AMENDMENTS
39 - 244

Draft report
Reimer Böge, Pervenche Berès
(PE628.556v01-00)

Establishment of a European Investment Stabilisation Function

Proposal for a regulation
AM_Com_LegReport
Amendment 39
Miguel Viegas

Proposal for a regulation

Proposal for rejection

The European Parliament rejects the Commission proposal.

Or. pt

Justification

The European Investment Stabilisation Function may seem innovative and even positive but is only yet another tool for the EU to blackmail and manipulate its Member States. The legal basis underpinning it and the eligibility criteria do nothing to reverse the neo-liberal path of EU economic governance, quite the contrary.

Amendment 40
Manuel dos Santos, Jonás Fernández, Eider Gardiazabal Rubial, Agnes Jongerius, Roberto Gualtieri

Proposal for a regulation
Title 1

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Proposal for a
REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on the establishment of a European Investment Stabilisation Function

Proposal for a
REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on the establishment of a European Protection Scheme

Or. en

Amendment 41
Paul Tang

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 1
Text proposed by the Commission

(1) The promotion of economic, social and territorial cohesion and the establishment of an economic and monetary union (EMU) are key objectives under the Treaties.

Amendment

(1) The promotion of economic, social and territorial cohesion, full employment and economic stability, and the establishment of an economic and monetary union (EMU) are key objectives under the Treaties.

Or. en

Amendment 42
Nicola Caputo

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 2

Text proposed by the Commission

(2) Strengthening economic cohesion amongst Member States whose currency is the euro would contribute to the stability of the monetary union and to the harmonious development of the Union as a whole.

Amendment

(2) Strengthening economic cohesion amongst Member States whose currency is the euro would contribute to the stability of the monetary union and to the harmonious development of the Union as a whole in the interests of full employment and social cohesion.

Or. it

Amendment 43
Philippe Lamberts, Jordi Solé
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 2

Text proposed by the Commission

(2) Strengthening economic cohesion amongst Member States whose currency is the euro would contribute to the stability of the monetary union and to the harmonious development of the Union as a whole.

Amendment

(2) Strengthening economic cohesion amongst Member States whose currency is the euro would contribute to the stability of the monetary union, to the harmonious development and the upwards convergence of the Union as a whole.
Amendment 44
Stanisław Ożóg, Zbigniew Kuźniuk
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 2 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

(2a) In addition, in line with the principle of openness towards countries outside the euro area, new projects should be open to voluntary participation by all EU Member States, in particular when they involve the provision of financial support from the general budget of the EU.

Amendment

Or. pl

Amendment 45
Bernd Lucke
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 3

Text proposed by the Commission

(3) Member States should conduct their economic policies and should coordinate them in such a way as to attain the objective of strengthening economic, social, and territorial cohesion.

Amendment

(3) Member States should conduct their economic policies in such a way as to ensure economically sustainable economic growth and the efficient use of scarce resources in a market economy committed to providing a sufficient level of social security. Without compromising these objectives, Member States should coordinate their economic policies in such a way as to attain the objective of strengthening economic, social, and territorial cohesion.

Or. en
Amendment 46  
Jonás Fernández, Eider Gardiazabal Rubial, Pervenche Berès, Agnes Jongerius, Roberto Gualtieri  
Proposal for a regulation  
Recital 3

**Text proposed by the Commission**

(3) Member States should conduct their economic policies and should coordinate them in such a way as to attain the objective of strengthening economic, social, and territorial cohesion.

**Amendment**

(3) Member States should conduct their economic policies and should coordinate them in such a way as to attain the objective of strengthening economic, social, and territorial cohesion. **Shocks may put at risk this objective while a stabilisation instrument would allow Members States to contribute to it.**

Or. en

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Amendment 47  
Esther de Lange  
Proposal for a regulation  
Recital 3

**Text proposed by the Commission**

(3) Member States should conduct their economic policies and should coordinate them in such a way as to attain the objective of strengthening economic, social, and territorial cohesion.

**Amendment**

(3) Member States should conduct their economic policies and should coordinate them in such a way as to attain the objective of strengthening economic, social, and territorial cohesion **and to increase the competitiveness and resilience against economic shocks of their economies.**

Or. en

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Amendment 48  
Ramon Tremosa i Balcells  
Proposal for a regulation  
Recital 3 a (new)
Furthermore, Member States should comply with the existing EU economic governance rules.

Or. en

Amendment 49
Markus Ferber
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 4

The unprecedented financial crisis and economic downturn that hit the world and the euro area has shown that in the euro area available instruments such as the single monetary policy, automatic fiscal stabilisers and discretionary fiscal policy measures at national level are insufficient to absorb large asymmetric shocks.

Or. en

Justification
This analysis is flawed as it neglects the failure of Member States to build up sufficient fiscal buffers.

Amendment 50
Bernd Lucke
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 4

The unprecedented financial crisis and economic downturn that hit the world and the euro area has shown that in the euro area available instruments such as the single monetary policy, automatic fiscal stabilisers and discretionary fiscal policy measures at national level are insufficient to absorb large asymmetric shocks.

Or. en

(4) The financial crisis was a huge symmetric shock which had a negative impact on all euro area countries and on almost all other countries in the world.
the single monetary policy, automatic fiscal stabilisers and discretionary fiscal policy measures at national level are insufficient to absorb large asymmetric shocks.

Countries recovered from the ensuing economic downturn at very different speeds depending on the structural characteristics of their economies and the economic policies enacted in response to the common shock. The single currency clearly aggravated the recovery for euro area countries whose competitiveness on international markets was low.

Amendment 51
Siegfried Mureşan, Dariusz Rosati, Gunnar Hökmark

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 4

Text proposed by the Commission

(4) The unprecedented financial crisis and economic downturn that hit the world and the euro area has shown that in the euro area available instruments such as the single monetary policy, automatic fiscal stabilisers and discretionary fiscal policy measures at national level are insufficient to absorb large asymmetric shocks.

Amendment

(4) The unprecedented financial crisis and economic downturn that hit the world and the euro area has exposed economic weaknesses in Member States, lacking resilience due to the postponement of structural reforms and thus their limited fiscal capacity to react, and has shown that in the euro area available instruments such as the single monetary policy, automatic fiscal stabilisers and discretionary fiscal policy measures at national level are insufficient to absorb large asymmetric shocks.

Amendment 52
Esther de Lange

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 4

Text proposed by the Commission

(4) The unprecedented financial crisis

Amendment

(4) The unprecedented financial crisis
and economic downturn that hit the world and the euro area has shown that in the euro area available instruments such as the single monetary policy, automatic fiscal stabilisers and discretionary fiscal policy measures at national level are insufficient to absorb large asymmetric shocks.

Or. en

Amendment 53
Paul Tang

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 4

Text proposed by the Commission

(4) The unprecedented financial crisis and economic downturn that hit the world and the euro area has shown that in the euro area available instruments such as the single monetary policy, automatic fiscal stabilisers and discretionary fiscal policy measures at national level are insufficient to absorb large asymmetric shocks.

Amendment

(4) The unprecedented financial crisis and economic downturn that hit the world and the euro area has shown that in the euro area available instruments such as the single monetary policy, automatic fiscal stabilisers and discretionary fiscal policy measures at national level are insufficient to bridge the investment gap and reach economic convergence.

Or. en

Amendment 54
Stanisław Ożóg, Zbigniew Kuźniuk

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 4

Text proposed by the Commission

(4) The unprecedented financial crisis and economic downturn that hit the world and the euro area has shown that in the euro area available instruments such as the single monetary policy, automatic fiscal stabilisers and discretionary fiscal policy measures at national level are insufficient to absorb large asymmetric shocks.

Amendment

(4) The unprecedented financial crisis and economic downturn that hit the world and the euro area, among others, has shown that in the euro area, for example, available instruments such as the single
stabilisers and discretionary fiscal policy measures at national level are insufficient to absorb large asymmetric shocks.

monetary policy, automatic fiscal stabilisers and discretionary fiscal policy measures at national level are insufficient to absorb large asymmetric shocks.

Amendment 55
Philippe Lamberts, Jordi Solé
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 4

Text proposed by the Commission

(4) The unprecedented financial crisis and economic downturn that hit the world and the euro area has shown that in the euro area available instruments such as the single monetary policy, automatic fiscal stabilisers and discretionary fiscal policy measures at national level are insufficient to absorb large asymmetric shocks.

Amendment

(4) The unprecedented financial crisis and economic downturn that hit the world and the euro area has shown that in the euro area available instruments such as the single monetary policy, the EU fiscal framework, automatic fiscal stabilisers and discretionary fiscal policy measures at national level are insufficient to absorb large asymmetric shocks.

Or. pl

Amendment 56
Bernd Lucke

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 4 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

(4a) An asymmetric shock is a shock which harms some countries while other countries benefit from the shock or are not affected at all. As such, the financial crisis was clearly not an asymmetric shock. The Commission is encouraged to invest in capacity building by brushing up basic economic knowledge of its staff.

Amendment

(4a) An asymmetric shock is a shock which harms some countries while other countries benefit from the shock or are not affected at all. As such, the financial crisis was clearly not an asymmetric shock. The Commission is encouraged to invest in capacity building by brushing up basic economic knowledge of its staff.
Amendment 57
Marco Valli, Laura Agea

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 5

Text proposed by the Commission

(5) In order to facilitate macroeconomic adjustment and cushion large asymmetric shocks in the current institutional set-up, Member States whose currency is the euro and other Member States that participate in the exchange rate mechanism (ERM II) have to rely more heavily on remaining instruments of economic policy, such as automatic fiscal stabilisers and other discretionary fiscal measures, making the adjustment more difficult overall. The sequence of the crisis in euro area also suggests strong reliance on the single monetary policy to provide for macro-economic stabilisation in severe macro-economic circumstances.

Amendment

(5) In the absence of rebalancing mechanisms to facilitate macroeconomic adjustment and cushion large asymmetric shocks in the current institutional set-up, Member States whose currency is the euro have to conduct consistently tight fiscal policy, making the adjustment more difficult overall. The sequence of the crisis in euro area suggests a strong reliance on the single, "one size fits all", monetary policy to provide for macro-economic stabilisation in severe macro-economic circumstances, which is by definition not suitable to address country-specific shocks.

Amendment 58
Bernd Lucke

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 5

Text proposed by the Commission

(5) In order to facilitate macroeconomic adjustment and cushion large asymmetric shocks in the current institutional set-up, Member States whose currency is the euro and other Member States that participate in the exchange rate mechanism (ERM II) have to rely more heavily on remaining instruments of

Amendment

(5) In order to facilitate macroeconomic adjustment and cushion large asymmetric shocks in the current institutional set-up, Member States whose currency is the euro and other Member States that participate in the exchange rate mechanism (ERM II) have to rely more heavily on remaining instruments of
economic policy, such as automatic fiscal stabilisers and other discretionary fiscal measures, making the adjustment more difficult overall. The sequence of the crisis in euro area also suggests strong reliance on the single monetary policy to provide for macro-economic stabilisation in severe macro-economic circumstances.

Amendment 59
Markus Ferber
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 5

Text proposed by the Commission

(5) In order to facilitate macroeconomic adjustment and cushion large asymmetric shocks in the current institutional set-up, Member States whose currency is the euro and other Member States that participate in the exchange rate mechanism (ERM II) have to rely more heavily on remaining instruments of economic policy, such as automatic fiscal stabilisers and other discretionary fiscal measures, making the adjustment more difficult overall. The sequence of the crisis in euro area also suggests strong reliance on the single monetary policy to provide for macro-economic stabilisation in severe macro-economic circumstances.

Amendment

(5) In order to facilitate macroeconomic adjustment and cushion large asymmetric shocks in the current institutional set-up, Member States whose currency is the euro and other Member States that participate in the exchange rate mechanism (ERM II) have to rely more heavily on remaining instruments of economic policy, such as automatic fiscal stabilisers and other discretionary fiscal measures, making the adjustment more difficult overall.

Amendment 60
Siegfried Mureșan, Dariusz Rosati, Gunnar Hökmark
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 5

...
In order to facilitate macroeconomic adjustment and cushion large asymmetric shocks in the current institutional set-up, Member States whose currency is the euro and other Member States that participate in the exchange rate mechanism (ERM II) have to rely more heavily on remaining instruments of economic policy, such as automatic fiscal stabilisers and other discretionary fiscal measures, making the adjustment more difficult overall. The sequence of the crisis in euro area also suggests strong reliance on the single monetary policy to provide for macro-economic stabilisation in severe macro-economic circumstances.

Amendment

(5) In order to facilitate macroeconomic adjustment and cushion large asymmetric shocks in the current institutional set-up, Member States whose currency is the euro and other Member States that participate in the exchange rate mechanism (ERM II) have to rely more heavily on remaining instruments of economic policy, such as automatic fiscal stabilisers and other discretionary fiscal measures, making the adjustment more difficult overall, which highlights the need for adherence to the Stability and Growth Pact in the framework of the EU’s fiscal rules in order to create fiscal space and thus be able to address economic shocks. The sequence of the crisis in euro area also suggests strong reliance on the single monetary policy to provide for macro-economic stabilisation in severe macro-economic circumstances.

Or. en

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 5

(5) In order to facilitate macroeconomic adjustment and cushion large asymmetric shocks in the current institutional set-up, Member States whose currency is the euro and other Member States that participate in the exchange rate mechanism (ERM II) have to rely more heavily on remaining instruments of economic policy, such as automatic fiscal stabilisers and other discretionary fiscal measures, making the adjustment more difficult overall. The sequence of the crisis in euro area also suggests strong reliance
on the single monetary policy to provide for macro-economic stabilisation in severe macro-economic circumstances.

Amendment 62
Philippe Lamberts, Jordi Solé
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 5

Text proposed by the Commission

(5) In order to facilitate macroeconomic adjustment and cushion large asymmetric shocks in the current institutional set-up, Member States whose currency is the euro and other Member States that participate in the exchange rate mechanism (ERM II) have to rely more heavily on remaining instruments of economic policy, such as automatic fiscal stabilisers and other discretionary fiscal measures, making the adjustment more difficult overall. The sequence of the crisis in euro area also suggests strong reliance on the single monetary policy to provide for macro-economic stabilisation in severe macro-economic circumstances.

Amendment

(5) In order to facilitate macroeconomic adjustment and cushion large asymmetric shocks in the current institutional set-up, Member States whose currency is the euro and other Member States that participate in the exchange rate mechanism (ERM II) have to rely heavily on remaining instruments of economic policy, such as automatic fiscal stabilisers and other discretionary fiscal measures, making the adjustment more difficult overall. The sequence of the crisis in euro area also puts in evidence a strong reliance on the single monetary policy to provide for macro-economic stabilisation in severe macro-economic circumstances.

Amendment 63
Bernd Lucke

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 6

Text proposed by the Commission

(6) The financial crisis has resulted in a pro-cyclical pattern for fiscal policies, which has been detrimental to the quality

Amendment

(6) In response to the financial crisis many Member States have enacted counter-cyclical fiscal policies, while
of public finances and in particular for public investment. In turn, that shortcoming has contributed to widespread differences in macroeconomic performance between Member States, imperilling cohesion.

other countries, in particular those under EFSF or ESM programmes, enacted contractionary fiscal policies in both the recession and the subsequent recovery. Different policies are one, but certainly not the only reason widespread differences in macroeconomic performance between Member States, imperilling cohesion.

Amendment 64
Eider Gardiazabal Rubial, Jonás Fernández, Agnes Jongerius, Roberto Gualtieri

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 6

(6) The financial crisis has resulted in a pro-cyclical pattern for fiscal policies, which has been detrimental to the quality of public finances and in particular for public investment. In turn, that shortcoming has contributed to widespread differences in macroeconomic performance between Member States, imperilling cohesion.

(6) The financial crisis has resulted in a pro-cyclical pattern for fiscal policies, which has been detrimental to the quality of public finances and in particular for public investment and national unemployment schemes. In turn, that shortcoming has contributed to widespread differences in macroeconomic performance between Member States, imperilling cohesion.

Amendment 65
Philippe Lamberts, Jordi Solé
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 6

(6) The financial crisis has resulted in a pro-cyclical pattern for fiscal policies, which has been detrimental to the quality of public finances and in particular for

(6) The financial crisis has resulted in and has been aggravated by a pro-cyclical pattern for fiscal policies, which has been detrimental to the quality of public
public investment. In turn, that shortcoming has contributed to widespread differences in macroeconomic performance between Member States, imperilling cohesion. finances and in particular for public investment. In turn, that shortcoming has contributed to widespread differences in macroeconomic performance between Member States, imperilling cohesion.

Or. en

Amendment 66
Paul Tang

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 6 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(6a) The attempt to strengthen the Stability and Growth Pact with regards to its credibility and macro-economic coherence by means of the Six Pack, the Two Pack and the Fiscal Compact have added more complexity and less credibility than needed, proving to be a poor substitute for a more fundamental overhaul of euro area governance that will be required in order to achieve a sustainable balance between responsibility and solidarity within the Union;

Or. en

Amendment 67
Bernd Lucke

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 7

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(7) Additional instruments are therefore necessary to avoid in the future that large asymmetric shocks result into deeper and broader situations of stress and weaken cohesion.

(7) No evidence exists that the Euro area has ever been hit by an asymmetric shock.
Amendment 68
Philippe Lamberts, Jordi Solé
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 7

Text proposed by the Commission

(7) Additional instruments are therefore necessary to avoid in the future that large asymmetric shocks result into deeper and broader situations of stress and weaken cohesion.

Amendment

(7) Additional instruments are therefore necessary to avoid in the future that large asymmetric shocks result into deeper and broader situations of stress and weaken cohesion. Together with the gradual establishment such additional instruments and in order to facilitate macroeconomic adjustment, the revision of the EU fiscal framework should also be a priority as the current framework rules contributed to excessive fiscal austerity during the crisis, thus helping to aggravate and prolong its economic, social and political consequences. Moreover, either because countries did not abide by the rules or because the rules were not sufficiently strictly applied during good years, there was insufficient debt reduction in many countries in the 2000s, which reduced their fiscal capacity during bad years. In addition, the rules suffered from large measurement problems as they are based on the non-observable structural budget balance, the estimation of which is subject to massive errors.

Amendment 69
Siegfried Mureşan, Dariusz Rosati, Gunnar Hökmark

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 7
Additional instruments are therefore necessary to avoid in the future that large asymmetric shocks result into deeper and broader situations of stress and weaken cohesion.

Sound public finances could be complemented in the future by additional instruments to avoid that large asymmetric shocks result into deeper and broader situations of stress and weaken cohesion.

More responsible fiscal policies as well as additional instruments are therefore necessary to avoid in the future that large asymmetric shocks result into deeper and broader situations of stress and weaken cohesion.

A stabilisation instrument would avoid negative impacts on potential growth as a shock on public investment or employment can easily turn into structural. This would affect primarily the hit Member State but, as the euro area is very integrated, it would damage growth prospects of other Members States. The
most efficient channel to produce this spill over effect is trade. Therefore, a stabilisation tool is not only a matter of solidarity but also of economic policy.

Amendment 72
Bernd Lucke

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 8

Text proposed by the Commission

(8) In particular, in order to support Member States whose currency is the euro to respond better to rapidly changing economic circumstances and stabilise their economy by preserving public investment in the event of large asymmetric shocks, a European Investment Stabilisation Function (EISF) should be established.

Amendment

(8) In particular, no convincing argument exists for establishing a European Investment Stabilisation Function (EISF).

Or. en

Amendment 73
Pirkko Ruohonen-Lerner

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 8

Text proposed by the Commission

(8) In order, in particular, to help Member States whose currency is the euro to respond better to rapidly changing economic circumstances and stabilise their economies by preserving public investment in the event of large asymmetric shocks, a European Investment Stabilisation Function (EISF) should be established.

Amendment

(8) The Stabilisation Function will not resolve the structural competition problems of the euro area: on the contrary. So that the euro countries that are suffering from structural, long-term competition problems do not perpetuate their unemployment and do not delay solutions to their problems by incurring debt, the market mechanism must be allowed to operate. Public support, such
as a stabilisation function, maintains the inefficient allocation of resources, because it acts as a brake on the adjustment of the price level to a changed market situation. In this way, long-term unemployment and related labour market exclusion are aggravated and problems become more intractable. If the problems of a euro country affected by an asymmetric shock are only transient, it is not difficult for the euro country concerned to borrow on the financial markets, so there is no need for so-called stabilisation functions financed from public funds.

Amendment 74
Manuel dos Santos, Jonás Fernández, Eider Gardiazabal Rubial, Agnes Jongerius, Roberto Gualtieri, Luigi Morgano

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 8

Text proposed by the Commission

(8) In particular, in order to support Member States whose currency is the euro to respond better to rapidly changing economic circumstances and stabilise their economy by preserving public investment in the event of large asymmetric shocks, a European Investment Stabilisation Function (EISF) should be established.

Amendment

(8) In particular, in order to support Member States whose currency is the euro to respond better to rapidly changing economic circumstances and stabilise their economy by preserving public investment and financing national unemployment schemes in the event of large asymmetric or symmetric shocks, a European Protection Scheme (EPS) should be established.

Amendment 75
Philippe Lamberts, Jordi Solé
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 8
Text proposed by the Commission

(8) In particular, in order to support Member States whose currency is the euro to respond better to rapidly changing economic circumstances and stabilise their economy by preserving public investment in the event of large asymmetric shocks, a European Investment Stabilisation Function (EISF) should be established.

Amendment

(8) In particular, in order to support Member States whose currency is the euro to respond better to rapidly changing economic circumstances and stabilise their economy by preserving public investments in line with the Sustainable Development Goals and the Paris Climate agreement, in the event of large asymmetric shocks, a European Investment Stabilisation Function (EISF) should be established as a first step towards a fully-fledged capacity to address asymmetric shocks in the EMU.

Or. en

Amendment 76
Ramon Tremosa i Balcells

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 8

Text proposed by the Commission

(8) In particular, in order to support Member States whose currency is the euro to respond better to rapidly changing economic circumstances and stabilise their economy by preserving public investment in the event of large asymmetric shocks, a European Investment Stabilisation Function (EISF) should be established.

Amendment

(8) In particular, in order to support Member States whose currency is the euro to respond better to rapidly changing economic circumstances and stabilise their economy by preserving public investment in the event of large asymmetric shocks, a European Investment Stabilisation Function (EISF) should be established based on conditionality and the principle to exclude any type of moral hazard.

Or. en

Amendment 77
Stanisław Ożóg, Zbigniew Kuźniuk

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 8
(8) In particular, in order to support Member States whose currency is the euro to respond better to rapidly changing economic circumstances and stabilise their economy by preserving public investment in the event of large asymmetric shocks, a European Investment Stabilisation Function (EISF) should be established.

Amendment 78
Philippe Lamberts, Jordi Solé
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 8 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

(8a) The EISF should be bound by the same objectives than the one included in the Article 4.1 of the regulation laying down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund Plus, the Cohesion Fund, the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund and financial rules for those and for the Asylum and Migration Fund, the Internal Security Fund and the Border Management and Visa Instrument.

Amendment 79
Manuel dos Santos, Jonás Fernández, Eider Gardiazabal Rubial, Pervenche Berès, Agnes Jongerius, Roberto Gualtieri

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 8 a (new)
(8a) This Regulation does not affect terms and conditions of Member States’ unemployment schemes nor does it affect relations between social partners, including the right to negotiate and conclude collective agreements in accordance with national law.

Or. en

Amendment 80
Bernd Lucke

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 9

Text proposed by the Commission

(9) EISF should not only benefit Member States whose currency is the euro but also other Member States that participate in the exchange rate mechanism (ERM II).

Amendment

deleted

Or. en

Amendment 81
Marco Valli, Laura Agea

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 9

Text proposed by the Commission

(9) EISF should not only benefit Member States whose currency is the euro but also other Member States that participate in the exchange rate mechanism (ERM II).

Amendment

(9) In its initial implementation, EISF should only benefit Member States whose currency is the euro, which are more vulnerable to asymmetric shocks due to the flawed set-up of the Euro area. The extension to other Member States that participate in the exchange rate mechanism (ERM II) shall be assessed in the context of the review referred to in Article 22 of
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 9

Text proposed by the Commission

(9) **EISF** should not only benefit Member States whose currency is the euro but also other Member States that participate in the exchange rate mechanism (ERM II).

Amendment

(9) **Participation in the EISF** should be open not only to Member States whose currency is the euro and Member States participating in the exchange rate mechanism (ERM II), but also, on a voluntary basis, to Member States outside the euro area.

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 9

Text proposed by the Commission

(9) **EISF** should not only benefit Member States whose currency is the euro but also other Member States that participate in the exchange rate mechanism (ERM II).

Amendment

(9) **EPS** should not only benefit Member States whose currency is the euro but also other Member States that participate in the exchange rate mechanism (ERM II).

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 10

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Text proposed by the Commission

(10)  **EISF should be a Union instrument which complements national fiscal policies.** It should be recalled that Member States should pursue sound fiscal policies and build up fiscal buffers in favourable economic times.

Amendment

(10)  It should be recalled that Member States should pursue sound fiscal policies and build up fiscal buffers in favourable economic times. **If they do so, they comply with the Treaties and have no need for EU support measures.**

Or. en

Amendment 85
Marco Valli, Laura Agea

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 10

Text proposed by the Commission

(10)  **EISF should be a Union instrument which complements national fiscal policies.** It should be recalled that Member States should pursue sound fiscal policies and build up fiscal buffers in favourable economic times.

Amendment

(10)  **EISF should be a Union instrument which complements national fiscal policies.** The response to the economic crisis has highlighted the need to allow Member States facing an economic downturn to conduct well-designed expansionary fiscal policies supporting aggregate demand in order to absorb economic shocks and counter deflation.

Or. en

Amendment 86
Markus Ferber, Siegfried Mureșan

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 10

Text proposed by the Commission

(10)  **EISF should be a Union instrument which complements national fiscal policies.** It should be recalled that Member States should pursue sound fiscal policies and build up fiscal buffers in favourable economic times.

Amendment

(10)  **EISF should be a Union instrument which complements national fiscal policies** in clearly defined emergency situations. It should be recalled that **it is essential that** Member States pursue sound fiscal policies...
Member States shall only be able to access the EISF if they have pursued responsible fiscal policies in the years prior to activating the trigger.

Amendment 87
Olle Ludvigsson

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 10

Text proposed by the Commission

(10) EISF should be a Union instrument which complements national fiscal policies. It should be recalled that Member States should pursue sound fiscal policies and build up fiscal buffers in favourable economic times.

Amendment

(10) EISF should be a Union instrument which complements national fiscal policies. It should be recalled that Member States should pursue sound fiscal policies and build up fiscal buffers in favourable economic times. This is vital in order to implement rapid measures combating asymmetric shocks effectively, while safeguarding sufficient financial flexibility promoting counter cyclical policies that foster sustainable growth in accordance with the Paris agreement;

Amendment 88
Philippe Lamberts, Jordi Solé
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 10

Text proposed by the Commission

(10) EISF should be a Union instrument which complements national fiscal policies. It should be recalled that Member States should pursue sound fiscal policies and build up fiscal buffers in favourable economic times.

Amendment

(10) EISF should be a Union instrument which complements national fiscal policies. It should be recalled that Member States should pursue sound fiscal policies and build up fiscal buffers in favourable economic times.
States should pursue sound fiscal policies and build up fiscal buffers in favourable economic times and facilitate countercyclical macroeconomic adjustment in bad times. Member States should also pursue in that perspective an upwards fiscal convergence and the fight against fiscal and social dumping.

Amendment 89
Manuel dos Santos, Jonás Fernández, Eider Gardiazabal Rubial, Agnes Jongerius, Luigi Morgano
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 10

Text proposed by the Commission

(10) EISF should be a Union instrument which complements national fiscal policies. It should be recalled that Member States should pursue sound fiscal policies and build up fiscal buffers in favourable economic times.

Amendment

(10) EPS should be a Union instrument which complements national fiscal policies.

Amendment 90
Martin Schirdewan
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 10

Text proposed by the Commission

(10) EISF should be a Union instrument which complements national fiscal policies. It should be recalled that Member States should pursue sound fiscal policies and build up fiscal buffers in favourable economic times.

Amendment

(10) EISF should be a Union instrument which complements national fiscal policies.

Or. en
Amendment 91  
Bernd Lucke

Proposal for a regulation  
Recital 11

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(11) At Union level, the European Semester of economic policy coordination is the framework to identify national reform priorities and monitor their implementation. Member States develop their own national multiannual investment strategies in support of those reform priorities. Those strategies should be presented alongside the yearly National Reform Programmes as a way to outline and coordinate priority investment projects to be supported by national and/or Union funding. They should also serve to use Union funding in a coherent manner and to maximise the added value of the financial support to be received notably from the programmes supported by the Union under the European Regional Development Fund, the Cohesion fund, the European Social Fund, the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund and the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development, *the EISF* and InvestEU, where relevant.

*Amendment*

(11) At Union level, the European Semester of economic policy coordination is the framework to identify national reform priorities and monitor their implementation. Member States develop their own national multiannual investment strategies in support of those reform priorities. Those strategies should be presented alongside the yearly National Reform Programmes as a way to outline and coordinate priority investment projects to be supported by national and/or Union funding. They should also serve to use Union funding in a coherent manner and to maximise the added value of the financial support to be received notably from the programmes supported by the Union under the European Regional Development Fund, the Cohesion fund, the European Social Fund, the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund and the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development, and InvestEU, where relevant.

Or. en

Amendment 92  
Xabier Benito Ziluaga

Proposal for a regulation  
Recital 11

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(11) **At Union level, the European Semester of economic policy coordination is the framework to identify national**

*Amendment*

(11) **Union funding** should be used in a coherent manner and to maximise the added value of the financial support to be
reform priorities and monitor their implementation. Member States develop their own national multiannual investment strategies in support of those reform priorities. Those strategies should be presented alongside the yearly National Reform Programmes as a way to outline and coordinate priority investment projects to be supported by national and/or Union funding. They should also serve to use Union funding in a coherent manner and to maximise the added value of the financial support to be received notably from the programmes supported by the Union under the European Regional Development Fund, the Cohesion fund, the European Social Fund, the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund and the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development, the EISF and InvestEU, where relevant.

Or. es

Justification

It is precisely the structural adjustment and austerity measures promoted by the European Semester that constitute one of the origins of the economic crisis. The aim is to boost public investment in a coherent manner, but not to implement austerity policies, which are clearly recessive in nature.

Amendment 93
Eider Gardiazabal Rubial, Jonás Fernández, Agnes Jongerius, Luigi Morgano

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 11

Text proposed by the Commission  
(11) At Union level, the European Semester of economic policy coordination is the framework to identify national reform priorities and monitor their implementation. Member States develop their own national multiannual investment strategies in support of those reform

Amendment  
(11) At Union level, the European Semester of economic policy coordination is the framework to identify national reform priorities and monitor their implementation. Member States develop their own national multiannual investment strategies in support of those reform
priorities. Those strategies should be presented alongside the yearly National Reform Programmes as a way to outline and coordinate priority investment projects to be supported by national and/or Union funding. They should also serve to use Union funding in a coherent manner and to maximise the added value of the financial support to be received notably from the programmes supported by the Union under the European Regional Development Fund, the Cohesion fund, the European Social Fund, the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund and the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development, the EISF and InvestEU, where relevant.

Or. en

**Amendment 94**
Nicola Caputo

**Proposal for a regulation**
**Recital 11**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(11) At Union level, the European Semester of economic policy coordination is the framework to identify national reform priorities and monitor their implementation. Member States develop their own national multiannual investment strategies in support of those reform priorities. Those strategies should be presented alongside the yearly National Reform Programmes as a way to outline and coordinate priority investment projects to be supported by national and/or Union funding. They should also serve to use Union funding in a coherent manner and to maximise the added value of the financial support to be received notably from the programmes supported by the Union under the European Regional Development Fund, the Cohesion fund, the European Social Fund, the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund and the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development, the EISF and InvestEU, where relevant.

**Amendment**

(11) At Union level, the European Semester of economic and social policy coordination is the framework to identify national reform priorities and monitor their implementation. Member States develop their own national multiannual investment strategies in support of those reform priorities. Those strategies should be presented alongside the yearly National Reform Programmes as a way to outline and coordinate priority investment projects to be supported by national and/or Union funding. They should also serve to use Union funding in a coherent manner and to maximise the added value of the financial support to be received notably from the programmes supported by the Union under the European Regional Development Fund, the Cohesion fund, the European Social Fund Plus, the European Maritime and...
Fund and the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development, the EISF and InvestEU, where relevant.

Amendment 95
Markus Ferber

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 12

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(12) *The European Stability Mechanism (ESM) or its legal successor could provide further support in addition to support under EISF.*

*Amendment*

deleted

Or. it

Amendment 96
Siegfried Mureşan, Dariusz Rosati, Gunnar Hökmark

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 12

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(12) *The European Stability Mechanism (ESM) or its legal successor could provide further support in addition to support under EISF.*

*Amendment*

deleted

Or. en

Amendment 97
Marco Valli, Laura Agea

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 12

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*
The European Stability Mechanism (ESM) or its legal successor could provide further support in addition to support under EISF.

Or. en

Amendment 98
Bernd Lucke

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 12

Text proposed by the Commission

The European Stability Mechanism (ESM) or its legal successor could provide further support in addition to support under EISF.

Amendment

Or. en

Amendment 99
Eider Gardiazabal Rubial, Jonás Fernández, Luigi Morgano

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 12

Text proposed by the Commission

The European Stability Mechanism (ESM) or its legal successor could provide further support in addition to support under EISF.

Amendment

Or. en

Amendment 100
Philippe Lamberts, Jordi Solé
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 12

The European Stability Mechanism (ESM) or its legal successor could provide further support in addition to support under EPS.
Text proposed by the Commission

(12) The European Stability Mechanism (ESM) or its legal successor could provide further support in addition to support under EISF.

Amendment

(12) The European Stability Mechanism (ESM) or its legal successor should provide further support in addition to support under EISF.

Or. en

Amendment 101
Bernd Lucke

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 13

Text proposed by the Commission

(13) EISF support should be given in case one or several Member States whose currency is the euro or other Member States that participate in the exchange rate mechanism (ERM II) are confronted with a large asymmetric shock. Changes in unemployment rates are highly correlated with business cycle fluctuations in such Member States. Strong increases in national unemployment rates above their long-term averages are a clear indicator of a large shock in a specific Member State. Asymmetric shocks affect one or several Member States significantly more strongly than the average of Member States.

Amendment

(13) EU support may be given in case one or several Member States whose currency is the euro or other Member States that participate in the exchange rate mechanism (ERM II) are confronted with a large asymmetric shock. The existence of such shocks can only be established by market data which are exogenous with respect to government policies. Adverse developments in unemployment may clearly have their root in ill-designed government policies. Moreover, adverse developments in unemployment in one country are no proof for the asymmetry of a macroeconomic shock.

Or. en

Amendment 102
Xabier Benito Ziluaga

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 13

Text proposed by the Commission

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EN
(13) EISF support should be given in case one or several Member States whose currency is the euro or other Member States that participate in the exchange rate mechanism (ERM II) are confronted with a large asymmetric shock. Changes in unemployment rates are highly correlated with business cycle fluctuations in such Member States. Strong increases in national unemployment rates above their long-term averages are a clear indicator of a large shock in a specific Member State. Asymmetric shocks affect one or several Member States significantly more strongly than the average of Member States. It should be noted that the asymmetric shocks are caused by the Eurozone’s own economic architecture. Therefore, the stabilisation mechanism must operate in a compensatory manner to counteract the economic divergence and the tendency to deepen the unequal relationship between the centre and the periphery it causes, for example as regards the balance of payments or the intensity of the economic cycle.

Or. es

Justification

The shocks experienced have fundamentally been of a symmetric nature (financial crisis, profitability crisis) but have been unevenly driven by mechanisms which deepened their asymmetric features. It is because of the architecture of the eurozone that the shock spread in and impacted the countries of the European periphery more severely. The planned mechanism should therefore play a counterbalancing role.

Amendment 103
Marco Valli, Laura Agea

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 13

Text proposed by the Commission

(13) EISF support should be given in

Amendment

(13) EISF support should be given in

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case one or several Member States whose currency is the euro or other Member States that participate in the exchange rate mechanism (ERM II) are confronted with a large asymmetric shock. Changes in unemployment rates are highly correlated with business cycle fluctuations in such Member States. Strong increases in national unemployment rates above their long-term averages are a clear indicator of a large shock in a specific Member State. Asymmetric shocks affect one or several Member States significantly more strongly than the average of Member States.

Amendment 104
Stanisław Ożóg, Zbigniew Kuźmiuk

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 13

Text proposed by the Commission

(13) EISF support should be given in case one or several Member States whose currency is the euro or other Member States that participate in the exchange rate mechanism (ERM II) are confronted with a large asymmetric shock. Changes in unemployment rates are highly correlated with business cycle fluctuations in such Member States. Strong increases in national unemployment rates above their long-term averages are a clear indicator of a large shock in a specific Member State. Asymmetric shocks affect one or several Member States significantly more strongly than the average of Member States.

Amendment

(13) EISF support should be given in case one or several Member States are confronted with a large asymmetric shock. Changes in unemployment rates are highly correlated with business cycle fluctuations in such Member States. Strong increases in national unemployment rates above their long-term averages are a clear indicator of a large shock in a specific Member State. Asymmetric shocks affect one or several Member States significantly more strongly than the average of Member States.

Amendment 105
Eider Gardiazabal Rubial, Jonás Fernández, Agnes Jongerius, Luigi Morgano
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 13

Text proposed by the Commission

(13) **EISF** support should be given in case one or several Member States whose currency is the euro or other Member States that participate in the exchange rate mechanism (ERM II) are confronted with a large asymmetric shock. Changes in unemployment rates are highly correlated with business cycle fluctuations in such Member States. Strong increases in national unemployment rates above their long-term averages are a clear indicator of a large shock in a specific Member State. Asymmetric shocks affect one or several Member States significantly more strongly than the average of Member States.

Amendment

(13) **EPS** support should be given in case one or several Member States whose currency is the euro or other Member States that participate in the exchange rate mechanism (ERM II) are confronted with a large asymmetric shock. Changes in unemployment rates are highly correlated with business cycle fluctuations in such Member States. Strong increases in national unemployment rates above their long-term averages are a clear indicator of a large shock in a specific Member State. Asymmetric shocks affect one or several Member States significantly more strongly than the average of Member States.

Or. en

Amendment 106
Philippe Lamberts, Jordi Solé
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 13

Text proposed by the Commission

(13) **EISF** support should be given in case one or several Member States whose currency is the euro or other Member States that participate in the exchange rate mechanism (ERM II) are confronted with a large asymmetric shock. Changes in unemployment rates are highly correlated with business cycle fluctuations in such Member States. Strong increases in national unemployment rates above their long-term averages are a clear indicator of a large shock in a specific Member State. Asymmetric shocks affect one or several Member States significantly more strongly than the average of Member States.

Amendment

(13) **EISF** support should be given in case one or several Member States whose currency is the euro or other Member States that participate in the exchange rate mechanism (ERM II) are confronted with a large asymmetric shock. Changes in unemployment rates are highly correlated with business cycle fluctuations in such Member States. Strong increases in national unemployment rates above their long-term averages are a clear indicator of a large shock in a specific Member State. Asymmetric shocks affect one or several Member States significantly more strongly than the average of Member States.
than the average of Member States.

Amendment 107
Bernd Lucke

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 14

_text proposed by the Commission_  

(14) The activation of EISF support should therefore be determined by a double activation trigger based on both the level of national unemployment rate compared to its past average and the change in unemployment compared to a certain threshold.  

_deleted_

Amendment

Or. en

Amendment 108
Esther de Lange

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 14

_text proposed by the Commission_  

(14) The activation of EISF support should therefore be determined by a non-automatic and conditional double activation trigger based on both the level of national unemployment rate compared to its past average and the change in unemployment compared to a certain threshold.

Or. en

Amendment 109
Philippe Lamberts, Jordi Solé
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 14

Text proposed by the Commission

(14) The activation of EISF support should therefore be determined by a double activation trigger based on both the level of national unemployment rate compared to its past average and the change in unemployment compared to a certain threshold.

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 14

Text proposed by the Commission

(14) The activation of EISF support should therefore be determined by an activation trigger based on the level of national unemployment rate compared to its past average, the change in unemployment compared to a certain threshold or a change in a leading indicator to anticipate turning point in economic activity.

Amendment

Or. en

Amendment 110
Jonás Fernández, Eider Gardiazabal Rubial, Ramón Jáuregui Atondo, Manuel dos Santos, Roberto Gualtieri

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 14

Text proposed by the Commission

(14) The activation of EISF support should therefore be determined by a double activation trigger based on both the level of national unemployment rate compared to its past average and the change in unemployment compared to a certain threshold.

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 14

Text proposed by the Commission

(14) The activation of EPS support should therefore be determined by an activation trigger based on the level of national unemployment rate compared to its past average or the change in unemployment rate compared to a certain threshold.

Amendment

Or. en

Amendment 111
Marco Valli, Laura Agea
The activation of EISF support should therefore be determined by a double activation trigger based on both the level of national unemployment rate compared to its past average and the change in unemployment compared to a certain threshold.

Amendment 112
Marco Valli, Laura Agea

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 15

Strict eligibility criteria based on compliance with decisions and recommendations under the Union's fiscal and economic surveillance framework over a period of two years before the request for EISF support should be fulfilled by the Member State requesting EISF support in order not to diminish the incentive for that Member State to pursue prudent budgetary policies.

Amendment 113
Martin Schirdewan

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 15

Strict eligibility criteria based on compliance with decisions and recommendations under the Union's fiscal and economic surveillance framework over a period of two years before the request for EISF support should be fulfilled by the Member State requesting EISF support in order not to diminish the incentive for that Member State to pursue prudent budgetary policies.
fiscal and economic surveillance framework over a period of two years before the request for EISF support should be fulfilled by the Member State requesting EISF support in order not to diminish the incentive for that Member State to pursue prudent budgetary policies.

Amendment 114
Bernd Lucke

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 15

Text proposed by the Commission

(15) Strict eligibility criteria based on compliance with decisions and recommendations under the Union’s fiscal and economic surveillance framework over a period of two years before the request for EISF support should be fulfilled by the Member State requesting EISF support in order not to diminish the incentive for that Member State to pursue prudent budgetary policies.

Amendment

(15) Strict eligibility criteria based on compliance with decisions and recommendations under the Union’s fiscal and economic surveillance framework over a period of ten years before the request for EISF support should be fulfilled by the Member State requesting EISF support in order not to diminish the incentive for that Member State to pursue prudent budgetary policies.

Amendment 115
Pervenche Berès, Reimer Böge

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 15

Text proposed by the Commission

(15) Strict eligibility criteria based on compliance with decisions and recommendations under the Union’s fiscal and economic surveillance framework over a period of two years before the request for EISF support should be fulfilled by the Member State requesting EISF support in order not to diminish the incentive for that Member State to pursue prudent budgetary policies.

Amendment

(15) Strict eligibility criteria based on compliance with decisions and recommendations under the Union’s fiscal and economic surveillance framework, including the Communication on
EISF support should be fulfilled by the Member State requesting EISF support in order not to diminish the incentive for that Member State to pursue prudent budgetary policies.

flexibility, over a period of two years before the request for EISF support and compliance with a Convergence Code focusing on a few decisive criteria allowing for better national ownership, should be fulfilled by the Member State requesting EISF support in order not to diminish the incentive for that Member State to pursue prudent and sustainable budgetary policies. The convergence code, adopted under the ordinary legislative procedure and taking in account the country-specific recommendations should focuses for a five-year period on convergence criteria regarding taxation, labour market, investment, productivity, social cohesion, and public administrative and good governance capacities within the existing Treaties.

Amendment 116
Jonás Fernández, Eider Gardiazabal Rubial, Ramón Jáuregui Atondo, Manuel dos Santos

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 15

Text proposed by the Commission

(15) Strict eligibility criteria based on compliance with decisions and recommendations under the Union’s fiscal and economic surveillance framework over a period of two years before the request for EISF support should be fulfilled by the Member State requesting EISF support in order not to diminish the incentive for that Member State to pursue prudent budgetary policies.

Amendment

(15) Strict eligibility criteria based on compliance with decisions and recommendations under the Union's fiscal and economic surveillance framework over a period of two years before the request for EPS support should be fulfilled by the Member State requesting EPS support in order not to diminish the incentive for that Member State to pursue prudent budgetary policies. In this assessment the Commission’s Communication on "Making the best use of the flexibility within the existing rule of the Stability and Growth Pact" shall be considered;
Amendment 117
Siegfried Mureşan, Dariusz Rosati, Gunnar Hökmark

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 15

Text proposed by the Commission
(15) Strict eligibility criteria based on compliance with decisions and recommendations under the Union's fiscal and economic surveillance framework over a period of two years before the request for EISF support should be fulfilled by the Member State requesting EISF support in order not to diminish the incentive for that Member State to pursue prudent budgetary policies.

Amendment
(15) Strict eligibility criteria based on compliance with the Stability and Growth Pact as part of the Union's fiscal and economic surveillance framework over a period of five years before the request for EISF support should be fulfilled by the Member State requesting EISF support in order not to diminish the incentive for that Member State to pursue prudent budgetary policies. Compliance with any other eligibility criteria, such as a convergence code, shall only be additional to the EU’s fiscal rules and not in replacement of them.

Amendment 118
Philippe Lamberts, Jordi Solé
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 15

Text proposed by the Commission
(15) Strict eligibility criteria based on compliance with decisions and recommendations under the Union's fiscal and economic surveillance framework over a period of two years before the request for EISF support should be fulfilled by the Member State requesting EISF support in

Amendment
(15) Eligibility criteria for grants could be partially based on compliance with decisions and recommendations under the Union's fiscal and economic surveillance framework over a period of two years before the request for EISF in order not to diminish the incentive for that Member
order not to diminish the incentive for that Member State to pursue prudent budgetary policies.

Amendment 119
Markus Ferber
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 15

Text proposed by the Commission

(15) Strict eligibility criteria based on compliance with decisions and recommendations under the Union's fiscal and economic surveillance framework over a period of two years before the request for EISF support should be fulfilled by the Member State requesting EISF support in order not to diminish the incentive for that Member State to pursue prudent budgetary policies.

Amendment

(15) Strict eligibility criteria based on compliance with decisions and recommendations under the Union's fiscal and economic surveillance framework over a period of five years before the request for EISF support should be fulfilled by the Member State requesting EISF support in order not to diminish the incentive for that Member State to pursue prudent budgetary policies.

Or. en

Justification

Member States shall only be eligible to receive support if they have a strong track record of being in compliance with the EU rules of economic governance.

Amendment 120
Martín Schirdewan
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 15 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

(15a) Eligibility for EISF funds should be based on Member States adhering to a development code which sets out socio-economic convergence criteria for the
European Union and the respective Member State in matters such as just taxation, social inclusion and social cohesion as well as balanced and participative economic growth.

Amendment 121
Philippe Lamberts, Jordi Solé
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 16

Text proposed by the Commission
(16) Member States whose currency is the euro which benefit from financial assistance by the ESM, the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM) or the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and which are under a macro-economic adjustment programme within the meaning of Article 7(2) of Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council12 should not benefit from EISF support since their financing needs including for maintaining public investment are addressed via the financial assistance granted.

Amendment
deleted

(16) **Member States whose currency is the euro which benefit from financial assistance by the ESM, the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM) or the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and which are under a macro-economic adjustment programme within the meaning of Article 7(2) of Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council** should not benefit from EISF support since their financing needs including for maintaining public investment are addressed via the financial assistance granted.

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Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM) or the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and which are under a macro-economic adjustment programme within the meaning of Article 7(2) of Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council¹² should not benefit from EISF support since their financing needs including for maintaining public investment are addressed via the financial assistance granted.


Amendment 124
Xabier Benito Ziluaga

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 16

Text proposed by the Commission

(16) Member States whose currency is the euro which benefit from financial assistance by the ESM, the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM) or the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and which are under a macro-economic adjustment programme within the meaning of Article 7(2) of Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council¹² should not benefit from EISF support since their financing needs including for maintaining public investment are addressed via the financial assistance

Amendment

(16) Member States whose currency is the euro which benefit from financial assistance by the ESM, the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM) or the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and which opt for EISF funding, should submit a project that favours the development of synergies and complementarity between investment projects financed, that is in accordance with a viable budget and that is liable to boost their economy in the medium term.
grant


Or. es

Justification

Macroeconomic adjustment programmes represent one of the main problems and not the solution for economic development.

Amendment 125
Eider Gardiazabal Rubial, Jonás Fernández, Agnes Jongerius, Luigi Morgano

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 16

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Text proposed by the Commission</th>
<th>Amendment</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(16) Member States whose currency is the euro which benefit from financial assistance by the ESM, the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM) or the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and which are under a macro-economic adjustment programme within the meaning of Article 7(2) of Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council(^\text{12}) should not benefit from EISF support since their financing needs including for maintaining public investment are addressed via the financial assistance granted.</td>
<td>(16) Member States whose currency is the euro which benefit from financial assistance by the ESM, the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM) or the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and which are under a macro-economic adjustment programme within the meaning of Article 7(2) of Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council(^\text{12}) should not benefit from EPS support since their financing needs including for maintaining public investment are addressed via the financial assistance granted.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{12}\) Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
21 May 2013 on the strengthening of economic and budgetary surveillance of Member States in the euro area experiencing or threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their financial stability, (OJ L 140, 27.5.2013, p. 1).

21 May 2013 on the strengthening of economic and budgetary surveillance of Member States in the euro area experiencing or threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their financial stability, (OJ L 140, 27.5.2013, p. 1).

Or. en

Amendment 126
Stanisław Ożóg, Zbigniew Kuźmiuk

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 16

Text proposed by the Commission

(16) Member States whose currency is the euro which benefit from financial assistance by the ESM, the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM) or the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and which are under a macro-economic adjustment programme within the meaning of Article 7(2) of Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council should not benefit from EISF support since their financing needs including for maintaining public investment are addressed via the financial assistance granted.

Amendment

(16) Member States which benefit from financial assistance by the ESM, the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM) or the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and which are under a macro-economic adjustment programme within the meaning of Article 7(2) of Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council should not benefit from EISF support since their financing needs including for maintaining public investment are addressed via the financial assistance granted.

Or. pl

Amendment 127
Martin Schirdewan

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 17

Text proposed by the Commission

(17) Member States with a derogation which benefit from balance of payments support within the meaning of point (a) of Article 3(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No 332/2002¹³ should not benefit from EISF support since their financing needs including for maintaining public investment are addressed via the medium-term financial assistance facility granted.


Amendment 128
Marco Valli, Laura Agea

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 17

Text proposed by the Commission

(17) Member States with a derogation which benefit from balance of payments support within the meaning of point (a) of Article 3(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No 332/2002¹³ should not benefit from EISF support since their financing needs including for maintaining public investment are addressed via the medium-term financial assistance facility granted.


Amendment 129
Philippe Lamberts, Jordi Solé
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 17

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(17) Member States with a derogation which benefit from balance of payments support within the meaning of point (a) of Article 3(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No 332/2002 should not benefit from EISF support since their financing needs including for maintaining public investment are addressed via the medium-term financial assistance facility granted.

________________________________________


Amendment 130
Eider Gardiazabal Rubial, Jonás Fernández, Agnes Jongerius, Luigi Morgano, Roberto Gualtieri

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 17

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(17) Member States with a derogation

(17) Member States with a derogation

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which benefit from balance of payments support within the meaning of point (a) of Article 3(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No 332/2002 should not benefit from EISF support since their financing needs including for maintaining public investment are addressed via the medium-term financial assistance facility granted.


Amendment 131
Bernd Lucke
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 18

Text proposed by the Commission
(18) EISF support should take the form of loans to the Member States concerned. That instrument would provide them with financing to continue executing public investment.

Amendment
(18) EISF support should take the form of loans to the Member States concerned granted under market conditions and subject to a debt sustainability analysis by a highly-reputed and politically neutral academic institution.

Or. en

Amendment 132
Philippe Lamberts, Jordi Solé
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 18

Text proposed by the Commission
(18) EISF support should take the form

Amendment
(18) EISF support should take the form

Or. en
of loans to the Member States concerned. That instrument would provide them with financing to continue executing public investment.

of grants or loans to the Member States concerned. That instrument would provide them with financing to continue executing public investments particularly those in line with the Sustainable Development Goals and the Paris Climate agreement.

Or. en

Amendment 133
Eider Gardiazabal Rubial, Jonás Fernández, Agnes Jongerius, Roberto Gualtieri, Luigi Morgano

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 18

Text proposed by the Commission

(18) EISF support should take the form of loans to the Member States concerned. That instrument would provide them with financing to continue executing public investment.

Amendment

(18) EPS support should take the form of loans to the Member States concerned. That instrument would provide them with financing to continue executing public investment and support national unemployment scheme.

Or. en

Amendment 134
Bernd Lucke

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 19

Text proposed by the Commission

(19) In addition to loans, interest rate subsidies should be granted to the Member States concerned to cover the interest costs incurred on such loans, as a specific type of financial assistance under Article 220 of the Financial Regulation. Such an interest rate subsidy would provide additional support in parallel to the loan for Member States undergoing an asymmetric shock and facing tight

Amendment

(19) In addition to loans, no interest rate subsidies should be granted to the Member States.
financing conditions on the financial markets.

Amendment 135
Siegfried Mureșan, Dariusz Rosati, Gunnar Hökmark

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 19

Text proposed by the Commission

(19) In addition to loans, interest rate subsidies should be granted to the Member States concerned to cover the interest costs incurred on such loans, as a specific type of financial assistance under Article 220 of the Financial Regulation. Such an interest rate subsidy would provide additional support in parallel to the loan for Member States undergoing an asymmetric shock and facing tight financing conditions on the financial markets.

Amendment

(19) In addition to loans, interest rate subsidies should be granted to the Member States concerned to cover the interest costs incurred on such loans, as a specific type of financial assistance under Article 220 of the Financial Regulation. Such an interest rate subsidy would provide additional support in parallel to the loan for Member States undergoing an asymmetric shock and facing tight financing conditions on the financial markets. Payment of interest rate subsidies should be strictly conditional upon the availability of sufficient means in the Stabilisation Support Fund.

Amendment 136
Philippe Lamberts, Jordi Solé
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 19

Text proposed by the Commission

(19) In addition to loans, interest rate subsidies should be granted to the Member States concerned to cover the interest costs incurred on such loans, as a specific type of financial assistance under Article 220 of the Financial Regulation. Such an interest rate subsidy would provide additional support in parallel to the loan for Member States undergoing an asymmetric shock and facing tight financing conditions on the financial markets.

Amendment

(19) In addition to grants and loans, interest rate subsidies should be granted to the Member States concerned to cover the interest costs incurred on such loans, as a specific type of financial assistance under Article 220 of the Financial Regulation.
rate subsidy would provide additional support *in parallel to the loan* for Member States undergoing an asymmetric shock and facing tight financing conditions on the financial markets.

Such an interest rate subsidy would provide additional support for Member States undergoing an asymmetric shock and facing tight financing conditions on the financial markets *whenever such Member State is not fully eligible for a grant.*

**Amendment 137**

Bernd Lucke

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 20

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(20) With a view to *swiftly* provide EISF support, the competence for granting the loans when the eligibility and activation criteria are fulfilled and deciding on granting interest rate subsidies should be entrusted to the Commission.

**Amendment**

(20) With a view to *efficiently* provide EISF support, the competence for granting the loans when the eligibility and activation criteria are fulfilled and deciding on granting interest rate subsidies should *under no means* be entrusted to the Commission. *Rather, the Council should be entrusted, provided the Council approves of such loans in a unanimous decision.*

**Amendment 138**

Markus Ferber

Proposal for a regulation

Recital 20

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(20) With a view to swiftly provide EISF support, the competence for granting the loans *when* the eligibility and activation criteria are fulfilled and deciding on granting interest rate subsidies should be entrusted to the Commission.

**Amendment**

(20) With a view to swiftly provide EISF support, the competence for granting the loans *upon the strict precondition that* the eligibility and activation criteria are fulfilled and deciding on granting interest rate subsidies should be entrusted to the Commission. *The eligibility and activation*
criteria must be the only relevant criteria; there must not be any political considerations in the decision making process.

Or. en

Amendment 139
Philippe Lamberts, Jordi Solé
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 20

**Text proposed by the Commission**

(20) With a view to swiftly provide EISF support, the competence for granting the loans when the eligibility and activation criteria are fulfilled and deciding on granting interest rate subsidies should be entrusted to the Commission.

**Amendment**

(20) With a view to swiftly provide EISF support, the competence for granting the loans when the eligibility and activation criteria for grants are not fulfilled and deciding on granting interest rate subsidies should be entrusted to the Commission.

Or. en

Amendment 140
Eider Gardiázabal Rubial, Jonás Fernández, Agnes Jongerius, Luigi Morgano

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 20

**Text proposed by the Commission**

(20) With a view to swiftly provide EISF support, the competence for granting the loans when the eligibility and activation criteria are fulfilled and deciding on granting interest rate subsidies should be entrusted to the Commission.

**Amendment**

(20) With a view to swiftly provide EPS support, the competence for granting the loans when the eligibility and activation criteria are fulfilled and deciding on granting interest rate subsidies should be entrusted to the Commission.

Or. en
Amendment 141
Bernd Lucke

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 21

Text proposed by the Commission

(21) Member States should invest the support received under EISF in eligible public investment \textit{and also maintain} the level of public investment \textit{in general} compared to the average level of public investment \textit{over the five last years in order to ensure that the objective pursued by this Regulation is achieved}. In that respect, there is the expectation that Member States should give priority to maintaining eligible investment in programmes supported by the Union under the European Regional Development Fund, the Cohesion fund, the European Social Fund, the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund and the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development.

Amendment

(21) Member States should invest the support received under EISF in eligible public investment \textit{which has a clearly identified European added value}. They should critically review the level of public investment compared to the level of public investment \textit{which is deemed sustainable}.

Or. en

Amendment 142
Jonás Fernández, Eider Gardiazabal Rubial, Ramón Jáuregui Atondo, Manuel dos Santos

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 21

Text proposed by the Commission

(21) Member States should invest the support received under \textit{EISF} in eligible public investment \textit{and also maintain the level of public investment in general compared to the average level of public investment over the five last years in order to ensure that the objective pursued by this Regulation is achieved}. In that respect, there is the expectation that

Amendment

(21) Member States should invest the support received under \textit{EPS} in eligible public investment. In that respect, there is the expectation that Member States should give priority to maintaining eligible investment in programmes supported by the Union under the European Regional Development Fund, the Cohesion fund, the European Social Fund, the European
Member States should give priority to maintaining eligible investment in programmes supported by the Union under the European Regional Development Fund, the Cohesion fund, the European Social Fund, the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund and the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development.

Amendment 143
Philippe Lamberts, Jordi Solé
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 21

Text proposed by the Commission

(21) Member States should invest the support received under EISF in eligible public investment and also maintain the level of public investment in general compared to the average level of public investment over the five last years in order to ensure that the objective pursued by this Regulation is achieved. In that respect, there is the expectation that Member States should give priority to maintaining eligible investment in programmes supported by the Union under the European Regional Development Fund, the Cohesion fund, the European Social Fund, the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund and the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development.

Amendment

(21) Member States should invest the support received under EISF in eligible public investment and also maintain the level of public investment in general compared to the higher level of public investments over the five last years in order to ensure that the objective pursued by this Regulation is achieved. In that respect, there is the expectation that Member States should give priority to maintaining eligible investment in programmes supported by the Union under the European Regional Development Fund, the Cohesion fund, the European Social Fund, the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund and the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development.

Amendment 144
Eider Gardiazabal Rubial, Jonás Fernández, Agnes Jongerius, Luigi Morgano

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 21
(21) Member States should invest the support received under EISF in eligible public investment and also maintain the level of public investment in general compared to the average level of public investment over the five last years in order to ensure that the objective pursued by this Regulation is achieved. In that respect, there is the expectation that Member States should give priority to maintaining eligible investment in programmes supported by the Union under the European Regional Development Fund, the Cohesion fund, the European Social Fund, the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund and the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development.

Amendment

145
Philippe Lamberts, Jordi Solé
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 22

Text proposed by the Commission

(22) To that effect, the Commission should examine whether the Member State concerned has respected those conditions. In case of non-compliance the Member State concerned should repay part or the entire loan given and should not be entitled to receiving an interest rate subsidy.

Amendment

To that effect, the Commission should examine whether the Member State concerned has respected those conditions. In case of non-compliance the Member State concerned should be subject to exclusion of additional grants for a period of two years or repay part or the entire loan given and should not be entitled to receiving an interest rate subsidy.

Or. en
Jonás Fernández, Eider Gardiazabal Rubial, Ramón Jáuregui Atondo, Manuel dos Santos

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 22

Text proposed by the Commission

(22) To that effect, the Commission should examine whether the Member State concerned has respected those conditions. In case of non-compliance the Member State concerned should repay part or the entire loan given and should not be entitled to receiving an interest rate subsidy.

Amendment

(22) To that effect, the Commission should examine whether the Member State concerned has respected this condition. In case of non-compliance the Member State concerned should repay part or the entire loan given and should not be entitled to receiving an interest rate subsidy.

Or. en

Amendment 147
Siegfried Mureşan, Dariusz Rosati, Gunnar Hökmark

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 22

Text proposed by the Commission

(22) To that effect, the Commission should examine whether the Member State concerned has respected those conditions. In case of non-compliance the Member State concerned should repay part or the entire loan given and should not be entitled to receiving an interest rate subsidy.

Amendment

(22) To that effect, the Commission should examine whether the Member State concerned has respected those conditions. In case of non-compliance the Member State concerned should repay the entire loan given and should not be entitled to receiving an interest rate subsidy.

Or. en

Amendment 148
Esther de Lange

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 22 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

(22a) Furthermore, a Member State is

Amendment

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only eligible to receive EISF support if during the five years preceding and five years following the support given, it is not under the Excessive Deficit Procedure and is running a budget in line with the rules set out in the Stability and Growth Pact, including the Medium-Term Budgetary Objectives.

Amendment 149
Stanisław Ożóg, Zbigniew Kuźniuk
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 22 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

(22a) In addition, where national budgetary or economic policies are no longer compatible with EU requirements, the EISF loan should be repaid in part or in full.

Amendment

Or. pl

Amendment 150
Bernd Lucke
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 23

Text proposed by the Commission

(23) The maximum level of eligible public investment that could be supported by EISF loan for a Member State should be automatically set on the basis of a formula which captures the ratio of public eligible investment to gross domestic product (GDP) in the Union over a period of five years before the Member State concerned requests a loan and its GDP over the same period. The maximum level

(23) Public investment should always be in line with the productivity effects it generates. Mechanical and automatically set levels of public investment entail a waste of resources and remind attentive observers of the huge misallocation of funds in centrally planned economies.
of eligible public investment should also be scaled by means of scaling factor (α) towards the fixed ceiling in the Union budget. That factor is determined such that with hindsight of the recent crisis, all the EISF support could have been provided to the Member States concerned, had the mechanism been in place.

Or. en

Amendment 151
Xabier Benito Ziluaga

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 23

Text proposed by the Commission

(23) The maximum level of eligible public investment that could be supported by EISF loan for a Member State should be automatically set on the basis of a formula which captures the ratio of public eligible investment to gross domestic product (GDP) in the Union over a period of five years before the Member State concerned requests a loan and its GDP over the same period. The maximum level of eligible public investment should also be scaled by means of scaling factor (α) towards the fixed ceiling in the Union budget. That factor is determined such that with hindsight of the recent crisis, all the EISF support could have been provided to the Member States concerned, had the mechanism been in place.

Amendment

(23) The ideal level of public investment to be granted and allocated in proportion to the needs duly indicated by the candidate countries for funding should depend on the level of deficit in their balance of payments. The purpose of this automatic shock-absorption mechanism should be to stabilise this macroeconomic parameter and create jobs by boosting economic investment, which constitutes a joint instrument for fostering real demand and the improvement of the quality of supply as well as the candidate country’s macroeconomic relationship with the European economic framework.

Or. es

Justification

Well-designed investment policies are part of the solutions to economic crises. Reference should not be made to a maximum, although this will depend on the size of the fund, instead the means to achieve a minimum level of investment should be provided. If it is to be compensatory in nature – given that the imbalances in the balance of payments are largely
the result of the architecture associated with the single currency and the single market – such an instrument will not be useful if it does not from the outset provide for appropriate diagnosis and thus introduces corrective factors in order to resolve the underlying problems.

Amendment 152
Eider Gardiazabal Rubial, Jonás Fernández, Agnes Jongerius, Luigi Morgano

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 23

Text proposed by the Commission

(23) The maximum level of eligible public investment that could be supported by EISF loan for a Member State should be automatically set on the basis of a formula which captures the ratio of public eligible investment to gross domestic product (GDP) in the Union over a period of five years before the Member State concerned requests a loan and its GDP over the same period. The maximum level of eligible public investment should also be scaled by means of scaling factor (α) towards the fixed ceiling in the Union budget. That factor is determined such that with hindsight of the recent crisis, all the EISF support could have been provided to the Member States concerned, had the mechanism been in place.

Amendment

(23) The maximum level of eligible public investment that could be supported by EPS loan for a Member State should be automatically set on the basis of a formula which captures the ratio of public eligible investment to gross domestic product (GDP) in the Union over a period of five years before the Member State concerned requests a loan and its GDP over the same period. The maximum level of eligible public investment should also be scaled by means of scaling factor (α) towards the fixed ceiling in the Union budget. That factor is determined such that with hindsight of the recent crisis, all the EPS support could have been provided to the Member States concerned, had the mechanism been in place.

Or. en

Amendment 153
Bernd Lucke

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 24

Text proposed by the Commission

(24) The amount of EISF loan should also be automatically determined on the basis of a formula which firstly takes into account the maximum level of eligible

Amendment

deleted
public investment that can be supported under EISF and secondly the severity of the large asymmetric shock. The support determined on the basis of that formula should also be scaled in function of the severity of the shock by means of a factor (β). That factor is determined such that for a shock that increases unemployment by more than 2.5 percentage points, the maximum support is made available to the Member State concerned. An EISF loan could be increased up to the maximum level of eligible public investment in case the asymmetric shock is particularly severe as reflected by other indicators of the Member State’s position in the economic cycle (e.g. confidence surveys) and a deeper analysis of the macroeconomic situation (as conducted in particular in the context of the macroeconomic forecast and the European Semester). With a view to ensure that as many Member States as possible could qualify for support under EISF, the loan to a Member State should not exceed 30 percent of the remaining available means under the ceiling set for calibrating the loans under EISF to the available means in the Union budget.

Amendment 154
Marco Valli, Laura Agea
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 24

Text proposed by the Commission

(24) The amount of EISF loan should also be automatically determined on the basis of a formula which firstly takes into account the maximum level of eligible public investment that can be supported under EISF and secondly the severity of the large asymmetric shock. The support

Amendment

(24) The amount of EISF loan should also be automatically determined on the basis of a formula which firstly takes into account the maximum level of eligible public investment that can be supported under EISF and secondly the severity of the large asymmetric shock. The support
determined on the basis of that formula should also be scaled in function of the severity of the shock by means of a factor (β). That factor is determined such that for a shock that increases unemployment by more than 2.5 percentage points, the maximum support is made available to the Member State concerned. An EISF loan could be increased up to the maximum level of eligible public investment in case the asymmetric shock is particularly severe as reflected by other indicators of the Member State's position in the economic cycle (e.g. confidence surveys) and a deeper analysis of the macroeconomic situation (as conducted in particular in the context of the macroeconomic forecast and the European Semester). With a view to ensure that as many Member States as possible could qualify for support under EISF, the loan to a Member State should not exceed 30 percent of the remaining available means under the ceiling set for calibrating the loans under EISF to the available means in the Union budget.

Amendment 155
Siegfried Mureşan, Gunnar Hökmark

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 24

Text proposed by the Commission

(24) The amount of EISF loan should also be automatically determined on the basis of a formula which firstly takes into account the maximum level of eligible public investment that can be supported under EISF and secondly the severity of the large asymmetric shock. The support determined on the basis of that formula should also be scaled in function of the severity of the shock by means of a factor (β). That factor is determined such that for a shock that increases unemployment by more than 2.5 percentage points, the maximum support is made available to the Member State concerned. An EISF loan could be increased up to the maximum level of eligible public investment in case the asymmetric shock is particularly severe as reflected by other indicators of the Member State's position in the economic cycle, such as youth unemployment, confidence surveys, rate of companies' bankruptcies and large declines in economic output or exports in goods and services.

Amendment

(24) The amount of EISF loan should also be automatically determined on the basis of a formula which firstly takes into account the maximum level of eligible public investment that can be supported under EISF and secondly the severity of the large asymmetric shock. The support determined on the basis of that formula should also be scaled in function of the severity of the shock by means of a factor (β). That factor is determined such that for
a shock that increases unemployment by more than 2.5 percentage points, the maximum support is made available to the Member State concerned. An EISF loan could be increased up to the maximum level of eligible public investment in case the asymmetric shock is particularly severe as reflected by other indicators of the Member State’s position in the economic cycle (e.g. confidence surveys) and a deeper analysis of the macroeconomic situation (as conducted in particular in the context of the macroeconomic forecast and the European Semester). With a view to ensure that as many Member States as possible could qualify for support under EISF, the loan to a Member State should not exceed 30 percent of the remaining available means under the ceiling set for calibrating the loans under EISF to the available means in the Union budget.

Amendment 156
Eider Gardiazabal Rubial, Jonás Fernández, Agnes Jongerius, Luigi Morgano

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 24

Text proposed by the Commission

(24) The amount of EISF loan should also be automatically determined on the basis of a formula which firstly takes into account the maximum level of eligible public investment that can be supported under EISF and secondly the severity of the large asymmetric shock. The support determined on the basis of that formula should also be scaled in function of the severity of the shock by means of a factor (β). That factor is determined such that for a shock that increases unemployment by more than 2.5 percentage points, the maximum support is made available to the Member State concerned. An EISF loan

Amendment

(24) The amount of EPS loan should also be automatically determined on the basis of a formula which firstly takes into account the maximum level of eligible public investment that can be supported under EPS and secondly the severity of the large asymmetric shock. The support determined on the basis of that formula should also be scaled in function of the severity of the shock by means of a factor (β). That factor is determined such that for a shock that increases unemployment by more than 2.5 percentage points, the maximum support is made available to the Member State concerned. An EPS loan
could be increased up to the maximum level of eligible public investment in case the asymmetric shock is particularly severe as reflected by other indicators of the Member State's position in the economic cycle (e.g., confidence surveys) and a deeper analysis of the macroeconomic situation (as conducted in particular in the context of the macroeconomic forecast and the European Semester). With a view to ensure that as many Member States as possible could qualify for support under **EISF**, the loan to a Member State should not exceed 30 percent of the remaining available means under the ceiling set for calibrating the loans under **EISF** to the available means in the Union budget.

**Amendment 157**
**Xabier Benito Ziluaga**

**Proposal for a regulation**
**Recital 24**

(24) The amount of EISF loan should also be automatically determined on the basis of a formula which firstly takes into account the maximum level of eligible public investment that can be supported under EISF and secondly the severity of the large asymmetric shock. The support determined on the basis of that formula should also be scaled in function of the severity of the shock by means of a factor (β). That factor is determined such that for a shock that increases unemployment by more than 2.5 percentage points, the maximum support is made available to the Member State concerned. An EISF loan could be increased up to the maximum level of eligible public investment in case the asymmetric shock is particularly severe as reflected by other indicators of the
Member State's position in the economic cycle (e.g. confidence surveys) and a deeper analysis of the macroeconomic situation (as conducted in particular in the context of the macroeconomic forecast and the European Semester). With a view to ensure that as many Member States as possible could qualify for support under EISF, the loan to a Member State should not exceed 30 percent of the remaining available means under the ceiling set for calibrating the loans under EISF to the available means in the Union budget.

Member State's position in the economic cycle (e.g. the effective rate of return) and a deeper analysis of the macroeconomic situation (as conducted in particular in the context of the macroeconomic forecast). With a view to ensure that as many Member States as possible could qualify for support under EISF, the loan to a Member State should not exceed 30 percent of the remaining available means under the ceiling set for calibrating the loans under EISF to the available means in the Union budget.

Or. es

Justification

The European Semester should cease to be a reference for defining economic policies in the EU. Confidence surveys, for their part, are a subjective indicator, whereas the effective rate of return (profit rate minus financial cost for investment) is a more robust, meaningful and consistent indicator.

Amendment 158
Jonás Fernández, Eider Gardiazabal Rubial, Ramón Jáuregui Atondo, Manuel dos Santos

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 24 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment (24a) In the case of asymmetric shocks, Member States shall have the possibility to use a percentage of the EPS support to financing national unemployment schemes.

Or. en

Amendment 159
Bernd Lucke

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 25

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(25) The amount of **EISF** interest rate subsidies should be determined as a percentage of the interest rate costs incurred by the Member State on the loan granted under the **EISF**.

**Amendment**

*deleted*

Or. en

Amendment 160
Eider Gardiazabal Rubial, Jonás Fernández, Agnes Jongerius, Luigi Morgano

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 25

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(25) The amount of **EISF** interest rate subsidies should be determined as a percentage of the interest rate costs incurred by the Member State on the loan granted under the **EISF**.

**Amendment**

(25) The amount of **EPS** interest rate subsidies should be determined as a percentage of the interest rate costs incurred by the Member State on the loan granted under the **EPS**.

Or. en

Amendment 161
Bernd Lucke

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 26

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(26) A **Stabilisation Support Fund** should be established to finance the interest rate subsidy. The **Stabilisation Support Fund** should be endowed with national contributions from Member States whose currency is the euro and other Member States that participate in the exchange rate mechanism (ERM II).

**Amendment**

*deleted*

Or. en
Amendment 162
Philippe Lamberts, Jordi Solé
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 26

Text proposed by the Commission

(26) A Stabilisation Support Fund should be established to *finance the interest rate subsidy*. The Stabilisation Support Fund should be *endowed* with national contributions from Member States whose currency is the euro and other Member States that participate in the exchange rate mechanism (ERM II).

Amendment

(26) A Stabilisation Support Fund should be established to *reimburse the borrowing operations due by the EISF* endowed with annual payment *appropriations from the EU budget within the limits of the multiannual financial framework and a financial envelope of EUR 120000 million foreseen for the implementation of the Stabilisation Support Fund with the aim of covering the reimbursement of borrowing operations carried by the EISF. Such payments should be *topped up* with national contributions from Member States whose currency is the euro and other Member States that participate in the exchange rate mechanism (ERM II) which experience a current account surplus for a third year in a row. The amount of such contribution should be calculated as the difference between the current account and the maximum threshold whenever a Member State exceeds for a third year in a row the maximum threshold of the current account indicator provided in the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure scoreboard established to in Regulation (EU) 1176/2011. The determination and the transfer of such national contributions should be governed by an intergovernmental agreement to be concluded between Member States whose currency is the euro and other Member States that participate in the exchange rate mechanism (ERM II).
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 26

Text proposed by the Commission

(26) A Stabilisation Support Fund should be established to finance the interest rate subsidy. The Stabilisation Support Fund should be endowed with national contributions from Member States whose currency is the euro and other Member States that participate in the exchange rate mechanism (ERM II).

Amendment

(26) A Stabilisation Support Fund should be established to finance the interest rate subsidy. The Stabilisation Support Fund should be endowed with national contributions from Member States whose currency is the euro.

Amendment 163
Marco Valli, Laura Agea

Amendment 164
Eider Gardiazabal Rubial, Jonás Fernández, Agnes Jongerius, Roberto Gualtieri

Amendment 165
Bernd Lucke
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 27

Text proposed by the Commission

(27) Both the determination of the amount of the national contributions to the Stabilisation Support Fund and their transfer should be governed by an intergovernmental agreement to be concluded between Member States whose currency is the euro and other Member States that participate in the exchange rate mechanism (ERM II). That agreement should provide that the national contributions for all the Member States are calculated based on the share of the national central banks of those Member States whose currency is the euro in the monetary income of the Eurosystem. For Member States which participate in ERM II a specific key should be foreseen to determine the national contributions. The Commission should assist the Member States for the calculation of those contributions. To that end, the European Central Bank (ECB) should communicate to the Commission the amount of monetary income the national central banks of the Eurosystem are entitled to.

Amendment 166
Philippe Lamberts, Jordi Solé
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 27

Text proposed by the Commission

(27) Both the determination of the amount of the national contributions to the Stabilisation Support Fund and their transfer should be governed by an intergovernmental agreement to be concluded between Member States whose currency is the euro and other Member States that participate in the exchange rate mechanism (ERM II). That agreement should provide that the national contributions for all the Member States are calculated based on the share of the national central banks of those Member States whose currency is the euro in the monetary income of the Eurosystem. For Member States which participate in ERM II a specific key should be foreseen to determine the national contributions. The Commission should assist the Member States for the calculation of those contributions. To that end, the European Central Bank (ECB) should communicate to the Commission the amount of monetary income the national central banks of the Eurosystem are entitled to.

(27) A new Own Resource within the 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework should be established by
Transfer should be governed by an intergovernmental agreement to be concluded between Member States whose currency is the euro and other Member States that participate in the exchange rate mechanism (ERM II). That agreement should provide that the national contributions for all the Member States are calculated based on the share of the national central banks of those Member States whose currency is the euro in the monetary income of the Eurosystem. For Member States which participate in ERM II a specific key should be foreseen to determine the national contributions. The Commission should assist the Member States for the calculation of those contributions. To that end, the European Central Bank (ECB) should communicate to the Commission the amount of monetary income the national central banks of the Eurosystem are entitled to.

Amendment 167
Marco Valli, Laura Agea

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 27

Text proposed by the Commission

(27) Both the determination of the amount of the national contributions to the Stabilisation Support Fund and their transfer should be governed by an intergovernmental agreement to be concluded between Member States whose currency is the euro and other Member States that participate in the exchange rate mechanism (ERM II). That agreement should provide that the national contributions for all the Member States are calculated based on the share of the national central banks of those Member States whose currency is the euro in the

Amendment

(27) Both the determination of the amount of the national contributions to the Stabilisation Support Fund and their transfer should be governed by an intergovernmental agreement to be concluded between Member States whose currency is the euro. That agreement should provide that the national contributions for all the Member States are calculated based on the share of the national central banks of those Member States whose currency is the euro in the monetary income of the Eurosystem. The Commission should assist the Member States whose currency is the euro and for other Member States that participate in the exchange rate mechanism referred to in Article 140(1) of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union. Such Own Resource should provide an amount equivalent to be overall financial envelope of the Stabilisation Support Fund.
monetary income of the Eurosystem. **For Member States which participate in ERM II a specific key should be foreseen to determine the national contributions.** The Commission should assist the Member States for the calculation of those contributions. To that end, the European Central Bank (ECB) should communicate to the Commission the amount of monetary income the national central banks of the Eurosystem are entitled to.

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**Amendment 168**

*Esther de Lange*

**Proposal for a regulation**

**Recital 27**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(27) Both the determination of the amount of the national contributions to the Stabilisation Support Fund and their transfer should be governed by an intergovernmental agreement to be concluded between Member States whose currency is the euro and other Member States that participate in the exchange rate mechanism (ERM II). That agreement should provide that the national contributions for all the Member States are calculated based on the share of the national central banks of those Member States whose currency is the euro in the monetary income of the Eurosystem. For Member States which participate in ERM II a specific key should be foreseen to determine the national contributions. The Commission should assist the Member States for the calculation of those contributions. To that end, the European Central Bank (ECB) should communicate to the Commission the amount of monetary income the national central banks of the Eurosystem are entitled to.

*Amendment*

(27) Both the determination of the amount of the national contributions to the Stabilisation Support Fund and their transfer should be governed by an intergovernmental agreement to be concluded between Member States whose currency is the euro and other Member States that participate in the exchange rate mechanism (ERM II). That agreement should provide that the national contributions for all the Member States are calculated based on the share of the national central banks of those Member States whose currency is the euro in the monetary income of the Eurosystem **without any fixed or minimum share of monetary income allocated to the national central banks of the Eurosystem.** For Member States which participate in ERM II a specific key should be foreseen to determine the national contributions. The Commission should assist the Member States for the calculation of those contributions. To that end, the European Central Bank (ECB) should communicate
Eurosystem are entitled to. to the Commission the amount of monetary income the national central banks of the Eurosystem are entitled to.

Or. en

Amendment 169
Pervenche Berès, Reimer Böge
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 27

Text proposed by the Commission

(27) Both the determination of the amount of the national contributions to the Stabilisation Support Fund and their transfer should be governed by an intergovernmental agreement to be concluded between Member States whose currency is the euro and other Member States that participate in the exchange rate mechanism (ERM II). That agreement should provide that the national contributions for all the Member States are calculated based on the share of the national central banks of those Member States whose currency is the euro in the monetary income of the Eurosystem. For Member States which participate in ERM II a specific key should be foreseen to determine the national contributions. The Commission should assist the Member States for the calculation of those contributions. To that end, the European Central Bank (ECB) should communicate to the Commission the amount of monetary income the national central banks of the Eurosystem are entitled to.

Amendment

(27) Both the determination of the amount of the national compartment and contributions to the Stabilisation Support Fund and their transfer should be governed by an intergovernmental agreement to be concluded between Member States whose currency is the euro and other Member States that participate in the exchange rate mechanism (ERM II). That agreement should provide that national compartment function as a Rainy day fund and that the national contributions for all the Member States are calculated based on 10% of the amount of monetary income allocated to the national central banks of those Member States whose currency is the euro in the monetary income of the Eurosystem. For Member States which participate in ERM II a specific key should be foreseen to determine the national contributions. The Commission should assist the Member States for the calculation of those contributions. To that end, the European Central Bank (ECB) should communicate to the Commission the amount of monetary income the national central banks of the Eurosystem are entitled to.

Or. en

Amendment 170
Ramon Tremosa i Balcells

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 27

Text proposed by the Commission

(27) Both the determination of the amount of the national contributions to the Stabilisation Support Fund and their transfer should be governed by an intergovernmental agreement to be concluded between Member States whose currency is the euro and other Member States that participate in the exchange rate mechanism (ERM II). That agreement should provide that the national contributions for all the Member States are calculated based on the share of the national central banks of those Member States whose currency is the euro in the monetary income of the Eurosystem. For Member States which participate in ERM II a specific key should be foreseen to determine the national contributions. The Commission should assist the Member States for the calculation of those contributions. To that end, the European Central Bank (ECB) should communicate to the Commission the amount of monetary income the national central banks of the Eurosystem are entitled to.

Amendment

(27) Both the determination of the amount of the national compartment and contributions to the Stabilisation Support Fund and their transfer should be governed by an intergovernmental agreement to be concluded between Member States whose currency is the euro and other Member States that participate in the exchange rate mechanism (ERM II). That agreement should provide that national compartment function as a contingency fund and that the national contributions for all the Member States are calculated based on the 10% of the national central banks of those Member States whose currency is the euro in the monetary income of the Eurosystem. For Member States which participate in ERM II a specific key should be foreseen to determine the national contributions. The Commission should assist the Member States for the calculation of those contributions. To that end, the European Central Bank (ECB) should communicate to the Commission the amount of monetary income the national central banks of the Eurosystem are entitled to.

Or. en

Amendment 171
Siegfried Mureșan, Gunnar Hökmark

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 27

Text proposed by the Commission

(27) Both the determination of the amount of the national contributions to the Stabilisation Support Fund and their

Amendment

(27) Both the determination of the amount of the national contributions to the Stabilisation Support Fund and their

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transfer should be governed by an intergovernmental agreement to be concluded between Member States whose currency is the euro and other Member States that participate in the exchange rate mechanism (ERM II). That agreement should provide that the national contributions for all the Member States are calculated based on the national contributions for all the Member States. For Member States which participate in ERM II a specific key should be foreseen to determine the national contributions. The Commission should assist the Member States for the calculation of those contributions. To that end, the European Central Bank (ECB) should communicate to the Commission the amount of monetary income the national central banks of the Eurosystem are entitled to.

Or. en

Amendment 172
Eider Gardiazabal Rubial, Jonás Fernández, Agnes Jongerius, Roberto Gualtieri

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 27 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

(27a) Within five years, at most, of the date of entry into force of this Treaty, on the basis of an assessment of the experience with its implementation, the necessary steps should be taken, in accordance with the Treaty on the European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, with the aim of incorporating the substance of this Treaty into the legal framework of the European Union.

Amendment

Or. en
Amendment 173
Bernd Lucke

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 28

Text proposed by the Commission

(28) After that intergovernmental agreement has entered into force, payment of the interest rate subsidy to the Member State concerned should be conditional upon the Member State transferring its yearly contribution to the Stabilisation Support Fund. Payment of interest rate subsidies should be conditional upon the availability of sufficient means in the Stabilisation Support Fund. Payment of interest rate subsidies from the Stabilisation Support Fund would be postponed in case the interest rate subsidy to a specific Member State would exceed 30 percent of the available means in the Stabilisation Support Fund at the moment when such payment is due.

Or. en

Amendment 174
Siegfried Mureșan, Dariusz Rosati, Gunnar Hökmark

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 28

Text proposed by the Commission

(28) After that intergovernmental agreement has entered into force, payment of the interest rate subsidy to the Member State concerned should be conditional upon the Member State transferring its yearly contribution to the Stabilisation Support Fund. Payment of interest rate subsidies should be conditional upon the availability of sufficient means in the Stabilisation Support Fund, without exceptions, as the risk of moral hazard and permanent transfers.
of sufficient means in the Stabilisation Support Fund. Payment of interest rate subsidies from the Stabilisation Support Fund would be postponed in case the interest rate subsidy to a specific Member State would exceed 30 percent of the available means in the Stabilisation Support Fund at the moment when such payment is due. Should remain limited. Payment of interest rate subsidies should be strictly conditional upon the availability of sufficient means in the Stabilisation Support Fund, as payments through other funds cannot be guaranteed and would increase the risk of moral hazard. Payment of interest rate subsidies from the Stabilisation Support Fund would be postponed in case the interest rate subsidy to a specific Member State would exceed 20 percent of the available means in the Stabilisation Support Fund at the moment when such payment is due.

Amendment 175
Philippe Lamberts, Jordi Solé
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 28

Text proposed by the Commission

(28) After that intergovernmental agreement has entered into force, payment of the interest rate subsidy to the Member State concerned should be conditional upon the Member State transferring its yearly contribution to the Stabilisation Support Fund. Payment of interest rate subsidies should be conditional upon the availability of sufficient means in the Stabilisation Support Fund. Payment of interest rate subsidies from the Stabilisation Support Fund would be postponed in case the interest rate subsidy to a specific Member State would exceed 30 percent of the available means in the Stabilisation Support Fund at the moment when such payment is due.

Amendment

(28) Grants and Payment of interest rate subsidies should be conditional upon the availability of sufficient means in the Stabilisation Support Fund. Grants and Payment of interest rates subsidies from the Stabilisation Support Fund would be postponed in case such amounts allocated to a specific Member State would exceed 30 percent of the available means in the Stabilisation Support Fund at the moment when such payment is due.
Amendment 176
Bernd Lucke

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 29

Text proposed by the Commission

(29) The Commission should be in charge for managing the assets of the Stabilisation Support Fund in a safe and prudent manner.

Amendment

(29) Under no means should the Commission be in charge for managing the assets of the Stabilisation Support Fund.

Or. en

Amendment 177
Bernd Lucke

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 30

Text proposed by the Commission

(30) In order to increase the impact of public investment and potential EISF support the quality of Member States' public investment systems and practices should be ensured and where appropriate strengthened. An assessment by the Commission should be carried out regularly and take the form of a report and if warranted contain recommendations to improve the quality of public investment systems and practices in Member States. A Member State could request technical assistance from Commission. The latter could undertake technical missions.

Amendment

(30) For its public investment, a Member State may request technical assistance from Commission. The latter could undertake technical missions.

Or. en

Amendment 178
Xabier Benito Ziluaga

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 30

Text proposed by the Commission

(30) In order to increase the impact of public investment and potential EISF support the quality of Member States’ public investment systems and practices should be ensured and where appropriate strengthened. An assessment by the Commission should be carried out regularly and take the form of a report and if warranted contain recommendations to improve the quality of public investment systems and practices in Member States. A Member State could request technical assistance from Commission. The latter could undertake technical missions.

Amendment

(30) In order to increase the impact of public investment and potential EISF support the quality of Member States’ public investment systems and practices should be ensured and where appropriate strengthened. An assessment by the Commission should be carried out regularly and take the form of a report and if warranted contain recommendations to improve the quality of public investment systems and practices in Member States. A Member State could request technical assistance from Commission. The latter could undertake technical missions. At any rate, within the macroeconomic parameters consistent with boosting investments, ensuring coherence and complementarity between them in programmes with a holistic approach and a medium-term perspective, technical assistance may only put forward suggestions since the economic sovereignty of the requesting country must be respected.

Or. es

Justification

Technical advice should contribute to increasing European synergies and quality of investment, but technical assistance should not impinge upon the economic sovereignty of the Member State.

Amendment 179
Eider Gardiazabal Rubial, Jonás Fernández, Agnes Jongerius, Luigi Morgano, Roberto Gualtieri

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 30

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

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In order to increase the impact of public investment and potential EISF support the quality of Member States’ public investment systems and practices should be ensured and where appropriate strengthened. An assessment by the Commission should be carried out regularly and take the form of a report and if warranted contain recommendations to improve the quality of public investment systems and practices in Member States. A Member State could request technical assistance from Commission. The latter could undertake technical missions.

Amendment 180
Xabier Benito Ziluaga

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 30 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(30a) In order to give the automatic stabilisation programme coherence, it would appear necessary to operate both in countries affected negatively by asymmetric shocks and in those that benefit. Thus, along with setting criteria for boosting public investment in peripheral countries experiencing asymmetric shocks, which are the result of a balance of payments deficit, it will be necessary to establish ways to ensure that the countries with surpluses carry out measures to correct their surpluses, such as establishing an indicator for automatically increasing real wages.

Justification

We propose a compensatory criterion in the shape of indicators that address the underlying
issue, in order to guide the automatic referencing for the planned shock-absorption mechanism. Investment in the periphery will improve the preconditions for development and the balance of payments of countries with a deficit, and an increase in real wages in countries with a surplus will boost domestic demand and imports, thus reducing external surpluses.

Amendment 181
Siegfried Mureşan, Dariusz Rosati, Gunnar Hökmark

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 31

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(31) In order to determine the rules for the involvement of the ESM or its legal successor in providing financial assistance in parallel to the Commission in support of public investment, the power to adopt acts in accordance with Article 290 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union should be delegated to the Commission in respect of the exchange of relevant information as regards the EISF loan, the impact of the ESM’s involvement for calculating the amount of EISF support, and the granting of an interest rate subsidy by the Stabilisation Support Fund to the Member State for costs incurred on ESM financial assistance. The Commission should also be empowered to adopt delegated acts determining the percentage in the formula for calculating the interest rate subsidy, the detailed rules for the administration of the Stabilisation Support Fund and the general principles and criteria for its investment strategy. It is of particular importance that the Commission carry out appropriate consultations during its preparatory work, including at expert level, and that those consultations be conducted in accordance with the principles laid down in the Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-Making of 13 April 2016. In particular, to ensure equal participation in the preparation of delegated acts, the
European Parliament and the Council receive all documents at the same time as Member States' experts, and their experts systematically have access to meetings of Commission expert groups dealing with the preparation of delegated acts.

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14 OJ L 231, 12.5.2016, p. 1

Or. en

Amendment 182
Bernd Lucke

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 31

Text proposed by the Commission

(31) In order to determine the rules for the involvement of the ESM or its legal successor in providing financial assistance in parallel to the Commission in support of public investment, the power to adopt acts in accordance with Article 290 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union should be delegated to the Commission in respect of the exchange of relevant information as regards the EISF loan, the impact of the ESM's involvement for calculating the amount of EISF support, and the granting of an interest rate subsidy by the Stabilisation Support Fund to the Member State for costs incurred on ESM financial assistance. The Commission should also be empowered to adopt delegated acts determining the percentage in the formula for calculating the interest rate subsidy, the detailed rules for the administration of the Stabilisation Support Fund and the general principles and criteria for its investment strategy. It is of particular importance that the Commission carry out appropriate consultations during its preparatory work, including at expert
level, and that those consultations be conducted in accordance with the principles laid down in the Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-Making of 13 April 2016\textsuperscript{14}. In particular, to ensure equal participation in the preparation of delegated acts, the European Parliament and the Council receive all documents at the same time as Member States' experts, and their experts systematically have access to meetings of Commission expert groups dealing with the preparation of delegated acts.

\textsuperscript{14} OJ L 231, 12.5.2016, p. 1

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Amendment 183
Marco Valli, Laura Agea

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 31

\textit{Text proposed by the Commission} \hspace{1cm} \textbf{Amendment}

\textbf{(31)} In order to determine the rules for the involvement of the ESM or its legal successor in providing financial assistance in parallel to the Commission in support of public investment, the power to adopt acts in accordance with Article 290 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union should be delegated to the Commission in respect of the exchange of relevant information as regards the EISF loan, the impact of the ESM's involvement for calculating the amount of EISF support, and the granting of an interest rate subsidy by the Stabilisation Support Fund to the Member State for costs incurred on ESM financial assistance. The Commission should also be empowered to adopt delegated acts determining the percentage in the formula for calculating the interest rate subsidy, deleted
the detailed rules for the administration of the Stabilisation Support Fund and the general principles and criteria for its investment strategy. It is of particular importance that the Commission carry out appropriate consultations during its preparatory work, including at expert level, and that those consultations be conducted in accordance with the principles laid down in the Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-Making of 13 April 2016. In particular, to ensure equal participation in the preparation of delegated acts, the European Parliament and the Council receive all documents at the same time as Member States' experts, and their experts systematically have access to meetings of Commission expert groups dealing with the preparation of delegated acts.

\[14\] OJ L 231, 12.5.2016, p. 1

Amendment 184
Philippe Lamberts, Jordi Solé on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 31

Text proposed by the Commission

(31) In order to determine the rules for the involvement of the ESM or its legal successor in providing financial assistance in parallel to the Commission in support of public investment, the power to adopt acts in accordance with Article 290 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union should be delegated to the Commission in respect of the exchange of relevant information as regards the EISF loan, the impact of the ESM's involvement for calculating the amount of EISF support,

Amendment

(31) In order to determine the rules for the involvement of the ESM or its legal successor in providing financial assistance in parallel to the Commission in support of public investment, the power to adopt acts in accordance with Article 290 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union should be delegated to the Commission in respect of the exchange of relevant information as regards the EISF support, the impact of the ESM's involvement for calculating the amount of
and the granting of an interest rate subsidy by the Stabilisation Support Fund to the Member State for costs incurred on ESM financial assistance. The Commission should also be empowered to adopt delegated acts determining the percentage in the formula for calculating the interest rate subsidy, the detailed rules for the administration of the Stabilisation Support Fund and the general principles and criteria for its investment strategy. It is of particular importance that the Commission carry out appropriate consultations during its preparatory work, including at expert level, and that those consultations be conducted in accordance with the principles laid down in the Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-Making of 13 April 2016. In particular, to ensure equal participation in the preparation of delegated acts, the European Parliament and the Council receive all documents at the same time as Member States' experts, and their experts systematically have access to meetings of Commission expert groups dealing with the preparation of delegated acts.

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Or. en

Amendment 185
Bernd Lucke

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 32

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(32) Pursuant to paragraph 22 and 23 of the Inter-institutional agreement for Better Law-Making of 13 April 2016, there is a need to evaluate this Regulation in order in particular to assess its effectiveness, its contribution to the
conduct of economic policies in Member States and the Union's strategy for jobs and growth, and to determine possible further developments that are needed in order to create an insurance mechanism serving the purpose of macro-economic stabilisation. This will be done on the basis of information collected through specific monitoring requirements, while avoiding overregulation and administrative burdens, in particular on Member States. These requirements, where appropriate, can include measurable indicators, as a basis for evaluating the effects of the Regulation on the ground.

Or. en

Amendment 186
Philippe Lamberts, Jordi Solé
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 32

Text proposed by the Commission

(32) Pursuant to paragraph 22 and 23 of the Inter-institutional agreement for Better Law-Making of 13 April 2016, there is a need to evaluate this Regulation in order in particular to assess its effectiveness, its contribution to the conduct of economic policies in Member States and the Union's strategy for jobs and growth, and to determine possible further developments that are needed in order to create an insurance mechanism serving the purpose of macro-economic stabilisation. This will be done on the basis of information collected through specific monitoring requirements, while avoiding overregulation and administrative burdens, in particular on Member States. These requirements, where appropriate, can include measurable indicators, as a basis for evaluating the effects of the Regulation on the ground.

Amendment

(32) Pursuant to paragraph 22 and 23 of the Inter-institutional agreement for Better Law-Making of 13 April 2016, there is a need to evaluate this Regulation in order in particular to assess its effectiveness, its contribution to the conduct of economic policies in Member States and the Union's strategy for jobs and growth, and to determine further developments that are needed in order to create a fully-fledged insurance mechanism serving the purpose of macro-economic stabilisation. This will be done on the basis of information collected through specific monitoring requirements, while avoiding overregulation and administrative burdens, in particular on Member States. These requirements, where appropriate, can include measurable indicators, as a basis for evaluating the effects of the Regulation on the ground.
for evaluating the effects of the Regulation on the ground.

Amendment 187
Markus Ferber

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 33

Text proposed by the Commission

(33) EISF should be considered as a first step in the development over time of a fully-fledged insurance mechanism to cater for macro-economic stabilisation. Currently, EISF would be based on loans and granting of interest rate subsidies. In parallel, it is not excluded that the ESM or its legal successor would be involved in the future by providing financial assistance to Member States whose currency is the euro facing adverse economic conditions in support of public investment. Moreover, a voluntary insurance mechanism with a borrowing capacity based on voluntary contributions by Member States could be set up in the future to provide for a powerful instrument for the purpose of macro-economic stabilisation against asymmetric shocks.

Or. en

Amendment 188
Bernd Lucke

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 33

Text proposed by the Commission

(33) EISF should be considered as a first step in the development over time of a fully-fledged insurance mechanism to cater for macro-economic stabilisation. Currently, EISF would be based on loans and granting of interest rate subsidies. In parallel, it is not excluded that the ESM or its legal successor would be involved in the future by providing financial assistance to Member States whose currency is the euro facing adverse economic conditions in support of public investment. Moreover, a voluntary insurance mechanism with a borrowing capacity based on voluntary contributions by Member States could be set up in the future to provide for a powerful instrument for the purpose of macro-economic stabilisation against asymmetric shocks.

Or. en
EISF should be considered as a first step in the development over time of a fully-fledged insurance mechanism to cater for macro-economic stabilisation. Currently, EISF would be based on loans and granting of interest rate subsidies. In parallel, it is not excluded that the ESM or its legal successor would be involved in the future by providing financial assistance to Member States whose currency is the euro facing adverse economic conditions in support of public investment. Moreover, a voluntary insurance mechanism with a borrowing capacity based on voluntary contributions by Member States could be set up in the future to provide for a powerful instrument for the purpose of macro-economic stabilisation against asymmetric shocks.

Amendment 189
Siegfried Mureşan, Dariusz Rosati, Gunnar Hökmark

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 33

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

EISF should be considered as a first step in the development over time of a fully-fledged insurance mechanism to cater for macro-economic stabilisation. Currently, EISF would be based on loans and granting of interest rate subsidies. In parallel, it is not excluded that the ESM or its legal successor would be involved in the future by providing financial assistance to Member States whose currency is the euro facing adverse economic conditions in support of public investment. Moreover, a voluntary insurance mechanism with a borrowing capacity based on voluntary contributions by Member States could be set up in the future to provide for a powerful instrument for the purpose of macro-economic stabilisation against asymmetric shocks.
future to provide for a powerful instrument for the purpose of macro-economic stabilisation against asymmetric shocks.

Amendment 190
Marco Valli, Laura Agea

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 33

Text proposed by the Commission

(33) EISF should be considered as a first step in the development over time of a fully-fledged insurance mechanism to cater for macro-economic stabilisation. Currently, EISF would be based on loans and granting of interest rate subsidies. In parallel, it is not excluded that the ESM or its legal successor would be involved in the future by providing financial assistance to Member States whose currency is the euro facing adverse economic conditions in support of public investment. Moreover, a voluntary insurance mechanism with a borrowing capacity based on voluntary contributions by Member States could be set up in the future to provide for a powerful instrument for the purpose of macro-economic stabilisation against asymmetric shocks.

Amendment

(33) EISF should be considered as a first step in the development over time of a fully-fledged stabilisation mechanism to cater for macro-economic rebalancing within the Euro area. Currently, EISF would be based on loans and granting of interest rate subsidies to support public investments.

Amendment 191
Jakob von Weizsäcker

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 33
Text proposed by the Commission

(33) EISF should be considered as a first step in the development over time of a fully-fledged insurance mechanism to cater for macro-economic stabilisation. Currently, EISF would be based on loans and granting of interest rate subsidies. In parallel, it is not excluded that the ESM or its legal successor would be involved in the future by providing financial assistance to Member States whose currency is the euro facing adverse economic conditions in support of public investment. **Moreover, a voluntary insurance mechanism with a borrowing capacity based on voluntary contributions by Member States could be set up in the future to provide for a powerful instrument for the purpose of macro-economic stabilisation against asymmetric shocks.**

Amendment

(33) EISF should be considered as a first step in the development over time of a fully-fledged insurance mechanism to cater for macro-economic stabilisation. Currently, EISF would be based on loans and granting of interest rate subsidies. In parallel, it is not excluded that the ESM or its legal successor would be involved in the future by providing financial assistance to Member States whose currency is the euro facing adverse economic conditions in support of public investment. **In addition, a European Unemployment Re-Insurance Scheme should be set up in the future, combining self-insurance at the national level with reinsurance against large shocks in order to help weather future crises in a predictable and incentive compatible manner.**

Or. en

Amendment 192
Eider Gardiazabal Rubial, Jonás Fernández, Agnes Jongerius, Roberto Gualtieri, Luigi Morgano

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 33

Text proposed by the Commission

(33) **EISF** should be considered as a first step in the development over time of a fully-fledged insurance mechanism to cater for macro-economic stabilisation. Currently, **EISF** would be based on loans and granting of interest rate subsidies. In parallel, **it is not excluded that** the ESM or its legal successor **would be involved** in the future by providing financial assistance to Member States whose currency is the euro facing adverse economic conditions in support of public investment. Moreover, **a voluntary insurance mechanism with a borrowing capacity based on voluntary**

Amendment

(33) **EPS** should be considered as a first step in the development over time of a fully-fledged insurance mechanism to cater for macro-economic stabilisation. Currently, **EPS** would be based on loans and granting of interest rate subsidies. In parallel, the ESM or its legal successor **should in the future become the backstop for the EPS** by providing financial assistance to Member States whose currency is the euro facing adverse economic conditions in support of public investment. Moreover, **an insurance mechanism with a borrowing capacity**
contributions by Member States could be set up in the future to provide for a powerful instrument for the purpose of macro-economic stabilisation against asymmetric shocks.

Amendment 193
Philippe Lamberts, Jordi Solé
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 33

Text proposed by the Commission

(33) EISF should be considered as a first step in the development over time of a fully-fledged insurance mechanism to cater for macro-economic stabilisation. Currently, EISF would be based on loans and granting of interest rate subsidies. In parallel, it is not excluded that the ESM or its legal successor would be involved in the future by providing financial assistance to Member States whose currency is the euro facing adverse economic conditions in support of public investment. Moreover, a voluntary insurance mechanism with a borrowing capacity based on voluntary contributions by Member States could be set up in the future to provide for a powerful instrument for the purpose of macro-economic stabilisation against asymmetric shocks.

Amendment

(33) EISF should be considered as a first step in the development over time of a fully-fledged insurance mechanism to cater for macro-economic stabilisation. Currently, EISF would be based on grants and loans providing interest rate subsidies. In parallel, it is not excluded that the ESM or its legal successor would be involved in the future by providing financial assistance to Member States whose currency is the euro facing adverse economic conditions in support of public investment. Moreover, a fully-fledged insurance mechanism with a borrowing capacity based on contributions by Member States should be set up in the future to provide for a powerful instrument for the purpose of macro-economic stabilisation against asymmetric shocks.

Amendment 194
Marco Valli, Laura Agea

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 33 a (new)
(33a) Financial assistance should also be provided in order to support automatic stabilisers by means of an unemployment insurance scheme. In addition, a Euro area macro-economic rebalancing mechanism, based on contributions by Member States with current account surpluses in excess of 4% of national GDP, should be established to provide for a powerful instrument for the purpose of offsetting losses in competitiveness through public investments and addressing asymmetric shocks arising from macroeconomic imbalances.

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 35

Text proposed by the Commission

(35) Horizontal financial rules adopted by the European Parliament and the Council on the basis of Article 322 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union apply to this Regulation. These rules are laid down in the Financial Regulation and determine in particular the procedure for establishing and implementing the budget through grants, procurement, prizes, indirect implementation, and provide for checks on the responsibility of financial actors. Rules adopted on the basis of Article 322 TFEU also concern the protection of the Union's budget in case of generalised deficiencies as regards the rule of law in the Member States, as the respect for the rule of law is an essential precondition for sound financial management and effective EU funding.

Or. en
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 36

Text proposed by the Commission

(36) Since the objective of this Regulation, namely setting up a European Investment Stabilisation Function to absorb large asymmetric shocks which risk imperilling economic and social cohesion cannot be sufficiently achieved by Member States due to the architecture of the EMU with a centralised monetary policy but national fiscal policies, but can rather, by reason of the scale of action required be better achieved at the Union level, the Union may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union. In accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in that Article, this Regulation does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve those objectives,

Amendment 197
Eider Gardiazabal Rubial, Jonás Fernández, Agnes Jongerius

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 36

Text proposed by the Commission

(36) Since the objective of this Regulation, namely setting up a European Investment Stabilisation Function to absorb large asymmetric shocks which risk
imperilling economic and social cohesion cannot be sufficiently achieved by Member States due to the architecture of the EMU with a centralised monetary policy but national fiscal policies, but can rather, by reason of the scale of action required be better achieved at the Union level, the Union may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union. In accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in that Article, this Regulation does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve those objectives,

asymmetric shocks which risk imperilling economic and social cohesion cannot be sufficiently achieved by Member States due to the architecture of the EMU with a centralised monetary policy but national fiscal policies, but can rather, by reason of the scale of action required be better achieved at the Union level, the Union may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union. In accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in that Article, this Regulation does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve those objectives,

Or. en

Amendment 198
Eider Gardiazabal Rubial, Roberto Gualtieri, Jonás Fernández, Agnes Jongerius, Luigi Morgano

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1

Text proposed by the Commission

1. This Regulation establishes a European Investment Stabilisation Function (EISF).

Amendment

1. This Regulation establishes a European Investment and Employment Stabilisation Function: the European Protection Scheme (EPS)

Or. en

Amendment 199
Marco Valli, Laura Agea

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1

Text proposed by the Commission

1. This Regulation establishes a European Investment Stabilisation

Amendment

1. This Regulation establishes a European Investment Stabilisation
Amendment 200
Xabier Benito Ziluaga

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 2

**Text proposed by the Commission**

2. **The EISF shall provide financial assistance in the form of loans and interest rate subsidies for public investment to a Member State which is experiencing a large asymmetric shock.**

**Amendment**

2. **The EISF shall provide financial assistance in the form of automatic transfers of funds, loans and interest rate subsidies for public investment to a Member State which is experiencing a large asymmetric shock.**

**Or. en**

*Justification*

The mechanism should allow internal transfers – justified in light of shocks – that may take different formats, not only loans but also subsidies for specific purposes or the above-mentioned interest rate subsidies.

Amendment 201
Eider Gardiazabal Rubial, Jonás Fernández, Agnes Jongerius, Luigi Morgano

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 2

**Text proposed by the Commission**

2. **The EISF shall provide financial assistance in the form of loans and interest rate subsidies for public investment to a Member State which is experiencing a large asymmetric shock.**

**Amendment**

2. **The EPS shall provide swift financial assistance for public investment and national unemployment schemes to a Member State which is experiencing a large symmetric or asymmetric shock.**

**Or. en**
Amendment 202
Bernd Lucke

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 2

Text proposed by the Commission

2. The EISF shall provide financial assistance in the form of loans and interest rate subsidies for public investment to a Member State which is experiencing a large asymmetric shock.

Amendment

2. The EISF shall provide financial assistance in the form of loans for public investment to a Member State which is experiencing a large asymmetric shock, provided the public investment projects have a clearly identified European added value.

Or. en

Amendment 203
Pervenche Berès, Reimer Böge

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 2

Text proposed by the Commission

2. The EISF shall provide financial assistance in the form of loans and interest rate subsidies for public investment to a Member State which is experiencing a large asymmetric shock.

Amendment

2. The EISF shall provide swift financial assistance in the form of loans and interest rate subsidies for public investment and a reinsurance unemployment scheme to a Member State which is experiencing a large asymmetric shock.

Or. en

Amendment 204
Marco Valli, Laura Agea

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 2

Text proposed by the Commission

2. The EISF shall provide financial

Amendment

2. The EISF shall provide swift
assistance in the form of loans and interest rate subsidies for public investment to a Member State which is experiencing a large asymmetric shock.

financial assistance in the form of loans and interest rate subsidies for public investment to a Member State whose currency is the euro which is experiencing a large asymmetric shock.

Or. en

Amendment 205
Wolf Klinz, Caroline Nagtegaal, Lieve Wierinck

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 2

*Text proposed by the Commission*

2. The EISF shall provide financial assistance in the form of loans and interest rate subsidies for public investment to a Member State which is experiencing a large asymmetric shock.

*Amendment*

2. The EISF shall provide, based on strict conditionality, financial assistance in the form of loans and interest rate subsidies for public investment to a Member State which is experiencing a large asymmetric shock.

Or. en

Amendment 206
Ramon Tremosa i Balcells

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 2

*Text proposed by the Commission*

2. The EISF shall provide financial assistance in the form of loans and interest rate subsidies for public investment to a Member State which is experiencing a large asymmetric shock.

*Amendment*

2. The EISF shall provide financial assistance in the form of loans and interest rate subsidies for public investment to a Member State which is experiencing a large asymmetric shock, based on conditionality.

Or. en

Amendment 207

PE630.417v01-00 98/117 AM\1168421EN.docx
Jonás Fernández, Eider Gardiazabal Rubial, Ramón Jáuregui Atondo, Manuel dos Santos

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 2

Text proposed by the Commission

2. The EISF shall provide financial assistance in the form of loans and interest rate subsidies for public investment to a Member State which is experiencing a large asymmetric shock.

Amendment

2. The EPS shall provide financial assistance in the form of loans and interest rate subsidies for public investment and national unemployment schemes to a Member State which is experiencing an asymmetric shock.

Or. en

Amendment 208
Philippe Lamberts, Jordi Solé
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 2

Text proposed by the Commission

2. The EISF shall provide financial assistance in the form of loans and interest rate subsidies for public investment to a Member State which is experiencing a large asymmetric shock.

Amendment

2. The EISF shall provide financial assistance in the form of loans, grants and interest rate subsidies for public investment to a Member State which is experiencing a large asymmetric shock.

Or. en

Amendment 209
Stanisław Ożóg, Zbigniew Kuźmiuk

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 3

Text proposed by the Commission

3. EISF support shall be available for Member States whose currency is the euro and for other Member States that

Amendment

3. EISF support shall be available for all Member States on a voluntary basis.
participate in the exchange rate mechanism referred to in Article 140(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

Amendment 210
Bernd Lucke

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 3

Text proposed by the Commission

3. EISF support shall be available for Member States whose currency is the euro and for other Member States that participate in the exchange rate mechanism referred to in Article 140(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

Amendment

3. EISF support shall be available for all Member States.

Or. pl

Amendment 211
Marco Valli, Laura Agea

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 3

Text proposed by the Commission

3. EISF support shall be available for Member States whose currency is the euro and for other Member States that participate in the exchange rate mechanism referred to in Article 140(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

Amendment

3. EISF support shall be available for Member States whose currency is the euro.

Or. en
Amendment 212
Jonás Fernández, Eider Gardiazabal Rubial, Agnes Jongerius, Luigi Morgano

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 3

Text proposed by the Commission
3. EISF support shall be available for Member States whose currency is the euro and for other Member States that participate in the exchange rate mechanism referred to in Article 140(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

Amendment
3. EPS support shall be available for Member States whose currency is the euro and for other Member States that participate in the exchange rate mechanism referred to in Article 140(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

Or. en

Amendment 213
Philippe Lamberts, Jordi Solé
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Text proposed by the Commission

(1) 'agreement' means the intergovernmental agreement concluded between all Member States whose currency is the euro and other Member States that participate in the exchange rate mechanism (ERM II) determining the calculation and the transfer of their financial contributions to the Stabilisation Support Fund;

Amendment
deleted

Or. en

Amendment 214
Stanisław Ożóg, Zbigniew Kuźmiuk

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Text proposed by the Commission

(1) ‘agreement’ means the intergovernmental agreement concluded between all Member States whose currency is the euro and other Member States that participate in the exchange rate mechanism (ERM II) determining the calculation and the transfer of their financial contributions to the Stabilisation Support Fund;

Amendment

(1) ‘agreement’ means the intergovernmental agreement concluded between the Member States determining the calculation and the transfer of their financial contributions to the Stabilisation Support Fund;

Or. pl

Amendment 215
Marco Valli, Laura Agea

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Text proposed by the Commission

(1) ‘agreement’ means the intergovernmental agreement concluded between all Member States whose currency is the euro and other Member States that participate in the exchange rate mechanism (ERM II) determining the calculation and the transfer of their financial contributions to the Stabilisation Support Fund;

Amendment

(1) ‘agreement’ means the intergovernmental agreement concluded between all Member States whose currency is the euro determining the calculation and the transfer of their financial contributions to the Stabilisation Support Fund;

Or. en

Amendment 216
Pervenche Berès, Reimer Böge

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 1

Text proposed by the Commission

(1) ‘agreement’ means the intergovernmental agreement concluded between all Member States whose currency is the euro and other Member States that

Amendment

(1) ‘agreement’ means the intergovernmental agreement concluded between all Member States whose currency is the euro and other Member States that
participate in the exchange rate mechanism (ERM II) determining the calculation and the transfer of their financial contributions to the Stabilisation Support Fund;

Or. en

Amendment 217
Bernd Lucke

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 3

Text proposed by the Commission

(3) 'eligible public investment' means:
(a) the public investment in support of policy objectives as defined in Regulation (EU) No [XX] of [XX] [insert reference to new Common Provisions Regulation]16 and
(b) any expenditure in areas of education and training as defined in Annex A to Regulation (EU) No 549/2013 and not covered in point (a);

16 [Insert correct reference to new version of Common Provisions Regulation]

Amendment

(3) 'eligible public investment' means:
the public investment in support of policy objectives as defined in Regulation (EU) No [XX] of [XX] [insert reference to new Common Provisions Regulation]16 and shown to have a clearly identified European added value.

16 [Insert correct reference to new version of Common Provisions Regulation]

Or. en

Amendment 218
Philippe Lamberts, Jordi Solé
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 3

Text proposed by the Commission

(3) 'eligible public investment' means:
(a) the public investment in support of policy objectives as defined in Regulation (EU) No [XX] of [XX] [insert reference to

Amendment

(3) 'eligible public investment' means:
(a) the public investment in support of policy objectives as defined in Regulation (EU) No [XX] of [XX] [insert reference to
new Common Provisions Regulation]\(^{16}\) and (b) any expenditure in areas of education and training as defined in Annex A to Regulation (EU) No 549/2013 and not covered in point (a);

\[\text{new Common Provisions Regulation}]^{16}\] which finances a sustainable activity as provided for in Regulation No [XX] of [insert reference to the Taxonomy] and (b) and in so far not covered by point a, any expenditure in areas:

(i) of education, research and training as defined in Annex A to Regulation (EU) No 549/2013 and (ii) in energy efficiency, especially those aiming at fighting against energy poverty as defined in Regulation (EU) No XXX on the Governance of the Energy Union\(^{1a}\).

\(^{16}\) [Insert correct reference to new version of Common Provisions Regulation]

\(^{1a}\) https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52016PC0759R(01)&from=EN

Amendment 219
Marco Valli, Laura Agea

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 3

Text proposed by the Commission

(3) 'eligible public investment' means:

(a) the public investment in support of policy objectives as defined in Regulation (EU) No [XX] of [XX] [insert reference to new Common Provisions Regulation]\(^{16}\) and (b) any expenditure in areas of education and training as defined in Annex A to Regulation (EU) No 549/2013 and not covered in point (a);

Amendment

(3) 'eligible public investment' means:

(a) the public investment in support of policy objectives as defined in Regulation (EU) No [XX] of [XX] [insert reference to new Common Provisions Regulation]\(^{16}\) and (b) any expenditure in areas of research and development, public health, education and training as defined in Annex A to Regulation (EU) No 549/2013 and not covered in point (a);

\(^{16}\) [Insert correct reference to new version of Common Provisions Regulation]

Amendment 220
Ramon Tremosa i Balcells

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 3

Text proposed by the Commission  
(3) ’eligible public investment’ means:
(a) the public investment in support of policy objectives as defined in Regulation (EU) No [XX] of [XX] [insert reference to new Common Provisions Regulation]\(^\text{16}\) and (b) any expenditure in areas of education and training as defined in Annex A to Regulation (EU) No 549/2013 and not covered in point (a);

\(^{16}\) [Insert correct reference to new version of Common Provisions Regulation]

Amendment
(3) ’eligible public investment’ means:
(a) the public investment in support of policy objectives as defined in Regulation (EU) No [XX] of [XX] [insert reference to new Common Provisions Regulation]\(^\text{16}\) and (b) any expenditure in areas of education, research and development, and training as defined in Annex A to Regulation (EU) No 549/2013 and not covered in point (a);

\(^{16}\) [Insert correct reference to new version of Common Provisions Regulation]

Amendment 221
Eider Gardiazabal Rubial, Jonás Fernández, Manuel dos Santos, Agnes Jongerius

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 3 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

(3a) ‘unemployment financing’ means: financing for national unemployment scheme for unemployment benefits paid to unemployed persons.

Amendment

(3a) ‘unemployment financing’ means: financing for national unemployment scheme for unemployment benefits paid to unemployed persons.
Amendment 222
Ramon Tremosa i Balcells

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 3 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(3a) ‘national unemployment financing mechanism’ means: financing for unemployment benefits paid to persons in situation of unemployment

Or. en

Amendment 223
Pervenche Berès, Reimer Böge

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 3 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(3a) ‘national unemployment financing scheme’ means: financing for unemployment benefits paid to unemployed persons

Or. en

Amendment 224
Ramon Tremosa i Balcells

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 4

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

(4) 'EISF support' means Union financial assistance within the meaning of Article [220] of the Financial Regulation in the form of loans and interest rate subsidies under the EISF in support of eligible public investment and reinsurance unemployment mechanism

Or. en
Amendment 225
Pervenche Berès, Reimer Böge

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 4

Text proposed by the Commission

(4) 'EISF support’ means Union financial assistance within the meaning of Article [220] of the Financial Regulation in the form of loans and interest rate subsidies under the EISF in support of eligible public investment;

Amendment

(4) 'EISF support’ means Union financial assistance within the meaning of Article [220] of the Financial Regulation in the form of loans and interest rate subsidies under the EISF in support of eligible public investment and reinsurance unemployment scheme.

Or. en

Amendment 226
Bernd Lucke

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 4

Text proposed by the Commission

(4) 'EISF support’ means Union financial assistance within the meaning of Article [220] of the Financial Regulation in the form of loans and interest rate subsidies under the EISF in support of eligible public investment;

Amendment

(4) 'EISF support’ means Union financial assistance within the meaning of Article [220] of the Financial Regulation in the form of loans under the EISF in support of eligible public investment;

Or. en

Amendment 227
Philippe Lamberts, Jordi Solé on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 4
(4) 'EISF support' means Union financial assistance within the meaning of Article [220] of the Financial Regulation in the form of loans and interest rate subsidies under the EISF in support of eligible public investment;

(4) 'EISF support' means Union financial assistance within the meaning of Article [220] of the Financial Regulation in the form of loans, grants and interest rate subsidies under the EISF in support of eligible public investment;

Amendment 228
Eider Gardiazabal Rubial, Jonás Fernández, Agnes Jongerius, Luigi Morgano
Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 4

Text proposed by the Commission

(4) 'EISF support' means Union financial assistance within the meaning of Article [220] of the Financial Regulation in the form of loans and interest rate subsidies under the EISF in support of eligible public investment;

Amendment

(4) 'EPS support' means Union financial assistance within the meaning of Article [220] of the Financial Regulation in the form of loans and interest rate subsidies under the EPS in support of eligible public investment;

Or. en

Amendment 229
Philippe Lamberts, Jordi Solé
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group
Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 6

Text proposed by the Commission

(6) 'Union strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth' means the targets and shared objectives guiding the action of Member States and the Union set out in the Conclusions adopted by the European Council of 17 June 2010 as Annex I (New European Strategy for Jobs

Amendment

(6) 'Union strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth' means the targets and shared objectives guiding the action of Member States and the Union set out in the Conclusions adopted by the European Council of 17 June 2010 as Annex I (New European Strategy for Jobs
and Growth, EU Headline Targets), Council Recommendation (EU) 2015/1184\textsuperscript{17} on broad guidelines for the economic policies of the Member States and of the European Union of 14 July 2015 and in Council Decision (EU) 2016/1838\textsuperscript{18}, and any revision of such targets and shared objectives.\textsuperscript{17}

\textsuperscript{17} OJ L 192, 18.7.2015, p. 27
\textsuperscript{18} OJ L 280, 18.10.2016, p. 30

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Amendment 230
Martin Schirdewan

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 6 a (new)

\textit{Text proposed by the Commission}

(6a) ‘Development code’ means the commitment of a Member State regarding socio-economic convergence in matters of balanced and participative economic growth including current account balances, just taxation, labour market participation, investment, productivity, social cohesion and social inclusion and public administrative and good governance capacities within the reformed Treaties.

Or. en

Amendment 231
Bernd Lucke

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 6 a (new)
**Text proposed by the Commission**

(6a) 'asymmetric shock' means a macroeconomic event, beyond the control of a certain Group of Member States ('Member States concerned'), having large negative impact on the Member States concerned while having no significant negative impact on other Member States.

Or. en

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**Amendment 232**  
Bernd Lucke

Proposal for a regulation  
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 6 b (new)

**Text proposed by the Commission**

(6b) 'large negative impact of a shock' means a difference of more than three percentage points between two IMF forecasts for the real GDP of the calendar year which follows the year in which the shock took place, the difference being calculated between the last IMF forecast preceding the shock and the first IMF forecast after the shock.

Or. en

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**Amendment 233**  
Bernd Lucke

Proposal for a regulation  
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 6 c (new)

**Text proposed by the Commission**

(6c) 'no significant negative impact of a shock' means a difference of less than half a percentage point between two IMF forecasts for the real GDP of the calendar year which follows the year in which the shock took place.
year which follows the year in which the shock took place, the difference being calculated between the last IMF forecast preceding the shock and the first IMF forecast after the shock.

Amendment 234
Marco Valli, Laura Agea

Proposal for a regulation
Article 3

Text proposed by the Commission

Amendment

Article 3 deleted

Eligibility criteria

1. A Member State shall be eligible for EISF support where it is not subject to:

(a) a decision of the Council establishing that no effective action has been taken to correct its excessive deficit under Article 126(8) or Article 126(11) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union in the two years prior to requesting support from the EISF;

(b) a decision of the Council in accordance with Article 6(2) or Article 10 of Council Regulation (EU) No 1466/97 establishing that no effective action has been taken to address the observed significant deviation in the two years prior to requesting support from the EISF;

(c) two successive recommendations of the Council in the same imbalance procedure in accordance with Article 8(3) of Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council on grounds that the Member State concerned has submitted an insufficient corrective action plan in the two years prior to requesting support from
the EISF;

(d) two successive decisions of the Council in the same imbalance procedure in accordance with Article 10(4) of Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council having established non-compliance by the Member State concerned on grounds that it has not taken the recommended corrective action in the two years prior to requesting support from the EISF;

(e) a decision of the Council approving a macroeconomic adjustment programme within the meaning of Article 7(2) of Regulation (EU) No 472/2013;

(f) a decision of the Council implementing a medium-term financial assistance facility within the meaning of point (a) of Article 3(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No 332/200221.

2. When the agreement has entered into force, a Member State shall only be eligible for receiving an interest rate subsidy if it complies with its obligations under the agreement.

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Or. en

Justification

EISF support has specific policy goals that are not consistent with the ones related to the
economic governance framework. Access to this support should therefore not be used as a political leverage to enforce compliance with the European Semester procedures.

Amendment 235
Wolf Klinz, Caroline Nagtegaal

Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – introductory part

Text proposed by the Commission

1. A Member State shall be eligible for EISF support where it is not subject to:

Amendment

1. A Member State shall be eligible for EISF support where each of the following conditions are met:

(i) in the four years prior to the Member State’s support request, the Commission each year assessed that the Member State has effectively addressed the challenges identified in the context of the European Semester, i.e. in the country-specific recommendations and in other relevant European Semester documents officially adopted by the Commission;

(ii) in the four years prior to the Member State’s support request, the Council never established that an excessive deficit under Article 126(6) TFEU exists in the Member State;

(iii) in accordance with Article 126(2) TFEU, in the four years prior to the Member State’s support request, the ratio of government debt to gross domestic product in the Member State has been sufficiently diminishing and approaching the reference value at a satisfactory pace;

(iv) in the four years prior to the Member State’s support request, the Member State never had a sovereign debt credit rating below investment grade;

(v) the Member State is not subject to a procedure referred to Article 7(1) or 7(2) of the Treaty on European Union;

(vi) the Member State is not subject to
any of the following:

Or. en

Amendment 236
Philippe Lamberts, Jordi Solé
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – introductory part

Text proposed by the Commission  Amendment

1. A Member State shall be eligible for EISF support where it is not subject to:

1. A Member State shall be fully eligible for EISF support if it meets its annual intermediate targets in the context of the Union strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth and is not subject to:

Or. en

Amendment 237
Martin Schirdewan

Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – introductory part

Text proposed by the Commission  Amendment

1. A Member State shall be eligible for EISF support where it is not subject to:

1. A Member State shall be eligible for EISF support where it is compliant with a development code as defined in Article 2.

Or. en

Amendment 238
Eider Gardiazabal Rubial, Jonás Fernández, Agnes Jongerius, Luigi Morgano

Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
Text proposed by the Commission

1. A Member State shall be eligible for EISF support where it is not subject to:

Amendment

1. A Member State shall be eligible for EPS support where it is not subject to:

Or. en

Amendment 239
Martin Schirdewan

Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point a

Text proposed by the Commission

(a) a decision of the Council establishing that no effective action has been taken to correct its excessive deficit under Article 126(8) or Article 126(11) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union in the two years prior to requesting support from the EISF;

Amendment

deleted

Or. en

Amendment 240
Bernd Lucke

Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point a

Text proposed by the Commission

(a) a decision of the Council establishing that no effective action has been taken to correct its excessive deficit under Article 126(8) or Article 126(11) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union in the two years prior to requesting support from the EISF;

Amendment

(a) a decision of the Council establishing that no effective action has been taken to correct its excessive deficit under Article 126(8) or Article 126(11) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union in the ten years prior to requesting support from the EISF;

Or. en
Amendment 241  
Esther de Lange  

Proposal for a regulation  
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point a  

Text proposed by the Commission  

(a) a decision of the Council establishing that no effective action has been taken to correct its excessive deficit under Article 126(8) or Article 126(11) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union in the two years prior to requesting support from the EISF;  

Amendment  

(a) a decision of the Council establishing that no effective action has been taken to correct its excessive deficit under Article 126(8) or Article 126(11) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union in the five years prior to requesting support from the EISF and five years after requesting the support;  

Or. en  

Amendment 242  
Markus Ferber, Siegfried Mureșan  

Proposal for a regulation  
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point a  

Text proposed by the Commission  

(a) a decision of the Council establishing that no effective action has been taken to correct its excessive deficit under Article 126(8) or Article 126(11) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union in the two years prior to requesting support from the EISF;  

Amendment  

(a) A decision of the Council in accordance with Article 126 (6) of the TFEU establishing that an excessive deficits exists in the five years prior to requesting support from the EISF;  

Or. en  

Justification  

Member States shall only be eligible to receive support if they have a strong track record of being in compliance with the EU rules of economic governance.  

Amendment 243  
Eider Gardiazabal Rubial, Jonás Fernández, Agnes Jongerius, Luigi Morgano, Roberto
Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point a

_text proposed by the Commission_

(a) a decision of the Council establishing that no effective action has been taken to correct its excessive deficit under Article 126(8) or Article 126(11) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union in the two years prior to requesting support from the _EISF_;

_or. en_

Amendment 244
Wolf Klinz, Caroline Nagtegaal

Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point a

_text proposed by the Commission_

(a) a decision of the Council establishing that no effective action has been taken to correct its excessive deficit under Article 126(8) or Article 126(11) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union in the _two_ years prior to requesting support from the _EISF_;

_or. en_

_text proposed by the Commission_

(a) a decision of the Council establishing that no effective action has been taken to correct its excessive deficit under Article 126(8) or Article 126(11) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union in the _five_ years prior to requesting support from the _EISF_;

_or. en_