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*Plenary sitting*

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**B9-0292/2021**

18.5.2021

## MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION

with request for inclusion in the agenda for a debate on cases of breaches of human rights, democracy and the rule of law

pursuant to Rule 144 of the Rules of Procedure

on the situation in Chad  
(2021/2695(RSP))

**Pedro Marques, Andrea Cozzolino, Maria Arena**  
on behalf of the S&D Group

**European Parliament resolution on the situation in Chad  
(2021/2695(RSP))**

*The European Parliament,*

- #- having regard to its previous resolution on EU-African security cooperation in the Sahel region, West Africa and the Horn of Africa of 16 September 2020,
- having regard the statement by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the death of President Idriss Déby Itno of 20 April 2021,
  - having regard the statement by the Spokesperson for the UN Secretary-General on Chad of 20 April 2021,
  - having regard the Communiqué issued by the President of France and the President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo on the situation in Chad of 27 April 2021,
  - having regard to the Report of the Investigation Mission to Chad from April to May 2021 of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union,
  - having regard the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) against Boko Haram, mandated by the African Union Peace and Security Council, and supported by the EU African Peace Facility,
  - having regard to UN Security Council Resolution 2359 (2017) welcoming the deployment of the G5 Sahel Joint Force (FC-G5S),
  - having regard to the joint declaration of the European Council and Member States of the G5 Sahel on security, stability and development of the Sahel of 28 April 2020,
  - having regard to the Council conclusions on reaffirming the importance of a solid and long-term partnership between the EU and the Sahel of April 2021,
  - having regard to the European Development Fund 2014-2020 National Indicative Programme for Chad,
  - having regard to the Constitution of Chad,
  - having regard to the Cotonou Agreement,
  - having regard to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights which was adopted on 27 June 1981 and entered into force on 21 October 1986;
  - having regard to the 2019 Global Terrorism Index,
  - having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
  - having regard to Rules 144(5) and 132(4) of its Rules of Procedure
- A. whereas the security situation in the Sahel region has significantly deteriorated in recent years, posing a serious threat to regional and international security; whereas human rights violations and mass killings are widespread; whereas the Sahel saw the most rapid increase in violent extremist activity of any region in 2019; whereas human security is necessary for lasting peace and stability;

- B. whereas Chad has suffered heavily from terrorist activities and attacks; whereas Boko Haram – allied with the Islamic State since 2015 - has spread throughout the region and caused significant [displacement](#) in the Lake Chad basin; whereas there are [133 000 Internally Displaced Persons and some 500 000 refugees](#) currently in Chad;
- C. whereas the presidential election that took place in April 2021 was marred by violations of freedom of association and expression, as well as the arbitrary arrest of more than 112 leaders, members of opposition political parties, and human rights defenders; whereas in the weeks leading up to the election campaign security forces used disproportionate and illegitimate force against peaceful protesters;
- D. whereas President Idriss Deby Itno was in power in Chad for more than 30 years following a coup d'état; whereas the President died of his injuries on 19 April 2021 in a military confrontation with rebels in the north of the country one day after having been declared the winner of the controversial [presidential elections](#);
- E. whereas President Deby had long cooperated with European and UN troops in efforts to defeat terrorism in the Sahel, including Boko Haram, Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups; whereas his death risks further destabilisation in Chad; whereas the role of the country is instrumental in securing regional peace;
- F. whereas the military dissolved the Government and National Assembly in Chad following President Deby's death; whereas the President's son, Mahamat Idriss Deby Itno, was appointed as [interim head of state](#) by the 'Transitional Military Council' (CMT), composed of military officers;
- G. whereas, before the death of President Déby, the human rights situation in Chad was catastrophic, with, in particular, numerous arbitrary arrests, kidnappings and intimidation which became the daily life of Chadians; whereas having a president not democratically elected could lead to 30 more years of abuse;
- H. whereas on 2 May 2021 the CMT appointed a new transitional government; whereas the government includes some opposition representation including the Prime Minister Albert Pahimi Padacké but not the main opposition leader Saleh Kebzabo; whereas the CMT has announced a transition toward civilian government by holding elections within the next 18 months;
- I. whereas the Constitution of Chad provides for the democratic transition to be led by the Speaker of Parliament following the death of the sitting President; whereas the CMT has suspended the constitution and superseded it with a 'Transition Charter'; whereas this is in violation of national and international standards including the African Charter for Democracy and good governance;
- I. whereas this has been widely criticised by opposition parties in Chad and by national and international civil society organisations; whereas a fact-finding mission from the African Union was deployed to assess the political situation and subsequently made a series of recommendations;
- J. whereas disproportionate and illegitimate use of armed force against demonstrators has been deployed by the military government against citizens; whereas there have been at least 6 deaths, dozens of wounded and many people arbitrarily arrested and detained in response to protests since President Deby's death; whereas it is believed over 600 people have been arrested in the clashes;
- K. whereas on 9 May 2021 Chad's military claimed victory over the rebel forces Front for Change and Concord in Chad (FACT) in the northern battles in which President Deby was killed; whereas FACT have not recognised this claim and are continuing offensive actions; whereas FACT fighters were employed in the Libyan conflict by the Russian paramilitary company, Wagner Group, to support together with the United Arab Emirates, General Haftar's attempted coup against the then United Nations-recognized Government of National Accord in Tripoli;

- L. whereas the Sahel and Lake Chad have been blighted by armed conflicts and violence for many years, that have left some 3.8 million internally displaced across the region and triggered 270,000 to flee to neighbouring countries;
  - M. whereas the Multinational Joint Task Force has driven terrorist groups out of many areas under their control since its establishment in 2015, though the region still remains highly unstable; whereas the recent withdrawal of 1 200 Chadian soldiers has coincided with a surge of violence in the North-East Region;
  - N. whereas the G5 Sahel, a collaborative defence effort between Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger, notably supported by the EU and AU, coordinates the action in regional development and security to fight terrorism and bring stability to the region; whereas, in this regard, Mauritania and Niger are currently playing a positive role of political mediation entrusted by the summit of the G5 Sahel in order to promote dialogue between the political forces and create the conditions for a consensual and successful transition in Chad;
  - O. whereas since 2017 the EU has followed a process of regionalisation of its CSDP missions present in the Sahel region; whereas a regional coordination cell based within EUCAP Sahel Mali was established; whereas security and defence experts were deployed in all G5 Sahel countries, including Chad; whereas the regional coordination facilitates the organisation of trainings by the EU CSDP missions present in the Sahel regional for all G5 Sahel countries security and defence forces, including these of Chad;
  - P. whereas at a summit in Ouagadougou on 14 September 2019, the Economic Community Summit of West African States (ECOWAS) announced a plan worth USD 1 billion to combat rising insecurity in the Sahel region;
  - Q. whereas Chad is considered a fragile state; whereas poverty, food insecurity and lack of economic opportunities are endemic; whereas the country is ranked 187th out of 189 countries in the 2019 Human Development Index;
  - R. whereas corruption and impunity remain severe challenges; whereas Chad is placed 160th of 180 countries in the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index, and 47th out of 54 African countries in the Mo Ibrahim Index of African governance;
  - S. whereas the EU supports development, peace and security efforts in Chad and throughout the Sahel through the European Development Fund, the African Peace Facility, the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace, and the Trust Fund for Africa; whereas the EU allocated €542 million under EDF to Chad between 2014 and 2020 for supporting including consolidation of the rule of law; whereas the future European Peace Facility is due to take over from the Africa Peace Facility on 1 July 2021;
1. Expresses its shock and sincere condolences to the people of Chad and to the family and colleagues of President Idriss Déby Itno, for the death of the Chadian head of state;
  2. Deplores the continual violence and terrorist attacks which have taken place in the country; reiterates its concern about the protracted crisis in Chad and the volatile security situation in the north, and strongly condemns the repeated violations of human rights, international and humanitarian law;
  3. Deeply regrets the dissolution of the Government and National Assembly of Chad by the military and the assumption of head of state duties by Mahamat Idriss Deby Itno; condemns the bypassing of the provisions of the national constitution for a democratic transition and the creation instead of a military-civilian transitional charter;
  4. Underlines the importance of a rapid return to constitutional order; urges the CMT to adhere to the

provisions of the national constitution and allow for the assumption of head of state functions by the Speaker of the National Assembly, an inclusive national dialogue and the creation of a civilian transitional government of unity;

5. Calls for new transparent, inclusive, and credible legislative and presidential elections to be organised as soon as possible, which fully respect the national constitution and international electoral standards including the full participation of opposition parties; notes the importance of an independent and transparent national electoral commission and cooperation with international partners in this regard;
6. Recalls that genuine democratic transition and reform must be civilian-led and allow for the full and active involvement of civil society organisations, women and young people, opposition parties and the free press, which are able to operate without violence, intimidation or restrictions;
7. Condemns the restriction of the right to demonstrate and the use of violence against protestors and civil society; urges the authorities in Chad to fully respect the country's national and international commitments, notably the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association, and the right to physical integrity;
8. Calls for the opening of an independent and impartial investigation in order to prosecute the perpetrators of violence against individuals and civil society;
9. Is extremely concerned at the continuing levels of corruption and impunity in Chad; notes that the failure to address such impunity for human rights violations contributes to the continuation of such abuses and to the weakening of public trust in state institutions;
10. Recalls that climate change, food insecurity, population growth, exploitation of natural resources, poverty and a lack of educational and economic opportunities are root causes driving instability, violence and terrorist recruitment across the Sahel; notes that the Covid-19 pandemic has exacerbated these pressures and significantly hampered development progress; emphasises that coordination of security, development, humanitarian and democracy-support assistance is necessary to ensure lasting sustainable development across the region;
11. Recalls that regional organisations and partnerships including the African Union and G5 Sahel group are key actors in organising and supporting an Africa-led strategy to addressing terrorism and instability in the Sahel; reaffirms its support for the regional Multinational Joint Task Force, and its continued support through the African Peace Facility, soon to be transferred to the European Peace Facility;
12. Welcomes the regionalisation process of CSDP presence in the Sahel region, with a view to reinforcing a regional approach in the EU work in the region, to support cross-border cooperation in the Sahel and amongst regional cooperation structures, and to enhance national capacities of the G5 Sahel countries;
13. Urges Member States and the EU to continue supporting the G5 Sahel group to become operational and sustainably funded; further calls for the EU to support the operational and logistical costs of the operations against terrorism conducted by the national armed forces of Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Chad, within the framework of peacekeeping operations in the Sahel-Saharan area, including through the use of the European Peace Facility; recalls that the capacity-building component of the EPF shall fully respect the Common Position 2008/944/CFSP, Human Rights and Humanitarian law, and shall have effective transparency provisions as enumerated in its recommendation of 28 March 2019 on the establishment of the European Peace Facility;
14. Urges Member States and the EU to rethink its vision of the Sahel region by considering Mauritania and Niger as the two pivotal countries of any serious prospect of security and development in the Sahel, and Presidents Mohamed Ould Cheikh El Ghazouani from Mauritania and Mohamed Bazoum from Niger as privileged interlocutors in this perspective;

15. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Government and National Assembly of Chad, and the African Union and its institutions.#