Istungi stenogramm

Teisipäev, 24. oktoober 2006 - Strasbourg

21. Dumpingu- ja subsiidiumidevastaste ning kaitsemeetmete rakendamine kolmandate riikide poolt (2004) (arutelu)

  Przewodniczący. Kolejnym punktem porządku dziennego jest sprawozdanie sporządzone przez Cristianę Muscardini w imieniu Komisji Handlu Zagranicznego w sprawie rocznego sprawozdania Komisji dla Parlamentu Europejskiego dotyczącego działań antydumpingowych, antysubsydyjnych i ochronnych prowadzonych przez państwa trzecie wobec Wspólnoty (2004) (2006/2136(INI)) (A6-0243/2006)

  Cristiana Muscardini (UEN), relatrice. – Signor Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, signor Commissario, la relazione annuale 2004 sulle misure antidumping, antisovvenzioni e di salvaguardia adottate dai paesi terzi nei confronti della Comunità, presentata dai servizi della Commissione, ha fatto emergere un dato che ha destato più di una preoccupazione in seno alla nostra commissione parlamentare. Da essa risulta un incremento anormale dei casi di difesa commerciale, sia da parte di utilizzatori tradizionali di tali misure, sia da parte degli Stati membri dell'OMC di più recente sviluppo. In molti casi, le regole e la giurisprudenza dell'OMC sono state parzialmente o totalmente disattese, causando un danno per l'industria comunitaria.

Per i paesi sviluppati, con in testa gli Stati Uniti, sorgono problemi principali di un'applicazione unilaterale e comunque poco attenta alle regole dell'OMC. Per alcuni paesi emergenti, l'applicazione di diritti compensativi non è intesa a contrastare pratiche illegali, bensì ad assicurare alle industrie locali una protezione supplementare contro le importazioni europee. In molti casi, gli standard investigativi sono bassi e sono tali da suscitare più di un dubbio circa la loro piena conformità alle regole dell'OMC.

La relazione della Commissione riporta alcuni di questi casi significativi, vale a dire il caso "Zeroing" con gli Stati Uniti, i casi antidumping indiani, i casi agricoli sudamericani e australiani e, in generale, l'uso estensivo e scorretto delle salvaguardie. In molti dei contenziosi intrapresi contro la Comunità europea, quest'ultima riesce a ottenere un'adeguata soddisfazione per la risoluzione delle controversie in sede di OMC.

Tuttavia, tale successo è spesso troppo tardivo e il danno per l'industria europea è irreparabile. Di fronte al quadro che ci è stato presentato dalla Commissione esecutiva nella sua relazione, la commissione per il commercio internazionale avrebbe potuto suggerire, rispondendo a una reazione d'istinto, di adottare la stessa metodologia e di usare lo stesso comportamento dei partner commerciali che violano le norme in materia di antidumping, antisovvenzione e salvaguardia, ma non lo ha fatto. Siamo infatti convinti che il rispetto delle regole in materia commerciale, stabilite a livello internazionale e in un quadro multilaterale, costituisca un principio base per la crescita economica e, più in generale, per la convivenza pacifica fra le nazioni. Due errori non fanno mai una ragione. Ciò premesso, vogliamo ribadire che le regole devono essere applicate e che alla loro mancata applicazione devono corrispondere sanzioni che garantiscano il diritto entro termini brevi. Se non vi sono termini brevi, il danno rimane irreparabile.

A difesa della legalità e di quella parte dell'industria europea che si sente ingiustamente colpita da misure illegittime, invitiamo la Commissione a proseguire con decisione i negoziati in sede di OMC, volti a rendere meno arbitraria l'applicazione di misure di difesa commerciale da parte di altri membri dell'OMC, facendosi promotrice di un'azione mirata a rendere più rapida ed efficace l'applicazione delle decisioni dell'organo di risoluzione delle dispute all'interno dell'OMC. Questi punti dovrebbero essere inseriti nell'Agenda di sviluppo di Doha qualora tali negoziati dovessero – come ci auguriamo – ripartire.

Invitiamo pertanto la Commissione a dare la giusta rilevanza a questa materia nell'ambito delle iniziative volte ad accrescere la competitività esterna dell'industria europea, che sono state recentemente annunciate dal Commissario Mandelson dinanzi alla commissione per il commercio internazionale.

Infine, formuliamo alla Commissione la raccomandazione di astenersi dal concedere trattamenti preferenziali o trattamenti di favore a quei partner commerciali che, ripetutamente e con gravi ripercussioni economiche per l'industria europea, non agiscono in linea con le regole e la giurisprudenza dell'OMC.

La commissione per il commercio internazionale è del parere che di fronte a situazioni gravi non si possa restare completamente inerti. Se vogliamo raccogliere il consenso dei cittadini nei confronti delle nuove regole del commercio internazionale, occorre adoperarsi per una maggiore trasparenza, coerenza e rispetto della legalità da parte di tutti gli attori, attuando misure cha vanno dal controllo alle frontiere all'applicazione di sanzioni comuni nei confronti di coloro i quali commerciano merci contraffatte o comunque illegali sul territorio europeo.

Non possiamo non legare le conclusioni di questa relazione alla recente iniziativa della Commissione per una riforma della politica antidumping e antisovvenzione della Comunità europea, volta a limitare l'uso di tali strumenti da parte della Commissione nel quadro di una considerazione più attenta e più estesa dell'interesse comunitario.

  Peter Mandelson, Member of the Commission. Mr President, I would like to thank the rapporteur, Mrs Muscardini, and the Committee on International Trade for the excellent work that they have done on this important issue.

The European Union is a major exporter worldwide and this leaves us exposed to trade defence actions by third countries. When such actions are taken in compliance with WTO rules, we cannot and should not complain, and we do not. However, that is not always the case and these actions can easily become a serious and unjustified impediment to our legitimate market access opportunities.

Therefore, we must closely monitor third-country actions against our exports and intervene to minimise the negative impact of such actions on our companies. And we should certainly be vigilant. Whenever possible we favour the diplomatic route, which is the quicker and the most efficient way to solve those issues when we have partners who wish to solve them. But when diplomacy fails, we do not hesitate to resort to WTO panels, as it is our right to do.

Both the diplomatic and the litigation approaches have met with notable successes. Take, for example, the Indian cases mentioned in the report. Diplomacy has resulted in the removal of no fewer than 12 measures. We also hope for significant success on the agricultural products cases that you have identified.

It is well known that the United States is a recurrent problem for us in this context. It is pro-free trade, but its use of the trade defence instrument is seen by many as unreasonable on certain issues. This has been particularly marked in the steel sector, where we have been arguing against certain practices for years on a large number of their dumping and subsidy measures. We have had a considerable success in Geneva but, frankly, it is a long hard slog even getting them to implement the remedies to the disputes which they have lost.

We cannot solve everything through diplomacy or litigation. This is why we welcome your support for the proposals we have tabled in the Doha Round to strengthen the rules and the disciplines governing the use of anti-dumping and countervailing measures.

The Round is suspended, something I deeply deplore and regret, but we are fighting hard to get it restarted. For trade defence this would allow us to seek improved disciplines along the lines of the EU practice in this field, making it more difficult for countries to abuse the system, which I am afraid some are only too prepared to do. We need tightened disciplines in the anti-dumping system.

We need greater transparency in the operation of trade defence instruments. We need less arbitrariness on the part of governments. Such behaviour simply discredits the rules. It brings the system into disrepute and it does not reflect credit on the multilateral trade system and its principal institution, the WTO.

We agree with you that the dispute settlement mechanism is an essential feature of the WTO system, which needs protecting, but we are working hard to improve it so that faster remedies can be achieved.

We will take the opportunity of any bilateral trade agreement with third countries to ensure that our partner countries take on specific obligations on the fair use of trade defence instruments. This is not an alternative to strengthening and improving the rules at the WTO. On the contrary, it underpins that. It is a way of getting insurance in place, so that we can use all available methods to bring reason and discipline to the operation of these instruments. This would particularly apply for those countries that abuse them the most.

Good practices are as important as good rules. That is why the Commission’s departments devote a great deal of time and resources to providing technical assistance to third countries that become new users of trade defence instruments. Our aim is that they should apply them in a fair and balanced manner and in accordance with our own high standards.

These efforts seem to bear fruit. The end of 2005 saw a welcome change from the trend of previous years, with a significant fall in the number of trade defence cases initiated against Community exporters, from 33 in 2004 to 19 in 2005. Market access, including a fair and proper implementation of WTO trade defence instruments by our trading partners, features high on our priority list and we will continue to take any steps required to ensure that our exports are not unduly penalised.

Of course it is difficult to follow each and every case with our current resources and I would certainly like to do more for our exporters, in particular small and medium-sized companies, which often have little experience in this area. The EU must remain an example that others can follow.

As the report recalls, we are viewed as a moderate user of trade defence instruments. That reputation is deserved and that must remain so. It is in that spirit that I recently launched a reflection process on how Europe’s trade defence instruments such as the anti-dumping instrument operate in the modern global economy. A broad public consultation will take place early in 2007, based on a Green Paper expected in the coming months.

This consultation will allow the Commission to draw on a wide range of views and identify whether there is scope to improve our rules and practices further. Our trade defence instruments can make an important contribution to ensuring both free and fair trade, thereby stimulating our competitiveness. This will involve strong and close cooperation with all stakeholders, including Member States and industry, and, I would add, the support and involvement of the European Parliament.

  Syed Kamall, on behalf of the PPE-DE Group. – Mr President, I welcome the general tone of both the Commission’s and Mrs Muscardini’s reports in wanting to see a world trading system that is as open and fair as possible. However, when we consider the anti-dumping measures of third countries, we in the Community need to show moral leadership and avoid hypocrisy.

We can agree that trade defence mechanisms are often used as an excuse to protect domestic markets from competition; but we should also admit that the EU is sometimes guilty of using these mechanisms to protect uncompetitive companies from non-EU providers – shoes and textiles being recent examples. Fortunately, we continue to be sparing users of these mechanisms.

With the potential collapse of the Doha development round, we must work with our trading partners to ensure that their legislation and practices comply as far as possible with WTO rules. However, to have any moral authority in this area, our own anti-dumping and anti-subsidy investigations must be transparent and impartial.

I am concerned about the call for a Community approach to defend exporting SMEs faced with protectionism abroad. During last year’s ‘bra wars’, it was a so-called Community approach that suspended imports from China and caused SMEs in London’s fashion industry to lose contracts and to provide compensation to clients left waiting for unfulfilled orders. If that is a Community approach, then we in London want to see less of it.

When it comes to arbitration, I think we all agree that any ad hoc arbitration group should consist of relevant experts. But we must ensure that any experts serving on these groups are experts in the sector being investigated who understand the structure of the industry and costs involved, not simply experts in more general trade issues.

Overall, I would like to congratulate both the Commission and the rapporteur on this report.

  Francisco Assis, em nome do Grupo PSE. – Senhor Presidente, o incremento do comércio internacional verificado ao longo dos últimos anos conduzindo, entre outras coisas, a um aumento da concorrência, tem despertado em muitos países a tentação de recurso à utilização dos instrumentos de defesa comercial como forma de protecção dos seus mercados. Não é, pois, de estranhar que se venha a assistir ao crescimento de um número de situações em que se procede à adopção das medidas anti-dumping, anti-subvenções e de salvaguarda.

As exportações europeias, como demonstra claramente o relatório agora em avaliação, têm sido alvo, em várias ocasiões, da adopção destas medidas por parte de países terceiros. Estes casos têm vindo mesmo a aumentar de forma preocupante. Aos países tradicionais, associam-se agora alguns dos novos protagonistas das relações comerciais internacionais.

Importa, pois, abordar com seriedade este fenómeno que pode prejudicar significativamente vários sectores da economia europeia. Uma abordagem séria passa, desde logo, pela separação correcta e rigorosa dos casos em que o recurso a estes instrumentos decorre estritamente da legítima aplicação do princípio da lealdade nas relações comerciais daqueles em que a sua utilização mais não constitui do que um artifício legal para, ilegitimamente, encobrir intenções verdadeiramente proteccionistas, no pior sentido desta palavra. Ora, essa distinção só se poderá fazer com total clareza se se apostar no reforço da transparência no tratamento dos processos conducentes à avaliação do carácter lícito ou ilícito da utilização dos instrumentos da defesa comercial, procurando garantir, deste modo, o respeito integral pelas regras e pela jurisprudência da Organização Mundial do Comércio. A Comissão deve, nesse sentido, empenhar-se em contribuir para a melhoria desses procedimentos, concorrendo assim para desincentivar a utilização indevida destes instrumentos.

Por outro lado, convém também salientar a importância do apoio prestado pela Comissão aos Estados-Membros e à indústria europeia nos processos de defesa comercial apresentados por países terceiros. Esse apoio tem um especial significado para as pequenas e médias empresas, naturalmente menos preparadas para enfrentarem situações deste tipo.

Por último, afigura-se-nos útil que a Comissão se disponha a participar activamente num trabalho conjunto no âmbito da OMC tendo em vista uma revisão equilibrada das disposições que regulam a adopção dos instrumentos de defesa comercial numa perspectiva de valorização do multilateralismo. No entanto, nesse debate, em nenhum momento se deverá esquecer que a União Europeia é já o espaço comercial mais aberto do mundo e que os Europeus têm também interesses legítimos a salvaguardar.

  Daniel Caspary (PPE-DE). – Herr Präsident, Herr Kommissar, meine sehr geehrten Kollegen! Geschätzte Kollegin Muscardini, herzlichen Glückwunsch zu diesem gelungenen Bericht!

Der freie Zugang zu ausländischen Märkten ist von existenzieller Bedeutung für sehr viele europäische Unternehmen. Dieser freie Zugang ist heute in vielen Fällen nicht gegeben. In diesen Fällen behindern Drittländer schlicht vertragswidrig oder im Widerspruch zu den WTO-Regeln den Marktzugang von europäischen Unternehmen. Die Drittländer nutzen hierbei das gesamte Spektrum von tarifären und nichttarifären Handelshemmnissen geschickt zu ihrem Vorteil und unserem Nachteil aus. Die Wettbewerbsfähigkeit der europäischen Wirtschaft und somit auch der Arbeitsmarkt der Europäischen Union leiden enorm unter diesen Schwierigkeiten. Dieses Vorgehen einiger unserer Handelspartner ist nicht akzeptabel.

Sehr geehrter Herr Kommissar, wir können es als Europäische Union nicht zulassen, dass andere Länder uns gegenüber so vorgehen. Alle Welthandelspartner müssen sich an die Regeln halten. Auch wir als Europäische Union dürfen gegenüber Drittländern nicht so vorgehen. Auch wir müssen uns an alle Regeln halten, um glaubwürdig und ohne offene Flanken gegen die Regelbrecher vorgehen zu können. Ein fairer und freier Welthandel ist nur möglich, wenn es ein Regelwerk gibt, das verbindlich ist und an das sich wirklich alle halten.

Was ist also zu tun? Ich fordere die Kommission auf, alles daranzusetzen, dass wir Europäer uns an die Regeln halten. Ich fordere die Kommission auf, Maßnahmen zum Schutz unserer Unternehmen zu ergreifen, wenn feststeht, dass die Regeln von einzelnen Handelspartnern nicht eingehalten werden. Ich fordere die Kommission auf, hierbei das bestehende oder auch ein verbessertes Streitbeilegungsverfahren konsequent zu nutzen, wenn es bei konkreten Fällen kurzfristig keine gütliche Einigung gibt.

Die Einhaltung der Regeln durch alle Handelspartner muss ein Schwerpunkt unserer künftigen Bemühungen sein. Nur wenn sich wirklich alle an die Regeln halten, können die Menschen auf Dauer von den Vorteilen des Welthandels profitieren.

  Małgorzata Handzlik (PPE-DE). – Panie Przewodniczący! Chciałabym podziękować pani poseł sprawozdawcy za bardzo kompleksowe sprawozdanie na temat środków protekcjonistycznych używanych przez państwa trzecie w stosunku do Unii Europejskiej. Analiza sprawozdania pani poseł sprawozdawcy oraz sprawozdania Komisji niestety potwierdza, iż europejska polityka handlowa, szczególnie jeżeli chodzi o rolnictwo, jest zbyt mocno zorientowana na ochronę producentów, za co najwyższą cenę płacą konsumenci.

Kwoty na import, cła antydumpingowe oraz administracyjne bariery na produkty rolne kosztują bowiem każdą europejską rodzinę około 1500 dolarów rocznie. Oczywistym wydaje się jednak, że czasami, ale w bardzo ograniczonych i ściśle określonych przypadkach, stosowanie środków ochronnych może być dopuszczalne. Decyzje o ich wprowadzeniu muszą być jednak wcześniej określone, zaplanowane i szeroko rozpowszechnione, tak aby przedsiębiorcy mogli zaplanować swoje zamówienia czy dostawy z wyprzedzeniem.

Obecnie aktorzy rynku wymian nadal ponoszą niestety zbyt wysoką cenę za źle planowane polityki handlowe i za nagłe decyzje o ustanawianiu stawek ochronnych, doprowadzające do niepewności prawnej i handlowej, oraz osłabiające możliwości szybkiej reakcji dostosowania się do zmian dla osób uczestniczących w wymianie. Dlatego też bardzo ważne jest, aby w polityce handlowej istniała przewidywalność i stabilizacja. Stawki preferencyjne muszą być zrozumiałe i łatwe do wdrażania, a wprowadzenie ich powinno być wcześniej szeroko dyskutowane z wszystkimi partnerami handlowymi, tak aby każdy przedsiębiorca mógł być dobrze poinformowany, pewny jutra i swoich zamówień.

Jeszcze moja końcowa uwaga dotycząca handlu z krajami rozwijającymi się, WTO oraz Unią Europejską. Kraje rozwijające się powinny jak najbardziej korzystać z możliwości, jakie daje im uczestnictwo w Światowej Organizacji Handlu. Należy je traktować, jako równorzędnych partnerów, dlatego też ochranianie przez uprzemysłowione kraje interesów dużych firm głównie z Unii Europejskiej, ale i także z USA nie powinno mieć miejsca.

  Γεώργιος Παπαστάμκος (PPE-DE). – Κύριε Πρόεδρε, συγχαίροντας την εισηγήτρια κ. Muscardini, και ευχαριστώντας τον κ. Επίτροπο για την τεκμηριωμένη παρέμβασή του, θα ήθελα να πω εισαγωγικά, ότι η διατήρηση και ενίσχυση της ανταγωνιστικότητας της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης στο νέο διεθνοποιημένο περιβάλλον απαιτεί, πρώτον, αυξημένη ευρωπαϊκή πρόσβαση στις αγορές των τρίτων χωρών και δεύτερον, αποτελεσματική προστασία από τις αθέμιτες εμπορικές πρακτικές των εταίρων μας.

Η Κοινότητα –ειπώθηκε αυτό- παραμένει σταθερά ένας μετριοπαθής χρήστης μέσων εμπορικής άμυνας. Αντιθέτως, η συνεχόμενη αύξηση μέτρων εμπορικής άμυνας εις βάρος της Κοινότητας, εμφανίζει ανησυχητικές διαστάσεις.

Η Ένωση είναι -και πρέπει να παραμείνει- μία ανοικτή αγορά στο διεθνή ανταγωνισμό. Αντιτασσόμεθα στον προστατευτισμό. Παράλληλα όμως αντιτασσόμεθα στη στρέβλωση του ανταγωνισμού, στην επίτευξη ανταγωνιστικών πλεονεκτημάτων εκ μέρους των εταίρων μας τα οποία στηρίζονται σε αδιαφανείς πρακτικές κατά παράβαση των διεθνών εμπορικών κανόνων.

Δεν νοείται μονομερής αφοπλισμός της Ένωσης. Ο εμπορικός "πασιφισμός" λειτουργεί μόνον όταν εφαρμόζεται από όλα τα μέρη. Ουδείς αμφισβητεί ότι παρατηρείται αυξημένη χρήση μέτρων εμπορικής άμυνας εις βάρος της Κοινότητας. Ως εκ τούτου, η Επιτροπή οφείλει να παρακολουθεί στενά και να διασφαλίζει την απόσυρση των καταχρηστικών και μη σύννομων μέτρων, είτε μέσω διαβουλεύσεων, είτε και μέσω της προσφυγής στα δικαιοδοτικά όργανα του ΠΟΕ όπου χρειάζεται.

Παρατηρείται επίσης μεγάλος, συγκριτικά, αριθμός μέτρων εμπορικής άμυνας εις βάρος ευρωπαϊκών γεωργικών προϊόντων. Είναι λοιπόν ευθύνη της Επιτροπής να διασφαλίζει ότι οι ριζικές μεταρρυθμίσεις της ΚΑΠ λαμβάνονται επαρκώς υπόψη από τους εμπορικούς μας εταίρους κατά την ενεργοποίηση μέτρων αντεπιδοτήσεων.

  Peter Mandelson, Member of the Commission. Mr President, I have never been a unilateral disarmer at any stage in my political career, in any context. I have always been a multilateralist, whether it be in respect of disarmament or the putting in place of international rules to create institutions of global governance or in the design of processes to create agreements or to solve disputes in the world. I bring those principles and that approach to this subject as I have done to others throughout my political career.

We have heard a call this evening for moral leadership. The morality that I bring to this subject of trade is my belief in free trade. I say it is moral because I believe that free trade is the best way to drive economic growth, to lever up living standards, to create opportunities for people and to attack poverty in our world. That is what I call ‘moral’.

However, one of the ways in which we ‘morally’ pursue free trade is by standing up for fair trade. When I look around me and see the public disquiet, uncertainty and unhappiness about what is going on in the global economy and the sense that people feel increasingly insecure and threatened by the dramatic changes that are taking place in the architecture and landscape of the global economy, I see people beginning to question whether free trade is a good idea. I see them beginning to wonder whether sheltering from the global economy would be better; whether erecting barriers between us and our trading partners might not be a better way of securing our jobs and our livelihoods.

I make a very strong argument against that reaction and instinct, but I will never help that argument against protectionism if I am seen to be or thought to be weak when it comes to standing up for the upholding and implementation of internationally agreed trade rules which stand out against anti-competitive behaviour, state interventions or trade distortions, which are designed to give one trading partner an unfair, unreasonable and unacceptable advantage in trade against another. That is why it is appropriate and proper to operate trade defence instruments within the rules created by our multilateral institutions.

However, I would never want to see those rules used as a weapon against others’ low-cost competition or against others’ legitimate use of their comparative advantage. That is not right and it is not acceptable, but nor, if I may say to Mr Kamall, was that the case either in respect of textiles or shoes. Shoes, yes, was an anti-dumping measure, arrived at after considerable investigation, analysis, recommendation, discussion, debate and finally decision amongst our Member States, as it properly should be. I would stand by the objectivity and the transparency with which that decision was arrived at, and it certainly was not adopted for protectionist purposes.

However, in the case of textiles, I never said it was unfair trading. I never said that the fierce competition that we were facing in the case of textiles was as a result of price or market distortions by the Chinese. I merely pointed to the fact that with the final lifting of quotas we in Europe were suddenly and unexpectedly faced with what amounted to an avalanche which, if it had not been resisted, would have had the likely effect of burying our market and severely distorting what people produce, how people sell, their profits, their livelihoods and, therefore, their jobs in such a sudden way that I believed it was appropriate – and, in the end, our Chinese trading partners also agreed that it was right and appropriate – to take voluntary cooperative measures to slow down the rapid increase in Chinese textile exports.

You are right that at all times, on all occasions and in all cases we should operate impartiality, transparency and truthfulness in the analysis we put forward, the conclusions we reach and how we seek to justify the measures we are advocating.

It is true, as Mrs Handzlik said, that any intervention of any sort in the market – legitimate, anti-dumping or other uses of trade defence instruments – is bound to create some uncertainty and weaken the ability of businesses to plan ahead. Mr Kamall made a similar point. I take this very seriously indeed, because I do not want my actions, as agreed by the Member States, to have the effect of making a bad situation worse by further disrupting or undermining the ability of companies to plan ahead and to organise their production, which, of course, is hampered if supply and production chains are undermined or disrupted by interventions such as these. Therefore we must minimise the disruption. One of the things I want to take very seriously in the context of our Green Paper and our examination of this matter, is how we can minimise disruption and offer the greatest possible predictability to companies that might be affected.

I just want to make this last point: Mr Caspary said – if I may elaborate on and embroider his words slightly – that we should keep to the rules and at all times seek to strengthen and improve them. I agree with that. That is precisely what we are doing in the DDA and why we have a multilateral system and process governing these rules and an institution that enables us to negotiate precisely the strengthening and the improvement that you advocate. That is why the WTO system is so important.

I would just like to say in conclusion that, whatever disruptions, interventions, distractions or diversions we have in a trade agenda which is very wide and very complex, I will always keep my eyes very carefully focused on the DDA, the importance of the agenda we are pursuing in the DDA and the vital importance of bringing those negotiations to a successful completion. I want to do that in respect not only of market access but also of trade rules and their strengthening, and that is what the Commission remains dedicated to achieving.

  Przewodniczący. Zamykam debatę.

Głosowanie odbędzie się w środę o godz.12.30.