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*Plenary sitting*

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**B9-0598/2021**

13.12.2021

## MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION

to wind up the debate on the statement by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy

pursuant to Rule 132(2) of the Rules of Procedure

on the situation at the Ukrainian border and in Russian-occupied territories of Ukraine  
(2021/3010(RSP))

**Anna Fotyga, Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, Raffaele Fitto, Jadwiga Wiśniewska, Ladislav Ilčić, Ryszard Antoni Legutko, Angel Dzhambazki, Witold Jan Waszczykowski, Ryszard Czarnecki, Adam Bielan, Elżbieta Kruk, Veronika Vrecionová, Dace Melbārde, Roberts Zīle, Elżbieta Rafalska, Jan Zahradil, Alexandr Vondra**  
on behalf of the ECR Group

**European Parliament resolution on the situation at the Ukrainian border and in Russian-occupied territories of Ukraine (2021/3010(RSP))**

*The European Parliament,*

- having regard to its previous resolutions on Russia,
- having regard to the UN Charter, the 1975 Helsinki Final Act and the 1990 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Charter of Paris,
- having regard to UN General Assembly resolution 68/262 of 27 March 2014 entitled ‘Territorial integrity of Ukraine’ and to UN General Assembly resolution 71/205 of 19 December 2016 entitled ‘Situation of human rights in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol (Ukraine)’,
- having regard to the Council decisions concerning the EU’s restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine,
- having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
- having regard to the joint declaration of the International Crimea Platform of 23 August 2021,
- having regard to its recommendation of 16 September 2021 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the direction of EU-Russia political relations<sup>1</sup>,
- having regard to the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
- having regard to the package of measures for the implementation of the Minsk Agreements, adopted and signed in Minsk on 12 February 2015, and endorsed as a whole by UN Security Council resolution 2202 (2015) of 17 February 2015,
- having regard to the Russian Federation’s membership of the Council of Europe and the OSCE, and its ensuing commitments and obligations,
- having regard to Ukraine’s suggestion of 29 March 2021 to return to the full ceasefire in eastern Ukraine and the draft of the Joint Action Plan on the implementation of the Minsk agreements,

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<sup>1</sup> Texts adopted, P9\_TA(2021)0383.

- having regard to the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances of 5 December 1994,
  - having regard to UN General Assembly resolution of 9 December 2021 entitled ‘Problem of the militarization of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, Ukraine, as well as parts of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov’ ,
  - having regard to the statement of 12 December 2021 by the G7 Foreign Ministers of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States of America and the High Representative of the European Union,
  - having regard to the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
  - having regard to Rule 132(2) of its Rules of Procedure,
- A. whereas Russia’s invasion and illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 demonstrated the Kremlin’s aggressive and revisionist policies aimed at thwarting any attempts to aid the democratic development of a region that it considers its ‘near abroad’;
  - B. whereas the current Russian regime is threatening peace and security in Europe as a means of imposing a new security architecture;
  - C. whereas since this act of aggression the Normandy Format and Minsk I and II Agreements have failed to put an end to hostilities between Ukraine and Russian-backed separatists in Donetsk and Luhansk, and no progress has been made in ending Russia’s illegal annexation and occupation of Crimea; whereas Russia is a party to the conflict, and cannot therefore present itself as a mediator;
  - D. whereas to date, the conflict has claimed more than 14 000 lives; whereas Russia continues to violate the ceasefire in Donbas, with 2 346 attacks launched against Ukrainian positions, leaving 65 Ukrainian soldiers dead and 261 wounded, including 29 servicemen of the Ukrainian Armed Forces killed by snipers between 1 January and 2 December 2021;
  - E. whereas President Putin’s Russia has engaged in permanent hybrid warfare against Ukraine backed by the ever-present threat of force across the region to keep Ukraine politically off balance and tied to Moscow’s self-declared sphere of influence, effectively removing the right of Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries to choose their own alliances;
  - F. whereas against the backdrop of a crisis on the EU–Belarusian border, Russia has assembled over 100 000 troops on the border of Ukraine in an offensive formation, including main battle tanks and self-propelled artillery, while stepping up its hybrid warfare tactics targeting the Ukrainian State, creating widespread concern of a potential second invasion of Ukraine; whereas this build-up has also included calling up tens of thousands of reservists, sending additional troops and equipment to occupied Crimea and arms to proxy forces in the Donbass and Luhansk regions;
  - G. whereas in occupied Crimea, Russia continues to prepare Crimean military

infrastructure for the deployment of nuclear weapons, including by refurbishing the necessary infrastructure in Soviet-era nuclear warhead storage facilities;

- H. whereas in 2021, the Russian Federation conducted 90 military exercises of various levels, including large scale exercises in Crimea and adjacent waters of the Black Sea;
- I. whereas President Putin has threatened a broader war in Ukraine over NATO enlargement, demanding ‘legal guarantees’ to ensure Ukraine does not join the military alliance or become any kind of ‘unofficial’ member hosting NATO troops or defence infrastructure; whereas for the second time since spring 2021, President Putin has carried out a massive military build-up around Ukraine and has been able to create an impression of strategic uncertainty while trying to force the West to collectively negotiate a number of Kremlin objectives on his terms;
- J. whereas since the beginning of the conflict Russia has engaged in disinformation campaigns, denial-of-service attacks, website defacements, leaks by ‘hacktivist’ groups, and the extensive use malware against Ukraine;
- K. whereas Russia has significantly stepped up its disinformation campaign against Ukraine, spreading a false narrative alleging that it is Ukraine that is seeking to provoke a conflict with Russia, accompanied by a massive, more than tenfold spike in social media activity pushing anti-Ukrainian propaganda, approaching the levels last seen in the lead-up to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2014;
- L. whereas the situation on the EU border with Belarus remains tense, with Belarusian officers and soldiers engaging in a large number of provocative actions; whereas the instrumentalisation of migrants by the Belarusian regime aims to disrupt the EU’s unity and threatens the regional security of the EU;
- M. whereas the migrant crisis jointly manufactured by Russia and Belarus has been deemed an act of aggression by the West, but could also be part of a strategy to distract European nations while Russia prepares for an invasion of Ukraine;
- N. whereas the divisive decisions by some Member States to build the Nord Stream pipelines are incompatible with the values of the energy union and a direct threat to the security of Central and Eastern Europe, and could serve as an instrument to blackmail Ukraine, Poland and the EU more broadly;
- O. whereas NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg stated that ‘there will be a high price to pay’ for any further Russian aggression against Ukraine;
- P. whereas the Biden administration is concerned about Russia potentially invading Ukraine through Belarus, disguising its forces as Belarusian forces and thus giving itself deniability;
- Q. whereas since 2014, the United States has provided over USD 2.9 billion in security assistance to Ukraine, with an annual allocation of USD 393 million as of 2021, making Ukraine the largest single recipient of foreign military financing (FMF) and international military education and training funding in Europe; whereas the United Kingdom and Canada have also launched separate programmes and operations in

support of Ukraine;

- R. whereas the human rights situation in the occupied parts of the eastern Ukraine and the occupied Crimean peninsula continues to deteriorate, with violations of freedom of speech, freedom of religion, property rights, severe restrictions on education and language rights, abuses of media freedom and the forced imposition of Russian citizenship becoming systematic, and fundamental human rights and freedoms not being guaranteed; whereas the self-proclaimed authorities in occupied Crimea continue to harass Crimean Tatars, prosecuting dozens on trumped-up terrorism charges;
- S. whereas there are more than 160 illegal prisons in the Russian-occupied territories of Ukraine in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, where more than 3 000 people have been illegally held captive and subjected to torture and inhuman treatment since the beginning of the conflict;
1. Strongly condemns Russia's ongoing acts of aggression and hostility towards Ukraine, EaP countries and the EU;
  2. condemns unequivocally Russia's illegal occupation and annexation of Crimea and the de facto occupation of certain parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, and calls for the EU to reinforce sanctions and freeze diplomatic relations until Russia complies with its international obligations; supports Ukraine's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders, as stipulated in the preamble to the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement;
  3. Rejects any Russian justification for the offensive formation of over 100 000 Russian troops along Ukraine's border and calls for them to be immediately withdrawn; recalls that in line with UN Charter, all UN Members must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or from acting in any other manner inconsistent with the UN's aims;
  4. Condemns strongly the ongoing Russian policy of blocking all peace initiatives by the Ukrainian side; expresses its concern, moreover, that Russia is preventing the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission from performing its role, jamming the Mission's unmanned aerial vehicles and blocking observers' access to the occupied territories; deplores Russia's decision to close the OSCE observer mission at the Gukovo and Donetsk Russian checkpoints;
  5. Is gravely concerned about the continued militarisation of the Sea of Azov, the Black Sea and the Baltic Sea region, particularly about the militarisation of the Kaliningrad District and the illegally occupied Crimea, including the development of anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) capabilities by the Russian Federation, which involve the use of new S-400 anti-aircraft systems, and an unprecedented build-up of conventional forces and preparations for possible deployment of nuclear weapons;
  6. Expresses its concern about the ongoing deterioration of the international security and arms control architecture, including as a result of the Russian Federation's temporary occupation of Crimea, which has had a destabilising impact on international arms control regimes and security and confidence building measures, including those

established by the Treaty on Open Skies, the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and the Vienna Document 2011 on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures; regrets, in this regard, that Crimea remains inaccessible for any verification or inspection under the Vienna Document, Open Skies and Conventional Forces in Europe Treaties, and calls on the international community to increase pressure on Russia to change this situation; underlines that Russian actions are an attempt to impose a new security order;

7. Calls on the Member States to prepare for additional targeted sanctions against Russia, including blocking Russia's access to the SWIFT system in order to deprive its ruling elite of the financial means to wage further acts of aggression against other states, and strengthening sectoral measures, including strict restrictions on the export of EU goods and services, including luxury products, to the Russian Federation, and on the import of goods and services originating from Russia, as well as expanding the range of areas of application of the Crimean sanctions;
8. Calls on the Council and the upcoming French Presidency to invite Ukraine to the Defence Summit;
9. Calls on the Council and the Commission to also accordingly assess Russia as a major threat to the European continent in the Strategic Compass, as was also stated in the NATO Reflection Group's report;
10. Rejects any attempts by Russia to include some countries in its 'sphere of influence' and thus shape their future; welcomes, in this regard, the NATO statement about the irreversibility of the 2008 Bucharest Summit decisions and membership perspective for Ukraine and Georgia;
11. Notes that Ukraine's potential future participation in permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) projects would significantly improve Ukraine's national defence capabilities in line with EU's best practices and standards;
12. Calls on the Member States and our partners to deepen military assistance to Ukraine; welcomes the EU Council's decision adopted at its meeting of 2 December 2021 to provide Ukraine with a package of EUR 31 million under the European Peace Facility (EPF) to help strengthen resilience and defence capabilities, particularly Ukraine's cybersecurity, medical, engineering, mobile and logistics capabilities, as well as anti-drone and anti-sniper systems; expects the EU to use the EPF to its full extent in this regard;
13. Strongly condemns the instrumentalisation of migrants and refugees by the Lukashenka regime and supports Member States' efforts to effectively manage migratory flows in order to protect the EU's external borders; warns that this situation orchestrated by President Putin aims to be a distraction from plans for further Russian invasion of Ukraine;
14. Reiterates its concern over the construction of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline and reiterates the project's fundamental long-term political, economic and security risks; notes that the pipeline increases the EU's dependency on Russian gas supplies, threatens the EU internal market, is not in line with EU energy policy or its strategic interests, and could

have negative consequences for war-torn Ukraine; calls on all stakeholders, therefore, in line with its previous positions, and, in particular, those in the Member States and Europe, to make use of all available legal provisions to halt the project;

15. Strongly condemns ongoing human rights violations in illegally occupied Crimea and other parts of de facto Russian-occupied territories in Ukraine; condemns the Russian Federation for settling Russian citizens in occupied Crimea and the territories of Donetsk and Luhansk, thus upsetting the balance between Russian passport holders and Ukrainians, and for continuing to issue Russian passports to residents of the temporarily occupied territories in Ukraine;
16. Calls on the EU to further contribute to the development of the consultation and coordination format of the international Crimea Platform, with the aim of peacefully ending the Russian Federation's temporary occupation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol and of restoring Ukraine's control over the territory, in full respect for international law;
17. Supports the Ukrainian authorities in their efforts to reform the country in line with the provisions of the Association Agreement and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area; underlines that such efforts are necessary to increase Ukrainian resilience and to more effectively counter current and future Russian aggression;
18. Encourages Member States to coordinate with NATO's Enhanced Forward Presence (EfP) and assist host countries and front line states with their defence posture in order to deter further acts of Russian aggression;
19. Calls on the Commission to scale up its efforts to improve the resilience and expertise of the Ukrainian cybersecurity authorities to prevent and deflect attacks;
20. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the President, Government and Parliament of Ukraine, to the President, Government and Parliament of the Russian Federation and to the Secretary-General of NATO.