European Parliament



2019-2024

Plenary sitting

B9-0145/2024

26.2.2024

MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION

to wind up the debate on the statement by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy

pursuant to Rule 132(2) of the Rules of Procedure

on the critical situation in Cuba (2024/2584(RSP))

Manu Pineda, Sandra Pereira, Leila Chaibi on behalf of The Left Group

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B9-0145/2024

European Parliament resolution on the critical situation in Cuba (2024/2584(RSP))

The European Parliament,

- having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 and other international human rights treaties and instruments,
- having regard to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1966, in particular Article 1 thereof,
- having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 16 December 1966,
- having regard to the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights of 2011,
- having regard to the principles laid down in the UN Charter,
- having regard to the UN General Assembly resolution of 2 November 2023 entitled 'Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba',
- having regard to the United States' so-called Monroe Doctrine, which remains the heart of American diplomacy on the American continent and justifies its expansionism and interference,
- having regard to the Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Cuba, of the other part¹ (the EU-Cuba Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement),
- having regard to the joint press statements by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Josep Borrell, and the Cuban Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Anayansi Rodríguez Camejo, after the EU-Cuba Joint Council of 26 May 2023,
- having regard to its previous resolutions on Cuba, in particular those of 15 November 2018 on the human rights situation in Cuba², of 28 November 2019 on Cuba, the case of José Daniel Ferrer³, of 10 June 2021 on the human rights and political situation in Cuba⁴, of 16 September 2021 on the government crackdown on protests and citizens in Cuba⁵ and of 16 December 2021 on the situation in Cuba, namely the cases of José Daniel Ferrer, Lady in White Aymara Nieto, Maykel Castillo, Luis Robles, Félix Navarro, Luis Manuel Otero, Reverend Lorenzo Rosales Fajardo, Andy Dunier García

¹ OJ L 337 I, 13.12.2016, p. 3.

² OJ C 363, 28.10.2020, p. 70.

³ OJ C 232, 16.6.2021, p. 17.

⁴ OJ C 67, 8.2.2022, p. 113.

⁵ OJ C 117, 11.3.2022, p. 104.

and Yunior García Aguilera⁶,

- having regard to its position of 5 July 2017 on the draft Council decision on the conclusion, on behalf of the Union, of the Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Cuba, of the other part⁷,
- having regard to Rule 132(2) of its Rules of Procedure,
- A. whereas the US economic, trade and financial blockade on Cuba constitutes a violation of the human rights of the Cuban people that qualifies as an act of economic warfare hindering the development of the Cuban people and the full achievement of the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs);
- B. whereas the US blockade against Cuba has lasted since February 1962; whereas this blockade is justified by the US administration as 'the only foreseeable way to reduce domestic support was through disenchantment and discouragement based on dissatisfaction and economic difficulties [...] Any means to weaken the economic life of Cuba must be used quickly [...]: refuse to give credit and to supply Cuba to lower real and monetary wages with the aim of causing hunger, despair and the overthrow of the government'; whereas as such, it can been seen as a crime against humanity;
- C. whereas the consequences of the US economic, commercial and financial blockade have worsened severely, including during Cuba's fight against the COVID-19 pandemic; whereas the blockade has been reinforced, in particular since the beginning of the pandemic by former US President Donald Trump, who added 243 additional coercive measures against Cuba, notably the suspension of Western Union services throughout the country, making it almost impossible for relatives abroad to send foreign currency and hindering the country's access to vital medicines and medical equipment; whereas these measures have been maintained by the Biden administration and, from 1 March 2022 to 28 February 2023 alone, have caused damage to the Cuban economy estimated at USD 4.867 billion;
- D. whereas the US-imposed Helms-Burton Act, and the reactivation of Titles III and IV thereof in particular, violates several principles of international law and the rules of the multilateral trade and commerce system;
- E. whereas the extraterritorial application of the US blockade goes against the sovereignty of other countries, including Member States; whereas this blockade has led to titanic fines of USD 11 billion for 38 banks, including the French group BNP Paribas; whereas most European banks (including ING and BNP Paribas) have since then refused to transfer money to the island, making investments and solidarity actions extremely complicated;
- F. whereas a few days before the end of his mandate in January 2021, former US president Donald Trump added Cuba to the list of countries sponsoring international terrorism on the pretext of Cuba having welcomed the Colombian peace agreements and for having

⁶ OJ C 251, 30.6.2022, p. 120.

⁷ OJ C 334, 19.9.2018, p. 235.

refused to extradite the leaders of the National Liberation Army (ELN), as requested at the time by the Duque government, even though this was contrary to international law; whereas the extradition request was withdrawn by the new Colombian Government; whereas since the end of 2022, under the leadership of Gustavo Petro, the Colombian Government has been negotiating with the ELN; whereas a ceasefire agreement was reached in Havana on 9 June 2023;

- G. whereas the inclusion of Cuba on the list of countries sponsoring international terrorism has led to new sanctions, not only restricting assistance and foreign trade with the US and imposing significant financial limitations, but also negatively impacting commercial relations with foreign operators, especially European ones;
- H. whereas it has also damaged the international tourism sector, as nationals of countries that benefit from the Electronic System for Travel Authorisation to enter US territory cannot benefit from the visa waiver programme with the United States, but must formally apply for a visa to enter the US if they visited Cuba after 1 March 2011;
- I. whereas the important tourism sector collapsed due to the COVID-19 pandemic and has still not recovered, because of the war in Ukraine and the energy crisis; whereas the Cuban people have recently faced serious economic and social difficulties in their daily lives; whereas there is a serious shortage of fuel, which is also causing significant delays in the distribution of food; whereas the energy crisis has led to daily periods of mandatory power cuts;
- J. whereas material difficulties have led to an unprecedented migratory wave; whereas according to estimates, more than 500 000 people emigrated in 2022 and 2023, of whom around 400 000 entered the United States irregularly, encouraged by US policies of unique benefits for Cuban irregular migrants, its non-compliance with the immigration agreements and the refusal to effectively process visas at the US Consulate in Havana;
- K. whereas in May 2023, the Third Cuba-EU Joint Council was hosted in Havana on the third cycle of the implementation of the Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement (PDCA) between Cuba, the EU and its 27 Member States, which was signed on 12 December 2016 and has been in force, provisionally, since 1 November 2017;
- L. whereas the development and consolidation of democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, are included in the PDCA between the EU and Cuba;
- M. whereas the EU Special Representative for Human Rights, Eamon Gilmore, met with representatives of the Cuban authorities such as the President of the Republic, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Justice, the Attorney General, the Deputy Minister of the Interior and deputies of the National Assembly during his last visit to Havana; whereas after these exchanges, he recognised the 'honest' and 'respectful' two-way EU-Cuba dialogue on human rights and fundamental freedoms;
- N. whereas during his visit to the island in May 2023, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR), Josep Borrell, stated that 'despite all the limitations and

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restrictive measures of the American blockade, which does not make things any easier, we are Cuba's main trading partner'; whereas he announced an EUR 14 million fund to help promote small businesses in Cuba, a sign of the EU's 'willingness to accompany Cuba in its process of economic and social reform in a relationship of mutual respect';

- O. whereas according to the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Anayansi Rodríguez Camejo, 'The III Joint Council confirmed the progress achieved in the fulfilment of the objectives defined in the PDCA and also its validity as a guideline and driver for the development and deepening of mutually beneficial relations';
- P. whereas the visits of the EU Special Representative for Human Rights to Cuba in November 2023 and the visit of VP/HR Josep Borrell confirm the value of this cooperation and the full engagement of the Cuban authorities; whereas the validity and usefulness of all the political and sectoral dialogues have been established in the PDCA, without establishing a hierarchy between them;
- Q. whereas the US and its allies from the extreme right in Europe are trying to use the pretext of the current difficult situation in Cuba to further destabilise the country and reestablish the so-called common position, which was a regime of sanctions unique in the world;
- R. whereas the UN General Assembly resolution of 2 November 2023 entitled 'Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba' was approved for the 31st consecutive time (as it has been every year since 1992 with the exception of 2020 owing to the pandemic), with 187 countries voting in favour, including all EU Member States;
- S. whereas, without the EU being the target of sanctions, blockage or difficulties in accessing the international financial system, 21.6 % of its population, more than 95 million people, were at risk of poverty or social exclusion in the EU in 2021 and 2022; whereas in spite of constituting the third-largest capitalist economy in the world and accounting for one sixth of global trade, almost 1 million people suffer from homelessness in the EU; whereas almost 40 % of the agricultural and livestock farms in the EU have disappeared in the last 20 years;
- 1. Expresses full solidarity with the people of Cuba, who are suffering as the result of a very difficult economic and social situation, mainly as a consequence of impositions by foreign powers, which have been trying to put an end to its own model of development since 1 January 1959; urges the immediate lifting of the economic, trade and financial blockade imposed by the US, as well as all other unilateral coercive measures, which are the main cause of this difficult situation and the current wave of migration;
- 2. Calls for the immediate removal of Cuba from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, in order to put an end to the country's difficulties in accessing the international financial system that this listing entails;
- 3. Recognises the permanent efforts of the Cuban authorities to look for measures that improve and update the Cuban development model, focusing on benefiting the majority within society and endeavouring to minimise the serious economic and social consequences of the illegal US blockade;

- 4. Rejects any attempt to exploit the difficult economic situation of the Cuban people in order to interfere in internal affairs; highlights that, according to Article 1 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1966, 'All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development' without foreign interference; urges the EU and its Member States, therefore, to respect international law;
- 5. Calls for an increase in EU aid and cooperation with Cuba and for effective ways of financing foreign investments to be explored; calls for the cancellation of Cuba's debt payments to the Member States, and, in particular, the members of the so-called Paris Club, to enable the Cuban authorities to better cope with the difficult economic situation and to compensate for the Member States 'climate debt';
- 6. Calls for EU-Cuba relations to be strengthened on the basis of dialogue and cooperation on common challenges, such as climate change or the full achievement of the UN SDGs, in particular goal 16; denounces the consequences for the EU and its Member States, citizens and enterprises of the extraterritorial application of the US economic, commercial and financial blockade; calls on the Commission to develop measures to counter the effects of this policy in collaboration with other countries;
- 7. Stresses the importance of the PDCA as a key tool to promote understanding and mutually beneficial relations between the EU and Cuba; welcomes the start of the fourth implementation cycle of the PDCA in November 2023, with political dialogues on human rights and disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control; welcomes the visits to Cuba of the VP/HR, Josep Borrell, and the EU Special Representative for Human Rights, Eamon Gilmore, in 2023;
- 8. Stresses Cuba's importance in multilateral forums, in particular since January 2023 and the Cuban Presidency of the G77; highlights the efforts made by the Cuban Government and the Cuban people in order to achieve the UN SDGs and the country's important role in promoting them;
- 9. Commends Cuba for the significant role it played in the global fight against the COVID-19 pandemic, in particular for its development of five candidate vaccines, three of which were certified; commends the brigades of doctors and nurses for saving lives around the world, including in the EU;
- 10. Reaffirms its commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Cuba; calls for an immediate dismantlement of the naval base and military prison in Guantánamo Bay, the withdrawal of all US forces from Cuban territory and the restoration of Cuba's territorial integrity; calls on the US authorities to guarantee respect for the human rights of prisoners remaining in Guantánamo Bay, including their right to a fair trial;
- 11. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the parliaments and governments of the Member States, the Government and the National Assembly of the Republic of Cuba, the Euro-Latin American Parliamentary Assembly, and the Latin American sub-regional entities,

including the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States.

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