MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on Russiagate: allegations of Russian interference in the democratic processes of the European Union

5.2.2024 - (2024/2548(RSP))

to wind up the debate on the statements by the Council and the Commission
pursuant to Rule 132(2) of the Rules of Procedure

Sergey Lagodinsky, Viola von Cramon‑Taubadel, Malte Gallée, Markéta Gregorová, Henrike Hahn, Heidi Hautala, Bronis Ropė, Ignazio Corrao, Nicolae Ştefănuță, Alviina Alametsä, Gwendoline Delbos‑Corfield, Alice Kuhnke, Jakop G. Dalunde, Pär Holmgren
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

See also joint motion for a resolution RC-B9-0124/2024

B9‑0124/2024

European Parliament resolution on Russiagate: allegations of Russian interference in the democratic processes of the European Union

(2024/2548(RSP))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Russia,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on foreign interference and corruption,

– having regard to its resolution of 9 March 2022 on foreign interference in all democratic processes in the European Union, including disinformation[1],

– having regard to its resolution of 1 June 2023 on foreign interference in all democratic processes in the European Union, including disinformation[2],

– having regard to its resolution of 13 July 2023 on recommendations for reform of European Parliament’s rules on transparency, integrity, accountability and anti-corruption[3],

– having regard to its decision of 13 September 2023 on amendments to Parliament’s Rules of Procedure with a view to strengthening integrity, independence and accountability[4],

– having regard to Commission Recommendation (EU) 2023/2829 of 12 December 2023 on inclusive and resilient electoral processes in the Union and enhancing the European nature and efficient conduct of the elections to the European Parliament[5],

– having regard to Rule 132(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas reports by independent media outlets on 29 January 2024 presented concrete evidence asserting that MEP Tatjana Ždanoka may have acted as an informant for the Fifth Service of the Russian Federation’s Federal Security Service (FSB) from at least 2004 to 2017; whereas the case has been referred to the European Parliament’s Advisory Committee on the Conduct of Members for investigation; whereas the Latvian security services have also announced their own investigation;

B. whereas the Russian Federation is known to use an array of different methods of interference, as part of a larger strategy to harm, confuse, frighten, weaken and divide the EU’s Member States and to attack their democratic functioning, as well as that of the EU institutions; whereas subverting support for Ukraine within the EU has become another explicit goal of the Russian Federation’s interference in EU countries’ democratic spaces;

C. whereas journalists and experts have continued to reveal Russia’s funding of political activities and connections to politicians in the EU before and after 24 February 2022, which puts at risk the integrity of the democratic functioning of the EU Member States and institutions and necessitates a thorough investigation to hold those complicit accountable;

D. whereas there is concrete evidence that the EU’s polity, media and electoral processes are being targeted and interfered with through disinformation campaigns, corruption schemes and other tactics aimed at undermining democratic ideals and fundamental rights; whereas the 2024 European elections are likely to be a special target for disinformation campaigns at local, regional and EU level;

E. whereas foreign interference, information manipulation and disinformation gravely undermine and threaten the fundamental freedoms of expression and information, as laid down in Article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights; whereas they also undermine democratic processes in the EU and its Member States, including the holding of free and fair elections;

F. whereas the European Parliament’s response to foreign interference has become more vigilant, first with the Special Committee for foreign interference in all democratic processes in the EU and later following the 2022 Qatargate and Moroccogate scandals; whereas Parliament’s Rules of Procedure were amended on 13 September 2023 to strengthen integrity, independence and accountability in Parliament; whereas, however, more robust measures have yet to be taken to ensure effective protection against undue external influence;

1. Condemns all attempted Russian interference in the democratic processes of the European Union; insists that the Russian authorities and any individual or entity acting on its behalf must end these practices; calls on the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Council to take appropriate measures against Russian individuals and should the allegations of interference be confirmed in order to safeguard the security of our Union and its democratic processes;

2. Expresses deep concern over reports that MEP Tatjana Ždanoka may have acted as an informant for the FSB’s Fifth Service while also serving as a Member of the European Parliament; stresses that it is imperative that the European Parliament, as well as the Latvian authorities, investigate this matter thoroughly in order to determine, without delay, the appropriate sanctions and criminal proceedings;

3. Stresses that an FSB informant having access to benefits and information as a Member of the European Parliament would be a severe threat to our Union’s security and democracy; calls for an immediate investigation into these matters, including any other potential cases of Russian or other foreign interference or other kinds of malicious interference in the work of the European Parliament;

4. Remains steadfast in its support for efforts to improve and enforce the rules that protect the integrity of this institution as a pillar of European democracy;

5. Reiterates its concerns about Russia’s significant funding of and close connections with political parties and politicians in a number of countries throughout Europe, as it attempts to further interfere and gain leverage in domestic- and EU-level processes;

6. Expresses particular concern about recent reports that the Russian authorities are providing specific narratives to far-right political parties and actors in different EU countries, most notably in Germany and France, aimed at subverting public support for Ukraine, following Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022;

7. Stresses that, in this year of major elections, including the European Parliament elections in June, more effective responses are needed at both national and European level to fight Russian and other foreign interference in electoral processes, be it in the form of cyberattacks, the use of bots on social media, widespread disinformation or the use of agents of influence; calls for the Member States and the European institutions to implement resilience strategies for the elections;

8. Underlines the need to strengthen permanent monitoring efforts and enhance their implementation well ahead of elections, referendums and other important political processes across Europe;

9. Urges the EU institutions and the Member States to make significant and lasting investments in strengthening our democratic resilience and the rule of law, including through measures directed at enhancing the EU’s counter-intelligence capabilities; calls for the Commission to improve the quality of the Defence of Democracy package, specifically the proposal of 12 December 2023 for a directive establishing harmonised requirements in the internal market on transparency of interest representation carried out on behalf of third countries and amending Directive (EU) 2019/1937[6], to effectively address internal threats of undue influence and to move away from a singular and ineffective focus on actors receiving foreign funding;

10. Stresses that, beyond the EU’s own democratic spaces, there is an urgent need for it and its Member States to provide enhanced support to Eastern Partnership and candidate countries, as well as to partner countries in the Global South, in particular through cooperation on building state and societal resilience to disinformation and Russian covert influence and state propaganda, in order to counter any strategic weakening or fragmentation of their societies and institutions;

11. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the European External Action Service, the parliaments of the Member States and the Russian authorities.

 

• [1] OJ C 347, 9.9.2022, p. 61.
• [2] OJ C, C/2023/1226, 21.12.2023, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2023/1226/oj.
• [3] Texts adopted, P9_TA(2023)0292.
• [4] Texts adopted, P9_TA(2023)0316.
• [5] OJ L, 2023/2829, 20.12.2023, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reco/2023/2829/oj,
• [6] COM(2023)0637.