calls for the establishment of qualitative and quantitative indicators, which should be comparable and remain stable over time, in order to measure the impact of EU funds and the achievement of their objectives; stresses that quantified data should be collected systematically; believes that the European Court of Auditors should monitor projects throughout the budget cycle and not just at the end;
31. Believes that responsible authorities should ensure more transparency throughout the application process and that calls for tender should be widely disseminated and easily accessible; suggests that at Member State level, local and regional technical bodies could play an active role in this dissemination, as well as providing support in the application process; stresses that each year, the following information should be publicised by the Commission as regards the selected projects and programmes: the names and nature of all projects supported (avoiding generic titles that do not reflect the actual content, like ‘capacity-building’); the year of funding; the duration of the project; the amount of the EU’s contribution and the policy priority it addresses; the overall number of applicants for the call; the evaluation criteria; and the remaining amount of the EU contribution that has not been allocated;
32. Calls for EU development funds and humanitarian aid not to be linked to partner countries’ capacity and/or willingness to collaborate in migration control, for example through readmission clauses; insists that projects that run against the fundamental rights of migrants and give legitimacy to dictatorial regimes should not be supported;
33. Believes that civil society, including non-governmental organisations (NGOs), plays a significant role in safeguarding, promoting and implementing migrants’ rights; stresses that such NGOs should be supported in their role as watchdogs and promoters of fundamental rights, as direct service providers and as innovators in developing new tools and building the capacities of various stakeholders; calls, therefore, for the establishment of effective partnership principles for civil society organisations, securing their consultation in the preparation, planning, monitoring, implementation and evaluation of funding at both national and EU levels; highlights that such principles should be mandatory;
34. Believes that funds used for the reception and integration of migrants and asylum seekers should be exempt from EU deficit rules as laid out in the EU Stability and Growth Pact;
Security and defence
35. Rejects the creation of a European Defence Union and the activation of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), which harms the consensus principle of the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and common security and defence policy (CSDP), leading to an EU army and straight to more conflicts and less peace; opposes, therefore, any increase of Member State budgets for security and defence; insists that the EU and the Member States should work for peace, for diplomatic and peaceful conflict resolution, including through mediation initiatives, and for disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes in line with the United Nations Charter; supports the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and nuclear disarmament;
36. Firmly rejects the establishment of the European Defence Fund and the European Defence Industrial Development Programme (EDIDP), as well as the creation of the new heading V ‘Security and Defence’, from which the European Defence Fund will be financed after 2020; recalls that, in accordance with Article 41(2) of the Treaty on European Union, expenditure arising from operations having military or defence implications shall not be charged to the Union budget; denounces and deeply deplores the unprecedented speed with which the EU is being militarised; urges disarmament, including nuclear disarmament, the demobilisation of troops and an end to external military interventions; urges the dissolution of NATO; recalls that the best way to promote peace is to support measures on poverty eradication, humanitarian aid and sustainable and fair economic and social development; states that external cooperation should be based on the principle of international solidarity and on complete respect for each country’s desire for and pace of development;
Crisis response
37. Highlights the importance of the European Union Solidarity Fund (EUSF) for responding to major natural disasters and takes note of the proposed increase in commitments and payment appropriations for the EUSF; calls on the Commission to oversee a further increase in this fund and to adapt the rules to make its mobilisation more flexible and punctual, to cover a wider range of disasters with significant impacts and reduce the time between the disaster and the availability of funds;
External Action
38. Objects to the Commission’s proposal to merge almost all existing external instruments into one single instrument (the so-called ‘Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument’ (NDICI)), as this will further restrict and put at risk democratic oversight, traceability of funds and spending as well as parliamentary scrutiny;
39. Believes that the current EU funds for developing countries should be instruments that contribute to development and solidarity among peoples, not to the promotion and defence of the economic and financial interests of transnational corporations or to the political interests of EU powers;
Administration
40. Is concerned with its current human resources policy, bearing in mind that the challenges and workload are increasing for the EU institutions; notes that there is a lack of interpreters and translators, which is a problem for the preservation and defence of the principle of multilingualism and for the work of the delegations from different countries; rejects further cuts to human resources;
Other issues
41. Reiterates its conviction that a synchronisation of the financial programming with the mandate of the Commission and Parliament would increase democratic responsibility, accountability and legitimacy; welcomes the model of 5+5, with a revision process in the middle, if it is aligned with the economic cycle; notes that the MFF has so far been constructed in seven-years cycles, and that a new model of 5+5 could ensure political scrutiny by Parliament in each parliamentary term; highlights that it could also give more flexibility for change in the management of programmes, considering that economic cycles are shorter today than in the past, creating the opportunity to adopt an expansive MFF in periods of recession, and a more moderated approach in periods of economic boom, without sacrificing the stability of long-term programmes, which could continue for the full 10-year period;
Own Resources
42. Is of the opinion that effective measures against corruption and tax evasion by multinationals and the wealthiest individuals would make it possible to return to the Member States’ budgets an amount estimated by the Commission at one trillion euros per year, and that in this field there has been a serious lack of action by the European Union; points to the urgent need to set up a European authority to combat tax evasion and tax fraud;
43. Believes that a fairer and more progressive Europe can only be achieved if the EU overhauls itself so as to respond more fully to citizens’ expectations with regard to solidarity, cohesion, asylum, environmental and biodiversity protection, greening of the economy and energy production, and support for research, education and social progress; considers that only an income system based on genuine own resources coming from the taxation of the biggest fortunes, financial transactions and the most polluting industries could allow for adequate financing of the Union’s action in these domains;
44. Calls in this regard for the introduction of taxes on the financial sector and large digital multinationals, the introduction of a common corporate tax base as well as a carbon border tax, in order to achieve an autonomous, fairer, more transparent, simpler and more equitable financial system which can be better understood by the citizens and make clearer its contribution to the EU budget;
45. Recalls the possibility of implementing coordinated measures of taxation between the different Member States, directed towards big capital and for the benefit of the people, the workers and countries; rejects the development of a ‘European tax policy’;
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46. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States and the other institutions and bodies concerned.
- [1] OJ L 347, 20.12.2013, p. 884.
- [2] OJ L 163, 24.6.2017, p. 1.
- [3] OJ C 373, 20.12.2013, p. 1.
- [4] OJ L 168, 7.6.2014, p. 105.
- [5] OJ L 168, 7.6.2014, p. 29.
- [6] OJ L 168, 7.6.2014, p. 39.
- [7] Texts adopted, P8_TA(2016)0309.
- [8] Texts adopted, P8_TA(2017)0401.
- [9] Texts adopted, P8_TA(2016)0363.
- [10] Texts adopted, P8_TA(2017)0010.
- [11] OJ C 27E , 31.1.2008, p. 214.
- [12] OJ C 380E , 11.12.2012, p. 89.
- [13] Texts adopted, P7_TA(2014)0378.
- [14] Texts adopted, P7_TA(2014)0432.
- [15] Texts adopted, P8_TA(2014)0097.
- [16] Texts adopted, P8_TA(2016)0309.
- [17] Texts adopted, P8_TA(2017)0316.