MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the application of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092, the rule-of-law conditionality mechanism
17.3.2021 - (2021/2582(RSP))
pursuant to Rule 132(2) of the Rules of Procedure
Bogdan Rzońca, Ryszard Czarnecki, Jadwiga Wiśniewska, Zbigniew Kuźmiuk, Ryszard Antoni Legutko, Raffaele Fitto, Adam Bielan, Joachim Stanisław Brudziński, Jorge Buxadé Villalba, Angel Dzhambazki, Carlo Fidanza, Anna Fotyga, Krzysztof Jurgiel, Karol Karski, Izabela‑Helena Kloc, Joanna Kopcińska, Zdzisław Krasnodębski, Elżbieta Kruk, Beata Mazurek, Andżelika Anna Możdżanowska, Tomasz Piotr Poręba, Nicola Procaccini, Elżbieta Rafalska, Jacek Saryusz‑Wolski, Beata Szydło, Dominik Tarczyński, Grzegorz Tobiszowski, Valdemar Tomaševski, Witold Jan Waszczykowski, Kosma Złotowski
on behalf of the ECR Group
B9‑0207/2021
European Parliament resolution on the application of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092, the rule-of-law conditionality mechanism
The European Parliament,
– having regard to Articles 2, 5, 7 and 15 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU),
– having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget[1],
– having regard to Opinion No 1/2018 of the Court of Auditors concerning the proposal of 2 May 2018 for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of the Union’s budget in case of generalised deficiencies as regards the rule of law in the Member States[2],
– having regard to the conclusions of the European Council adopted on 11 December 2020[3],
– having regard to Rule 132(2) of its Rules of Procedure,
A. whereas the Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities;
B. whereas the limits of Union competences are governed by the principle of conferral, which, as a consequence, means that competences not conferred upon the Union in the Treaties remain with the Member States;
C. whereas Article 2 TEU does not confer any material competence upon the Union, but only lists certain values that ought to be respected by both the institutions of the Union and by its Member States when they act within the limits of the powers conferred on the Union in the Treaties, and without affecting their limits;
D. whereas Article 2 is not a directly effective provision and may not be pursued under the procedures set out in Articles 258-260 and 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU);
E. whereas a breach of the values of the Union, including the rule of law, may be invoked against a Member State only when it acts on a matter for which the Union has competence on the basis of specific competence-setting Treaty provisions;
F. whereas respect of the rule of law by the Member States cannot be the subject of an action by the institutions of the Union, irrespective of the existence of a specific material competence to frame this action, with the sole exception of the procedure described in Article 7 TEU;
G. whereas only Article 7 TEU provides for a Union competence to supervise the application of the rule of law, as a value of the Union, in a context that is not related to a specific material competence or that exceeds its scope;
H. whereas Article 7 TEU does not set a basis to further develop or amend the procedure described therein;
I. whereas the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice in regard to the rule of law is limited solely to reviewing respect of the procedural stipulations contained in Article 7 TEU and solely at the request of the Member State concerned;
J. whereas the EU institutions have no competence to adopt any definition of the values listed in Article 2 TEU, in particular of the notion of the rule of law, as they were not given this competence in the Treaties;
K. whereas in the absence of the relevant competence, the institutions would, by adopting such a definition, be in breach of the Treaties and the definition would be contrary to the Treaties;
L. whereas the European Council shall provide the Union with the necessary impetus for its development and shall define the general political directions and priorities thereof;
M. whereas the European Council is justified to adopt conclusions in the exercise of its competence under Article 15 TEU to provide impetus for the Union’s development;
N. whereas the conclusions are neither in conflict with the Regulation, nor do they contradict or amend it;
O. whereas it is not unprecedented or unusual for the Commission to adopt Guidelines setting out how it will apply and implement legislation in a certain area, and there is nothing illegal in the Commission’s choice to develop and adopt Guidelines for the Regulation;
P. whereas all interpretations set out in the Guidelines will be statements of how the Commission understands the Regulation;
Q. whereas the Commission is independent in carrying out its responsibilities and, until the Guidelines are finalised, it may decide not to propose measures under the Regulation;
1. Stresses that Article 7 TEU offers the only possibility for the EU to intervene authoritatively in matters related to respect by the Member States of the Union’s values as such; emphasises that Article 7 TEU is complete and exhaustive;
2. Considers it legally unacceptable to introduce a de facto new rule-of-law control mechanism, even if its purpose is to protect the EU budget; points out that this does not prevent the adoption of acts and measures to protect the budget as such;
3. Recalls the Commission’s declaration which confirms that in applying the Regulation the Commission will be committed to the European Council conclusions of 11 December 2020; recalls that the Commission intends to develop and adopt Guidelines on the way it will apply the Regulation;
4. Notes the agreement that the Regulation will apply only in relation to budgetary commitments starting under the new Multiannual Financial Framework;
5. Notes the agreement that the Commission will not propose measures under the Regulation until the Guidelines are finalised;
6. Further notes the agreement that the Guidelines will be developed in close consultation with the Member States, and that the Guidelines will be finalised only after the Court of Justice has delivered its judgment so as to incorporate any relevant elements stemming from such judgment;
7. Invites the Court of Justice to declare the Regulation void after conducting fair and impartial proceedings;
8. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.
- [1] OJ L 433I, 22.12.2020, p. 1.
- [2] OJ C 291, 17.8.2018, p. 1.
- [3] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/47296/1011-12-20-euco-conclusions-en.pdf