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Pirmadienis, 2006 m. balandžio 3 d. - Strasbūras

11. 2004 m. konkurencijos politika (diskusijos)

  Předseda. Dalším bodem je zpráva, kterou předložil Alain Lipietz za Hospodářský a měnový výbor, o zprávě Komise o politice hospodářské soutěže v roce 2004 (2005/2209(INI)) (A6-0065/2006).

  Alain Lipietz (Verts/ALE), rapporteur. – Monsieur le Président, mes chers collègues, nous avons à examiner un rapport qui, pour la première fois, acquiert une dimension politique. En effet, dans les débats des référendums de 2005 à propos de la ratification du traité constitutionnel, les notions d'espace de concurrence libre et ouverte - comme il est dit actuellement - ou non faussée - comme il aurait été dit si le traité sur la Constitution européenne avait été adopté - ont été au centre du débat.

Notre problème est aujourd'hui d'apporter la preuve que la politique de la concurrence peut être au service de la population, qu'elle doit être au service de la population, qu'elle est déjà au service de la population. Sur ce point, il existe un large consensus au sein de notre commission mais, dès l'instant qu'en tant que rapporteur, j'ai eu à souligner des cas manifestes qui demandaient un réexamen ou une réorientation de la politique de la concurrence, ou qui au contraire appelaient à encourager fortement la politique de la concurrence, des désaccords sont apparus.

Le rapport, dans son état actuel après amendement, est caractéristique des rapports du Parlement européen, que pratiquement personne ne peut ou n'a envie de lire parce qu'ils ne disent strictement rien. Je souhaite que, sur au moins trois points, il soit réaffirmé des idées fortes pour montrer à la population que les institutions européennes sont à leur service.

La politique de la concurrence se divise en trois grandes branches: la lutte contre la formation des monopoles, la lutte contre les ententes et la lutte contre les aides d'État illicites ou nuisibles à une saine concurrence non faussée. Je prendrai ces trois exemples et je vous proposerai, mes chers collègues, des idées fortes sur ces politiques.

En premier lieu, la lutte contre les monopoles: la politique de l'Union européenne a été admirable dans sa bataille contre l'abus de position dominante de Microsoft. Ma commission, la commission économique et monétaire, a choisi de ne pas soutenir la Direction générale de la concurrence dans ce combat. Je vous demande, chers collègues, de réaffirmer le soutien du Parlement européen à la Direction de la concurrence et à la Commission dans le bras de fer qu'elles mènent contre Microsoft.

En second lieu, j'aborderai la formation de ces monopoles et la lutte contre les ententes. Globalement, la Direction générale de la concurrence a été admirable. Je pense en particulier à l'affaire Vivendi/Hachette. Je crois que des fautes ont été commises en 1999 par précipitation, par inadvertance, lors de la fusion entre Rhône-Poulenc et Hoechst. Il faut essayer de comprendre d'où viennent ces erreurs. Nous n'avons pas un droit de révocation des mesures prises par la Commission et je ne le sollicite pas, mais je demande une commission d'enquête sur ce qui s'est passé pour comprendre comment des dizaines de milliers de salariés, des dizaines de milliers de petits actionnaires ont pu être ruinés faute d'un contrôle que la Commission s'était pourtant engagée à exercer.

Le troisième point sur lequel je vous demande d'intervenir et d'émettre des idées fortes concerne le domaine des aides publiques. La Direction de la concurrence et le rapport 2004 approuvent ces aides quand elles correspondent à la politique de Göteborg et à la politique de Lisbonne. Il faut la soutenir sur ce point. Quand, au contraire, la Direction de la concurrence approuve la ville de Charleroi qui subventionne largement la compagnie Ryanair, je pense qu'il faut la critiquer parce que cela fausse la concurrence entre les villes, entre les entreprises et entre les modes de transport, de façon préjudiciable à la politique de Lisbonne et Göteborg.

  Neelie Kroes, Member of the Commission. Mr President, I would like to thank the rapporteur Mr Lipietz and the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs for this report. I am aware that there are a number of points on which I have to thank the rapporteur for giving the credit to the Commission and its services.

As you note, competition policy must help drive EU competition, competitiveness and growth and, as the rapporteur mentioned, in the end it should all work in favour of the consumers – what he called the ordinary people.

I am glad that Parliament follows competition policy developments closely and proactively. Our valuable debate in February on state aid reform is a very good example. I will continue to involve you fully in policy development, even if the Treaty does not give this House a legislative role in this area.

This Parliament has also been an ardent and consistent supporter of the Commission’s work to enforce the competition rules fairly, firmly and effectively, as rightly mentioned by the rapporteur – whom I thank for that. I agree with your comments on many issues: the anti-trust reforms implemented in 2004; the coordination of the European competition network; European Competition Days; international cooperation; and of course consumer information.

On private damage actions for breach of the EC anti-trust rules, I look forward to Parliament’s review of our Green Paper. We are continuing to work on the review of Article 82 of the Treaty, on areas of importance for the information society and on the sector inquiries, where I take your point about the areas in which our methodology could be improved.

Turning to a couple of specific points touched on by the rapporteur, we have discussed Altmark at length before, and the Commission will provide guidance when adopting decisions on individual cases. I have no indication in relation to questioning the behaviour of the national competition authorities as regards national incumbents, but would remind you that, if such a case arose, the Commission can intervene and deal with the case itself.

Finally, I have two comments in response to Mr Lipietz. First, the Commission’s handling of the Hoechst/Rhône-Poulenc merger in 1999 and 2004 has been discussed at length and in detail during the committee meetings when this report was being prepared. The Commission has provided detailed responses to all the points raised. I do not think that any new factors have been brought forward. So, as far as I am concerned, that is behind us.

Secondly, the Commission decided that some of the aid granted to Ryanair at Charleroi was compatible with the common market in the context of transport policy. This concerned aid which permitted development and improved use of secondary airport infrastructure that was underused and represented a cost to society as a whole. However, I should add that the remainder of the aid was found not to be compatible and must be recovered.

  Jonathan Evans, on behalf of the PPE-DE Group. – Mr President, I wish to begin by saying that I very much commend the report as it emerged from committee and I thank Mr Lipietz for his work.

I think it is the general view that the report has been improved by a number of the amendments made and I want to focus quickly on some of them: the emphasis on consumers, with specific proposals adding that we support the idea of private competition and enhancing the role of the consumer liaison officer. We welcome the first year of implementation of the process of reform undertaken by the Commission and we are also looking forward to the completion of the Article 82 approach – the interpretation of which is currently the subject of consultation.

I do not, however, propose to go through all the provisions in the report in detail. I just want to say that, in welcoming, for instance, the sectoral inquiries that have been launched, I draw attention to the aim of the Commission and of Commissioner Kroes to tackle protectionism.

In this context, I make no apology for highlighting something of great concern to all of us, which has arisen since this report was drawn up, and that is the vote that has recently taken place in the United States Senate to extend the process for dealing with merger cases in a way which amounts to blatant US protectionism. In my view, this amendment of the rules of the Committee on Foreign Investments in the United States could place new and damaging restrictions on foreign investments. Those are not my words, but the words of six of the leading financial services institutions in the United States.

The Commissioner, along with her colleagues, has been working very closely with the US Government to deal with issues of regulatory cooperation. I have in front of me a copy of the agreement of last December. Item 8 of this states: ‘We – that is the US Government and the Commission – agree to discuss any significant remaining obstacles to transatlantic investment that the other party identifies, and will consider how to address and reduce such obstacles with a view to promoting closer transatlantic economic integration’.

In my view, the proposals in the United States strike a blow against that proposition and I would say that it is so serious that the Commissioner should make it clear to her counterparts in the United States that if they proceed in this way then retaliatory measures in Europe may be necessary.

  Antolín Sánchez Presedo, en nombre del Grupo PSE. – Señor Presidente, señora Comisaria, queridos colegas, la presentación del informe anual sobre la política de competencia que se somete al examen, debate y resolución del Parlamento es un ejercicio de responsabilidad por parte de la Comisión.

Ofrece la oportunidad de subrayar los hitos más importantes, consolidar el acervo acumulado y enriquecerlo con la experiencia adquirida en el periodo y con orientaciones para el futuro. En este sentido, me ha parecido realmente útil la ponencia del señor Lipietz.

Como ponente del Grupo Socialista, quiero, en primer lugar, expresar mi satisfacción por que, desde el 1 de mayo de 2004, la política de competencia se haya extendido a diez nuevos países como consecuencia de la ampliación y por la integración en la Red de Autoridades de la Competencia de las autoridades de los nuevos miembros.

Tras las elecciones, el Parlamento se pronunció sobre la investidura de la nueva Comisión, que incluía una nueva titular al frente de la Competencia.

Un papel activo y creciente del Parlamento aporta más legitimidad y transparencia al desarrollo de la política de competencia, como se ha venido constatando. La reiterada aspiración del Parlamento a contar con poderes de codecisión está bien justificada.

Durante 2004, la Comisión ha completado su paquete de modernización. Ha mejorado las garantías de sus procedimientos y ha promovido iniciativas en el ámbito de la sociedad de la información y de la comunicación. Ha perseguido acuerdos colusorios y abusos de posición dominante y también ha controlado concentraciones y ayudas públicas. Hemos querido destacar la importancia de estas actuaciones y expresar nuestro apoyo.

Sin embargo, también hemos detectado insuficiencias y debilidades en el informe, como la falta de evaluación de los efectos de las decisiones más importantes sobre concentraciones y ayudas públicas, el tratamiento de los servicios de interés general, la problemática de la negociación colectiva en sectores sensibles, como el agrícola, la promoción de la cooperación internacional, también con los países emergentes y en vías de desarrollo, o el protagonismo de los consumidores en una genuina cultura de la competencia. La resolución final será más completa si se hace eco de todos estos aspectos, para que obtengan la atención que merecen.

La política de competencia es fundamental para contribuir al éxito de la Estrategia de Lisboa y alcanzar los objetivos de crecimiento y empleo. La resolución que adoptemos tendrá más valor si refleja esta realidad, su papel estratégico y el potencial de la Red Europea de la Competencia y tendrá más fuerza si establece dos claras directrices: que la Comisión se centre en cuestiones relevantes para nuestros ciudadanos, para la mejora de sus condiciones de vida, y que actúe proactivamente, es decir, anticipándose y promoviendo los cambios y no solamente reaccionando frente a ellos.

  Sharon Bowles, on behalf of the ALDE Group . – Mr President, in 2004, the Commission issued its decision on Microsoft. Press reports since then, concerning attempts at compliance, have presented conflicting information.

This is not the first time that progress, and even the right of defence prior to hearings or to appeal, seems to have been compromised by the Commission denying undertakings access to full information or evidence against them. In effect, undertakings are told: you must do more, but no, you cannot have the evidence and we will not tell you exactly what we want. Is such lack of transparency necessary, useful or, taken to its extreme, even in line with the principles of justice that one associates with an advanced democratic community?

With some reservations, I welcome the Article 82 consultation, which draws on recent experience, but it seems to me that there should also be more consultation with regard to Commission procedures and Regulation (EC) No 773/2004. This should include comparison with other countries, including the United States, keeping our aim of fostering a competitive business and investment environment.

The Microsoft case is particularly difficult because it includes interoperability in a highly technical field. It is very important to define the general procedures for interoperability and it is with some regret that we lost those in the CII Directive. However, the general procedures for interoperability must not be defined by a hard case. Hard cases make bad law, and at present it is even difficult to reconcile the proposals in the consultation document – such as paragraphs 238, 239 and 240 – both with themselves and with the apparent demands on Microsoft. There are also further concerns in paragraph 242, concerning trade secrets.

  Godfrey Bloom, on behalf of the IND/DEM Group. – Mr President, I wonder if Parliament and the Commission would be so keen to applaud the Competition Commissioner Mrs Kroes if they knew that for some 13 years she was a member of Ballast Nedam’s welfare council, which was set up to protect employee welfare. She would therefore have been aware of the situation that would result when Ballast Nedam, owned by a Dutch construction company, unceremoniously pulled the plug on the UK subsidiary, leaving some 2000 employees with a grossly under-funded pension fund. Many in my constituency are now almost destitute.

If this is the type of behaviour which results in people being awarded positions in the Commission, it is little wonder that Europe is doing so fantastically badly in everything it turns its hand to.

  Gunnar Hökmark (PPE-DE). – Herr talman! När vi diskuterar konkurrenspolitiken finns det skäl att understryka en sak och det är att europeisk välfärd, europeiska företag och europeiska jobb har byggts upp av konkurrens. Möjligheten att starta nya företag, möjligheten att utmana gamla bestående företag – det är det som har skapat den europeiska välfärden och det europeiska välståndet. Det är därför högst legitimt och viktigt att slå vakt om konkurrenspolitiken gentemot alla de krafter som på olika sätt vill lansera protektionismen. Det finns ett par uppgifter i detta sammanhang – och det framgår också av det betänkande som vi diskuterar – där kommissionen har särskilt viktig roll.

Det första är att diskutera konkurrensfrågor utifrån hela den inre marknaden. Det är ett steg som vi måste ta, för om vi ska få globala "champions" så måste vi också se till att i Europa, över gränserna, kunna få livsstarka stora företag som också kan vara aktörer på den globala scenen. Det ställer krav på en konkurrenspolitik som flyttar fram positionerna från den gamla konkurrenspolitiken. Därmed menar jag att kommissionen måste agera med kraft och vara obrottsligt lojal när det gäller att driva det som är fördraget.

Med detta menar jag att agera med kraft mot de delar av den inre marknaden där medlemsländer inte lever upp till de krav som ställs. Det gäller telekomfrågor, där vi har sett att avregleringen av konkurrens har gett välfärd och där det är viktigt att detta kommer att gälla i alla delar av ekonomin. Det gäller energifrågorna, och jag välkomnar det faktum att kommissionen, enligt vad jag har förstått av media, kommer att agera för att genomdriva en inre marknad och slå mot den protektionismen som vi ser i dag när det gäller olika företagsfusioner.

Den sista saken handlar om det som också Jonathan Evans tog upp, nämligen att se till att vi får en transatlantisk konkurrenspolitik som är ömsesidig och som ger hela den transatlantiska ekonomin styrka och kraft. Med detta vill jag också understryka att det är konkurrenspolitiken och konkurrensen som är den starkaste kraften bakom den europeiska integrationen i dag. Det är den som väver ekonomierna samman och det är den som ger oss nya jobb.

(Applåder)

  Pervenche Berès (PSE). – Monsieur le Président, Madame la Commissaire, chers collègues, ce rendez-vous annuel est important puisque c'est le seul moment où le Parlement européen peut pleinement parler de la politique de la concurrence telle qu'elle est menée par la Commission et l'évaluer. À ce titre, il est important que ce Parlement veille à ce que la concurrence libre et non faussée demeure véritablement libre et non faussée et à ce que, lorsque des affaires méritent que l'on s'y intéresse d'un peu plus près, on puisse le faire, y compris dans cette enceinte, qu'il s'agisse de Microsoft, de Rhodia-Rhône-Poulenc, ou de Ryanair-Charleroi.

Puisque, Madame la Commissaire, vous allez rouvrir la réflexion sur, notamment, le concept important de concentration, lequel joue un rôle clé dans la politique de la concurrence, je voudrais attirer votre attention sur un point, en espérant que ce Parlement nous suivra sur cette question. Il nous semble que les critères en termes de seuils qui sont aujourd'hui en vigueur au sein de la Commission l'empêchent de se déclarer compétente chaque fois qu'elle le devrait. S'agissant par exemple du rapprochement entre le London Stock Exchange et Deutsche Börse, vous n'étiez finalement pas compétents, au motif que le chiffre d'affaires en cause était en deçà des seuils. Il y a là matière à une vraie interrogation.

Ma deuxième réflexion concerne de l'affaire Mittal-Arcelor. La concurrence libre et non faussée suppose-t-elle de laisser complètement de côté les conditions de propriété des entreprises en cause? Il y a là aussi, me semble-t-il, matière à réflexion.

Enfin, dernier point, je ne vous étonnerai pas en disant que, pour les socialistes, la politique de concurrence n'a de sens que si elle contribue à la stratégie de Lisbonne. Elle doit intégrer des objectifs sociaux, des objectifs environnementaux, des objectifs de long terme. J'espère que c'est en ce sens que nous parviendrons à rééquilibrer le concept de concurrence libre et non faussée pour que l'Union soit effectivement la zone la plus compétitive du monde, dans le respect du plein emploi et du développement durable.

  Corien Wortmann-Kool (PPE-DE). – Voorzitter, het mededingingsbeleid is een van de voornaamste pijlers van het Europese beleid en een goede en solide uitvoering ervan is belangrijk in het licht van de strategie van Lissabon. Ik steun dan ook van harte het hervormingsbeleid van commissaris Kroes met meer nadruk op de vereenvoudiging van de procedures en het voorkomen van administratieve rompslomp en juridische kosten. In dit verslag van het Europees Parlement staat terecht uw mededingingsbeleid centraal, want politici moeten niet, als het om concrete gevallen gaat, op de stoel van de commissaris of zelfs op de stoel van de rechter gaan zitten. Sommige collega's lijken het zelfs moeilijk te vinden dat niet te doen, maar in het verslag dat nu ter discussie staat, staat uw mededingingsbeleid centraal.

De oprichting van het Europees concurrentienetwerk is een belangrijke ontwikkeling en ik roep de Commissie op om de informatieuitwisseling tussen de nationale mededingingsautoriteiten in het Europees netwerk te verbeteren, zodat de eenheid in de uitvoering van het Europese mededingingsbeleid gewaarborgd blijft.

Tot slot zou ik de Commissie willen oproepen om vaart te maken met het laatste deel van de moderniseringsoperatie en dan heb ik het over artikel 82 - misbruik van economische machtspositie. Ik zou hierbij het belang willen onderstrepen van een beleid dat in ruime mate oog heeft voor de marktstructuur en zich niet, zoals het op dit moment het geval is, vooral concentreert op het marktaandeel van een bepaalde onderneming. Globalisering heeft immers de wereld veranderd en grote bedrijven met een aanzienlijk marktaandeel, die bijvoorbeeld belangrijke bijdragen leveren op het gebied van innovatie, moeten niet zonder meer beoordeeld worden op hun dominantiepositie, maar worden beschouwd in een bredere economische context. Ik hoop dat u dat goed recht wil doen in het beleid waarmee u gaat komen als het om artikel 82 gaat.

  Ieke van den Burg (PSE). – Voorzitter, vergun mij eerst even een korte reactie op hetgeen de heer Bloom net zei over de Ballast Nedam-affaire en de pensioenfondsen van de Engelse medewerkers van Ballast Nedam. Toevallig heb ik mij indertijd in die zaak verdiept en ik denk dat het typisch een zaak was van ontbrekend toezicht in het Verenigd Koninkrijk en ontbrekende regels in het Verenigd Koninkrijk en dat het dus onjuist is om daar nu Europa de schuld van te geven. Bovendien was dat in de periode-Thatcher - even voor de duidelijkheid.

Mijn opmerking zal ik beperken tot een aantal zaken die ook in het verslag aan de orde komen en die de laatste tijd aan de orde waren, met name in de discussie over de wijze waarop nationale belangen weer kunnen meespelen in het mededingingsbeleid.

Op dat punt zijn er in ieder geval twee zaken die ook relevant zijn voor de spelregels van het Europese mededingingsbeleid. Een daarvan is de tweederde-regel. Het is goed als daar verdere stappen worden genomen, omdat in dezen toch te weinig rekening gehouden wordt met de verschillen in grootte van lidstaten en de uitstraling die bepaalde maatregelen hebben, ook voor omliggende landen en voor een regionaal beleid. Dat is een heel belangrijk punt dat wij nog eens aan de orde gesteld hebben. Het andere punt is ook al genoemd door collega Berès aan de hand van het voorbeeld van de effectenbeurzen.

Daar blijkt duidelijk dat, ook al is er sprake van een omzet die onder de drempel van Europese bemoeienis ligt, de uitstraling van een dergelijke concentratie wel degelijk Europees kan zijn en dat is dus een reden - u heeft dat ook al aangegeven, commissaris - om ook in dit verband te bekijken of we de criteria voor Europese bevoegdheden niet kunnen verruimen. Op die punten zou ik dat graag nog eens aan de orde willen stellen en tevens wil ik om steun vragen voor ons amendement nummer 9.

  Andreas Schwab (PPE-DE). – Herr Präsident, liebe Kolleginnen und Kollegen! Zunächst einmal möchte ich mich bei der Kommissarin Neelie Kroes für ihre Arbeit als Wettbewerbskommissarin im Berichtszeitraum – während dem sie ja nur zur Hälfte im Amt war – bedanken. Ich glaube, dass das Parlament auf der Grundlage des Berichts der Kommission auch einen guten Alternativtext hat vorlegen können; die positiven Elemente des Parlamentstextes wurden schon mehrfach angesprochen.

Ich möchte zwei Dinge ansprechen, die noch nicht erwähnt wurden. Zum ersten glaube ich, dass es wünschenswert wäre, dass die Kommission im kommenden Jahr, also bei der Bewertung des Jahres 2005, den Bereich der Dienstleistungen von allgemeinem wirtschaftlichen Interesse wieder separat ausweist. Die Kommission will ja demnächst auch in diesem Bereich gesetzgeberisch weiter tätig werden, und deswegen wäre es günstig, wenn wir einen separaten Überblick bekämen.

Zum zweiten war ich einigermaßen überrascht, dass im Bericht über das Jahr 2004 die Postmärkte überhaupt nicht erwähnt sind. Wir verfolgen die Initiativen zur Öffnung des Postbereichs ja mit großem Interesse und glauben, dass wir in den kommenden Jahren in diesen Berichten noch das eine oder andere zu lesen bekommen.

Erlauben Sie mir aber ungeachtet des Berichts einige kurze Bemerkungen zur Wettbewerbspolitik allgemein. Man sagt ja immer, das Wettbewerbsrecht ist das Kernstück der europäischen Verträge; jedenfalls ist es – das wurde auch bereits beklagt – sehr exekutivlastig. Die aktuellen Fälle, die wir in Europa sehen, lassen jedoch die Frage aufkeimen, ob wirklich noch immer das Wettbewerbsrecht über allem steht oder ob nicht andere Elemente eine wichtige Rolle übernommen haben. Ich glaube, dass wir ehrlich sagen können, dass wir als Europäisches Parlament sehr wohl die volle Umsetzung der Artikel 81 und 82 in den Mittelpunkt unserer Wirtschaftspolitik stellen wollen.

Sie leiten darüber hinaus einige Strukturreformen im europäischen Kartellrecht ein, was ich außerordentlich gut finde. Aber ich glaube, dass sich bei vielen Fragen – etwa dem stop-the-clock-shop – zeigt, dass wir eine bessere Zusammenarbeit zwischen den nationalen Kartellbehörden brauchen. In diesem Sinne ermuntere ich Sie ausdrücklich, an der Stelle weiterzumachen, an der Sie in Ihren letzten Reden begonnen haben.

  Elisa Ferreira (PSE). – A finalidade última da política de concorrência é garantir o funcionamento adequado do mercado interno e, através dele, a provisão de bens e serviços de qualidade a preços acessíveis à generalidade dos consumidores europeus.

Temos assistido a uma sequência de operações de concentração no mercado interno que geraram monopólios naturais no domínio dos bens e serviços essenciais. A sua avaliação pela Comissão Europeia, embora formalmente correcta, revela-se na prática frequentemente incoerente face a esses objectivos, em especial no caso dos serviços públicos. Num período em que renascem sentimentos proteccionistas, a Europa deve dar garantias aos seus cidadãos de que é capaz, acima de tudo, de assegurar a provisão dos bens e serviços essenciais, com segurança, numa base universal e ao mais baixo custo.

Não basta, portanto, aprofundar o mercado interno. Impõe-se que seja acompanhado, pelo menos, de uma melhor capacidade de regulação. A regulação comunitária deve ser eficaz e as assimetrias na dimensão dos Estados-Membros não podem ser um factor adicional de distorção da concorrência. A confiança dos cidadãos europeus na construção do mercado interno depende, também, da garantia de que a vigilância dos seus interesses mais essenciais será reforçada. Torna-se, pois, importante uma actualização das regras em vigor em função dos objectivos que pretendemos atingir.

PRESIDENZA DELL'ON. COCILOVO
Vicepresidente

  Othmar Karas (PPE-DE). – Herr Präsident, meine Damen und Herren! Die Wettbewerbspolitik ist der Motor für den Erfolg der Strategie für Wachstum und Beschäftigung. Daher ist klar, dass das Europäische Parlament für eine verstärkte Mitsprache eintritt, weil wir so viel Wettbewerb wie möglich wollen und – aus sozialen und ökologischen Gründen, der Fairness und der ethischen Wertsituation wegen – so wenig Reglementierung wie notwendig.

Daher ist jede Grenzziehung eine politische Frage. Die Wettbewerbspolitik ist der Motor des Binnenmarktes. Daher gibt es einen Zusammenhang zwischen der Umsetzung der vier Freiheiten anhand oder wegen der Wettbewerbspolitik und der Stärkung des Binnenmarktes nach innen wie nach außen. Ich habe das Gefühl, dass wir die Wettbewerbspolitik immer auf drei Ebenen betrachten: Wettbewerbspolitik innerhalb der Mitgliedstaaten, Wettbewerbspolitik zwischen den Mitgliedstaaten und Wettbewerbspolitik der Europäischen Union in einer globalen Welt. Daher kommt es auch zu sehr viel Rechtsunsicherheit. Wir haben zwar das Altmarkt-Urteil, das die Prüfungskriterien klar festlegt, aber wir haben doch oft Hinweise darauf, dass die Kommission diese Prüfungskriterien unterschiedlich auslegt. Wir haben auf der einen Seite die Debatte, ob bei der Untersuchung der marktbeherrschenden Stellung einmal der nationale Markt und ein anderes Mal der europäische Markt herangezogen wird. Wir haben keine klare Grenze, was Teil der Wettbewerbspolitik und was Teil der Daseinsvorsorge ist. Jetzt ist das Kapitel überhaupt schon aus dem Bericht herausgefallen. Für mich ist es Teil der Wettbewerbspolitik, auch dafür Sorge zu tragen, dass die Richtlinien, die wir beschließen, gleichzeitig umgesetzt werden. Die ungleiche Umsetzung der Richtlinien führt zu Wettbewerbsverzerrungen und ist eine der Ursachen für den verstärkten Protektionismus, gegen den wir massiv vorzugehen haben.

Daher treten wir für einen einheitlichen europäischen Forschungsraum und einen einheitlichen Energieraum ein sowie auch für die Mitentscheidung bei der Steuerpolitik; zumindest ist eine einheitliche Bemessungsgrundlage für die Unternehmensbesteuerung notwendig.

  Alexander Stubb (PPE-DE). – Mr President, I should like to make three points. First, I welcome both the European Parliament report as changed and the Commission’s report on the guidelines for 2004. Things are moving in the right direction and I should like to congratulate the whole team of DG Competition and the Commissioner, who is continuing Mr Monti’s work very well. We are living in a mood of economic nationalism right now, and being the Competition Commissioner is not necessarily the easiest job in town. The Commissioner is doing a good job.

My second point – and one that Mr Hökmark made as well – is that it is very important to take a broad approach. To my mind, competition and the internal market are married; they go hand in hand. Commissioner Kroes takes care of the competition part and Commissioner McCreevy takes care of the internal market side. If today we were to define the four freedoms, I do not think, unfortunately, in the mood we are in, that we would get them. Therefore, keep the four freedoms in mind; they are under attack, much like competition policy in general.

That brings me to my final point about the four key areas dealt with in the report itself. The first is mergers: keep on fighting against the type of protectionist behaviour that you see, for example, from the Spanish Government in the Endesa case or from the Polish Government in the banking sector. Secondly, on state aid: continue your vigorous control, kill all the national champions you can – they are bad for consumers and taxpayers. I would urge you to read Mr Hökmark’s report on this issue. The third is Article 81 on cartels: fight them. They are all over the place; they try to hide; tease them out; keep the consumers happy.

Finally, on Article 82 on dominant positions: there is a sufficiently high profile case. I am not entirely sure that all is clear on that case. One can perhaps see both sides, but it is important to keep at it and, much like Mr Evans said, if we want a transatlantic market, let us keep it and let us watch out for American protectionism in the meantime.

  Christopher Heaton-Harris (PPE-DE). – Mr President, before I start might I ask that someone remove the ‘t’ from my name up on the screen because it is quite unnerving really!

I would like to associate myself with the comments made by Mr Stubb and Mrs Bowles, but I would like to talk about transparency in these issues. Am I the only one here to think that the behaviour in the Commission in relation to transparency in competition cases has been quite odd? It is bizarre in a way, because the Commission seems to be conducting prosecutions in the media, rather than in hearings or in courts. Before Christmas we had the strange outbursts from the Commission spokesperson in relation to the case concerning the collective selling of UK football premiership TV rights, and this tactic has been repeated in the Commission’s ongoing anti-trust investigation into Microsoft.

I certainly find it a matter of concern that the Commission, whilst acting as investigator, prosecutor, judge and jury in competition cases, can make public statements condemning the people it is investigating, or happily allow confidential documents to enter the public domain without any apparent concern or investigation. Those of us interested in transparency in the European Parliament, and indeed those of us interested in justice in the wider world, are becoming more worried that the Commission seems to be willing to ride roughshod over natural justice in its bid for a judicial and public relations result against those it is pursing.

Madam Commissioner, you have made a number of very sensible statements about the future direction of competition policy in the EU, including the statement on 13 December 2005 on improving rules for access to files in merger and anti-trust procedures. Can I humbly suggest that you circulate this more widely throughout your department, because in the recent Microsoft case and in others before that – in the General Electric case, in the Tetra Laval case and in the TV premiership football case – access to information and files you are keeping has been one of the Commission’s weaknesses.

  Neelie Kroes, Member of the Commission. Mr President, I sincerely hope you will not cut me off. Let me say that I am very happy with the statements of nearly everybody in this debate, especially the remarks that have been made about this portfolio. Competition policy is a challenge; indeed it is an instrument, a motor for achieving the Lisbon Agenda. I could not agree more with Mr De Rossa and Mrs van den Burg that we must deliver, within the framework of Europe, sustainable and full employment and social welfare; but at the end of the day we must also deliver more economic growth and more and better quality jobs.

Turning now to a couple of details about competition policy, it was rightly mentioned that cartels are absolutely unacceptable and we must combat them. Where there is a near-monopoly, we have to realise that this does not benefit the consumer. People may argue that in the short term it is a pleasing situation, but I can assure you that a monopoly or near-monopoly will not be very keen to spend money in areas like research or innovation. Yet we badly need that type of investment. Why? Because we have to compete on the global stage, because we need to be aware that competitors from outside Europe are investing in depth in research, in innovation, and in their competitiveness. So, Mr Evans rightly referred to the need for fair treatment, for a bilateral but not unbalanced approach: if we are behaving ourselves, the others should behave as well. It is a question of the competitiveness of Europe.

I really appreciate your interest in competition policy. The Commission informs you of all the major policy initiatives in this area and, of course, I pay attention to all the opinions of Parliament. We may not agree completely at every moment, on every subject, every dossier; I do not agree with a couple of remarks that were made this evening because the way they were put does not reflect the truth and is not realistic. But I will come back to that in more detail.

I have listened carefully to the views expressed by the rapporteur, by the members of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and by all other Members. I would like to add a few words in response to specific issues. On international cooperation, I think that in a global market competition is very important and the competition authorities need to be in line. Regarding a European network, I am really impressed by the European competition network and those concerned are doing an extremely good job. We can still learn from each other and we still need to realise that the time has passed for national policy. At the end of the day we have one internal market. It is about two-way traffic. Mr McCreevy and I are buddies and we need to tackle all the barriers that have to be tackled.

In relation to Microsoft, which was touched upon by a couple of Members, the Commission is actively pursuing the implementation of the March 2004 decision. I accept, of course, remarks that do not agree with my line, but to say that we are not transparent, that we are not listening to all the questions and remarks, is not the truth. Since March 2004, there has been a decision, which has rightly been mentioned and discussed; I have done so myself with the head of Microsoft. With regard to Professor Neil Barrett, a very highly respected advisor to the Commission, he was indeed appointed by the Commission, but the list he headed came from Microsoft. He is very well-known for his knowledge and independence and to put it in quite clear language, he is the bridge between Microsoft and the Commission. He is indeed the advisor. But when we took the decision in December 2005, the statement of objections – which included a preliminary finding that Microsoft had not delivered what it had promised, that its obligation under the March 2004 decision did not take the form we were expecting – was not made public because of issues relating to certain procedures, protectionism and the legitimate interest of all parties. The hearing was an opportunity to have what I hope was a fruitful debate and every participant in it was given the floor. This is not only about Microsoft; there are complainants elsewhere and there are a couple of other really interesting American companies.

So Microsoft is not the only interesting company from the United States: there are a couple of other interesting companies that have lodged complaints with me. Therefore, without a doubt, I had to act and to react. I hope that will clarify the situation when we come to discuss what was talked about last Thursday and Friday. Another hearing – the Court hearing – will take place in Luxembourg on 24-28 April 2006. Once we have discussed what was talked about last week, we will come to a conclusion as soon as possible.

Mrs Berès mentioned Mittal’s bid for Arcelor. She should read it and she promised me she would, so let me be precise: the announcement of Mittal’s bid for Arcelor has attracted a great deal of attention not only in the media but also in some European capitals. The operation has not yet been formally notified to the Commission. If and when it is, the Commission will examine it very carefully and impartially and will conduct a wide-ranging investigation to assess its possible impact on the steel industry in Europe.

It is the responsibility of the Commission, the Commissioner and the services involved always to look very carefully and impartially at all cases. Size and nationality in itself is not a factor in making our decisions. The question is whether a decision can be taken and whether things can be done in the way requested by the parties, or whether there should be remedies. We will be looking at that.

Let me turn to the merger regulation and competence for cases under the two-thirds rule, which a couple of Members mentioned. At the moment we are asking the Member States for information. Once we have received that information we will have a debate and dialogue with those Member States and will try to reach conclusions. The rules and decisions were made in the 1980s and were right for that time, but since then, fortunately, the internal market has developed. I am aware that the internal market is not yet complete, we still have quite a lot of work to do and the four main freedoms still need to be achieved. At that time the two-thirds rule was the correct instrument, but now we have to consider whether it is still appropriate in that area. In certain sectors we need to ensure a balance and equal treatment, and there should be transparency regardless of the country in which a merger takes place. Brussels must ensure equal treatment, whatever the background to a merger might be.

Mr Hökmark and Mrs Ferreira raised the subject of mergers in the internal market. We are all aware that concerns have been expressed about the alleged upsurge of protectionism. It should be combated. I can understand it just a little, but it is not allowed and should not be tolerated. We should explain to those concerned that it is not in line with the decision we took on one internal market, one Europe, in which we are and will be in a better position to compete with the outside world. The Commission has significant powers under the Treaty to act as an independent and impartial referee to ensure that Member States fully respect the internal market rules and do not create unlawful obstacles to cross-border mergers. I can assure you that the Commission is firmly committed both to using these powers and to corporate restructuring in Europe. For that we need a united Europe.

It was rightly said that we must apply the rules of the game in the same way whether the team is playing at home or abroad. We have rules to respect and we have decisions to respect – the decisions taken in the past. We have to implement those decisions: one internal market and the Lisbon Agenda. Nearly all of you agreed that we should fight for that.

  Presidente. La discussione è chiusa.

La votazione avrà luogo domani alle 12.00.