Motion for a resolution - B9-0400/2022Motion for a resolution
B9-0400/2022

MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the situation in the Strait of Taiwan

12.9.2022 - (2022/2822(RSP))

to wind up the debate on the statement by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
pursuant to Rule 132(2) of the Rules of Procedure

Raffaele Fitto, Anna Fotyga, Charlie Weimers, Assita Kanko, Elżbieta Kruk, Witold Jan Waszczykowski, Hermann Tertsch, Beata Kempa, Alexandr Vondra, Bert‑Jan Ruissen, Kosma Złotowski, Adam Bielan, Veronika Vrecionová, Eugen Jurzyca, Beata Mazurek, Jadwiga Wiśniewska, Vincenzo Sofo, Carlo Fidanza
on behalf of the ECR Group

See also joint motion for a resolution RC-B9-0389/2022

Procedure : 2022/2822(RSP)
Document stages in plenary
Document selected :  
B9-0400/2022
Texts tabled :
B9-0400/2022
Debates :
Texts adopted :

B9‑0400/2022

European Parliament resolution on the situation in the Strait of Taiwan

(2022/2822(RSP))

The European Parliament,

 having regard to its recommendation of 21 October 2021 to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on EU-Taiwan political relations and cooperation[1],

 having regard to its resolutions of 7 June 2022 on the EU and the security challenges in the Indo-Pacific[2], of 16 September 2021 on a new EU-China strategy[3] and of 9 October 2013 on EU-Taiwan trade relations[4],

 having regard to the G7 Foreign Ministers’ statement of 3 August 2022 on preserving peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait,

 having regard to Rule 132(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas on 4 August 2022, China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) began a series of joint live-fire exercises in the Taiwan Strait by launching multiple missiles and dispatching numerous aircraft and vessels to enter Taiwan’s air defence identification zone and crossing the Taiwan Strait median line, which has since become an almost daily occurrence; whereas the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has deliberately used the visit of the Speaker of the US House of Representatives, Nancy Pelosi, on 2 and 3 August 2022 as a pretext for intensifying its provocative military actions in the waters and airspace around Taiwan;

B. whereas tensions in the Taiwan Strait were mounting over the past year, with the PRC having sent over 150 warplanes, including fighter jets and nuclear-capable bombers, into Taiwan’s air defence identification zone since 1 October 2021; whereas the latest violations of the Taiwanese air defence identification zone by the PRC occurred on 10 and 11 September 2022, with 17 and three Chinese aircraft, respectively, crossing the median line of the Taiwan Strait; whereas these incursions effectively shrink the buffer zone between the two sides and reduce the response time of Taiwan’s military;

C. whereas China’s continued military belligerence and grey-zone activities against Taiwan, as well as other forms of provocation, such as spying, cyberattacks and talent‑poaching, pose a grave threat not only to the status quo between Taiwan and China, but also to peace and security across the Taiwan Strait and the wider region; whereas these activities also undermine the rules-based international order, affect regular international traffic and trade and may lead to a dangerous escalation; whereas China launched mass disinformation campaigns and cyberattacks against Taiwan in conjunction with its military exercises, with the websites of Taiwanese government agencies such as the Presidential Office, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of National Defence being the main targets;

D. whereas the round of live-fire exercises is consistent with the PLA’s doctrine on strategic deterrence; whereas beyond the general objective of strategic deterrence, the PLA also has specific operational objectives intended to change the status quo;

E. whereas China’s repeated and provocative military actions appear as an attempt to unilaterally change the status quo across the Taiwan Strait, violate the UN principle of the peaceful settlement of disputes, and seriously violate Taiwan’s rights under international law; whereas China’s military exercises in areas surrounding Taiwan have hindered the normal operations of one of the busiest air and shipping routes in the Indo‑Pacific region; whereas this has had a serious impact on international transportation and trade and undermined regional peace and security;

F. whereas the Government of Taiwan stated that Taiwan ‘will neither escalate conflicts nor provoke disputes’ and will ‘respond calmly and resolutely to safeguard its sovereignty and national security’;

G. whereas in 2016 the EU committed to using every available channel to encourage initiatives aimed at promoting dialogue, cooperation and confidence-building across both sides of the Taiwan Strait; whereas these aspirations have so far not been fulfilled;

H. whereas China’s response, meanwhile, indicates that it wants to keep tensions under control ahead of the 20th Communist Party congress, which is expected to grant President Xi Jinping a third term as party leader;

I. whereas on 9 October 2021, President Xi Jinping vowed to pursue ‘reunification’ with Taiwan by supposedly peaceful means, but warned that the biggest obstacle to it was the ‘Taiwan independence’ force; whereas such a peaceful approach is put in serious doubt by China’s belligerent statements and actions; whereas according to a survey released by the Election Study Center of National Chengchi University in Taipei in July 2021, only 1.5 % of Taiwanese people support unification with mainland China as soon as possible, while an overwhelming majority support maintaining the status quo, at least in the short term;

J. whereas the PRC used the visit of the Speaker of the US House of Representatives as a pretext to further intensify provocative steps aimed at applying greater economic coercion against Taiwan, by banning the import of citrus, fish and other food from Taiwan while also suspending exports of natural sand to Taiwan;

K. whereas China is trying to deter other countries from interfering in its attempt to invade Taiwan with its missile tests; whereas China’s rehearsal of anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD) tactics proves China’s geostrategic ambitions to alter the status quo in the Taiwan Strait and the entire region;

L. whereas the PLA was Russia’s strongest partner at the Vostok 2022 drills, the goal of which, according to China’s Defence Ministry, was to ‘develop more practical and friendly collaboration with the armies of participating states, enhance the level of strategic cooperation among participants, and strengthen [...] the ability to respond to various security threats’;

M. whereas the PRC has published its first white paper on Taiwan since Xi Jinping came to power, refusing to rule out force in its bid to take control of Taiwan;

N. whereas the EU and Taiwan are like-minded partners that share the common values of freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law;

1. Is deeply concerned at China’s increasing military belligerence against Taiwan and the pressure on it, notably through China’s considerable investment in military capabilities, its military exercises and its frequent violations of Taiwan’s air defence identification zone and the Taiwan Strait median line; strongly condemns the recent, unjustified use of live-fire exercises and economic coercion, which risk unnecessary escalation and destabilise the region; expresses concern about Beijing’s disregard for the median line between the PRC and Taiwan – which both sides have respected as a feature of stability for more than 60 years – with historic numbers of military crossings in recent weeks; notes that these actions are part of an intensified pressure campaign by the PRC against Taiwan and countries expressing their support for the democratic people of Taiwan and its leaders; condemns, in particular, the unprecedented and particularly irresponsible live-fire exercises and missile launches;

2. Calls on the PRC not to seek to unilaterally change the status quo by force in the region and to resolve differences across the strait by peaceful means; demands that China exercises self-restraint; urges Beijing to cease its military, diplomatic and economic pressure and coercion against Taiwan, which is destabilising, runs the risk of miscalculations, and undermines regional peace and stability;

3. Is of the view that the recent military provocations by China cast doubt on China’s long‑term intentions of pursuing a peaceful solution; insists that any change to cross-strait relations must not be made unilaterally, nor go against the will of Taiwanese citizens;

4. Recalls that maintaining peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific is a core interest for the EU and its Member States; stresses that a military conflict in the Taiwan Strait would not only create significant economic disruptions affecting European interests, it would also seriously undermine the rules-based order in the region and a system of democratic governance with human rights, democracy and the rule of law at its core; stresses the importance of ensuring the freedom of navigation in the Taiwan Strait;

5. Reiterates its shared and steadfast commitment to maintaining the rules-based international order, peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and beyond; encourages all parties to remain calm, exercise restraint, act with transparency, and maintain open lines of communication;

6. Reiterates the importance of respecting international law, in particular the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and its provisions on the obligation to settle disputes by peaceful means and on maintaining the freedom of navigation and overflight;

7. Is convinced that China’s provocative actions against Taiwan and in the South China Sea must have consequences for EU-China relations;

8. Applauds the government of Taiwan for exercising restraint after the PRC’s military provocations in the Taiwan Strait;

9. Considers Taiwan a key partner and democratic ally in the Indo-Pacific on its own merit, as it is a robust democracy and technologically advanced economy that could contribute to maintaining a rules-based order in the middle of an intensifying rivalry between great powers; underscores the importance, particularly in the light of China’s continued provocations and military build-up, of further advancing all levels of the EU‑Taiwan partnership and cooperation;

10. Calls on the Commission to launch, without delay, an impact assessment, public consultation and scoping exercise on a Bilateral Investment Agreement with the Taiwanese authorities in preparation for negotiations to deepen bilateral economic ties; recalls, in the context of regional dynamics, the importance of trade and economic relations between the EU and Taiwan, including on matters relating to multilateralism and the World Trade Organization, technology and public health, as well as the importance of essential cooperation on critical supplies such as semiconductors;

11. Strongly advocates for Taiwan’s meaningful participation as an observer in the meetings, mechanisms and activities of international bodies, including the World Health Organization, the International Civil Aviation Organization, the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change;

12. Urges the EU and the Member States to take a proactive role in working with like‑minded international partners in the face of growing Chinese authoritarianism to pursue peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait, and to establish partnerships with the democratic Government of Taiwan;

13. Calls on the President of the European Parliament to pay an official visit to Taiwan; encourages the EU and Taiwan to foster greater economic, scientific, cultural, political and people-to-people exchanges, meetings and cooperation, as well as exchanges with the participation of Member States’ representatives, including at the most senior levels, so as to fully reflect the dynamic, multi-faceted and close cooperation between the EU and Taiwan as like-minded partners;

14. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the European External Action Service, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States and the accession and candidate countries, the Government and Parliament of the People’s Republic of China, and the Government and Parliament of Taiwan.

 

Last updated: 13 September 2022
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