MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the Military Junta crackdown on peaceful demonstrations in Chad
13.12.2022 - (2022/2993(RSP))
pursuant to Rule 144 of the Rules of Procedure
Angel Dzhambazki, Karol Karski, Joachim Stanisław Brudziński, Bogdan Rzońca, Elżbieta Rafalska, Ryszard Czarnecki, Dominik Tarczyński, Eugen Jurzyca, Valdemar Tomaševski, Witold Jan Waszczykowski, Alexandr Vondra, Andżelika Anna Możdżanowska, Jadwiga Wiśniewska, Veronika Vrecionová, Beata Kempa, Anna Zalewska, Carlo Fidanza, Elżbieta Kruk, Denis Nesci, Assita Kanko, Adam Bielan
on behalf of the ECR Group
See also joint motion for a resolution RC-B9-0575/2022
B9‑0579/2022
European Parliament resolution on the Military Junta crackdown on peaceful demonstrations in Chad
The European Parliament,
– having regard to its resolution of 20 May 2021 on the situation in Chad,
- having regard to the communiqué adopted by the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union on 19 September 2022 on the update on political transition in Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea, and Mali ,
- having regard to the communiqué of 2 0ctober 2022 of the EU Delegation and EU Member States on the transition in Chad,
- having regard to the statement of 20 October 2022 by the Vice‑President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Josep Borrell, on the violence in Chad,
- having regard to the press statement of 11 November 2022 of the PSC of the African Union on the Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the situation in Chad,
- having regard to the Cotonou Agreement,
- having regard to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights;
- having regard to the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance,
- having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
– having regard to Rule 144 of its Rules of Procedure,
A. whereas since the death of former President Idriss Deby Itno in April 2021, Chad has been ruled by the Transitional Military Council (TMC) led by his son, Mahamat Idriss Deby;
B. whereas since the beginning of the political transition, several demonstrations were banned and suppressed by the authorities; whereas between 27 April and 19 May 2021, at least 16 people were killed during protests in N’Djamena and Moundou; whereas the protest planned on 9 October 2021 by opposition and pro-democracy activists was repressed by the authorities;
C. whereas over the past years, a link between disruptions in internet access and moments of political contestation was observed in Chad; whereas civic space continues to be largely closed;
D. whereas the ad hoc commission report by Chad’s National Dialogue released on 28 September 2022, recommended an extension of the transition period for 24 months and an expansion of the mandate of the TMC and that members of the TMC be able to run as candidates in future post-transnational elections; whereas these recommendations constitute a monopoly of power in the incumbent executive branch and would jeopardize the democratic transition that was promised to the people of Chad;
E. whereas on 20 October 2022, demonstrations were held in Chad’s capital N’Djamena and elsewhere in the country to mark the date the TMC had initially promised to hand over power to a civilian government and to denounce the extension of the transition period for a further two years; whereas on 21 October 2022, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk deplored the use of force against these protesters, causing 50 people killed by live ammunition and nearly 300 injured and at least 500 people arrested, many apparently arbitrarily; whereas on 26 October 2022 UN and African Union independent experts condemned the lethal repression of peaceful protests over Chad’s extended political transition period and called for de-escalation of tensions;
F. whereas on 2 December 2022, a Chadian court has handed jail terms of between two and three years to 262 people who were arrested after the deadly protests in October and gave 80 people suspended terms; whereas this trial took place in the high-security Koro Toro prison located in the desert far from the public; whereas the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ Guidelines on Freedom of Association and Assembly in Africa provide that the state is responsible for security and safety during demonstrations and that organizers of a peaceful demonstration cannot be held responsible for acts committed by third parties during the demonstration;
1. Supports the aspirations of the Chadian people to realize the first democratic transfer of power in the country’s history;
2. Urges an inclusive, peaceful and timely transition to a democratic and civilian-led government, and calls on all parties to refrain from violence and to prioritize dialogue and respect for human rights of citizens, including the rights to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly;
3. Calls on the TMC to immediately halt the excessive use of force against peaceful demonstrators;
4. Regrets the results of the Chadian National Dialogue and their detrimental consequences for an inclusive, peaceful, and timely transition to a democratic and civilian-led government, and supports the principles outlined in the May 2021 communiqué of the African Union PSC, reiterated on 19 September 2022, which calls for the members of the TMC to abide by their commitment not to participate in democratic elections while working to ensure a civilian-led, inclusive and consensual transitional process in Chad, with clear separation of the roles and functions between the Transitional Government and the TMC;
5. Calls for those responsible for the violence and killings to be held accountable and urges that the Chadian authorities ensure that the Chadian military, gendarmes and police are trained in and abide by the UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials and the Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials;
6. Urges the EU and its Member States to raise these human rights concerns with the Chadian authorities, to provide technical support to Chad throughout the transition period, and to consider sanctions should the TMC fail to fulfill their pledged transition;
7. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice‑President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Government and National Assembly of Chad, and the African Union and its institutions .