MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on new allegations of Russian interference in the European Parliament, in the upcoming EU elections and the impact on the Union
22.4.2024 - (2024/2696(RSP))
pursuant to Rule 132(2) of the Rules of Procedure
Leila Chaibi
on behalf of The Left Group
B9‑0261/2024
European Parliament resolution on new allegations of Russian interference in the European Parliament, in the upcoming EU elections and the impact on the Union
The European Parliament,
– having regard to its resolution of 8 February 2024 entitled ‘Russiagate: allegations of Russian interference in the democratic processes of the European Union’[1],
– having regard to its resolution of 13 July 2023 on recommendations for reform of European Parliament’s rules on transparency, integrity, accountability and anti-corruption[2],
– having regard to its resolution of 9 March 2022 on foreign interference in all democratic processes in the European Union, including disinformation[3],
– having regard to its resolution of 15 December 2022 on suspicions of corruption from Qatar and the broader need for transparency and accountability in the European institutions[4],
– having regard to its resolution of 16 September 2021 on strengthening transparency and integrity in the EU institutions by setting up an independent EU ethics body[5],
– having regard to the legal principle of the presumption of innocence,
– having regard to Rules 9 and 10 of its Rules of Procedure and Annex I thereto on the Code of Conduct for Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) regarding integrity and transparency,
– having regard to Rule 132(2) of its Rules of Procedure,
A. whereas in early 2024, Czech authorities launched an investigation identifying a network of influence allegedly financed by the Russian Government via a Prague-based news site, Voice of Europe;
B. whereas 16 MEPs had engaged with the outlet, all of them from the hard right to the extreme right; whereas they are: Maxmilian Krah and Joachim Kuhs (Germany); Patricia Chagnon, Thierry Mariani and Hervé Juvin (France); Marcel de Graaff (Netherlands); Matteo Gazzini and Francesca Donato (Italy); Miroslav Radačovský and Milan Uhrík (Slovakia); Jaak Madison (Estonia); Hermann Tertsch and Jorge Buxadé (Spain); Ladislav Ilčić (Croatia); Anders Vistisen (Denmark); and Tom Vandendriessche (Belgium); whereas the Belgian and Czech Prime Ministers claim that participating MEPs were paid for spreading Russian influence and undermining security across Europe;
C. whereas Czech authorities have sanctioned two of Voice of Europe’s executives, one of whom is Viktor Medvedchuk, a Ukrainian oligarch and long-time friend of Russian leader Vladimir Putin; whereas shortly after this revelation, the Voice of Europe website was taken offline by the authorities; whereas the website was back online, from Kazakhstan, on 11 April 2024;
D. whereas investigations have been opened in Belgium and France, both Member States that host official seats of the European Parliament; whereas the German judiciary is also examining whether proceedings should be initiated;
E. whereas on 28 March 2024, the Polish counter-espionage services said that they had carried out searches in connection with this case and had recovered large sums of cash; whereas Polish authorities were acting as part of a coordinated action involving several EU Member States;
F. whereas a Czech media outlet claims that the Czech secret services have audio recordings confirming the payment of money of Russian origin to Petr Bystron, a candidate for the European elections, member of the German Bundestag and foreign policy officer for Alternative für Deutschland (AfD); whereas reputable German media outlets have also recently revealed that an employee of an AfD member in the German Bundestag was identified as a contact person for the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation; whereas MEP Maximilian Krah, AfD lead candidate for the European elections, is suspected of having received money covertly for some time;
G. whereas the Kremlin has sponsored and supported a number of far-right parties in Europe, by, among other things, facilitating a loan of EUR 9.4 million to the party of Marine Le Pen from a Russian bank in 2013;
H. whereas Voice of Europe’s access badge for Parliament’s premises has been suspended;
I. whereas those revelations follow recent leaks regarding MEP Tatjana Ždanoka; whereas that MEP, suspected of spying for the Russian Government, was sanctioned by the President of the European Parliament for breaching several rules of the Code of Conduct, in particular concerning the declaration of private interests and gifts or benefits received;
J. whereas, following Qatargate, right wing politicians in Parliament refused to change the Rules of Procedure to tighten appropriately the rules on declaration of private interests and gifts or benefits received;
K. whereas there is a growing and worrying trend towards viewing any voice that goes against dominant ideas as suspicious; whereas MEPs must not face further restrictions on the expression of their opinions when exercising their legitimate mandate; whereas freedom of expression is a right enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union;
L. whereas trust in Parliament’s integrity and the rule of law is paramount for the functioning of European democracy;
1. Expresses serious concern about the alleged acts of corruption;
2. Offers its full cooperation with the ongoing investigations; underlines the important role played by the Advisory Committee on the Code of Conduct; calls on Parliament’s Committee on Legal Affairs to cooperate proactively with judicial authorities, including by being prepared to lift the parliamentary immunity of MEPs who may be accused;
3. Remains committed to fighting all forms of corruption, alleged attempts to influence MEPs and other forms of undue interference in the EU’s democratic processes; underlines that there is a clear difference between legally reprehensible acts of corruption and public speeches and voting records that go against dominant ideas; reiterates that political opinions cannot be criminalised and that, in these cases, national judiciary authorities are pursuing potentially serious acts of corruption;
4. Calls for the European Union to be vigilant with regard to attempts by any non-EU country, including Russia, to unduly influence its democratic processes;
5. Notes with interest that the Commission does not grant long-term accreditation or free access to its premises to interest representatives and that they must present a formal invitation, in addition to having a valid record in the Transparency Register; suggests that this rule be adopted in the Rules of Procedures of the European Parliament;
6. Welcomes the interinstitutional agreement to establish a body for ethical standards; believes it is a first step towards enhanced rules and transparency across institutions that can ultimately better prevent corruption cases;
7. Considers that Parliament should continue to improve its internal rules on ethics, based on the highest standards;
8. Calls for the establishment, at the start of the upcoming parliamentary term, of a special committee dedicated to examining and improving applicable rules and enforcement mechanisms for the integrity of the European institutions; calls for a dedicated vice-president to be put in charge of integrity and fighting corruption and foreign interference in Parliament;
9. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.
- [1] Texts adopted: P9_TA(2024)0079.
- [2] Texts adopted, P9_TA(2023)0292.
- [3] OJ C 347, 9.9.2022, p. 61.
- [4] OJ C 177, 17.5.2023, p. 109.
- [5] OJ C 117, 11.3.2022, p. 159.