MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on one year of Russia’s invasion and war of aggression against Ukraine
13.2.2023 - (2023/2558(RSP))
pursuant to Rule 132(2) of the Rules of Procedure
Anna Fotyga, Elżbieta Kruk, Jadwiga Wiśniewska, Zbigniew Kuźmiuk, Roberts Zīle, Witold Jan Waszczykowski, Kosma Złotowski, Tomasz Piotr Poręba, Andżelika Anna Możdżanowska, Eugen Jurzyca, Angel Dzhambazki, Beata Mazurek, Veronika Vrecionová, Beata Szydło, Hermann Tertsch, Anna Zalewska, Bogdan Rzońca, Elżbieta Rafalska, Adam Bielan, Ryszard Czarnecki, Alexandr Vondra, Dominik Tarczyński, Zdzisław Krasnodębski, Beata Kempa
on behalf of the ECR Group
See also joint motion for a resolution RC-B9-0123/2023
B9‑0134/2023
European Parliament resolution on one year of Russia’s invasion and war of aggression against Ukraine
The European Parliament,
– having regard to its previous resolutions and reports on Ukraine and Russia,
– having regard to Ukraine’s application to join the EU and the subsequent decision to grant Ukraine candidate status,
– having regard to the UN Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention),
– having regard to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC),
– having regard to the Charter of the United Nations,
– having regard to the Helsinki Final Act of 1 August 1975 and subsequent documents,
– having regard to Rule 132(2) of its Rules of Procedure,
A. whereas the Russian Federation, with the active support of Belarusian dictator Aliaksandr Lukashenka, has for one year continued its illegal, unprovoked and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine, which escalated on 24 February 2022 but began as early as 2014 with the occupation of Crimea and parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts;
B. whereas tens of thousands of civilians in Ukraine have already been murdered, tortured, harassed, sexually assaulted, kidnapped or forcibly displaced; whereas this inhumane conduct by the Russian forces and their proxies is in total disregard for international humanitarian law, constitutes war crimes and crimes against humanity, and amounts to genocide; whereas since October 2022, Russia has been deliberately targeting Ukrainian civilian and critical infrastructure all over the country, including nuclear power plants, in order to terrorise the population and cut its access to gas, electricity, heating, water, the internet and other basic goods and services, which is particularly devastating during winter;
C. whereas Russia’s attempt to ethnically cleanse Ukraine has included mass atrocities, systematic cases of deliberate killing of civilians, mass deportations, the transfer of displaced Ukrainian children into Russia and the seizure and looting of Ukraine’s cultural heritage in an effort to destroy any artefacts demonstrating Ukraine’s authentic national identity and to erase Ukrainian culture and statehood;
D. whereas the EU has adopted nine sanction packages targeting Russian individuals and companies and is working on a 10th package; whereas, additionally, many Western enterprises have chosen to withdraw from the Russian market, although some have decided to stay, with German businesses being the most numerous;
E. whereas in 2022, according to estimates, as a result of Russian aggression, Ukraine lost at least one third of its gross domestic product and up to 8 million people fled the country, around 4.2 million of whom have sought refuge in EU Member States, including more than 1.5 million people in Poland alone; whereas the war has also had an impact on the EU and other countries, with the biggest burden in terms of humanitarian aid and the cost of hosting refugees being borne by Poland, and has led to a sharp increase in energy prices and inflation;
F. whereas over the last 15 years Russia’s imperial policies have led it to pursue wars in former Soviet areas of influence every six to seven years, undermining aspiring and developing countries in the South Caucasus, Central Asia and Eastern Europe while militarising its position in the Arctic in order to impose a new security architecture on Europe;
G. whereas despite the mass mobilisation in Russia, which has allowed it to continue its war of aggression against Ukraine, Russia maintains an active military presence everywhere that Moscow deems strategically important, primarily South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Kazakhstan, Transnistria, Syria, the wider Mediterranean, Africa (via the Wagner Group), Latin America and the Arctic, all of which create additional threat scenarios that cannot be discounted;
H. whereas on 28 February 2022, Ukraine applied for EU membership and on 23 June 2022, the European Council granted candidate status to Ukraine; whereas in December 2022, the Council referred to Ukraine for the first time in its conclusions, specifically in its conclusions on enlargement and the stabilisation and association process;
I. whereas according to the World Bank, Ukraine’s economy shrank by more than 30 % in 2022, while Russia’s economy contracted by 3.5 %; whereas the impact on the global economy has been profound, with oil prices likely to remain over EUR 79 per barrel and gas prices up by at least 50 % for an extended period, while Russia’s and Ukraine’s combined annual exports of 25 % of the world’s wheat and 28.9 % of the world’s sunflower oil have been profoundly damaged, leading to serious shortages and food scarcity in the wider world;
J. whereas the war has severely disrupted global supply chains, including land trade routes between Europe and Asia, the Bosporus and several other key routes, while forcing Ukraine to shut down commercial sea freight movements; whereas the suspension of air routes over Russia has greatly hindered air travel; whereas the World Trade Organization’s Trade Forecast 2022-2023 suggests a decline in economic growth from 4 % to 3 % at a time when the global economy is struggling to recover from the COVID-19 pandemic;
K. whereas Russia is responsible for the global food security crisis as a result of its war of aggression against Ukraine and its blockade of Ukrainian seaports; whereas Russia has been weaponising food and hunger since the beginning of the war;
L. whereas estimates from various pollsters suggest that support for the war remains relatively high in Russia, with some 73 % of Russians surveyed in October supporting the actions of the Russian armed forces in Ukraine, while some 56 % of those surveyed also supported the partial mobilisation; whereas these figures are confirmed by the very limited nature of anti-war activities within the Russian Federation, as well as among the Russian diaspora abroad, which has full access to all information regarding the war of aggression;
M. whereas numerous international actors have recognised Russia as a state sponsor of terrorism and a state which uses means of terrorism, which should now be followed by concrete measures; whereas as long as Russia remains an imperial state, it will continue to represent an ever-present threat of aggression on the European continent, and there is no reason to believe that Vladimir Putin’s successor would be any more peaceful;
N. whereas NATO and leading allies such as the United States and the United Kingdom have played a crucial role in coordinating and leading the efforts to support Ukraine militarily, not only with weapons, ammunition and equipment, but also with intelligence and data; whereas the ongoing war of aggression further confirms that the most important country for European security remains the United States, as the war continues to reveal profound structural faults in the EU security and defence architecture and unacceptable shortfalls in capabilities; whereas these events have underlined the role of Poland as a respected EU and NATO partner and a main hub for support to Ukraine;
O. whereas Russia’s war of aggression has had the direct consequence of Finland and Sweden applying for NATO membership, Ukraine and Moldova applying for EU membership, robust security assistance packages being delivered to Ukraine by over 50 states, and strong political support for Ukraine being expressed at the UN, resulting in Russia having created the geostrategic situation it claimed its war was intended to avoid;
P. whereas Poland and the Baltic States are effectively front-line states, making them the most affected by the war and its consequences; whereas they face consistent provocation from Russia, which has already resulted in the death of EU citizens, for example in November 2022 in Przewodów, Poland;
Q. whereas the decision of the Islamic Republic of Iran to supply Russia with thousands of Shahed drones has further cemented its place as a pariah state, and whereas the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps may yet offer further military support to assist Moscow’s war aims in Ukraine; whereas the fact that Russia is continuing to receive support from countries such as North Korea and China further demonstrates its unwavering hostility to international laws and norms;
R. whereas the fact that Ukraine agreed in 1994 to relinquish its nuclear arsenal in return for guarantees regarding its territorial integrity means it deserves to be supplied by the international community with all the modern weapons it needs to defend its territory;
S. whereas Russia’s war of aggression clearly demonstrates the essential nature of transatlantic cooperation and that Member States must abandon the false belief that soft power is some kind of replacement for hard power;
1. Reiterates its unwavering support for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, within its internationally recognised borders; reiterates its strongest condemnation of Russia’s illegal, unprovoked and unjustifiable war of aggression against Ukraine; demands that Russia and its proxy forces cease all military actions, in particular their attacks against residential areas and civilian infrastructure, and that Russia withdraw all military forces, proxies and military equipment from the entire internationally recognised territory of Ukraine;
2. Reaffirms its unwavering solidarity with the people of Ukraine, who continue to show remarkable courage and resilience at all levels – from the political leadership to the armed forces and to individual citizens – under unrelenting threats and attacks since 24 February 2022 and over the last nine years of Russian aggression;
3. Reiterates its call for the further increase and for the speeding up of financial and military assistance to Ukraine and for the immediate deployment of modern equipment, weapons and next-generation air-defence and surface-to-surface systems, including the Army Tactile Missile System (ATACMS); expresses its support for the decision by a number of Member States and international partners to provide Ukraine with modern main battle tanks, infantry fighting vehicles and armoured personnel carriers; underlines the need to move one step further and deliver Western fighter jets and attack helicopters to Ukraine and train Ukrainian crews as swiftly as possible;
4. Underlines that the ultimate goal of the Western allies should be:
(a) the military collapse of Russian forces and their proxies in Ukraine, which will enable Kyiv to fully restore its territorial integrity;
(b) ensuring that Russia pays compensation to Ukraine for the tremendous suffering it has caused;
(c) bringing to justice those responsible for waging the war of aggression against Ukraine for the crimes they have committed, including Vladimir Putin and Aliaksandr Lukashenka, as well as war criminals in the lower echelons of the Russian Government, the Russian armed forces and their proxies;
(d) making sure that Russian imperialism is eradicated and will not return;
5. Welcomes the granting of candidate status to Ukraine and acknowledges Ukraine’s considerable efforts to meet the objectives underpinning that status, despite very difficult circumstances; recognises the progress Ukraine has made in its reform process and encourages the Commission to further assist Ukraine in its efforts to fulfil the conditions specified in the Commission’s opinion on its EU membership application;
6. Calls for a new sanctions package to be swiftly prepared and implemented that would strengthen restrictive measures already in place and make it more difficult for Russia and third countries to circumvent those measures, as well as introduce additional ones targeting, among others, Russian companies still present in EU markets, such as Lukoil, reducing the EU’s nuclear fuel cooperation with Moscow and including the Russian State Atomic Energy Corporation Rosatom in the sanctions regime, banning the import of Russian diamonds, lowering the price cap on Russian oil and strengthening restrictive measures against Belarus, which despite numerous calls to do so do not mirror sanctions imposed on Moscow;
7. Is of the opinion that any strategy to end the war must be based on five principles:
(a) the West should fully support Ukraine militarily and financially for as long as is needed;
(b) Russia must pay reparations for the appalling death and damage it has inflicted on Ukraine;
(c) there can be no de facto Russian veto over EU or NATO decisions and no secret deals with Moscow can be entertained;
(d) there can be no return to a ‘business as usual’ policy;
(e) Russia must undergo deep changes and relinquish its imperial policies;
8. Reiterates, in this regard, its call on the Commission and the Member States to take the lead in the preparation of a multilateral mechanism for overseeing, enforcing and disbursing the payment of Russian reparations to Ukraine and enabling the use for this purpose of funds and assets frozen as a result of the Russian invasion;
9. Encourages sustained and robust efforts among Member States, along with Ukraine and international officials and prosecutors at the ICC, to support preparations for war crimes tribunals for Russian officials and members of the armed forces and their proxies, to ensure that all war criminals are brought to justice;
10. Welcomes the role played by NATO in supporting Ukraine and bolstering the defensive capabilities of its front-line states; underlines the role of the alliance as a cornerstone of future European security, especially after the accession of Sweden and Finland;
11. Underlines that the Russian war of aggression is the largest military conflict on the European continent since the end of the Second World War and that it illustrates the growing conflict between authoritarianism and democracy;
12. Reiterates its commitment to Europe as a whole, free and at peace, with Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova being full members of transatlantic institutions, which is the goal of their societies;
13. Strongly believes that the outcome of the war and the stance taken by the international community will be crucial in influencing future actions by other authoritarian states, such as China, Iran and others, which are closely observing the course of the war, as depending on its outcome, it might either deter them or encourage them to undertake similar actions in breach of international law against their neighbours or perceived foes, further undermining international stability, security and peace;
14. Reiterates its condemnation of the recent decision of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) to allow Russian and Belarusian athletes to compete in qualifications for the Paris 2024 Olympic Games under a neutral flag, which runs counter to those countries’ multifaceted isolation and will be used by both regimes for propaganda purposes; calls on the Member States and the international community to exert pressure on the IOC to reverse this decision, which is an embarrassment to the international world of sport, and to adopt a similar position on any other sport, cultural or scientific events;
15. Condemns the irreparable damage caused to cultural sites by the Russian armed forces and their affiliates and remains concerned that the war will lead to an increase of international smuggling and theft of cultural heritage;
16. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Criminal Court, the President, Government and Parliament of the Russian Federation, and the President, Government and Parliament of Ukraine.