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*Plenary sitting*

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**B9-0454/2023**

6.11.2023

## MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION

to wind up the debate on the statements by the Council and the Commission

pursuant to Rule 132(2) of the Rules of Procedure

on the effectiveness of the EU sanctions on Russia  
(2023/2905(RSP))

**Bernard Guetta, Petras Auštrevičius, Olivier Chastel, Katalin Cseh, Vlad Gheorghe, Karin Karlsbro, Georgios Kyrtos, Nathalie Loiseau, Karen Melchior, Javier Nart, Urmas Paet, Dragoș Pîslaru, Dragoș Tudorache**  
on behalf of the Renew Group

**European Parliament resolution on the effectiveness of the EU sanctions on Russia (2023/2905(RSP))**

*The European Parliament,*

- having regard to its previous resolutions on Russia and Ukraine, in particular since the escalation of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine in February 2022,
- having regard to the wide international condemnation of Russia’s illegal war of aggression against Ukraine, and the loss of human life and destruction it created in Ukraine,
- having regard to Council Decision (EU) 2022/2332 of 28 November 2022 on identifying the violation of Union restrictive measures as an area of crime that meets the criteria specified in Article 83(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union<sup>1</sup>,
- having regard to Rule 132(2) of its Rules of Procedure,
- A. whereas since 24 February 2022, when Russia re-launched its unprovoked, unjustified and illegal war of aggression against Ukraine, the geopolitical situation in Europe has fundamentally changed;
- B. whereas Russia’s forces have conducted indiscriminate attacks against residential areas and civilian infrastructure, killing thousands of Ukrainian civilians, forcibly deporting and illegally imprisoning Ukrainian citizens in Russia and Russian-occupied territories of Ukraine, and carrying out acts of terror throughout the country;
- C. whereas since 17 March 2014, the EU has imposed 11 sanctions packages against Russia aimed at weakening its economic base and curtailing its ability to wage war, including restrictive measures against almost 1 800 individuals and entities responsible for or involved in the war in Ukraine, a ban on numerous imported goods and services from Russia such as oil and raw materials, and a prohibition on exports to Russia of any military equipment or components;
- D. whereas measuring the impact of sanctions presents numerous challenges, including the lack of reliable figures and statistics; whereas the impact of EU sanctions cannot be easily separated from the impact of US and other sanctions, the Russian counter-sanctions or the impact of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; whereas, although the EU sanctions against Russia are unprecedented, the impact on the Russian economy so far seems to be smaller than initially forecasted by some of the projections and there are worrying signs that the effectiveness of the sanctions is wearing off; whereas the sanctions against Russia have forced and are still forcing their targets into a permanent search for costly byways;

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<sup>1</sup> OJ L 308, 29.11.2022, p. 18.

- E. whereas Russia's oil and gas export revenues decreased by 38 % between January 2022 and January 2023; whereas Russia's share of European gas demand fell from 23 % in 2022 to below 10 % in January 2023; whereas, according to the Russian Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat), total gas production in Russia decreased by 12 % in 2022, while the volume of liquefied natural gas production increased by 8.1 % to record levels; whereas, despite the EU embargo on the coal industry, Russian coal production increased by 0.3 % compared to 2021 and reached a record level;
- F. whereas, according to official Russian figures, the Russian economy allegedly shrank by only 2.1 % in 2022, much less than expected despite its war of aggression against Ukraine and the international sanctions; whereas the International Monetary Fund forecasts, on the basis of the official Russian figures, that the Russian economy will grow by 2.2 % in 2023 and by 1.1 % in 2024;
- G. whereas, on 3 December 2022, the Council, together with the US, the UK, Canada, Japan and Australia, decided to set an oil price cap at USD 60 per barrel; whereas, in October 2023, the average monthly price of Urals crude oil, Russia's major export oil brand, was over USD 75 per barrel, despite the G7's USD 60 price cap; whereas Russia's oil revenues rebounded in the first half of 2023, rising to the highest level since November 2022;
- H. whereas Russia has been able to redirect crude oil exports from Europe to alternative markets such as India, China and Türkiye; whereas EU imports from India and other nations of petroleum products made with Russian oil have soared, creating a backdoor route for Russian oil and undermining the impact of the EU sanctions;
- I. whereas purchases by EU Member States of Russian liquefied natural gas (LNG) or Russian-origin oil from non-EU countries are not restricted and are currently running well above levels seen before February 2022; whereas Russia is the EU's second largest supplier of LNG, behind only the US; whereas the increase in LNG imports from Russia runs counter to the EU's aim to end its reliance on Russian fossil fuels;
- J. whereas EU imports from Russia have fallen since February 2022; whereas, despite the sanctions, in practice some Member States have increased trade with Russia since February 2022;
- K. whereas a series of EU companies enjoy derogations under Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014<sup>2</sup> and, hence, continue to carry out business activities with Russian entities that are under financial and trade sanctions; whereas the competence of granting derogations belongs to the national authorities and the EU institutions are merely informed about the granted derogations, without the ability to contest them; whereas Parliament and other institutions do not have access to that essential information; whereas this derogation practice considerably reduces the desired impact of the EU sanctions, thus depriving one of the main EU foreign policy tools of effectiveness and credibility;
- L. whereas, in an attempt to counter the sanctions, Russia has turned to non-sanctioning

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<sup>2</sup> Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 of 17 March 2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, OJ L 78, 17.3.2014, p. 6.

countries in search of technology and other products; whereas Russia's trade with China hit a record high in 2022, up 30 % from 2021, and further grew by 36.5 % from January to July 2023; whereas China now accounts for around half of Russia's imports, up from a quarter before the war; whereas Russia's trade volume with India and Türkiye has also increased significantly;

- M. whereas several analyses of captured Russian weaponry have shown that Russia continues to import critical Western components due to its ability to find alternative suppliers, with imports of key items such as semiconductors even rising above pre-sanctions levels;
  - N. whereas several non-sanctioning countries such as Türkiye, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, some countries from the South Caucasus and Serbia have become hubs through which private companies reroute the products they import from the EU towards Russia;
  - O. whereas, on 2 December 2022, the Commission presented a proposal for a directive on the definition of criminal offences and penalties for the violation of Union restrictive measures<sup>3</sup> with a view to facilitating the investigation, prosecution and punishment of violations of EU sanctions in all Member States;
1. Reiterates its condemnation in the strongest terms of the unprovoked, illegal and unjustified Russian war of aggression against Ukraine; reiterates its call on Russia to immediately terminate all military activities in Ukraine and to unconditionally withdraw all forces and military equipment from the entire internationally recognised territory of Ukraine;
  2. Recalls that the effectiveness of international sanctions depends on the firmness, cohesion, cooperation, honesty and respect for the commitments of the states that have adopted them;
  3. Calls for the Member States to clearly identify sanctioned Russian foreign assets being held in their jurisdictions and to ensure that they are effectively removed from the reach of Russian entities;
  4. Calls for the EU and its Member States to reinforce and centralise, at EU level, the oversight of sanctions implementation and to develop a sanctions circumvention prevention and monitoring mechanism to limit Russia's ability to circumvent sanctions; calls on the Member States' authorities to cooperate more closely on investigations of sanctions violations or circumvention and to demonstrate the consequences of such violations by dynamically and vigorously preventing and/or prosecuting violations of EU sanctions; calls, in this regard, for the EU institutions to reach a swift agreement on an ambitious directive on the definition of criminal offences and penalties for the violation of Union restrictive measures; calls on the European Council to adopt a decision extending the powers of the European Public Prosecutor's Office to include the crime of violation of Union restrictive measures, which would allow for greater harmonisation and consistent and uniform enforcement of such crimes throughout the

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<sup>3</sup> Commission proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the definition of criminal offences and penalties for the violation of Union restrictive measures (COM(2022)0684).

EU;

5. Calls for the EU and its Member States to set up systems through which information on transactions can be shared more effectively in order to improve the enforcement of sanctions related to military and dual-use goods; calls on the Member States' authorities to provide the necessary information and assistance to companies in order to improve compliance with EU sanctions and to engage with the companies whose products are being exported to Russia in order to minimise the risk of unknowingly violating export controls;
6. Calls on the Member States to expand export controls to cover broader categories, to align export controls across jurisdictions and to enforce measures consistently to close loopholes;
7. Calls for the EU and its Member States to take particular measures to prevent advanced technology products that are being exported to non-EU countries from ending up in Russia, and to constantly monitor developments so as to identify how sanctions circumvention schemes work and to adapt the sanctions regimes accordingly;
8. Calls for the EU and its Member States to strengthen and increase coordination on the enforcement of existing sanctions on Russian oil exports; calls for the EU and its Member States to fully close the EU market for Russian-origin fossil fuels;
9. Calls for the EU and its Member States to ensure full alignment between sanctions and EU internal market regulations and to improve EU strategic communication on, and fight disinformation about, the EU sanctions against Russia;
10. Urges the companies of European and acceding countries to withdraw their operations from Russia; considers that the companies using derogations from the application of the EU sanctions against Russia, and, as such, maintaining business activities with Russia, should not benefit from any EU funds, or technical assistance or participation in EU-funded projects; considers that these companies should be automatically put on the Early Detection and Exclusion System and that their status on the Arachne risk scoring tool should be updated accordingly;
11. Believes that the same principle should apply, *mutatis mutandis*, to public procurement, whereby government departments or local authorities should not be allowed to purchase work, goods or services from companies derogating from EU sanctions under Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014;
12. Condemns the behaviour of the states, entities, legal service providers and individuals that help Russia to avoid the effects of EU sanctions; recalls that the violation of the sanctions represents a crime at EU level, and has a severe impact on EU financial interests; calls for the Member States and the EU institutions, including the EU International Special Envoy for the Implementation of EU Sanctions, to intensify their work to limit the evasion and circumvention of the EU sanctions on Russia; stresses that the assets confiscated as a result of sanctions violations must be used for the compensation of the victims of the Russian aggression, as well as for infrastructure reconstruction and reforms (under the Ukraine Facility);

13. Calls for the EU and the Member States to reassess their relations with countries that do not make sufficient efforts to limit the evasion and circumvention of the EU sanctions on Russia, including the financial assistance provided to these countries and any preferential access to EU markets;
14. Calls for the EU institutions and the Member States to maintain EU unity and to put increased pressure on Russia and its allies, including through further sanctions packages aimed at strategically limiting Russia's ability to replace its destroyed military equipment and finance its war campaign;
15. Calls for the EU and its Member States to work with the G7 to lower the price cap on Russian oil and petroleum products, to impose an embargo on Russian LNG imports into the EU and on the import of fuel and other petroleum products from non-EU countries if those products were produced using Russian oil and to prohibit the shipment of Russian LNG exports through EU territory; calls for the EU to introduce price and volume caps on Russian and Belarusian fertiliser imports into the EU;
16. Calls for the EU and its Member States to impose sanctions on all the major Russian oil companies, Gazprombank, their subsidiaries and their boards and management;
17. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to expand the sanctions to include a full ban on the marketing and cutting of diamonds of Russian origin or re-exported by Russia in the EU;
18. Welcomes the announcement by the Belgian Government on the taxing of the proceeds obtained from the immobilised Russian-owned assets being held by Euroclear; calls for the EU and its Member States to find legal avenues allowing for the confiscation of frozen Russian assets and for their use to address the various consequences of Russia's aggression against Ukraine, including the reconstruction of Ukraine and compensation for the victims of Russia's aggression;
19. Calls for restrictive measures against the regime in Belarus to be strengthened as the regime has given continuous political, financial, operational and logistical support to Moscow in its aggression against Ukraine;
20. Reiterates its position on maintaining robust transatlantic cooperation between the EU and the US on sanctions, closing any loopholes that could enable Russia to evade sanctions and streamlining export controls;
21. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the President, Government and Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, and the Russian and Belarusian authorities.