MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on allegations of Russian interference in the work of the European Parliament and foreign interference in the European elections and the impact on the Union
22.4.2024 - (2024/2696(RSP))
pursuant to Rule 132(2) of the Rules of Procedure
Pedro Marques, Gabriele Bischoff, Andreas Schieder, Raphaël Glucksmann, Domènec Ruiz Devesa
on behalf of the S&D Group
See also joint motion for a resolution RC-B9-0262/2024
B9‑0264/2024
European Parliament resolution on allegations of Russian interference in the work of the European Parliament and foreign interference in the European elections and the impact on the Union
The European Parliament,
– having regard to the Treaty on European Union, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, notably Articles 7, 8, 11, 12, 39, 40, 47 and 52 thereof, the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, notably Articles 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 16 and 17 thereof, and the Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, notably Article 3 thereof,
– having regard to the European Council conclusions of 24 February 2022 and 30-31 May 2022,
– having regard to Council Decision of 3 June 2022 amending Decision 2014/512/CFSP of 31 July 2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine[1],
– having regard to the Commission communication of 12 December 2023 on Defence of Democracy (COM(2023)0630),
– having regard to the Commission proposal for a directive establishing harmonised requirements in the internal market on transparency of interest representation carried out on behalf of third countries and amending Directive (EU) 2019/1937 (COM(2023)0637),
– having regard to the Commission communication of 3 December 2020 on the European democracy action plan (COM(2020)0790),
– having regard to its resolution of 23 November 2016 on EU strategic communication to counteract propaganda against it by third countries[2],
– having regard to its resolution of 9 March 2022 on foreign interference in all democratic processes in the European Union, including disinformation[3] (INGE1 final report),
– having regard to its resolution of 1 June 2023 on foreign interference in all democratic processes in the European Union, including disinformation[4] (INGE 2 final report),
– having regard to its oral question to the Commission of 31 May 2023 on Election integrity and resilience build-up in the run-up to the 2024 European elections (O-000018/2023),
– having regard to its resolution of 13 July 2023 on recommendations for reform of the European Parliament’s rules on transparency, integrity, accountability and anti-corruption[5],
– having regard to its resolution of 13 September 2023 on amendments to Parliament’s Rules of Procedure with a view to strengthening integrity, independence and accountability[6],
– having regard to its resolution of 8 February 2024 entitled ‘Russiagate: allegations of Russian interference in the democratic processes of the European Union’[7],
– having regard to Rule 132(2) of its Rules of Procedure,
A. whereas, as announced by Belgian Prime Minister Alexander De Croo, joint action by Belgian and Czech authorities uncovered Russian operations and revealed that members of the European Parliament had been paid to spread Russian propaganda;
B. whereas the revelations indicate that the Russian interference uncovered was conducted in particular through the online platform ‘Voice of Europe’ established in Prague, Czechia, with the aim of influencing public opinion in favour of Russia and undermining support for the EU, among other things, by paying serving members of the European Parliament;
C. whereas ‘Voice of Europe’ is presented as having operated on behalf of Ukrainian oligarch and media tycoon Viktor Medvedchuk, who is believed to have been a close adviser of the Russian president before the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine;
D. whereas ‘Voice of Europe’ mainly publishes interviews and videos with populist and far-right politicians;
E. whereas Czech media, citing intelligence sources, reported that politicians from Belgium, France, Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands, and Poland were paid by ‘Voice of Europe’ to influence the upcoming European Parliament elections and to undermine EU support for Ukraine’s resistance to Russia’s war of aggression;
F. whereas German MP Petr Bystron allegedly accepted EUR 25 000 from a pro-Russian network, as also confirmed by audio recordings;
G. whereas according to German newspaper Der Spiegel, payment was made either in cash at covert meetings in Prague or via cryptocurrency;
H. whereas the spread of disinformation, hacking of candidates’ electronic devices and cyberattacks on election infrastructure, notably from Russia, have risen to unprecedented levels;
I. whereas for several years Russia has been carrying out disinformation campaigns across both traditional media outlets and social media platforms, cyberattacks, elite capture and attacks, which also sought to prepare the ground for its aggression against Ukraine;
J. whereas episodes of foreign interference in EU and national institutions have increased significantly following the start of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine;
K. whereas funding from outside the EU of political activities and politicians within the European Union before and after 24 February 2022, in particular from Russia, continues to come to light and poses a risk for the integrity of democratic processes in the EU Member States, in particular of the upcoming European elections on 6-9 June 2024, and requires thorough investigation and resolute action;
L. whereas Russia has been using diverse methods of interference, including trying to weaken and divide the EU’s Member States, trying to influence European political parties, mostly on the far right, and trying to destabilise the EU’s neighbouring countries;
M. whereas several investigations have revealed that electoral rules have been breached or circumvented, in particular the existing provisions on the transparency of election campaign financing with allegations of covert funding from non-EU sources, notably from Russia;
N. whereas 2024 is a crucial electoral year and several presidential, national, local and regional elections are due to be held in Member States, in addition to the European elections scheduled on 6-9 June;
1. Is utterly outraged by the latest press allegations concerning another prominent example of Russian interference operations through the online platform ‘Voice of Europe’, which aimed to influence public opinion in favour of Russia and undermine support for the EU and its strong policy of support to Ukraine in the context of Russia’s illegal, unprovoked and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine, by offering money to certain members of Parliament in return for interviews and spreading disinformation;
2. Highlights the continued unveiling of evidence of Russian interference in the run-up to all major national and European elections, as highlighted in the final reports of its special committees on Foreign Interference in all Democratic Processes in the European Union, including Disinformation (INGE and INGE2);
3. Recalls its strong condemnation of the allegations arising from investigations conducted by the Latvian newspaper The Insider, revealing that MEP Tatjana Zdanoka was working on behalf of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), as expressed in its resolution of 8 February 2024;
4. Firmly denounces any attempts to advance Russia’s political agenda in Parliament and urgently calls for full disclosure of all relevant information concerning allegations of foreign interference in the European Parliament;
5. Believes that the recent allegations constitute sanctionable behaviours under its Code of Conduct and must be met with the firmest response; considers it therefore imperative to immediately conduct a thorough internal investigation in order to assess all possible cases of foreign interference from Russia and other countries;
6. Calls for the highest level of political and administrative attention to be given to the Recommendations for reform of the European Parliament’s rules on transparency, integrity, accountability and anti-corruption adopted on 13 July 2023 and the full implementation of its new rules on transparency and integrity adopted in September 2023, as well as the monitoring of all its internal codes of conduct and decisions approved by its Bureau, in particular concerning the interaction with third countries;
7. Considers that the most recent allegations of foreign interference confirm the work undertaken by Parliament so far and reiterate the importance of continuing to enhance integrity and transparency, to show zero tolerance for corruption and corrupting political interference and to protect European democracy;
8. Expresses its outrage that such episodes of interference could undermine the credibility and accountability of Parliament, just a few weeks before European elections of crucial importance for the democratic life of the Union;
9. Highlights that hybrid warfare and foreign interference threaten the very basis of our democracies; considers that electoral interference in one Member State affects the EU as a whole insofar as it can have an impact on the composition of the EU institutions; believes that national authorities cannot address these threats by working in isolation, nor can private sector self-regulation solve it all;
10. Highlights that Russian influence networks in the EU have been using several tools and resources to achieve their goals, by involving intelligence services, diplomatic corps, representatives of Russian companies in Europe, Russian-sponsored organisations and Russian-affiliated NGOs and individuals; believes therefore that constant monitoring of all entities potentially to be considered as vectors of Russian influence remains necessary;
11. Is deeply concerned by the evidence that much Russian interference made targeted use of anti-EU, extreme right and populist candidates; condemns the fact that foreign interference campaigns are often directed against specific minorities and vulnerable groups and notes that the targeting of those minorities serves the larger purpose of undermining the appeal of democratic and equal societies;
12. Is concerned by Russia’s attempts in recent years to exploit the migrant crisis in Europe by spreading disinformation and propaganda, in order to trigger fears and divisions within EU Member States, including through false narratives about the impact of migrants on crime rates and social welfare systems;
13. Notes that throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, various reports highlighted that Russian-linked media outlets and social media accounts spread disinformation about the virus and its origins, as well as casting doubt on the effectiveness of vaccines, including those approved by the EU;
14. Considers that the ultimate goal of all phenomena of Russian interference is to undermine, divide and weaken the EU;
15. Believes that subverting support for Ukraine is an explicit goal of Russian interference actions within EU members’ democratic debate;
16. Underlines that Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has exposed the massive extent of foreign manipulation of information and information threats to the EU and its immediate neighbourhood, namely the Western Balkans and Eastern Partnership countries; calls for the EU and its neighbouring countries to increase their cooperation on the fight against disinformation, hybrid threats and cyber security;
17. Calls on the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the Commission to thoroughly monitor the role played by media outlets in the EU and to include in the forthcoming 14th sanction package new Kremlin-based media outlets and other broadcasting and media organisations and individuals responsible for propaganda and disinformation campaigns in the EU;
18. Expresses its concern about Russia’s connections with several political parties and politicians in the EU; recalls that even in the case where the law limits the sources of political funding, Russian actors have found ways to circumvent them and offered support to their allies; recalls in particular the evidence of loans from foreign banks (such as in the case of the National Front party in France in 2016), purchase and commercial agreements (such as in the allegations reported by Der Spiegel and Süddeutsche Zeitung on 17 May 2019 about the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) and by Buzzfeeds and L’Espresso on 10 July 2019 about Lega per Salvini Premier in Italy), and facilitation of financial activities (as reported by the British press in relation to the Leave.eu campaign);
19. Recalls several episodes of cyber operations launched by Russia against its opponents, such as against Estonian government services and media outlets in 2007, against the German Bundestag in 2015, regular attacks since at least 2008 targeting Lithuanian infrastructure; highlights that the International Energy Agency found the average number of cyberattacks against European utilities more than doubled between 2020 and 2022;
20. Expects the Commission and the Council to deliver on the Defence of Democracy Package in order to urgently take action and close the numerous loopholes in EU party financing legislation, find a compulsory regulatory scheme for the big platforms, and step up the EU’s cyber defence against possible attacks on our electoral system;
21. Welcomes the Code of Conduct for the 2024 European Parliament elections developed by the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) in collaboration with European political parties, in the follow-up process to the Defence of Democracy Package;
22. Calls for Parliament to introduce mandatory, effective and regular training on security, interference, ethical standards, compliance and integrity for all MEPs and their offices and for all Parliament staff, raising awareness that they are potential targets of foreign state and non-state actors; calls for Parliament’s services to put in place effective monitoring and surveillance systems to detect foreign interference while respecting MEPs’ freedom of mandate;
23. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the governments and parliaments of the Member States.
- [1] OJ L 153, 3.6.2022, p. 128.
- [2] OJ C 224, 27.6.2018, p. 58.
- [3] OJ C 347, 9.9.2022, p. 61.
- [4] OJ C, C/2023/1226, 21.12.2023, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2023/1226/oj.
- [5] Texts adopted, P9_TA(2023)0292.
- [6] Texts adopted, P9_TA(2023)0316.
- [7] Texts adopted, P9_TA(2024)0079.