MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the current situation in Chad

18.5.2021 - (2021/2695(RSP))

with request for inclusion in the agenda for a debate on cases of breaches of human rights, democracy and the rule of law
pursuant to Rule 144 of the Rules of Procedure

Michèle Rivasi, Mounir Satouri, Piernicola Pedicini, Katrin Langensiepen, Pierrette Herzberger‑Fofana, Erik Marquardt, Ignazio Corrao, Hannah Neumann, Bronis Ropė, Francisco Guerreiro
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

See also joint motion for a resolution RC-B9-0290/2021

B9‑0290/2021

European Parliament resolution on the current situation in Chad

(2021/2695(RSP))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Chad,

_ having regard to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights of 1981,

_ having regard to the African Charter on Democracy Elections and Governance of 30th January 2007,

_ having regard to the Cotonou Agreement of 2000 between the European Union and the ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific) countries,

_ having regard to the Khartoum process signed in 2014 between the European Union and African countries, including Chad,

_ having regard to the Chadian constitution of December  2020,

_  having regard to the statements by the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy dated 21 and 27 April 2021,

_ having regard to the report of the African Union fact-finding mission to Chad from 29 April to 5 May 2021;

1. whereas on 18 April 2021, one day after he was proclaimed the winner of the presidential election, handing him a sixth term in office, the national army declared that Chad's President Idriss Déby has died of his injuries following clashes with rebels in the north of the country;
2. whereas following the death of Idriss Déby, the Transitional Military Council (TMC) organised an unconstitutional transfer of power and installed a transitional government headed by Mahamat Idriss Déby, the son of the Chadian president; whereas the TMC suspended the Constitution, dissolved the government and the National Assembly; whereas the TMC set up a  ‘transitional charter’ in place of the Constitution for a period of 18 months, renewable once;
3. whereas, the Chadian Constitution provides that in the event of a vacancy in power or the permanent incapacity of the head of state (Article 81, 82), an interim presidency would be exercised by the president of the National Assembly, who must organise elections within a period of 45 to 90 days; whereas most of the political opposition and civil society considered the seizure of power by the TMC as a coup d’état;
4. whereas the TMC rejected the proposal by the rebel armed groups of the Front for Change and Concord in Chad (FACT) to cease fire and hold negotiations; whereas on 10th May, the Chadian army announced the end of operations against rebels of the FACT;
5. whereas the African Union (AU), in its report on its fact-finding mission to Chad from 29 April to 5 May 2021 recommends to reiterate the commitment and unwavering condemnation and rejection of any unconstitutional change of government; whereas the report underlines the imperative of drafting a viable and universally acceptable Constitution for Chad and considers the Transitional Charter as inadequate to guarantee the political and civil rights of the population during the transition period; whereas several AU member countries are advocating for sanctions against Chad;
6. whereas many Chadians responded to calls for demonstrations against the coup d’état by political parties and civil society organisations within the Wakit Tama movement; whereas several protests erupted in the streets of N'Djamena and other urban centers in the country; whereas the military forces reacted by firing live ammunition on demonstrators resulting in several deaths and hundreds arrested and repression unanimously condemned by human rights organisations and the international community, including the African Union and the European Union; whereas the Wakit Tama movement calls for new protests on 19th May;
7. Whereas civil society in Chad have produced a comprehensive transition plan towards the end of the crisis, underlining the imperative necessity for the international community to accompany the country towards a return to democratic stability; whereas civil society have advised international support should take the form of a stabilisation mechanism aiming at reinstating constitutional order and supporting the transition plan, including by monitoring the implementation of resolutions adopted during the inclusive national dialogue; whereas the first urgent action required of the international community is to ensure the deployment of a monitoring and mediation mission to the country;
8. whereas Chad is among the 5 worst authoritarian regimes in the world; whereas fundamental freedoms and human rights were already threatened before the dead of former president Deby and subsequent crisis; whereas several opposition candidates such as Succès Masra or Yaya Dillo Djérou were prevented from standing in the last presidential elections of 11th April 2021 while other opponents such as Saleh Kebzabo boycotted the elections because of their non-transparent nature; whereas during the electoral campaign, opposition and civil society demonstrations were systematically banned by the regime in power; whereas on 28 February 2021, the home of opposition politician Yaya Dillo Djerou was attacked with heavy weapons by the Chadian presidential guard, leaving five people close to Yaya Dillo dead, including his mother and son;
9. whereas Chadian economy has been heavily dependent on oil with the sector providing about 97% of export revenues and 62% of the government revenues; whereas despite being an oil producing country Chad is currently ranked 187 out of 189 on the Human Development Index (HDI) and 66.2 % of its population of 15.5 million live in severe poverty, with 5.1 million people food insecure during the upcoming lean season;
10. whereas Deby’s government has almost systematically used Chad's abundant oil resources to fuel military spendings not to combat poverty; whereas former Déby’s government received significant international support for its role in the fight against armed Islamist groups in the Sahel and Lake Chad basin; whereas Chad has committed 1,200 troops to the G5 Sahel Joint Force; whereas, for the period 2014-2020 the European Union has mobilised €4.5 billion for the G5 Sahel countries and recently allocated additional €112 million to help them strengthen their security and defence capabilities;
11. whereas the capital Ndjamena is the headquarters of the French military operation Barkhane with 5100 men; whereas France still supports the transitional regime imposed by the TMC in its fight against the FACT rebels, providing it with military cooperation, logistical support and intelligence;
12. whereas the 11th European Development Fund (EDF) allocated €542 million to Chad for the 2014-2020 funding period for supporting the implementation of reforms to strengthen governance; whereas the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa allocated EUR 10 millions to Chad for security and border management;
13. whereas the European Union committed in its Integrated Strategy in the Sahel,  adopted by the Council on 16 April 2021, to supporting key moments for democracy in the region, to paying specific political attention to efforts in the areas of governance and the rule of law and to continuing to call for internal security forces to have a more central role in strengthening trust between people and the State;
14. whereas since February 2019 EUCAP Sahel Mali has been extended to Chad to provide strategic advice and training activities to internal security forces and the mandate of EUTM Mali has been extended in March 2020 to provide advice and training to national armed forces of the G5 Sahel countries including Chad;

1. Condemns the military coup d'état perpetrated on 20 April 2021 by the TMC and the subsequent suspension of the Chadian Constitution, the dissolution of the National Assembly and the government; condemns the unconstitutional nature of this seizure of power and the establishment of a charter by the TMC which has not been subject to democratic consultation;
2. Calls for a return to constitutional order as provided for in the Chadian Constitution, the withdrawal of the Transitional Military Council (TMC), the establishment of a civilian-led transition, and the organisation of free and transparent elections as soon as possible;
3. Condemns the restriction of the right to demonstrate and the use of violence by the TMC against demonstrators in protests against the coup d'état of 20 April 2021; calls on the establishment of an independent and impartial commission of enquiry to investigate into the abuses committed during the demonstrations and any human rights violations that may have occurred, including the apparent use of unnecessary or disproportionate force to disperse protests;
4. Calls for the immediate release of all peaceful demonstrators arrested during the marches organised by the opposition and civil society to protest against the coup d’état;
5. Calls on the HR/VP, EU delegation and EU missions in Chad to ensure the full implementation of the EU Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders and the EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy, including by observing protests and by providing the requested support identified in civil society’s transition plan towards the end of the crisis;
6.  Calls on the European Commission, the EEAS and the EU Special representative for the Sahel to unequivocally condemn the illegal seizure of power and to immediately require respect for the constitutional order and immediate democratic transition in Chad according to constitutional rules;
7. Insists that preserving the lives of the civilian population must come first; in this regard, calls for an immediate official ceasefire alongside the announcement of the end of the fighting between the Chadian armed forces and the FACT rebels; calls for negotiations to be held between the authorities and the rebels; encourages the European Union and the African Union to play a role in the negotiation process;
8. Underlines that the important role that Chad plays in the fight against terrorism and the preservation of security in sub-Saharan Africa in no way justifies the violation of the Chadian democratic and constitutional framework or of international treaties;
9. Stresses the importance of increasing the representativeness and accountability of the armed forces in Chad and to ensure that civil society can safely document human rights abuses committed by members of the armed forces without facing threats;
10. Calls on all EU member states’ military forces present on Chadian soil and in the Sahel region, including France, to adopt strict neutrality in Chad's internal affairs;
11. Calls on EU member states to freeze the financial assets on their soil for the perpetrators of the coup d'état of 20 April 2021, in particular for Mahamat Idriss Deby Itno and the other members of the TMC;
12. Calls for an evaluation of the EU funding allocated to Chad, in particular through the Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, in order to assess that the funds allocated have not been misused, in particular for military purposes; overall, calls on the European Commission to be more transparent in the allocation of resources from the Emergency Trust Fund for Africa and to ensure that such flexible funding mechanisms, is financed in full from the Union budget and allow for democratic oversight and scrutiny of the European Parliament; calls for an evaluation of the activities in Chad of the EU CSDP missions;
13. Calls on the European Commission to open a procedure under Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement, leading to possible sanctions against Chad;
14. Calls on the European Union, its member states and the international community to urgently respond to the humanitarian situation arising from the crisis in Chad and to provide the country with the necessary assistance to rapidly address its urgent needs for the necessary protection of IDPs and refugees;
15. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the EEAS, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission, the parliaments and governments of the Member States, the Co-Presidents of the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly, the African Union Commission and the Pan-African Parliament and the current political structure having taken power in Chad;