MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on new allegations of Russian interference in the European Parliament, in the upcoming EU elections and the impact on the Union
22.4.2024 - (2024/2696(RSP))
pursuant to Rule 132(2) of the Rules of Procedure
Michael Gahler, Vladimír Bilčík, Rasa Juknevičienė, Andrius Kubilius, Sandra Kalniete, Andrey Kovatchev, Javier Zarzalejos, David McAllister
on behalf of the PPE Group
See also joint motion for a resolution RC-B9-0262/2024
B9‑0266/2024
European Parliament resolution on new allegations of Russian interference in the European Parliament, in the upcoming EU elections and the impact on the Union
The European Parliament,
– having regard to its resolution of 8 February 2024 entitled ‘Russiagate: allegations of Russian interference in the democratic processes of the European Union’[1],
– having regard to the three reports by the Special Committee on foreign interference in all democratic processes in the European Union, including disinformation, and the strengthening of integrity, transparency, and accountability in the European Parliament (INGE and ING2),
– having regard to its resolution of 17 January 2024 on European historical consciousness[2],
– having regard to the European External Action Service (EEAS) report of 23 January 2024 entitled ‘2nd EEAS Report on Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference Threats – A Framework for Networked Defence’,
– having regard to the Commission communication of 12 December 2023 on Defence of Democracy (COM(2023)0630), and the proposals for the Defence of Democracy package therein,
– having regard to the European Council conclusions of 17 April 2024,
– having regard to its Rules of Procedure and the Code of Conduct for Members of the European Parliament,
– having regard to Rule 132(2) of its Rules of Procedure,
A. whereas a recent investigation by the Czech authorities has revealed that Russia has established a network including Members of the European Parliament as well as candidates for the upcoming elections with the goal of facilitating the spread of propaganda and misinformation in Parliament; whereas following these revelations numerous Member States have started inquiries into the matter and the European Parliament and the Belgian authorities have opened formal investigations;
B. whereas under President Putin Russia has identified democracy, human rights and the European way of life as a threat to its dictatorial government and hence for years has been pursuing a strategy of systematically trying to weaken democracies both in EU Member States as well as in EU candidate countries such as, in particular, Ukraine;
C. whereas Russia employs a variety of hybrid warfare tactics to achieve its goals, including intense foreign information manipulation as a means to divide democratic societies and foster conflict and instability within the EU;
D. whereas democracy, the rule of law, the division of powers and free and open elections are the very core of the European way of life, and hence by attacking our democratic foundations Russia is attacking the very heart of our societies and democratic systems, which are the basis of our freedom and economic prosperity;
E. whereas Russia has systematically maintained contacts with right-wing parties, personalities, and movements to gain support from institutional actors within the Union in order to legitimise its illegal and criminal actions; whereas certain members of far-right and far-left political groups, as well as some non-affiliated members, have been spreading pro-Kremlin messages and propaganda in the European Parliament and national institutions;
F. whereas in April Czech authorities uncovered a pro-Russian network attempting to conduct an influence operation with implications for Czechia and the EU; whereas thanks to the investigation the true nature of ‘Voice of Europe’, a propaganda tool funded by Viktor Medvedchuk, a pro-Kremlin Ukrainian oligarch currently living in exile in Russia, has been exposed;
G. whereas Viktor Medvedchuk, who is sanctioned in Czechia, allegedly used ‘Voice of Europe’ to disseminate propaganda via a media platform, aimed at undermining the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, as well as destabilising the EU as a whole; whereas interviews were held with certain Members of the European Parliament in exchange for Russian funding with a view to discrediting certain EU policies, such as the EU’s support for Ukraine;
H. whereas investigative reports by reputable German media outlets have revealed six-figure sums of money flowing via Poland to Czechia to pay for Russian influence operations organised by the ‘Voice of Europe’ channel, from which German MP Petr Bystron of the AfD (Alternative for Germany) party, second on the party’s European election list, in particular, is said to have benefited financially;
I. whereas on 16 April 2024 media reports circulated that the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) had questioned German AfD MEP Maximilian Krah, the AfD’s lead candidate for the European Elections, last December in New York over suspicions that he was receiving money from Kremlin agents;
J. whereas according to Latvian investigative journalists, for more than a decade MEP Tatjana Ždanoka has served as an agent of influence of the Russian intelligence services; whereas MEP Tatjana Ždanoka has received penalties for her non-compliance with the obligations laid down in the Code of Conduct;
K. whereas in January 2024 the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs uncovered a large-scale disinformation campaign on platform X, allegedly orchestrated by Russia with the aim of manipulating public opinion;
L. whereas reputable German media outlets have revealed that an employee of an AfD member of the German federal parliament was identified as a contact person for Russia’s FSB (Federal Security Service); whereas, according to media reports, the same person had been checked twice by German authorities when entering Germany from Russia and was carrying cash sums of EUR 9 000;
M. whereas numerous far-right MEPs, national MPs and members of regional parliaments have been invited by Russia to observe so-called elections in recent years; whereas in March a delegation of AfD members of the Bavarian regional parliament was invited to observe the so-called presidential elections and subsequently assessed the elections as open, democratic and free in public statements;
N. whereas in several resolutions Parliament has noted and expressed its concern about the relations between Catalan secessionism and the Kremlin and the large-scale disinformation campaigns that Russia has carried out in Catalonia; whereas Russian interference in Catalonia is part of a broader Russian strategy to promote internal instability and disunity in the EU; whereas Parliament has called on the competent judicial authorities to effectively investigate the connections between the MEPs allegedly associated with the Kremlin and with Russia’s attempts at destabilisation and interference in the EU and its Member States;
O. whereas the Kremlin has sponsored and supported a number of far-right parties in Europe including by providing the party of Marine Le Pen with a loan of EUR 9.4 million in 2013; whereas since then, Le Pen and her party members have further bolstered their pro-Kremlin stance by attending political events in Russia, including their participation in scam election observation missions (EOMs) during regional or national elections;
P. whereas MEPs from the Identity and Democracy (ID) and The Left groups, as well as non-attached Members, such as MEPs from the Hungarian Fidesz party, have been known to express pro-Kremlin propaganda, including calls as extreme as those made in public in January 2024 by MEP Miroslav Radačovský – who was also paid by Russian sources to observe the parliamentary elections in Russia in 2021 – for the destruction of Europe;
Q. whereas at its meeting on 17 April 2024 the European Council concluded that ‘in the context of the upcoming European elections, the European Council underlines the Union and its Member States’ determination to closely monitor and contain any risks stemming from disinformation, including through artificial intelligence, as well as foreign information manipulation and interference in electoral processes. The European Council invites the EU institutions and national authorities to cooperate on such matters’;
1. Expresses its outrage and deep concern about the continuous efforts by Russia to undermine European democracy; is appalled by further credible reports of Russia’s efforts to deepen divisions between European citizens by recruiting MEPs as agents of influence, as well as its efforts to systematically create a network of dependencies through European political parties that then act as amplifiers of the Kremlin’s propaganda;
2. Recognises Russia’s persistent and sophisticated attacks against European democracy as the biggest threat to our democratic future in decades and believes that it is high time to stop being naive and recognise the widespread and toxic network of Russian activities across Europe; recognises that the Kremlin under Vladimir Putin has copied and further developed the Soviet system of influence, manipulation and corruption;
3. Considers the Russian attacks on European democracy to be a grave crime and an immense threat to the future of political stability and democracy in the European Union; calls on the political leadership of the EU and its Member States to finally address these Russian efforts with the necessary sense of urgency and resolve;
4. Is appalled by the countless efforts by Russia, dating back at least to the Orange revolution of 2004-2005, to undermine Ukraine’s democratic aspirations; points to the sophisticated and multifaceted strategy of hybrid attacks by Russia against Ukraine, of which the high-intensity full-scale war since 24 February 2022 is a tragic and drastic conclusion, affecting millions of innocent people who strive to live in liberty and democracy, free from Russian oppression and indoctrination;
5. Expresses its concerns that similar efforts by Russia are visible in EU candidate countries, such as Moldova, Georgia and the Western Balkan countries; is deeply concerned that by undermining still fragile democracies and their legally elected authorities, while promoting legislation that hampers free speech and an independent civil society, Russia is trying to reverse progress along the path to democracy and thwart the European aspirations of millions of people, while seeking to force its own model of corruption and autocracy on these countries; recalls that the local populations have clearly demonstrated that they see their future in the European Union and not in a revived Soviet Union under the leadership of Vladimir Putin;
6. Is deeply concerned by recent credible allegations, based on investigations by various competent authorities, of Russian interference in the European Parliament implicating certain MEPs as collaborators with the propagandistic media outlet ‘Voice of Europe’;
7. Believes that more effort is needed to properly protect the heart of European democracy and strongly calls upon national authorities to fully inform citizens of the Member States concerned in the ‘Voice of Europe’ case, such as Germany and the Netherlands, about the ongoing investigations and the associated dangers;
8. Reiterates its readiness to fully cooperate with any national investigation into the illegal activities of the accused politicians and believes that a swift and thorough investigation is needed prior to the European elections so that European citizens are properly informed before casting their votes in the upcoming European elections, which will determine the EU’s course over the next five years;
9. Strongly condemns any attempt to interfere in Parliament’s work or to disseminate Russian propaganda, as well as any conduct that may contravene the MEPs’ code of conduct in relation to integrity and transparency; stresses that in the context of the upcoming European elections, all national and EU authorities must intensify their efforts to combat and uncover cases of foreign interference in order to ensure the full integrity of these important elections;
10. Points to credible reports involving MEPs, particularly belonging to the ID and The Left groups, as well as non-attached Members, who are knowingly serving Russia’s interests, as reflected by their public interventions, voting record, and organised events; underscores that the activities of these MEPs are undermining the security, credibility and democratic resilience of the EU;
11. Reiterates its previous condemnation of past cases of political partnerships between far-right parties in Europe and the Russian leadership such as the bank loan for Le Pen’s party in France, the partnership agreement between the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) and Putin’s United Russia party, as well as numerous meetings and exchanges between various elected Members, including the leadership of Germany’s AfD Party;
12. Is appalled by recent credible reports that Petr Bystron, a leading member of AfD and MP in the German federal parliament, has accepted payments of up to EUR 25 000 to spread pro-Russian propaganda; furthermore expresses its concern about the recent FBI questioning of AfD MEP Maximilian Krah and calls upon the AfD to publicly declare their financial relations with the Kremlin without delay and to publicly disclose the purpose and exact amount of all payments originating from Kremlin-linked sources;
13. Expresses its serious concern that following the Russian playbook, a number of far-right and far-left Members of the next European Parliament could be identified as paid agents of the Russian secret services, with the ultimate objective of spreading dangerous and anti-democratic pro-Russian propaganda in Parliament;
14. Reiterates its concern and outrage over clear cases of foreign interference in the European Parliament; points in this light to the case of the Latvian MEP Tatjana Ždanoka, who allegedly acted as an agent of influence for the Russian intelligence services for more than a decade, having maintained correspondence between 2004 and 2013 with a person identified as an agent of the FSB;
15. Expresses its concern about the Austrian espionage case, in which the former Austrian intelligence officer, Egisto Ott, who is said to be closely tied to FPÖ politician Hans-Jörg Jenewein, is accused of spying for Russia and illegally retrieving personal data from police databases, including handing over mobile phone data of former high-ranking Austrian officials to Russian intelligence;
16. Expresses its serious concern about a number of policies and positions of the Hungarian Government, which under the leadership of Prime Minister Orban has on numerous critical occasions assumed a pro-Russian, as well as pro-Chinese stand, which has not only led to severe disagreements within the EU and NATO, but has also been identified as a security risk for both the EU as a whole and its Member States;
17. Reiterates its consternation about and strong criticism of those former EU politicians who have forgotten their roots and have become paid agents of the Russian state, despite being fully aware of Putin’s numerous criminal and illegal activities; condemns, first and foremost, former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder who to this day continues to call Vladimir Putin one of his best and closest personal friends and whose unwillingness to break with the war-criminal Putin is the clearest and saddest example of the success of Russia’s efforts to undermine our democracies;
18. Is extremely worried about recent reports, dated 17 April, about two alleged Russian spies of German-Russian double nationality, who were arrested in Bavaria after being accused of scouting targets for potential attacks and sabotage operations, including the targeting of military facilities; reiterates its high concern about the extent of Russian espionage activities in Germany and other countries, such as Poland where similar activities were discovered in March 2023, and reiterates its strong call for a decisive response to the threat posed by Russian agents operating in Germany and beyond;
19. Is equally concerned by the arrest on 22 April of three Germans who have been arrested on suspicion of working with the Chinese Ministry of State Security (MSS) to hand over technology that could be used for military purposes; reiterates its previous calls on Member States to more effectively combat all elements of spying in the EU, which must also include a better protection of critical infrastructure as well as a frank and clear confrontation of the originating states of espionage; and underlines that these espionage revelations are likely just the tip of the iceberg and are a serious threat to our security and democracy;
20. Proposes the establishment of a publicly accessible and regularly updated Russian hybrid influence index in order to catalogue politicians and political parties in EU and EU candidate countries with connections to the Putin regime and involved in spreading Kremlin narratives; suggests that criteria for identifying such politicians and political parties as agents of Kremlin hybrid influence would include advocating against providing Ukraine with weapons under the guise of promoting peace, endorsing ‘foreign agent’ laws, labelling the LGBT community as an extremist organisation, imprisoning political opponents, receiving financial support from the Kremlin or being funded by local oligarchs with ties to the Kremlin; believes that the European Parliament Research Service should be tasked with preparing and updating this index, which should be made available on Parliament’s website and social media platforms;
21. Calls on the Council to supplement the Copenhagen criteria for EU accession with an evaluation of a candidate country’s resilience to Russia’s hybrid influence; underlines that any candidate country that adopts Russia-style laws, such as a Foreign Agent law, or meets other criteria of Kremlin hybrid influence, should not be invited to start accession negotiations or progress towards EU Membership;
22. Strongly condemns ongoing Russian efforts to abuse and falsify the historical recollection of Europe’s most tragic periods, such as the terror of the Nazi regime, in order to try to justify its current brutal, illegal and inhumane aggression and its expansionist policy, as well as its attempts to systematically spread false historical narratives with the goal of casting doubt on the sovereignty of other nations by systematically undermining their domestic democratic processes; is furthermore appalled by Russia’s attempts to justify and cover-up its own horrendous human rights violations, war crimes and other crimes against humanity, such as the abduction of Ukrainian children, by knowingly falsifying the recollection of historic events as well as denying the crimes by the communist regimes in the former Soviet Republics;
23. Strongly condemns the large-scale disinformation campaign exposed by the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs in January, purportedly orchestrated by Russia on platform X, with the intention of manipulating public opinion;
24. Expresses its concern about credible reports of increased Russian attempts to interfere in the upcoming elections for the Bulgarian national parliament on 9 June 2024; raises strong concerns about the existence and Russian control of a network of disinformation agents active on social media platforms, in traditional media, academia, NGOs, and political parties; is strongly concerned about the numerous properties on the territory of Bulgaria currently owned by Russian authorities, some of them of strategic importance, and which serve as centres of Russian influence and leverage over the democratic processes in the country;
25. Strongly condemns the alarming revelation brought to light by reputable German media outlets in February, exposing that an employee affiliated with the AfD and associated with a member of the German federal parliament was identified as a contact person for Russia’s FSB, raising serious concerns about potential foreign influence within the German political landscape; moreover, strongly condemns that the same individual, upon entry into Germany from Russia, was repeatedly intercepted by German authorities carrying cash sums of EUR 9 000;
26. Expresses deep concern about the massive disinformation campaigns that Russia has pursued in Catalonia, as well as the intense contacts and number of meetings between the agents responsible for Russian interference with the pro-independence movement and the regional government of the autonomous community of Catalonia as a part of a broader Russian strategy to promote internal destabilisation and EU disunity; calls on the competent Spanish authorities to continue, further intensify and swiftly conclude their investigations into the reported cases of interference by Russia, particularly those linked to Catalan secessionist groups;
27. Points out that Russia has assumed that fostering regional secessionism and interference through national diasporas is a useful instrument in its strategy to promote internal destabilisation and disunity in the European Union, with the aim of intensifying polarisation in our society, undermining trust between citizens and the public authorities by weakening the democratic processes in target countries, among other tactics; recalls in this light the infamous ‘Lisa case’ of 2016, where Russian actors invented a fake story about a Russian-German girl, in order to stir up national unrest and polarise the German domestic mood;
28. Is concerned about the recent revelations indicating collusion between Hungary and Russia to influence the 2020 Slovak elections in favour of the then-prime minister;
29. Underlines the importance of comprehensive and swift internal investigation procedures within the European Parliament in order to deter foreign interference;
30. Calls for the establishment of an early warning system in order to raise awareness and alert Member States about political crises in Europe, including but not limited to electoral processes, which are susceptible to Russian interference through disinformation strategies;
31. Reiterates its opinion that Parliament’s resources such as sponsoring events and trips, granting access to video recording studios and other communication platforms and the financing of political groups or Member’s communication projects, must not be used to undermine the values of the EU or for the purposes of disseminating hostile information by authoritarian regimes;
32. Calls for the application of the system of security clearances for the Members of the European Parliament working with sensitive security, defence and foreign affairs issues, underlines that many national parliaments and international organisations have legitimate and well-functioning systems in this domain and calls for best practices to be assessed;
33. Underlines that the media outlets working for hostile and authoritarians regimes should not have access to European Parliament premises;
34. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the governments and parliaments of the Member States.
- [1] Texts adopted, P9_TA(2024)0079.
- [2] Texts adopted, P9_TA(2024)0030).