Motion for a resolution - B9-0167/2022Motion for a resolution
B9-0167/2022
European Parliament

MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the need for urgent EU action to ensure food security in light of Russian aggression against Ukraine, and a long-term action plan on developing EU food autonomy

16.3.2022 - (2022/2593(RSP))

to wind up the debate on the statements by the Council and the Commission
pursuant to Rule 132(2) of the Rules of Procedure

Martin Häusling, Benoît Biteau, Sarah Wiener, Pär Holmgren, Tilly Metz, Francisco Guerreiro
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Procedure : 2022/2593(RSP)
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B9-0167/2022
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B9-0167/2022
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B9‑0167/2022

European Parliament resolution on the need for urgent EU action to ensure food security in light of Russian aggression against Ukraine, and a long-term action plan on developing EU food autonomy

(2022/2593(RSP))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Russia and Ukraine, and in particular that of 16 December 2021 on the situation at the Ukrainian border and in Russian-occupied territories of Ukraine[1],

– having regard to the statements on Ukraine by the European Parliament’s leaders of 16 and 24 February 2022,

– having regard to the declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the EU of 24 February 2022 on the invasion of Ukraine by the armed forces of the Russian Federation,

– having regard to the joint statement by the President of the European Council and the President of the Commission of 24 February 2022 on Russia’s unprecedented and unprovoked military aggression against Ukraine,

– having regard to the recent statements by the President of Ukraine and the President of the Commission on the situation in Ukraine,

– having regard to the G7 statement of 24 February 2022,

– having regard to the European Council conclusions of 24 February 2022,

– having regard to Article 39 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/2115 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 2 December 2021 establishing rules on support for strategic plans to be drawn up by Member States under the common agricultural policy (CAP Strategic Plans) and financed by the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) and by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1305/2013 and (EU) No 1307/2013[2],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/2117 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 2 December 2021 amending Regulations (EU) No 1308/2013 establishing a common organisation of the markets in agricultural products, (EU) No 1151/2012 on quality schemes for agricultural products and foodstuffs, (EU) No 251/2014 on the definition, description, presentation, labelling and the protection of geographical indications of aromatised wine products and (EU) No 228/2013 laying down specific measures for agriculture in the outermost regions of the Union[3],

– having regard to its resolution of 1 March 2022 on the Russian aggression against Ukraine[4],

– having regard to the statement by the heads of state or government of the European Council of 10 March 2022 on the Russian military aggression against Ukraine,

– having regard to the statement of the G7 Extraordinary Agriculture Ministers’ Meeting of 11 March 2022 on the invasion of Ukraine by armed forces of the Russian Federation,

– having regard to Rule 132(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas the Russian Federation launched an unprovoked and unjustified invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022;

B. whereas food and drinking water supplies have deteriorated in Ukraine, especially in cities under siege or in areas that are suffering badly from Russian bombings; whereas the humanitarian needs and in particular the food needs of Ukraine are rising and whereas the UN Refugee Agency anticipates that 4 million people will leave Ukraine by July 2022, with an additional 6.7 million displaced within Ukraine; whereas, after receiving an official request for assistance from the Government of Ukraine, the World Food Programme (WFP) launched an emergency operation to provide food assistance for people fleeing the conflict both in Ukraine and in neighbouring countries; whereas on 7 March 2022, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) launched a rapid response plan for Ukraine, seeking USD 50 million to assist 240 000 vulnerable rural people affected by the war; whereas according to the FAO, only 9 % (USD 4.6 million) of the funding requested has been provided, leaving a funding gap of USD 45.4 million (91 %);

C. whereas Ukrainian agricultural production will be severely compromised by the Russian invasion; whereas the war has already created significant problems in logistics and food supply chains within Ukraine; whereas the 10 regions where military engagements are now taking place represent 54 % of sunflower sowing areas and 42 % and 52 % of maize and wheat sowing areas respectively; whereas in the coming weeks, Ukrainian farmers should start planting crops and whereas the military intervention is jeopardising the wheat harvest; whereas Ukrainian farmers are also struggling to obtain seeds, in particular maize and sunflower seeds, further endangering future harvests; whereas fuel shortages are stopping farmers from using their equipment to plant crops; whereas delays in sowing seeds can have major adverse effects on yield;

D. whereas Ukraine produces a large amount of wheat, maize, sunflower seeds and sunflower oil for both food and feed, accounting in particular for 15 % of the global maize market, 15 % of the global barley market, 10 % of the global wheat market and 50 % of the global sunflower oil market;

E. whereas the global food market had already been heavily disturbed by the COVID-19 pandemic, the energy crisis and adverse climatic events prior to the war, with the FAO price index having reached its highest level since 2011 even before the invasion; whereas global stocks of wheat are currently estimated to be between 277.9 and 291.1 million tonnes and stocks of maize are estimated to be between 280.9 and 302.2 million tonnes (according to the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the International Grains Council and the FAO’s Agricultural Market Information System), and the EU grain stocks amount to around 30 million tonnes (of which 9.58 million tonnes of wheat); whereas the reduction or loss of Ukrainian exports will affect countries heavily reliant on their production, countries already experiencing food insecurity or countries that are vulnerable to supply shocks and price increases, such as Egypt, Lebanon, Yemen, Ethiopia, Afghanistan and Syria; whereas 90 % of Egypt’s wheat is imported from Ukraine and Russia;

F. whereas food crises can be provoked by speculation on food commodities, in addition to pressures on food supplies caused by demand for biofuels; whereas in addition, large producer and export countries may exert pressure on import countries reliant on their exports for food;

G. whereas Russia is a leading exporter of synthetic nitrogen fertilisers and its components, and Belarus is a significant exporter of potash-based fertilisers; whereas nitrogen fertiliser prices are heavily dependent on natural gas prices, a product for which Russia holds major market positions;

H. whereas Russia is the largest exporter of wheat, accounting for more than 18 % of global exports; whereas the situation of Russian exports remains uncertain, with Black Sea exports gradually resuming and Russia opening up the possibility to put in place certain export restrictions; whereas on 9 March 2022, the Ukrainian Government banned exports of key agricultural products including rye, barley, buckwheat, millet, sugar, salt, and meat until the end of 2022;

I. whereas the common agricultural policy’s goals include the stabilisation of EU markets, availability of supply, the rational development of agricultural production in the EU, and ensuring both a fair standard of living for the EU agricultural community and reasonable prices for EU consumers;

J. whereas the EU is Ukraine’s largest trading partner, accounting for more than 40 % of its trade in 2019; whereas Ukraine accounts for around 1.1 % of the EU’s total trade, as the 18th most important trading partner of the EU; whereas the main imports into the EU from Ukraine are raw materials, including agricultural products, chemical products and machinery;

K. whereas according to Commission forecasts, the EU is projected to remain a net exporter for cereal; whereas a good harvest is projected for this year, although the first signs of a spring drought are showing in parts of the EU;

L. whereas around two thirds of EU cereal production[5] and 70 % of oilseed production is intended for animal feed;

M. whereas around 3 % of EU cereal production[6] and close to 40 % of oilseed on the EU market is destined for crop-based biofuels; whereas the proportion of field crops destined for crop-based biofuels is higher in certain Member States, reaching nearly 18 % of German production; whereas in 2021, the EU produced 4 950 million litres of bioethanol (produced from crops), and 12 330 million litres of biodiesel (produced from vegetable oil), which represented 11 million tonnes of grain and 8.6 million tonnes of vegetable oil that could be redirected toward human and animal consumption;

N. whereas food prices have been rising in the EU, and globally; whereas according to the UN, world food prices hit a record high in February 2022, and have risen over 24 % in a year;

O. whereas in certain sectors, farmers have been facing serious and persistent challenges in covering their production costs for years, notably in the dairy sector; whereas inflation in farmers’ input and production costs has been concerning, particularly for energy, fertiliser and feed; whereas one significant factor in these price rises is the current over-reliance on imported gas, including from Russia, to synthesise nitrogen-based fertilisers in a highly energy intensive process responsible for 2 % of greenhouse gas emissions; whereas these production cost increases could lead to huge economic difficulty for some producers, notably animal farmers who depend on imported feed;

P. whereas the increasing production costs may lead to increased consumer costs, placing significant burden on low-income households as food expenditure rises, particularly in combination with rising energy prices;

Q. whereas certain Member States, as well as non-EU countries, have implemented export controls on agricultural products, notably grain and cooking oils;

R. whereas sanctions on Russia and Belarus will affect the sourcing of farming inputs such as fertiliser; whereas the Russian Federation suspended exports of ammonium nitrate on 2 February 2022 until at least April 2022; whereas major shipping companies have suspended shipping operations to and from Russia; whereas every tonne of imported fertilisers or raw materials from Russia funds Russia’s war machine;

S. whereas the European Green Deal and the Farm to Fork Strategy adopt holistic approaches not only to preventing a climatic and biodiversity crisis in Europe, but also to ensuring food security, improving nutrition and public health and ensuring the affordability of food, while generating fairer economic returns for farmers in the supply and value chain and strengthening the position of primary producers by improving sustainability, addressing the climate crisis, soil health and existential ecosystem collapse, and increasing autonomy for farmers and supply chains;

T. whereas the Farm to Fork Strategy outlined several important initiatives, including an EU contingency plan for ensuring the supply of food and food security in times of crisis within the legislative framework, to further accelerate the transition towards a sustainable food system by the end of 2023;

U. whereas the Farm to Fork Strategy aims to reduce the use of farm inputs and notably to decrease the overall use of chemical pesticides by 50 %, of the most hazardous pesticides by 50 %, and of fertilisers by at least 20 % by 2030;

V. whereas the ecological focus areas and their continuation in the common agricultural policy from 2022 onwards are intended to boost biodiversity and thus agroecosystem functions such as pollination, predation of ecosystem pests, soil protection, and the nutrient, water and carbon cycles, thereby reinforcing and making the entire agroecosystem more resilient and productive; notes that no ploughing or use of pesticides is essential for delivery of these services, which increase yields in the long term; whereas the 2019 figures for ecological focus areas (EFAs) show that almost 3 % of arable utilised agricultural areas were non-productive, 2.6 % being fallow land, while nearly 11 % of EFA land is already used productively, e.g. for leguminous crops;

W. whereas the status quo according to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services report, published on the same day as the invasion, shows a clear trend towards productivity decreasing owing to ecological simplification and agroecosystem collapse[7], which is linked to over-reliance on artificial inputs and collateral damage, e.g. soil erosion, loss of topsoil, pollinator decline affecting yields, loss of beneficial species underpinning productivity, a lack of resilience against pest attacks, droughts and flooding, impacts reducing the yields of fisheries and aquaculture production and a redistribution of marine fish stocks, as also outlined in the IPCC’s Special Report on the Ocean and Cryosphere in a Changing Climate published in 2019;

X. whereas attacks on the European Green Deal targets and on the transition to sustainability are based on the assumption that there will be a productivity lag while functional biodiversity builds up or agronomic techniques using natural processes replace functions previously carried out by synthetic inputs; whereas a huge number of independent, peer-reviewed scientific studies show that productivity does not decrease in nearly two thirds of cases, that losses are limited to a short transitional period and that productivity even increases in certain cases[8];

Y. whereas the increased biodiversity and associated services provided by functional biodiversity and beneficial species – pollination, predators of pests, increased resilience of agroecosystems to erosion, droughts and flooding, soil formation and carbon sinking – are also necessary to strengthen and ensure the continuation of food production while increasing profitability for farmers[9];

Z. whereas the room for manoeuvre to produce more grain in Europe is limited as the areas set aside and currently available do not exceed 6 million hectares, out of 100 million hectares of arable land, and the potential yields are low, as the areas set aside are on marginal land;

AA. whereas supporting the large-scale feeding of animals with food or arable land that could otherwise be allocated for human consumption is an inefficient use of calories and results in the EU being a net importer of calories[10]; whereas a clear reduction in the consumption of animal products and a transition to self-sufficient farming of livestock fed on EU grasslands and legumes would make it possible to move the EU from being a net importer to a net exporter of calories and reduce its carbon footprint, and would contribute to restoring biodiversity, storing carbon in EU agroecosystems and reducing the EU’s dependence on natural gas and fossil fuels for fertiliser production;

AB. whereas the 1996 Rome resolution of the Via Campesina first defined food sovereignty as the right of people and countries to define their own agricultural and food policies; whereas this concept aims at enabling each country to feed its own population and to be independent; whereas the Farm to Fork Strategy’s intention to reduce farmers’ dependency on external outputs is in line with this definition;

AC. whereas the 1994 Marrakech Agreement and in particular the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Agriculture have contributed to the specialisation of agricultural regions; whereas this specialisation has led to regions with high levels of exports and others that are almost fully dependent on imports: whereas this situation is not resilient to crises, such as wars, and is one of the factors contributing to the current global food instability;

A. Humanitarian emergencies

1. Demands that the Russian Federation immediately terminate all military activities in Ukraine, unconditionally withdraw all military and paramilitary forces and military equipment from the entire internationally recognised territory of Ukraine, and fully respect Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence within its internationally recognised borders;

2. Notes that securing food supply chains and safeguarding household-level production of nutritious foods will be critical to averting a food crisis;

3. Calls for an immediate and coordinated response and the deployment of the Union Civil Protection Mechanism to maximise support to Ukraine, especially in terms of humanitarian assistance and food aid, as well as by providing safe EU humanitarian corridors and offering food and shelter to all people fleeing the country; highlights that while EU financial humanitarian support has been estimated to amount to around EUR 500 million so far, further support is needed; stresses, notably, that the EU should provide humanitarian assistance to the Ukrainian people to ensure short-term food security in Ukraine, and to all refugees in the EU through the Cohesion’s Action for Refugees in Europe and the Recovery Assistance for Cohesion and the Territories of Europe programmes, as well as by contributing to the FAO Rapid Response Plan for Ukraine, increasing its financial assistance; highlights that additional funding must be found as Cohesion Policy funds play a primary role in ensuring the harmonised development of the EU Member States; calls on the EU to coordinate with UN agencies and all partners on the ground to provide urgent food and livelihood assistance to people affected by the war in Ukraine;

4. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to increase their contributions to the WFP by using the Solidarity and Emergency Aid Reserve provided for in the multiannual financial framework; notes that the Commission and the Member States contribute EUR 465 million per year and EUR 1.47 billion per year respectively to the WFP; notes, furthermore, that the Solidarity and Emergency Aid Reserve accounts for EUR 1.2 billion, of which up to 35 % (EUR 420 million) can be used for non-EU countries; underlines that the amount available under the Solidarity and Emergency Aid Reserve might not be sufficient and that additional budgetary flexibility might be needed;

5. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to urgently evaluate, in coordination with their international partners and relevant international institutions, all the means available to avoid any default in the balance of payments of importer countries, including direct funding and restructuring of their debt; stresses the importance of prioritising grant-based financing as the default option, especially for least developed countries, and not favouring the blending of guarantee mechanisms or loans over grants, as that could increase the burden of debt;

B. Ensuring short-term food security in the EU

6. Underlines that the current conflict in Ukraine is shining a spotlight on the vulnerabilities of the global food system; therefore urges the EU to safeguard the rights of developing countries to food sovereignty as a means of achieving nutritional security, poverty reduction, inclusive, sustainable and fair global supply chains and local regional markets, devoting particular attention to family farming, with the aim of securing the supply of affordable and accessible food;

7. Calls on the Commission and the Council to maintain the general escape clause brought in for the COVID-19 pandemic, which suspends Member State fiscal rules in the event of an emergency;

8. Calls for the European food security crisis preparedness and response mechanism, which was developed in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, to meet again as soon as possible in order to discuss the food security impacts of the war in the EU and beyond; notes that this body was originally supposed to meet in late March 2022, which would be too late for its deliberations to be fully effective;

9. Highlights the importance of food stocks, both in the EU and in non-EU countries, in ensuring access to food in unstable times; calls on the Commission to conduct a full evaluation of all food sources and stocks, both public and private, which are available at EU level and assess the means to mobilise and distribute them and to effectively mitigate availability, accessibility and affordability problems, notably in non-EU countries; highlights the need to assess, in addition, the scale of private commercial stocks;

10. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to swiftly propose a meeting of the FAO Committee on World Food Security, which should be the favoured coordination forum on the matter as it ensures the inclusive representation of all states; calls on the Commission and the Member States to engage in this forum to ensure international coordination, notably on stocks, biofuels and financial support to importer countries;

11. Calls on the European Union to convene an emergency meeting of the General Council of the WTO so it can take measures to regulate agricultural commodity markets in order to reduce speculation by states or private companies as much as possible and to facilitate access by dependent countries to the basic foodstuffs necessary for their populations; underlines that the current WTO rules on agriculture do not enable countries to implement policies of food sovereignty and regional cooperation and calls on the Commission to push for the necessary changes;

12. Recognises that market speculation, manipulation and the trading of food commodities can artificially inflate wholesale prices and lead to market volatility; calls, in that regard, for an immediate and temporary ban on speculative practices such as short selling, sovereign debt and credit default swaps, ‘futures’ stock options and the high-frequency trading of food commodities that can result in market manipulation, predatory pricing and profiteering; calls on the Commission and European Securities and Markets Authority to work with national regulators to bring forward an urgent proposal to temporarily ban short selling and safeguard food commodities on stock markets, including by revising the currently very permissive EU position limit regime, and to take into account volatility when setting those position limits; highlights the need for transparent statistics on agricultural production from both public and private stakeholders, especially considering the extreme concentration in the grain market;

13. Calls for the establishment of emergency financial support to ensure access to food for households living in poverty within the EU, through, inter alia, an increase in funding for the Fund for European Aid to the Most Deprived;

14. Calls on the Commission to activate Article 219 of Regulation (EU) 1308/2013[11] on using the crisis reserve to stabilise production in the EU, on the condition that sustainability criteria are respected;

15. Calls for swift and appropriate financial support for farmers affected by the crisis, but insists that any support has to be conditional upon the fulfilment of sustainability criteria, in order not to worsen the climate and biodiversity crisis or undermine the ecological basis and natural resources needed for long-term food security and continued food production; notes, in this context, the role of EFAs in boosting functional biodiversity and the yields of surrounding arable areas by up to 36 %; cautions strongly against use of pesticides in EFAs, as accumulated productivity gains will be lost by killing predators of pests and pollinators attracted to the strips, as well as against ploughing, which causes the loss of accumulated carbon; stresses, in particular, that no measure taken during the Ukrainian crisis should lead to an increase in the use of synthetic pesticides and fertilisers, nor should it be a reason to deliver emergency authorisations for pesticides that have been proven to be harmful to human or ecosystem health; highlights that emergency measures should be strictly limited in time;

16. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to keep the EU single market open and to avoid further market disturbance, in particular by avoiding restrictions on exports;

17. Stresses the need for full use of school schemes in order to ensure deprived children have access to food; highlights, furthermore, the utility of public procurement programmes in fostering public support for purchasing from smallholders and local producers when sourcing nutritious food for distribution, to guard against food insecurity;

18. Highlights that 88 million tonnes of food are wasted in the EU each year, with associated costs estimated to be EUR 143 billion; stresses that addressing food waste would have an immediate positive impact on food security; reiterates its call to take the measures required to achieve the EU food waste reduction target of 30 % by 2025 and 50 % by 2030 compared to the 2014 baseline; stresses the need to avoid loss of food during storage, to facilitate the donation of food through the coherent implementation of liability law and to encourage the recovery of food waste; calls on supermarkets, in particular, to urgently address the issue of preventable food waste through alternative options such as the roll-out of reduced price promotions and working together with local community projects, such as food banks, to alleviate local food poverty and insecurity; calls on the Member States to consider legislating on further unfair trading practices that create food waste, in addition to those already covered by the Unfair Trading Practices Directive[12]; calls for the upcoming initiatives on marketing standards to prioritise the reduction of food waste; stresses that consistent overproduction also risks creating food waste; calls for improved monitoring of food waste across the EU, in particular that generated at farm level; calls on all Member States to establish and implement food waste prevention programmes that fully integrate the principles of the circular economy and include the promotion of short food supply chains, which lower the risk of generating food waste;

C. Ensuring food security in the EU in the medium and long term

19. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to rapidly put in place temporary suspension measures for the production and blending of crop-based biofuels, bioliquids and biomass fuels in order to secure additional food supplies, stabilise global food commodity markets and phase out crop-based biofuels, not including advanced biofuels, by 2030; calls on the Commission to initiate concerted action between the USA and Canada so as to ensure food is prioritised over crop-based biofuels;

20. Calls for the promotion and simplification of access to energy efficiency measures to reduce the cost burden on farmers in terms of direct energy inputs, while noting that in most livestock systems, animal feed is the dominant energy use category;

21. Calls for food for people to be prioritised over feed for an EU population of farm animals that exceeds the EU’s food needs; calls, in particular, on the Commission and the Member States to finally implement an ambitious protein plan, focusing notably on leguminous crops, which can provide home-grown feed and replace or reduce fertiliser use by fixing nitrogen, and to decease pressure on animal feed and production costs, moving towards pasture-based grazing for ruminants; points out that gene-edited plants and animals are patented and should therefore be avoided as they would further contribute to market concentration in seed, plant and animal production and the increase of input costs, in addition to them not providing any advantages over agro-ecological systems, which have proven benefits in terms of biodiversity and the climate when it comes to alleviating food insecurity;

22. Calls on the Commission to further strengthen the Farm to Fork Strategy target on fertiliser use reduction, and to support, through all appropriate policies, practices to make soils more fertile through home-grown measures that ensure independence from imports of fertiliser or gas, such as crop rotation, composting and the use of animal waste within the limits of the Nitrates Directive[13]; highlights that fertiliser use constitutes an estimated 50 % of energy use in agriculture, when considering both direct and indirect use; stresses that rising energy prices have a consequent effect on rising synthetic fertiliser prices, which means that advice on finding agronomic alternatives can be the most cost-effective policy option; stresses the importance of farmers receiving technical support from independent farm advisory services so they can use the most appropriate and effective agroecological techniques; highlights the proven ability of organic agriculture to produce food without the use of synthetic fertilisers;

23. Strongly warns against cynically using the war as an opportunity to roll back to a dysfunctional and inherently unsustainable status quo that is clearly and scientifically proven to be unfit for purpose, and not to sacrifice our medium- and long-term food security for short-term gains such as the feeding of livestock and biofuel fermenters;

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24. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the President, Government and Parliament of Ukraine, and the President, Government and Parliament of the Russian Federation.

 

Last updated: 17 March 2022
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