MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the political crisis in Burkina Faso
15.2.2022 - (2022/2542(RSP))
pursuant to Rule 144 of the Rules of Procedure
Anna Fotyga, Karol Karski, Assita Kanko, Adam Bielan, Angel Dzhambazki, Bogdan Rzońca, Carlo Fidanza, Elżbieta Kruk, Elżbieta Rafalska, Eugen Jurzyca, Jadwiga Wiśniewska, Jan Zahradil, Ladislav Ilčić, Raffaele Fitto, Ryszard Czarnecki, Ryszard Antoni Legutko, Valdemar Tomaševski, Witold Jan Waszczykowski
on behalf of the ECR Group
See also joint motion for a resolution RC-B9-0104/2022
B9‑0116/2022
European Parliament resolution on the political crisis in Burkina Faso
The European Parliament,
– having regard to its resolution of 16 September 2020 on EU-African security cooperation in the Sahel region, West Africa and the Horn of Africa, and its resolution of 19 December 2019 on violations of human rights including religious freedoms in Burkina Faso,
– having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
– having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
– having regard to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights,
– having regard to the Cotonou Agreement,
– having regard to the Statement of 26 January 2022 by the AFET and DEVE Chairs and the Chair of the Delegation to the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly on the situation in Burkina Faso,
– having regard to the statement of 26 January 2022 by the High Representative Josep Borrell on the latest developments in Burkina Faso,
– having regard to the statement of 1 December 2021 by UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet concluding her official visit to Burkina Faso,
– having regard to the communiqué of 24 January 2022 of the President of the Commission of the African Union on the situation in Burkina Faso,
– having regard to the communiqué of 31 January 2022 of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union on the situation in Burkina Faso,
– having regard to the final communiqué of 28 January 2022 following the extraordinary summit of the ECOWAS authority of heads of state and government on the political situation in Burkina Faso,
– having regard to Rule 144 of its Rules of Procedure,
A. whereas on 24 January 2022, President Roch-Marc Christian Kaboré was overthrown by a military coup by military officers who announced the establishment of a “Mouvement Populaire pour la Sauvegarde et la Restauration” (MPSR), along with the suspension of the constitution, and the dissolution of the parliament and government;
B. whereas President Roch Kaboré has been in detention since 24 January 2022 but has been visited by an ECOWAS mission to assess the situation in Burkina Faso on 29 January 2022; whereas ECOWAS has suspended Burkina Faso from the regional organization; whereas the coup leader is Lt-Colonel Paul-Henri Damiba, who was appointed commander of the Ouagadougou military zone in a reshuffle of the army command following the Inata attack (November 2021), in which 53 gendarmes and 4 civilians were killed, and that was followed by widespread protests against the government’s handling of the conflict;
C. whereas the constant reports of militant Islamic attacks fuelled resentment among soldiers who felt they were being sent out without proper resources, to protect the nation against brutal militant groups such as the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM), which is aligned with al-Qaeda, and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), an offshoot of ISIL; whereas persistent equipment and supply problems have made the soldiers weaker while jihadist groups grow stronger;
D. whereas many Burkinabe were also frustrated with the political management of the Kaboré regime, which was regularly accused of corruption and nepotism, and had failed to meet the Burkinabe people’s expectations for good governance that were considerable after 27 years of rule by Compaoré, who also came to power in a coup; whereas in the current regional context , the recent coup highlights the challenges of ineffective governments that fail to meet people’s expectations in terms of delivering transparency, public services, work, development of local communities and security;
E. whereas the jihadist terrorist groups are targeting both security forces and civilians, with a clear strategy to foster local antagonisms; whereas the jihadist advance contributes to a worsened food supply in Burkina Faso and has a negative impact on the position of women and girls, who in these circumstances are married off in exchange for cattle and no longer go to school and thus lose a better perspective;
F. whereas in Burkina Faso more than 1.5 million people out of 21 million have been forced to flee their homes in the past three years and almost 7,000 have been killed; whereas in June 2021 jihadists slaughtered more than 100 people in Solhan, a village in the north of Burkina Faso, and in November 2021 they killed 49 police officers and four civilians near Inata, another northern town; whereas, following these attacks the government repressed media houses that reported on the humanitarian impact of the attacks and on the government’s handling of the crisis; whereas Burkanibe media reported serious allegations of sex-for-aid/food among IDPs by local humanitarian organizations;
G. whereas the Sahel region is confronting an unprecedented rural exodus since people who have been forcibly displaced are moving to urban areas where they encounter new risks and where threats to women and youth are particularly severe, including sexual and labour exploitation, forced recruitment and trafficking;
H. wheras the crisis in Burkina Faso is causing additional strain in the fragile Sahel region, where large parts remain or have become inaccessible to humanitarian organisations trying to support the 2.5 million people forced to flee their homes in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger; whereas, as a result, more people across the Sahel are moving southwards toward coastal countries, or to North Africa;
I. whereas ECOWAS called for a return to the constitutional order;
J. whereas military transitions with unpredictable outcomes are multiplying in West Africa; whereas the one in Burkina Faso carries the risk that it will destabilize what was previously a secular democratic state, and provide an opportunity for jihadist groups to further build on their operations in the area, to fill the vacuum left by the government in the countryside and to steadily move south from Burkina Faso into Ivory Coast and Benin; whereas the situation also continues to deteriorate in Mali and Niger; whereas cooperation within the G5 Sahel and ECOWAS has to be intensified;
K. whereas what happens in the Sahel matters to both the rest of Africa and Europe; whereas the international community has underestimated jihadism in the Sahel region as a creeping poison that destroys the secular societies of the Sahel countries very fast and that will have consequences for Europe as well in the form of compromised security and increasing migration flows;
L. whereas Russia is seizing opportunities in the Sahel region by selling security services and weapons; whereas Alexander Ivanov, the representative of Russian military trainers of the paramilitary Wagner Group in the Central African Republic, issued a statement offering training to the military of Burkina Faso;
1. Reaffirms its support to the people of Burkina Faso in their efforts to find solutions to the multifaceted challenges facing the country based on democratic principles and respect for human rights as well as support for security and cooperation in the Sahel region;
2. Demands the immediate restoration of constitutional order by the militaries and calls on the defence and security forces to remain committed to their core duties of protecting the population and defending the country’s territory and to make their demands known by non-violent means;
3. Supports the actions announced by the African Union and the actions taken by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in defence of democracy and the rule of law in Burkina Faso, and underscores ECOWAS’s call for the release of democratically elected President Roch Marc Christian Kaboré and all other persons who are unjustly detained in the context of this putsch;
4. Asks the HR/VP, the Commission and the Council to support ECOWAS’s efforts to initiate dialogue with and in Burkina Faso aimed at establishing a roadmap based on concrete objectives jointly agreed with the whole of Burkina Faso’s political class and civil society;
5. Urges the authorities of Burkina Faso to honour the country’s human rights commitments and to reorganise the security response over whole the country in a manner that respects and protects the fundamental rights of the people;
6. Urges the authorities of Burkina Faso to support the efforts to bring those who committed serious human rights violations before justice, to ensure that judicial investigations are concluded and that the convicted are sanctioned;
7. Calls on the authorities of Burkina Faso to revise the immunity clause in the statute of the Special Forces, a new military unit created in May 2021, that states that Special Forces cannot be pursued before the courts for any actions taken during their operations and thus violates the rights of victims to justice and reparation;
8. Calls on political powers in Burkina Faso to facilitate the work of humanitarian organizations in Burkina Faso, by ensuring their unfettered humanitarian access and enabling their reporting on the plight and needs of IDPs;
9. Calls for the EU and its Member States to alleviate the humanitarian situation in Burkina Faso by supporting the government and local organizations in establishing shelter for IDPs and education for children and ensuring that their rights to health and work are respected;
10. Asks the EU and its Member States to take account in formulating their Sahel policy that supporting good governance, civil society, development and investments in a more positive future for Sahelian communities remains essential; but that without helping to provide security, this support risks being wasted; urges them therefore to urgently establish a renewed Africa-Europe architecture for peace and security, as foreseen in the joint statement for the 6th EU-AU Summit of 17-18 February 2022, to face growing common security challenges, including the shared goal of combatting the spread of terrorism throughout the African continent; insists that this should be part of a more extensive change of the mind set on EU-Africa relations away from development aid, that is often misused in some countries and contributes to the rise in corruption, towards a cooperation between Europe and Africa on the basis of equal partnership instead of aid dependency, and to pay more attention to linking the remaining aid with fulfilment of necessary parameters and prerequisites by governments of receiving countries and to switch from filling budget gaps to providing incentives for growth and building trade capabilities and entrepreneurship;
11. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the President of the Republic of Burkina Faso, the African Union and its institutions and ECOWAS.