MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the social and economic consequences for the EU of the Russian war in Ukraine – reinforcing the EU’s capacity to act
11.5.2022 - (2022/2653(RSP))
pursuant to Rule 132(2) of the Rules of Procedure
Luis Garicano
on behalf of the Renew Group
See also joint motion for a resolution RC-B9-0267/2022
B9‑0267/2022
European Parliament resolution on the social and economic consequences for the EU of the Russian war in Ukraine – reinforcing the EU’s capacity to act
The European Parliament,
– having regard to its previous resolutions on Russia and Ukraine,
– having regard to its resolution of 7 April 2022 on the conclusions of the European Council meeting of 24-25 March 2022, including the latest developments of the war against Ukraine and the EU sanctions against Russia and their implementation[1],
– having regard to Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 on minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on measures promoting a balance of efforts between Member States in receiving such persons and bearing the consequences thereof (‘Temporary Protection Directive’)[2],
– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2022/562 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 April 2022 amending Regulations (EU) No 1303/2013 and (EU) No 223/2014 as regards Cohesion’s Action for Refugees in Europe (CARE)[3],
– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2020/2221 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 December 2020 amending Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013 as regards additional resources and implementing arrangements to provide assistance for fostering crisis repair in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic and its social consequences and for preparing a green, digital and resilient recovery of the economy (REACT-EU)[4],
– having regard to the Versailles Declaration of 11 March 2022,
– having regard to the Council’s decisions on sanctions and restrictive measures against Russia,
– having regard to Rule 132(2) of its Rules of Procedure,
A. whereas the Russian Federation launched an unprovoked and unjustified invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, which constitutes not just an attack on the Ukrainian people, but also on the European peace order and thereby threatens the foundations on which the EU’s foreign, security and defence policy were built;
B. whereas the physical damage in Ukraine caused by the invasion amounts to at least USD 500 billion; whereas the country is expected to lose half of its gross domestic product in 2022;
C. whereas by 5 May 2022, more than 5.7 million people had fled Ukraine according to data from the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, with more than 85 % of them currently being hosted in an EU country;
D. whereas the Russian war in Ukraine has shown the EU’s determination, unity and strength in defending democratic values; whereas it has also demonstrated the need for economic, social and institutional reforms of the EU to cope with the global consequences of Russia’s military aggression;
E. whereas since the beginning of the Russian invasion, the EU Member States have committed a combined total of EUR 12.8 billion in support to Ukraine, which includes funds pledged by the EU institutions and the European Investment Bank; whereas at the same time, the EU Member States have sent EUR 52 billion to Russia in payments for fossil fuels; whereas in the meantime, the United States has committed EUR 10.31 billion to Ukraine[5];
F. whereas Russia has unilaterally decided to cut off the gas supply to Bulgaria and Poland; whereas an increasing number of EU Member States have already expressed their support for implementing a full energy embargo on Russia to escape its blackmailing;
G. whereas, in such a dangerous moment, the EU must make full use of the powers conferred on it by the Treaties to resolve the current conflict and strengthen Europe’s security and defence capacities to ultimately provide its citizens and neighbours with the peace and security they deserve;
H. whereas the current crisis has shown the limitations of European defence and especially its budgetary dimension, notably given the ongoing discussion on what kind of military equipment or support the EU can provide;
I. whereas in the Versailles Declaration, EU leaders reaffirmed the EU’s commitment to take more responsibility for its own security and its ability to act autonomously and to address the EU’s strategic dependencies, including by reducing its external energy dependencies, especially on Russian gas and oil, substantially increasing defence expenditures, reinforcing its industrial and economic bases, developing strategic sectors, taking further initiatives to strengthen the European defence industrial and technological base and accelerating ongoing efforts to enhance military mobility throughout the EU;
J. whereas the EU must become a real power on the world stage with the capacity to act and decide by itself, in particular as regards defence, energy, agriculture, aquaculture and industry;
K. whereas Ukraine owes a total of USD 22 billion to the International Monetary Fund, World Bank and other international financial institutions;
Economic consequences
1. Highlights that the Russian military aggression against Ukraine and the EU’s justified sanctions against Russia and Belarus are affecting the post-pandemic economic recovery of the EU and pose a serious threat to its recovery and resilience strategy, as well as to the integrity of the single market;
2. Notes with great concern rising inflation rates, which have a direct negative effect on the purchasing power of all European citizens and on small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs); highlights, in particular, the increasing price of food, oil, gas, electricity and raw materials and the disproportionate effect of price increases on the most vulnerable households;
3. Welcomes that Member States have adopted costly but necessary measures to mitigate the impacts of rising prices on citizens and enterprises, in particular SMEs; stresses that the degree of dependency on Russian and Ukrainian imports, especially regarding energy, varies significantly across the EU; calls on the Commission and the Member States to come up with further measures to address and mitigate these impacts, in particular the differences in shocks to energy prices and supply across EU Member States;
4. Is deeply concerned by the consequences of the Russian war against Ukraine on the EU’s food system; stresses the urgent need to review the EU’s approach to food security, reduce its food system’s overall dependence on imports and build increased resilience into the food supply chain, particularly at the input access level;
5. Believes that there is an urgent need to address the weaknesses exposed by an over-reliance on imports of energy, feed and fertilisers from single or too few suppliers, the need to scale up agricultural practices that are less or not reliant on inputs, and the lack of supply chain diversification;
6. Recalls its position of 24 March 2022[6] asking for Middle Eastern and North African countries to organise a food security conference to address the short-term gaps in the food supply and the medium-term issue of agricultural resilience in the region; calls on the Commission to address this food situation by mobilising the relevant quantity of the EU’s international grain stock to avoid food security and affordability problems in the Middle East and North Africa;
Social consequences
7. Welcomes the efforts of EU citizens and residents in providing real support to Ukrainian refugees; calls on the Member States to facilitate the work and administrative procedures for volunteer organisations dealing with humanitarian aid and calls on them to support this work financially via EU funding;
8. Underlines that the efforts of the EU border countries of Poland, Romania, Hungary and Slovakia, alongside those of Moldova, all of whom took in the vast majority of Ukrainians fleeing the war, need to be properly commended and supported with adequate financial resources, particularly to assist local authorities and civil society organisations who are providing vital assistance to refugees;
9. Strongly denounces that access to the hardest hit areas remains challenging with continued security risks, both for affected civilians and humanitarian actors; acknowledges, however, the effort made by EU international partners, such as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, to provide more than 27 172 people in the hardest hit areas with life-saving assistance as part of inter-agency humanitarian convoys;
10. Calls therefore for the creation of safe passages and humanitarian corridors for those fleeing the conflict and for the provision of the urgent help needed by internally displaced persons, children and those stranded in or unable to leave encircled areas; recalls that, as set out in the Temporary Protection Directive, relocation should be available for all persons covered by temporary protection and should take into consideration the preferences of the individuals concerned;
11. Welcomes the Commission’s announcement on the establishment of the EU Solidarity Platform for exchanging information regarding the reception capacities of the Member States and the number of people enjoying temporary protection on their territories; asks all EU Member States to offer support, including for relocation when relevant, via such a platform;
12. Recalls the importance of collecting disaggregated data, in accordance with EU data protection standards, so as to identify vulnerable groups coming from Ukraine, such as those who are undocumented or stateless, in view of identifying the needs of particular groups and supporting them;
13. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to pay particular attention to the situation of unaccompanied minors to ensure that their immediate needs are met, that they are adequately identified and tracked and that data is shared between Member States with the aim of reuniting them with their families or later re-integrating them into Ukrainian society if possible, while guaranteeing their protection from abuse and trafficking, particularly in the case of young women;
14. Strongly urges the Commission and the Member States to include an adequate gender dimension in their efforts to help socially integrate women and activate their participation in the labour market, including as regards access to proper care either for themselves or those in their care, particularly victims of sexual aggression; further urges the Commission and the Member States to fight against the risk of human trafficking, including by offering assistance and counselling to victims of the networks that have been dismantled;
15. Calls on the Commission to strengthen its efforts to provide humanitarian assistance and to support the social and labour market integration of refugees, including through swift profiling and recognition of qualifications, in particular through the EU Skills Profile Tool for Third Country Nationals; calls on the Commission to also provide financial aid to the Member States for the reception and integration of refugees, including for care services, housing, food, material aid, training programmes and public employment services; considers that the frozen assets of Russian persons should also be used to host refugees; asks the Commission to monitor this funding closely to make sure that it reaches its intended targets;
16. Calls on the Member States, in particular their national Child Guarantee coordinators, to ensure that children fleeing Ukraine have free and effective access to a set of key services on equal footing with other children in the host countries, starting with housing, nutrition, access to care and education, as they are already included in the vulnerable categories identified by the Guarantee; also calls for access to be opened to Ukrainian youth for similar opportunities and facilities, including mental health support and counselling;
17. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to coordinate the transfer of patients, especially vulnerable persons, to all EU Member States; considers that Ukraine’s neighbouring EU countries should not shoulder the entire effort of receiving the large numbers of people arriving from Ukraine; calls on the Member States, with the support of the Commission, to ensure the continuity of routine vaccination and screening services, address gaps in prior vaccination histories and guarantee access to vaccines against communicable infectious diseases;
18. Notes with concern that an estimated 400 000 refugees fleeing Ukraine are people with disabilities and underlines the need to offer to them specialised protection and care, including by creating reception centres that can welcome and be accessible to people with disabilities, followed by meaningful policies to help their integration, possibly by activating and supporting local civil society organisations that are working on issues concerning people with disabilities;
Mitigating consequences with solidarity mechanisms
Increasing sanctions while mitigating consequences
19. Welcomes the urgent measures taken by the Council, including sanctions against Putin’s regime; calls on the Council to adopt new measures to ensure sanctions are effectively implemented and to monitor compliance by financial entities and other private actors;
20. Calls on the Council to extend the list of individuals directly targeted by EU sanctions, including Russian oligarchs, to include the list of 6 000 individuals identified by Alexey Navalny’s Anti-Corruption Foundation; calls for an extension of EU sanctions to Russian-affiliated media entities operating in the EU, specifically the ‘news agency’ InfoRos, which is affiliated with the GRU (Russia’s Chief Intelligence Office);
21. Further calls on the Council to extend the list of individuals targeted by EU sanctions to the European members of the boards of major Russian companies, notably including the former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder;
22. Recalls its previous resolution demanding an immediate full embargo on Russian imports of oil, coal, nuclear fuel and gas; regrets that the Member States have not yet taken action to implement this immediate full embargo; recognises that, meanwhile, the European Union has sent EUR 50 billion to Russia as payment for Russian fossil fuel imports; calls on the Commission, until the necessary unanimity for the full embargo is reached in the Council, to use its powers to propose a confiscatory tariff on fossil fuel imports from Russia; recognises that a tariff of this type would immediately reduce the consumption of Russian fossil fuel in the European Union while helping to compensate EU consumers for already high energy prices;
23. Calls on the Commission to keep State aid mechanisms in place for industries impacted by the sanctions and to provide guidance on applying them; calls on the EU and its Member States to introduce or maintain credit guarantees for exports to Ukraine by EU industries;
Short-term budgetary actions to mitigate consequences within the EU
24. Considers that the EU should first use existing financial resources to mitigate the consequences of the war within the EU; asks the Commission, therefore, to make it possible for Member States to use financial resources from unrequested Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) loans to cover the negative economic and social costs resulting from the war;
25. Calls on the Commission to initiate and coordinate regulatory intervention relating to windfall profits in order to use them to mitigate the social and economic consequences of the war in Ukraine for the EU;
26. Stresses the role of the RRF in the rollout of the REPowerEU plan, i.e. the ‘Joint European action for more affordable, secure and sustainable energy’ and invites the Commission to explore how this programme could be used together with the national recovery and resilience plans to advance investments in the energy transition; highlights that the loans available under the RRF could be used to supplement the REPowerEU programme;
27. Is convinced of the need to further strengthen our solidarity capacities in times of crisis to ensure that the most affected countries can cope with any social and economic consequences; points to the urgent need to share at EU level the negative economic and social consequences of the war, notably sanctions, inflows of refugees and energy and food crises, which will hit the Member States hard but in different ways;
28. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to explore ways to amend some budgetary lines of the 2023 EU budget in order to meet these additional costs; calls on the Commission to also assess the possibility and feasibility of mobilising additional financial support for the most affected sectors;
29. Calls on the Member States and the Commission to urgently increase funding for the European Child Guarantee to the benefit of young Ukrainian refugees and to contribute to the goal of reducing the number of children living in poverty by at least 15 million by 2030, including at least five million children in all Member States by 2030;
30. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to closely monitor the markets for agricultural and aquatic food products to ensure the integrity of the single market; calls specifically for monthly market analyses of the state of the agricultural, fisheries and aquaculture markets by sector, covering prices, quantities and supply chains; believes that the Commission should put forward measures relating to State aid and quota flexibility in the fisheries sector;
31. Insists on the need for compensation schemes for EU farmers; calls notably for urgent measures to be taken to help farmers cushion the effect of the exorbitant increase in fertiliser prices;
32. Calls on the Commission to urgently carry out an economic and social assessment of the consequences of the war on all modes of transport in the EU market, particularly given the sanctions affecting this market, and to swiftly offer, where necessary, support, including through further legislative and/or financial measures, to mitigate the negative effects of the war and ensure a well-functioning, level playing field and fair competition for the EU transport sectors;
33. Considers, however, that mobilising appropriations during crises through frontloading and siphoning regular EU programmes, such as cohesion policy, is not a viable practice in the medium- and longer-term;
34. Regrets that the margins of existing programmes, budgetary reserves and budget flexibility instruments are too limited and insufficient to significantly soften the negative economic and social consequences of the war;
35. Supports the reinforcement of the RRF, including the acceleration of the implementation of the national recovery and resilience plans, particularly in the area of energy, and the reprioritisation of the multiannual financial framework (MFF), to strengthen urgent measures at both national and EU level; strongly believes that both instruments should increase the EU’s strategic autonomy;
Revising the MFF
36. Calls, furthermore, on the Commission to propose an early revision of the MFF and the Financial Regulation as soon as possible in order to integrate the new resilience plan instrument to cover war-related costs and reinforce relevant existing funds, as well as to allow for the full use of decommitment amounts and budgetary surpluses from previous years; also invites the Commission to explore ways to significantly strengthen the flexibility instruments allowing the EU to cope with crises; insists that this revision should enter into force on 1 January 2023 at the latest;
37. Welcomes the swift adoption of the Cohesion’s Action for Refugees in Europe Regulation and the updated Recovery Assistance for Cohesion and the Territories of Europe (REACT-EU) Regulation and calls on the Commission to examine the possibility of similar flexibilities for EU funds under the 2021-2027 MFF;
Helping Ukraine
38. Supports global efforts to support Ukraine, in particular via the G7, and calls for debt relief for Ukraine; calls on the international community to facilitate a workout for Ukraine’s international debt to increase maturities, reduce interest rates and achieve immediate liquidity relief; suggests that such a plan should also include the opportunity to raise some new money from the same institutional investors;
39. Recalls its request for work to start on a Ukraine Solidarity Trust Fund and a Marshall-Plan-like fund to rebuild Ukraine after the war, launch a massive investment programme and unleash the country’s growth potential;
40. Considers that the fund should be financed inter alia by the EU, its Member States, donor contributions and compensation from Russia for war damages, including Russian assets which were previously frozen as a result of sanctions and should be legally confiscated in accordance with international law and following a thorough legal assessment by the Commission;
Reinforcing the EU’s capacity to act
Investing in our independence and encouraging private investors
41. Acknowledges that the Russian invasion in Ukraine and its consequences have brought to light the critical dependencies of the European Union on non-EU countries, especially when it comes to energy, and its weaknesses as a whole, including in terms of defence; considers that this situation is neither viable nor secure in an ever-changing and unstable world; considers that the EU response needs to be the reinforcement of the internal energy market in order to eliminate dependencies without creating new ones;
42. Calls on the Commission, in case the adverse effects of the crisis cannot be sufficiently addressed with existing programmes, to stand ready to present a new resilience plan to help households and companies, in particular SMEs, to cope with the consequences of the war, and to reinforce the EU’s capacity to act;
43. Considers that this new plan of reforms and investments should consist of a set of measures to unleash the growth potential of the single market, such as cutting red tape and improving the ease of doing business, and a new solidarity instrument to provide, where necessary, fiscal support to invest in the open strategic autonomy of the EU;
44. Proposes, therefore, in a second phase, the creation of a multibillion-euro strategic autonomy fund for Europe (SAFE) to invest in energy independence, cybersecurity, defence capabilities, food security, industrial competitiveness, new partnerships for commodities or any other critical sector where the EU is proving to have reached an excessive level of dependence on the outside world;
45. Believes that enhancing the EU’s productivity and global competitiveness requires structural, socially balanced, growth-enhancing and sustainable reforms and an adequate level of investment; recalls that the RRF presented an unprecedented and unique opportunity for all Member States to address key structural challenges and investment needs, including the just, green and digital transitions; encourages SAFE to draw on the lessons learned from NextGenerationEU, make the most of the opportunity and use it to transform the EU’s economies and make them sustainable, more competitive and more resilient to future shocks while keeping bureaucracy to a minimum so that SMEs can benefit from SAFE;
46. Insists that SAFE should be established according to the ordinary legislative procedure, be administered under the full oversight of Parliament and be directly managed by the Commission; emphasises that its overall amount should be established on the basis of a clear assessment of the costs and investment gaps and should include grants;
47. Calls on the Commission to ensure prudent fiscal policies in the Member States in order to prevent the occurrence of a sovereign debt crisis under the current economic circumstances, while remaining fully committed to abiding by the Stability and Growth Pact; for this purpose, calls on the Commission to extend the application of the general escape clause for one more year;
48. Also considers that we cannot solely rely on low interest rates and public sector investment to fill the enormous investment gaps we are currently facing; asks the Commission to put forward new proposals to encourage private actors to invest in the EU and in particular to remove barriers in the single market for services, make progress on the capital markets union and the banking union and make use of new forms of public-private partnerships in which the state assumes limited financing risks to crowd in more private sector investment activities, such as the COVID-19 support schemes for SMEs;
Reinforcing the EU capacity to act in times of war
49. Stresses that Russia’s aggression against Ukraine strongly relies on cyber warfare; stresses, furthermore, that institutions and organisations outside of Ukraine are also targets of Russian cyberattacks; calls for the cybersecurity levels in the EU to be rapidly increased and for the swift implementation of the directive on a high common level of cybersecurity;
50. Calls for the swift adoption and deployment of the Union secure connectivity programme, which will ensure the provision of worldwide secure, flexible and resilient satellite communication services in order to make sure the EU is strategically autonomous and provide support for Ukraine and any EU allies facing a similar threat to their communication systems in the future;
51. Calls on the Commission, with the support of relevant EU agencies, to anticipate war-linked threats that could be of chemical, nuclear, biological, environmental or infectious origin, identify medical countermeasures against those threats and ensure their availability;
52. Recognises the significant progress made over the past few years on building up the EU’s defence capabilities; reiterates, however, its call for a true European Defence Union able to cope with current and future security threats to be established, and for a comprehensive review of the common security and defence policy;
53. Believes that institutional reforms are more necessary than ever given the conclusions of the Conference on the Future of Europe; is of the opinion that such reforms should contribute to building a more democratic, geopolitical and agile EU, if necessary via a revision of the Treaties; calls in particular for the possibility to increase the EU’s competences in times of major crisis affecting more than one Member State to be introduced;
54. Calls on the Member States to increase their defence budgets and investments to close existing capability gaps, and stresses the importance of increasing consistency between the various national planning processes; urges the Member States to maintain a sustained pace of defence investment and use the opportunities presented by the European Defence Fund to encourage new investment;
55. Welcomes the use of the European Peace Facility to support Ukraine; calls for an increase in its funding for the remainder of the 2021-2027 financial period and an expansion of its ability to act in defence of the European Union and its neighbours;
56. Calls for the introduction of qualified majority voting for certain foreign policy areas, as already provided for in the Treaties, to increase the effectiveness of EU foreign policy;
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57. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission, the Council, the European Council and the governments and parliaments of the Member States.
- [1] Texts adopted, P9_TA(2022)0121.
- [2] OJ L 212, 7.8.2001, p. 12.
- [3] OJ L 109, 8.4.2022, p. 1.
- [4] OJ L 437, 28.12.2020, p. 30.
- [5] Antezza, A. et al., ‘The Ukraine Support Tracker: Which countries help Ukraine and how?’, Kiel Institute for the World Economy working paper, May 2022.
- [6] Texts adopted, P9_TA(2022)0099.