MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on recent developments in the Serbia-Kosovo dialogue, including the situation in the northern municipalities in Kosovo
16.10.2023 - (2023/2880(RSP))
pursuant to Rule 132(2) of the Rules of Procedure
Viola von Cramon‑Taubadel, Francisco Guerreiro, Jordi Solé, Henrike Hahn, Ignazio Corrao, Bronis Ropė
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group
See also joint motion for a resolution RC-B9-0437/2023
B9‑0440/2023
European Parliament resolution on recent developments in the Serbia-Kosovo dialogue, including the situation in the northern municipalities in Kosovo
The European Parliament,
– having regard to the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Serbia, of the other part[1], which entered into force on 1 September 2013,
– having regard to the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community, of the one part, and Kosovo, of the other part[2], which entered into force on 1 April 2016,
– having regard to its previous resolutions on Kosovo, particularly that of 10 May 2023 on the 2022 Commission Report on Kosovo[3],
– having regard to its previous resolutions on Serbia, particularly that of 10 May 2023 on the 2022 Commission Report on Serbia[4],
– having regard to Kosovo’s application for EU membership, submitted in December 2022,
– having regard to the Agreement on the path to normalisation between Kosovo and Serbia of 27 February 2023 (Brussels Agreement) and to the Implementation Annex thereto of 18 March 2023 (Ohrid Agreement),
– having regard to the statement of 24 April 2023 by the Spokesperson of the European External Action Service (EEAS) on by-elections in the north of Kosovo,
– having regard to the statement of 26 May 2023 by the EEAS Spokesperson on the latest tensions and clashes in Kosovo,
– having regard to the statement of 30 May 2023 by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Josep Borrell, on the ongoing confrontations in Kosovo,
– having regard to the statement of 3 June 2023 by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the latest developments in Kosovo,
– having regard to the statement of 19 September 2023 by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on expectations from Serbia and Kosovo in the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue,
– having regard to the statement of 24 September 2023 by High Representative Josep Borrell on the attack against Kosovo Police,
– having regard to Rule 132(2) of its Rules of Procedure,
A. whereas since July 2022, extremist organised groups backed by the Serbian Government have stoked tensions in the north of Kosovo by building barricades and engaging in violence against the Kosovan authorities in reaction to the decision regarding car licence plates; whereas in November 2022, Kosovo Serbs withdrew from Kosovan institutions in the north of the country;
B. whereas the Kosovo Special Police was deployed to the north of the country by the Kosovan Government in April 2022 and took over community policing when Kosovo Serbs withdrew from Kosovan institutions in November 2022; whereas some Serbian actors have used the Kosovo Special Police’s presence in urban centres and near schools to increase tensions among the local population;
C. whereas on 27 February 2023, the EU brokered the Brussels Agreement on the path to normalisation between Kosovo and Serbia; whereas on 18 March 2023, Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) Josep Borrell announced that Prime Minister of Kosovo Albin Kurti and President of Serbia Aleksandar Vučić had agreed, under the EU-facilitated dialogue, on an Implementation Annex to the Agreement on the path to normalisation between Kosovo and Serbia (Ohrid Agreement); whereas President Vučić effectively refused to sign both agreements;
D. whereas on 23 April 2023, Kosovo held local by-elections in four Serb-majority municipalities in the north of the country (Leposavić, North Mitrovica, Zubin Potok and Zvečan); whereas the main ethnic Serb party Srpska Lista, which has close links with President Vučić and the Serbian Progressive Party, actively boycotted the elections; whereas as a result of this boycott, the turnout in the elections was only around 3 %; whereas the elections were held in line with Kosovo’s legal framework, but cannot be considered to have yielded a representative outcome;
E. whereas on 26 May 2023, the Kosovo Special Police provided an escort for the newly elected mayors of these municipalities so that they could enter the municipality buildings; whereas the EU condemned this decision, which was made without consulting Kosovo’s international partners; whereas on 26 May 2023, there were violent clashes between protesters and the Kosovan police in the north of Kosovo; whereas between 29 and 31 May 2023, violent agitators brutally attacked officers of the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR), Kosovan police officers and an EU Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) patrol in the north of Kosovo; whereas in late May 2023, journalists and media workers were attacked in the north of Kosovo; whereas VP/HR Borrell condemned the violence and asked the parties to de-escalate; whereas on 30 May 2023, KFOR issued a statement stressing that 11 soldiers from the Italian contingent and 19 from the Hungarian contingent had sustained multiple injuries, including fractures and burns from improvised explosive incendiary devices, and that three Hungarian soldiers had been wounded by firearms; whereas as a result of the use of lethal weapons against KFOR, three soldiers ended up in critical condition and one Hungarian soldier lost his leg;
F. whereas on 1 June 2023, on the sidelines of the European Political Community meeting in Moldova, VP/HR Borrell, French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz asked Kosovo to withdraw its special police forces from urban neighbourhoods in the north of the country, to hold new local elections while ensuring the participation of Kosovo Serbs, and to start work to establish the Association/Community of Serb-Majority Municipalities under the EU-facilitated dialogue; whereas VP/HR Borrell warned that failure to do so would have serious consequences for the EU’s relations with Kosovo;
G. whereas on 14 June 2023, Serbian special forces violently abducted three Kosovan border police officers in the border region between the north of Kosovo and Serbia; whereas the US and individual EU foreign ministers called for the immediate and unconditional release of the three Kosovan police officers, a call that was not echoed by the VP/HR or the EU Special Representative for the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue and other Western Balkan regional issues; whereas it was not until 26 June 2023 that a Serbian court released them;
H. whereas the Commission imposed restrictive measures against Kosovo on 1 July 2023 on the initiative of VP/HR Borrell, including the suspension of the work of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement bodies, the interruption of funding to Kosovo and the suspension of high-level events and bilateral visits;
I. whereas on 24 September 2023, the blockade of a bridge at the entrance of Banjska, in the north of Kosovo, was reported to the Kosovan police; whereas when the Kosovan police arrived, they were attacked by a heavily armed group of around 30 men; whereas this attack resulted in the deaths of one Kosovan police officer and three of the assailants and caused many injuries; whereas the terrorists barricaded themselves inside Banjska Monastery despite the presence of a group of pilgrims from Serbia, who were also inside; whereas when the Kosovan police gained control of the situation, they arrested some of the gunmen and confiscated a massive amount of weapons, explosives and ammunition; whereas some of the arrested gunmen were Serbian citizens who had crossed the border from Serbia to Kosovo; whereas Milan Radoičić, the Vice-President of Srpska Lista, who was able to flee to Serbia with part of the group, claimed that he had organised the terrorist attack in Banjska alone, without the knowledge or involvement of his party or of the Serbian State; whereas Radoičić was placed in custody in Serbia on 3 October 2023 but was released one day later; whereas in 2021, Radoičić was added to the Specially Designated Nationals List of the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the US Department of Treasury, which targets persons responsible for corruption and serious human rights violations; whereas preliminary investigations and information released by the Kosovan authorities indicate that the Serbian authorities were heavily involved, in particular given the origin, type and amount of large military-type weaponry and ammunition in the group’s possession;
J. whereas Srpska Lista, the main party of the Kosovo Serbs, publicly announced on 13 October 2023 that it would unconditionally take part in the local elections in the north of Kosovo;
K. whereas on 14 October 2023, the Kosovan police seized more weapons and ammunition during several raids in the northern municipalities of Kosovo;
L. whereas the Kosovan police is Kosovo’s first security responder, with EULEX’s Formed Police Unit as the second security responder and KFOR as the third; whereas KFOR does not have a mandate to conduct law enforcement activities in the north of Kosovo, as these are the exclusive prerogative of the Kosovan police and are monitored by EULEX;
1. Condemns in the strongest terms the brutal and hideous attack in the village of Banjska, in the north of Kosovo, on 24 September 2023, during which Kosovan police officer Afrim Bunjaku was murdered; commends the Kosovan police’s cooperation with international partners, EULEX and KFOR in its response to the attack;
2. Calls for all the perpetrators of this terrorist attack to be brought to justice without delay, including in Serbia; calls, against this backdrop, for the EU to assist the investigation by the Kosovan authorities without hesitation, including by ensuring EULEX support; urges the Serbian Government to cooperate unconditionally with the relevant authorities, particularly those in Kosovo, with regard to this investigation;
3. Strongly condemns the violent attacks of May 2023 against KFOR soldiers, Kosovan police officers and journalists; calls on the relevant authorities to bring all the perpetrators of these deplorable attacks to justice;
4. Calls on the Commission and the Council to take measures against the Serbian Government if investigations reveal that the Serbian State was directly involved in the Banjska terrorist attack or the violent attacks that took place in the north of Kosovo in May 2023, or if the Serbian authorities are unwilling to cooperate fully; calls, in this context, on the Commission to freeze the funding provided to Serbia under the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance III if investigation findings indicate that the Serbian State was directly involved in these attacks;
5. Calls on Kosovo to establish the Association/Community of Serb-Majority Municipalities without further delay, in line with the Brussels Agreements of 2013 and 2015, Kosovo’s constitution and the 2015 judgment of the Constitutional Court of Kosovo;
6. Calls on KFOR to establish a containment plan for the north of Kosovo, incorporating robust aspects that can act as a deterrent to further escalation; welcomes the UK’s deployment of 200 soldiers to Kosovo to reinforce KFOR and strongly urges the EU Member States to deploy additional troops to the country without further delay; strongly welcomes NATO’s decision to equip KFOR with heavier armament to give it more combat power; urges NATO to ensure that KFOR has the right capabilities to closely monitor the entire north of Kosovo and carry out round-the-clock surveillance of the region to ensure that any paramilitary incursion, action or attempted abduction of Kosovan law enforcement officers can be detected immediately, at a very early stage;
7. Is concerned by evidence linking violent criminal groups in the north of Kosovo and in Serbia with the Serbian State; calls for a thorough investigation to address these concerns; recalls that, according to the 2022 Commission report on Serbia, there are still significant challenges and delays in implementation with regard to the impartiality, accountability, efficiency and professionalism of the Serbian judiciary; expresses deep concern, in this context, that all those responsible for the clashes in Banjska might not be brought to justice;
8. Deplores the military build-up by Serbia on its border with Kosovo; stresses that such aggressive military behaviour, together with radicalised political messaging in Serbia and strong indications of the Serbian State’s involvement in the recent political violence in the north of Kosovo, indicates that the Serbian Government is pursuing a very dangerous but coherent policy with regard to Kosovo and its Western partners;
9. Reiterates its calls on Serbia and Kosovo to re-engage in the EU-facilitated dialogue in good faith and in the spirit of compromise with a view to achieving a comprehensive, legally binding agreement on the normalisation of their relations, based on mutual recognition, in accordance with international law and without further delay; calls on the relevant parties to make the dialogue more citizen-oriented; calls on the EEAS to allocate more resources to the EU-facilitated dialogue;
10. Calls on both Serbia and Kosovo to fully implement the Brussels Agreement of 27 February 2023 and the Ohrid Agreement of 18 March 2023, as well as all the previous agreements, and to do so genuinely and in good faith; regrets that Serbia has refused to sign the Brussels and Ohrid Agreements; calls on the EEAS and the Commission to ensure the effective implementation of these agreements;
11. Deeply regrets Serbia’s objection to Kosovo’s membership of the Council of Europe, in clear violation of the Brussels Agreement of 27 February 2023; urges Serbia to refrain from the threat or use of force, in line with its international obligations;
12. Deeply regrets that both Serbia and the Republika Srpska entity of Bosnia and Herzegovina observed a national day of mourning honouring the three dead terrorists, with the aim of establishing a political narrative that these terrorists were heroes who fought for the cause of Serbs, which has greatly increased political tensions in the region;
13. Deplores the ultra-nationalistic and inflammatory rhetoric used by Serbian officials against Kosovo; deplores, in this context, the murals bearing the graffiti message ‘When the army returns to Kosovo’ and urges the Serbian authorities to remove them without further delay;
14. Is gravely concerned by the fact that government-controlled media in Serbia, such as Pink, Happy TV and Informer, are spreading huge amounts of disinformation and hate speech against Kosovo Albanians, which is contributing to fuelling ethnic tensions between Serbia and Kosovo; condemns the fact that Serbian pro-government media used the attack in Banjska to spread general hostility towards Kosovo Albanians;
15. Calls on Kosovo to ensure that new local elections can be held in the north of the country as soon as possible, since Srpska Lista has already announced its unconditional participation; calls on Serbia, in this context, not to interfere in Kosovo’s electoral processes;
16. Calls for the dismantling of parallel structures in the north of Kosovo;
17. Calls on the Government of Kosovo to genuinely engage in a meaningful internal dialogue with Kosovo Serb citizens and independent civil society organisations in the northern municipalities of the country;
18. Calls for a proper investigation of all ethnic-related attacks throughout Kosovo, including the attacks on the Bistrica bridge and in Štrpce on Orthodox Christmas Eve;
19. Urges the Commission to lift the restrictive measures imposed on Kosovo on 1 July 2023; highlights that restrictive and punitive measures should only be applied where there have been serious breaches of democracy, human rights and the rule of law;
20. Welcomes the joint statement on Kosovo signed by European and US parliamentarians in August 2023, which raised concerns about the EU’s current policy regarding Serbia-Kosovo relations; urges the Commission and the EEAS, in this context, to move away from their current policy of appeasement towards Serbia and to adopt a balanced, unbiased and proportionate policy of deterrence diplomacy, particularly in view of the fragile security situation in the Western Balkans;
21. Reiterates its calls on the Member States that have not yet recognised Kosovo as a sovereign state, namely Spain, Slovakia, Cyprus, Romania and Greece, to do so without further delay; calls for the EU, particularly the Member States that do recognise Kosovo as a sovereign state, to initiate a process of engaging with the five EU Member States that do not recognise it as part of the dialogue to ensure that Kosovo has no obstacles in its path to EU accession;
22. Recalls that the agreement on visa liberalisation for Kosovo is not and should not be linked to the dialogue and should enter into force on 1 January 2024 at the latest; calls on Spain, in this context, to guarantee visa-free travel to the holders of Kosovan passports;
23. Calls on the Council to adopt targeted restrictive measures, including but not limited to asset freezes and travel bans, against destabilising actors in the north of Kosovo and the leaders of major organised crime networks; calls on the Council, in this context, to follow the example of the United States and impose targeted measures against Milan Radoičić; calls on the Member States to adopt restrictive measures bilaterally or in concert with other Member States if it is not possible for the Council to adopt such measures;
24. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the European External Action Service, NATO, Kosovo Force, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, and the presidents, governments and national assemblies of both Kosovo and Serbia.
- [1] OJ L 278, 18.10.2013, p. 16.
- [2] OJ L 71, 16.3.2016, p. 3.
- [3] Texts adopted, P9_TA(2023)0193.
- [4] Texts adopted, P9_TA(2023)0192.