Posėdžio stenograma

Antradienis, 2005 m. liepos 5 d. - Strasbūras

31. "No-fly lists"/keleivių duomenys

  Przewodniczący. Kolejnym punktem porządku dziennego jest oświadczenie Komisji w sprawie „No-fly lists” czyli rejestru pasażerów objętych zakazem wstępu na pokład samolotów udających się do USA.

  Franco Frattini, Vice-President of the Commission. Mr President, as you know, with regard to the well-known incident with a KLM flight, the United States authorities indicated that the flight was prevented from entering US airspace after two passengers were identified from advance passenger information – API data. API data is essentially passport and ticket information collected at check-in to speed up immigration controls at the destination. The transfer of API data by airlines prior to arrival at the point of destination constitutes normal airline practice. According to the information available to the Commission, air carriers only send API information to border control authorities. That information is not retrieved by the US authorities from computer reservation systems. The Commission also wishes to clarify once again that the passengers concerned could not be identified on the basis of passenger name record – PNR – data. That instrument does not cover flights overflying the United States, but only flights from a! nd to the United States. As such, it is not relevant with regard to cases such as the KLM incident.

In the Commission’s view, the use of API data by the United States authorities does not seem to constitute a circumvention of the PNR agreement. The Commission will be particularly attentive to any circumvention of the agreement and will raise this issue in the framework of the joint review. The Commission wishes to underline that there is no current requirement for air carriers to provide the US with API data on passengers for over-flights. The no-fly list is drawn up by the US authorities and contains the names of people they do not wish to fly into the US on the basis of US intelligence and risk-threat assessment criteria. It is produced by the United States and that country alone is responsible for it. The European Union has a rigorous policy on aviation security, but that does not include a no-fly list.

In the Commission’s view, a no-fly list does not mean that the people included are necessarily suspected of any wrongdoing. The United States simply decided that it does not want them to enter the country for various reasons, based on a number of rather general criteria.

It is, of course, very annoying for somebody to be denied access to the United States because his or her name is on the no-fly list. In this regard, the Commission will seek clarification of the US no-fly list in its talks with the United States. For example, the early and effective forwarding to airlines of an up-to-date no-fly list is an essential aspect. The Commission is, therefore, seeking to better clarify these criteria with the American authorities, in order to prevent future cases of false positives.

Since the start of the US-EU talks in March 2003, the Commission has been able to secure from the United States the undertaking that the American Congress would require the appointment of a chief privacy officer within the Department of Homeland Security who has to report annually to Congress and whose findings are binding on the department. The chief privacy officer has agreed to receive and handle in an expedited manner cases lodged by data protection authorities in the European Union on behalf of citizens who consider that their complaints have not been satisfactorily addressed by the Department of Homeland Security. So the EU citizen has stronger assurance of fair treatment.

As regards the joint review of the United States Undertakings, the latter provide for a joint review of their implementation, to be conducted by the United States authorities and the Commission, the latter assisted by representatives of European law enforcement authorities and data protection supervisors. The joint review will take place after the summer break, presumably in September. The review aims to provide a clear picture of the way the Undertakings function. It is the Commission’s intention to inform this Parliament of the outcome of this joint review and any important developments.

Finally, national data protection authorities will be part of the Commission-led team conducting the joint review. This should allow the national data protection authorities, the so-called Article 29 Working Party, to assess fully the implementation of the Undertakings. I am pleased to tell you that despite differences in view of the United States PNR package, there is excellent cooperation on the implementation of this package between the Article 29 Working Party and the Commission, and this cooperation will continue.

  Georg Jarzembowski, im Namen der PPE-DE-Fraktion. – Herr Präsident, sehr verehrter Herr Kommissar! Für meine Fraktion kann ich erklären, dass Ihre Erläuterungen zu dieser Frage sehr überzeugend waren.

Lassen Sie uns einmal festhalten, dass es gut ist, dass wir eine gemeinsame Bewertung der Absprachen zu den PNR-Daten vornehmen wollen. Wir sind hier in einer schwierigen Situation. Es gilt, das Interesse eines jeden Mitgliedstaates innerhalb der Union auf der einen Seite und der USA auf der anderen Seite, am Schutz vor terroristischen Akten gegen den Schutz der Personendaten der einzelnen Bürger abzuwägen. Das ist ein schwieriger Prozess.

Ich hoffe, dass die Amerikaner auch das einhalten, was sie uns versprochen haben, nämlich dass die Daten, die wir ihnen liefern, nur zum Schutz gegen Terrorismus gesammelt und ausgewertet werden, dass sie entsprechend vernichtet werden, wenn sie nicht mehr benötigt werden, und dass wir uns gegenseitig über die Probleme der inneren Sicherheit informieren. Ich glaube schon, dass wir eine gute Chance haben, dass die Absprache zwischen der Europäischen Union und den USA zu einem Ergebnis führt, das sowohl die Datenschutzbestimmungen erfüllt als auch unsere gemeinsame Sorge in Bezug auf terroristische Angriffe mindert.

Aber lassen Sie uns einen Blick in die Zukunft werfen! Ich finde eines wichtig – und das müssen wir den Amerikanern auch immer wieder sagen: Unilaterale Sicherheitsbestimmungen mögen wie nicht, denn wir wollen unsere Bürger genau so schützen, wie die Amerikaner ihre Bürger schützen wollen. Deshalb, glaube ich, ist dieser Ansatz richtig, Herr Kommissar: Lassen Sie uns mit den USA gemeinsam die Risiken für unsere Passagiere bewerten und gemeinsame Schlussfolgerungen ziehen, so dass wir gemeinsam die Sicherheit unserer Bürger erhöhen können!

  Martine Roure, au nom du groupe PSE. – Monsieur le Président, Monsieur le Commissaire, nous vous remercions de toutes ces précisions, Monsieur le Commissaire. Force est cependant de constater que les États-Unis tentent d'imposer à l'Europe un nombre grandissant de contraintes sécuritaires et nous ne sommes toujours pas rassurés, c'est pourquoi nous nous opposons à l'accord sur le transfert aux autorités américaines, par les compagnies aériennes, des données relatives aux passagers.

En effet, la lutte contre le terrorisme doit maintenir un équilibre entre sécurité et liberté des citoyens. Or, les accords concernés sont disproportionnés au regard de leurs objectifs. On ne peut traiter tous les citoyens a priori comme des terroristes. C'est pourquoi un accord avec les États-Unis ne sera acceptable que si l'on met fin au transfert systématique des données personnelles relatives à tous les passagers.

Comme vous l'avez rappelé, Monsieur le Commissaire, un avion de la compagnie KLM à destination du Mexique a récemment été détourné à la demande des États-Unis. Cet incident a une nouvelle fois montré que les droits des citoyens européens sont bafoués. Comment les autorités américaines ont-elles pu obtenir les données relatives aux passagers de ce vol, alors que ce dernier ne se rendait pas sur leur territoire? D'ailleurs, les données relatives aux passagers ont-elles été transférées et, si tel est le cas, de quel droit l'ont-elles été? Quelles mesures précises la Commission peut-elle prendre afin de mettre absolument fin à ces pratiques, qui constituent un viol du droit communautaire, en particulier de la directive sur la protection des données? Vous avez eu un engagement, nous dites-vous. Comment pourrons-nous vérifier que cet engagement est tenu? La Commission peut-elle nous assurer que les autorités des États-Unis n'ont pas un accès illimité! aux systèmes de réservation des compagnies aériennes?

À cette vision répressive de la lutte contre le terrorisme, il est nécessaire que l'Europe oppose la sienne. Nous reconnaissons qu'une lutte efficace contre le terrorisme et la criminalité organisée implique une coopération transfrontalière renforcée mais la politique antiterroriste de l'Union européenne doit être élaborée dans le respect absolu des droits des citoyens, en particulier leur droit de circuler librement et leur droit à la protection de leur vie privée.

  Sophia in 't Veld, on behalf of the ALDE Group . – Mr President, Commissioner, this is not the first time that we meet in this House late at night to discuss issues of passenger data.

Commissioner, you mentioned the case of KLM and you reassured us that the way in which the US obtained the data was perfectly legitimate. However, like Mrs Roure, I, quite frankly, am not reassured because we never got a clear answer. In this case, the US acquired the ‘APIS’ data, which they apparently got from Mexico. Where did Mexico get the data? Was it allowed to transfer the data to the United States? Does such an agreement also apply to flights through US airspace? We would like a precise answer, not general reassurances. We were in the United States last week, discussing this issue. I have the feeling that the United States might be accessing the databases directly on the basis of the PNR Agreement.

Secondly, I would like to know about the US administration’s no-fly lists. You say that the people on those lists are not necessarily dangerous, but I still find it remarkable that the US administration considers them to be dangerous enough to deny them access to US airspace and send them back to the European Union without notifying the EU authorities; it only notifies the airlines. They are apparently considered to be dangerous in the United States but not in Europe.

As regards the annual joint review, you said that you will review issues of protection of privacy. I hope that you will also include the effectiveness of the measures in that review. The word ‘security’ has been mentioned here a number of times, but I would like to know how many crooks have been caught, how many attacks have been prevented and how many mistakes – false positives – there have been.

The joint review was supposed to take place in May. It has now been postponed until September. I understand that is because the US was unable or unwilling to provide us with the data requested. Could the Commissioner shed some light on that?

  Σταύρος Λαμπρινίδης (PSE). – Κύριε Πρόεδρε θα μιλήσω στα Ελληνικά. Είτε θα μιλήσω πάρα πολύ γρήγορα και δεν θα μεταφράζει κανείς, είτε θα μιλήσω πολύ γρήγορα είτε θα μιλήσω πιο αργά. Παρακαλώ για την ανοχή σας!

Πόσες λίστες απαγορευμένων επιβατών υπάρχουν σήμερα στην Αμερική και πώς αποφεύγονται οι λανθασμένες αναγνωρίσεις; Πόσοι και πώς προσθέτουν ονόματα στις λίστες αυτές; Με ποιους σκοπούς και πώς αποφεύγεται ο πειρασμός της χρήσης τους για άλλους σκοπούς; Πόσο ασφαλή είναι τα ονόματα και τα στοιχεία από αθέμιτη χρήση και πρόσβαση; Πόσο αποτελεσματικές τελικά είναι οι λίστες για τον εντοπισμό τρομοκρατών, όταν είναι γνωστό ότι ονόματα πιθανών τρομοκρατών δεν μπαίνουν στις λίστες καν, ώστε να μη γνωρίζουν οι αεροπορικές εταιρίες και να ! μη διαρρεύσει ότι παρακολουθούνται; Τέλος, πώς μπορεί κάποιος να δει και να διορθώσει τα στοιχεία του;

Αυτά δεν είναι δικά μου ερωτήματα. Τα έχει θέσει το ίδιο το αμερικανικό Κογκρέσο στην αμερικανική κυβέρνηση. Και αν είναι προβληματικά ερωτήματα για Αμερικάνους πολίτες είναι διπλά προβληματικά, όταν εμπλέκονται Ευρωπαίοι πολίτες. Εκεί η Επιτροπή οφείλει να απαιτήσει συνεργασία με την Αμερική και να επιχειρήσει να συνδιαμορφώσει πολιτικές που μας αφορούν.

Κύριε Επίτροπε, το Μάρτιο του 2005 το Congressional Research Service έβγαλε μία έκθεση ακριβώς γι' αυτό το θέμα. Σας πληροφορώ ότι αναφέρει ότι τα στοιχεία ΡΝR των Eυρωπαίων επιβατών θα χρησιμοποιούνται στο Secure Flight Programme, το οποίο είναι πρόγραμμα που αφορά μόνο τις εσωτερικές και όχι τις διεθνείς πτήσεις, σε αντίθεση με αυτό που είπατε. Θα σας δώσω εάν θέλετε τη σελίδα και τα στοιχεία.

Και κλείνω. Υπάρχουν τρεις μεγάλοι κίνδυνοι πλέον: Οι πολίτες να μην ελέγχουν τις αρχές αλλά οι αρχές να ελέγχουν και να παρακολουθούν τους πολίτες.

(Ο Πρόεδρος διακόπτει τον ομιλητή)

  Franco Frattini, Vicepresidente della Commissione . Signor Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, anch'io sarò estremamente rapido, ma ritengo che su determinati punti sia opportuno fare alcune considerazioni.

Nell'ambito dei colloqui con gli Stati Uniti d'America, la Commissione intende chiedere chiarezza, al fine di prevenire l'adozione di misure unilaterali che possano toccare gli interessi dei cittadini europei, ed esigere che tali misure siano essere concordate con le Istituzioni europee.

Mi riferisco in particolare alla cosiddetta no-fly list. Crediamo si tratti di un primo passo importante, in quanto attualmente la no-fly list è sotto l'esclusiva responsabilità degli Stati Uniti d'America solamente per il sorvolo del territorio degli Stati Uniti d'America.

Per quanto riguarda i voli con provenienza o destinazione europea, noi chiederemo alle compagnie aeree un avviso preventivo, in modo tale da evitare l'errore commesso in passato di iscrivere nella no-fly list persone omonime, provocando il blocco di un aereo semplicemente a causa di uno scambio di persona. Con un avvertimento preventivo alle compagnie sui dati della no-fly list, questi errori potrebbero essere evitati.

Per quanto riguarda la questione dei secure flights menzionata dall'onorevole Lambrinidis, abbiamo già avuto una discussione approfondita con le autorità americane per la sicurezza del trasporto aereo.

È con grande soddisfazione che vi annuncio che le autorità americane hanno recentemente acconsentito affinché le compagnie di trasporto aereo americane escludano i cittadini di origine europea dalla programmazione dei secure flights. In altre parole, esse si impegnano a non includere indicazioni di dati dei cittadini europei negli esperimenti che riguardano i voli interni degli Stati Uniti d'America. Si tratta di una garanzia che ci è stata data, sulla quale intendiamo comunque continuare il nostro confronto.

Non abbiamo avuto la possibilità di tenere questo incontro prima per ragioni di natura tecnica. Tuttavia, qualche settimana fa si è svolta una videoconferenza e il dialogo continuerà nell'incontro di settembre che ho annunciato prima. Da parte mia, sarò assolutamente chiaro nel pretendere il pieno rispetto della protezione dei dati personali dei cittadini europei. L'ho già espresso con chiarezza al segretario Chertoff, in occasione del nostro incontro a Sheffield qualche giorno fa, e continuerò a farlo.

  Przewodniczący. Zamykam debatę.