Stenograma dezbaterilor

Miercuri, 14 martie 2007 - Strasbourg

15. Reforma instrumentelor de politică comercială ale UE (dezbatere)

  Presidente. L'ordine del giorno reca l'interrogazione orale dell'on. Enrique Baron Crespo, a nome della commissione per il commercio internazionale, alla Commissione, sul Libro verde della Commissione e la consultazione pubblica riguardante una possibile riforma degli strumenti di politica commerciale dell'UE (O-0002/2007 - B6-0009/2007).

  Ignasi Guardans Cambó (ALDE), deputising for the author. – Mr President, we have asked for this debate to examine the background and the purpose of the Green Paper adopted by the Commission on 6 December 2006.

With the Green Paper, the Commission intends to stimulate a debate over the use of trade defence instruments in Europe: countervailing, anti-dumping and safeguard measures. I believe that this is a commendable initiative and I am convinced of the value of this debate. We need to talk much more about trade policy and about the choices made by the European Commission and by the Council and we need to ensure that decisions are properly discussed before this Parliament. We need to give this Parliament more power and to make trade policy more subject to democratic scrutiny.

We are all living through a moment which many view as some sort of crisis period. We are living through a time when Europeans are asking themselves: what does Europe represent and why do we need such a complicated thing as the European Union in the first place? And, when these legitimate concerns are raised, the importance of the role of a united EU in the globalised world and the importance of having a single voice to represent and defend the interests of 500 million citizens in any negotiation with other trade partners in the world market are vital factors to be considered.

Global trade and its impact on the lives of our citizens and on the future of our businesses, big, medium-sized and small, play an essential role in the anxieties felt by many over what we usually call ‘globalisation’. And, while many of us believe that some of the criticism is no more than cheap demagogy, we must understand those anxieties and we must oppose pure determinism in the way this new world develops, in the way trade takes place, in the way wealth and poverty are distributed.

Europeans who lose their jobs when a company suddenly decides to move eastwards in search of higher profits cannot simply be told that times have changed and that they cannot stand in the way of progress. They want to know what is going on and they must have their voice heard by those that ultimately decide.

We should not forget that there is more than one recipe for economic growth and trade development. It is a matter of policy options whether the future of Europe belongs only to huge retail corporations and to importers or whether we can preserve a model compatible with our most essential social and environmental concerns.

Our strong belief in free trade is perfectly compatible with the need to ask for a level playing field. Even the most peaceful countries in the world – and Europe among them – know that a full commitment to peace does not necessarily mean that armies are abolished and all means of defence are to be destroyed.

So, we say yes to the huge benefits of free trade in our open world and we say yes to the fair implementation of the rules on which this global trade is based.

We welcome the Green Paper, which has the merit of opening a debate on this subject. Its text and the questions it raises already assume that something must be done to modify the current Community trade defence system.

This might be true. The recent footwear case has shown that the risk of deadlocks is real. They are clearly of no benefit to anybody. Nobody here is blindly defending inefficient European production or supporting a protectionist approach to this highly sensitive matter. Trade defence reform can be considered, if it is to be made more effective and more transparent.

The Green Paper can be a good starting point if all the stakeholders’ views are properly taken into consideration and if the Commission and the Council do not entrench themselves behind preconceived ideological positions. The decision-making process can also be improved and we need to ensure that decisions are taken by Member States based on the well-founded research carried out by independent Community bodies, rather than on the basis of national interests, or, if you prefer, national selfishness.

It is therefore important to improve and reinforce trade defence instruments instead of watering them down. On the other side, a fresh approach can be made to less traditional threats to a balanced and free world trade. Practices such as so-called social or environmental dumping need also to be confronted and, when necessary, new means of tackling them should be seriously considered as a matter of Community interest.

The following are the questions I would like Mr Mandelson to respond to tonight. Firstly, the Doha negotiations have been restarted and I sincerely hope that they will result in a clear success. In this respect, would it not have been better to wait for the successful conclusion of multilateral negotiations before starting this exercise, which might weaken our position in Geneva?

Secondly, can Mr Mandelson explain why his services are already applying quite a few questionable innovations mentioned in the Green Paper, even before the public consultation has come to an end and without any discussions either before the Council, or before this Parliament?

Thirdly, since the new trade defence system proposed by the Commission assigns a role to all possible interested parties, including those not related to the production of goods falling under the scope of the investigation, do you not believe that the time has come to allow trade unions to lodge a complaint, as foreseen by the WTO anti-dumping agreement?

I conclude by formally asking Mr Mandelson to provide assurances that the European Parliament will be kept informed at all stages of the process and that the views expressed by its members will be fully taken into account when discussing this highly sensitive matter.

  Peter Mandelson, Member of the Commission. Mr President, I do not think I have ever been asked to reply, in any Parliament in which I have been President-in-Office, to an opening question or a speech with which I have agreed more than the speech I have just listened to. In terms of its description of the spirit, purpose and context of this exercise, I must say I thought the honourable Member captured in every respect what we are doing most accurately and well.

The only stage at which, I have to say, I somewhat part company is when he asks me why our services – DG Trade – are applying new rules before the conclusion of the review. I have absolutely no idea what instances or issues he is referring to, and I would be pleased to hear because I do not know of any.

On 29 May last year, I informed the European Parliament of the necessity to review our trade defence instruments. I am pleased to be able to be back here and to update you on this process. We are now coming to the end of the consultation that we launched in December. That consultation solicited opinion from Member States, business, NGOs, individuals and, of course, the European Parliament. What it did not do in any way was question the importance of trade defence instruments. TDI is necessary to combat unfair trade in an international economy that has no international equivalent to the competition rules we take for granted in our own domestic economies. TDI, in my view, is the flip side of an open economy. It is the guarantee that others will not abuse that openness by trading unfairly. The Green Paper asks if we could use TDI better, if our tools have adapted to a changing global economy and whether our rules could be clearer and operate more transparently.

I think the justification for such an exercise is pretty obvious. The last review of our trade defence instruments was in 1996, and a lot has changed in the ways EU companies operate and as regards the role of global supply chains in our economy. Many more EU companies now produce goods wholly or partially outside the EU for import into the EU. These changes challenge traditional understanding of what constitutes EU production and the EU’s economic interests. They make a definition of European workers’ interests harder to write, as cases are more complex. Because these interests overall are those in which trade defence is rooted, that is good reason to assess the way we work and the way those rules operate.

But the Green Paper launched a consultation; it contains no recommendations for reform and is not intended to. It puts forward a set of questions. I have repeatedly emphasised that this is an open process and I have no preconceived ideas. There was a question asked of me about the intentions behind the six categories of question in the consultation paper. They are designed simply to put the various issues in context. Some are linked to the impact of globalisation on our trade defence system. Others, especially those related to transparency, were raised by stakeholders and experts with whom I had informal discussions in July last year.

So there are no intentions beyond the desire for intelligent debate and to rebuild the consensus and solidarity that has underpinned TDI and has come under strain in some recent cases. I fully echo the honourable Member’s initial observation: we need to replace national selfishness with European solidarity, and that is what I hope to rebuild through the process of this review.

I do not come to you today with substantive proposals because that is not my role at this stage. Right now, we are listening. The scope of any proposed changes will depend on what we hear. Somebody asked how this review fits with our attempts to reform anti-dumping rules in the WTO. The honourable Member reflected that question. Actually, it is a rather good question. It is vital to push through the WTO to ensure others match the kind of standards we apply to ourselves. We are doing that and we will keep doing that in the DDA negotiations.

But EU legislation on TDI already goes beyond WTO requirements in many ways. The most obvious examples are the compulsory lesser duty rule and the Community interest test which we apply in all investigations. These are rules we introduced because they make the system work better in the wider EU interest. Of course we will push others to adopt similar rules, but reform at the international level is difficult and some of our key partners are, frankly, stubborn. So long as our refinements do not put us at a competitive disadvantage, so long as they reflect the EU’s economic interests, why should we not pursue further reform?

That point relates to the question about the EU’s general posture on anti-dumping. Are we protectionist or do we follow a ‘response and defence’ approach? In my view, protectionism is the shielding of a domestic industry from foreign competition, from fair competition – tough competition, yes, but fair nonetheless. That is not the intention of EU TDI policy and I will, of course, remain vigilant on that. We are not going to see our trade defence instruments turned into measures to protect EU industry from fair, legitimate competition. A protectionist does not recognise the difference between tough competition and unfair competition. We do. Our system does. That is the difference between protection and protectionism.

The EU process is complaint driven. We act only when EU industry can provide sufficient evidence that they are threatened by unfair trade, but we defend European production only against unfair trade, and we are bound by law to ensure that any trade defence measure is truly in the wider European economic interest. We are prudent and we are restrained but, above all, we are objective and dispassionate. A number of questions have gone right to this issue of making sure that TDI is effective and serves Europe’s growth and competitiveness agenda.

As you know, this review is part of the global Europe framework policy that I launched last year, which is explicitly intended to put EU trade policy at the service of this growth and job strategy. Beyond saying that, I think TDI can and should be part of our wider strategy for ensuring that EU companies compete on a level playing field internationally. I think it is for stakeholders to suggest how well the system is working to that end, and that is the purpose of the review.

The question about the effectiveness of our measures is a good one. The possibility of review of trade defence measures always exists and measures cannot be extended without clear evidence that they are functioning as intended. The Commission also undertakes internal analysis to ensure the effectiveness of its work. DG Trade has recently started to analyse the impact of trade defence measures on certain companies and sectors. A credible TDI system has to be based on this sort of analysis.

A question was asked about public information and about the results of the consultation process. As you know, the Commission has very clear rules on the transparency of decision-making. Some of you may have attended the seminar on the Green Paper that took place only yesterday in Brussels. This event was open to the public and relayed on the website. Unless a contributor requests anonymity, we are publishing all responses to the Green Paper on the website of DG Trade. The whole process has been totally transparent.

Finally, on cooperation and dialogue with Parliament: you know that I have constantly appeared before you on all important trade policy matters, and I will continue to do so. Parliament has a very important role in the TDI reflection process. Your report will be central to the ongoing review process, and I will study its recommendations very closely.

I thank you for hearing me again today and I look forward to being back here again soon to discuss any and every issue of trade policy, on which I delight in remaining answerable to this House.

  Christofer Fjellner, för PPE-DE-gruppen. – Herr talman! Kommissionär Mandelson! Handelspolitiska skyddsinstrument –, namnet är ganska avslöjande, ett instrument för att skydda sig mot handel. Men att skydda sig mot handel är både dyrt och dumt och därför finns det få ekonomer som brukar stöda användandet av detta instrument. Jag har själv också flera gånger här i kammaren berättat om t.ex. hur konsumenter tvingas betala ett skyhögt pris för ett begränsat producentintresse. Faktum är dock att vi även i fortsättningen kommer att ha någon form av handelspolitiska skyddsinstrument. Till dess att vi har en gemensam konkurrenslagstiftning internationellt kommer nog alla länder att känna ett behov av att kunna skydda sig mot vad de uppfattar som illojal handel. Därför tror jag att vi måste utforma instrumentet nu, så att det blir legitimt och uppfattas så av alla –producenter, importörer, konsumenter och alla medlemsstater.

Vi måste bort från de förutsägbara konflikter där nord står mot syd och producenter mot importörer och konsumenter, för konflikterna i sig undergräver förtroendet för instrumentet och i förlängningen för EU:s handelspolitik. Skall vi ha någon konsensus kring dessa handelspolitiska skyddsinstrument måste vi efterlikna konkurrenslagstiftningen mer. Alla jag möter kräver t.ex. mer transparens, mer förutsägbarhet och framför allt mindre politiskt kohandlande i frågan. Jag förstår dem, för det är ärligt talat inte seriöst att medlemsstaterna bara ges några dagar på sig att utvärdera tusentals sidor inför beslut om antidumpingtullar. Att vi i Bryssel har en armé av konsulter som springer runt och jagar på rykten om förslag från kommissionen om nya skyddsåtgärder är inte heller seriöst, och inte heller det politiska kohandlandet, där skotullar kan bytas mot undantag mot arbetstidsdirektiv, som i sin tur kan bytas mot tullar på norsk lax. Allt detta visar att vi behöver en grundläggande översyn.

Världen har dessutom förändrats. I takt med att de globala tullarna blir bundna och lägre använder fler av våra handelsparter instrument för att stoppa import av varor på traditionellt sätt och Europa är den största aktören på världsmarknaden, därför måste vi visa ledarskap. Jag skulle därför vilja avsluta med att fråga dig hur vi skall kunna se till att denna reform faktiskt på allvar inte längre blir en reform som Frédéric Bastiat t.ex. skulle säga ”kastar sten i våra hamnar bara för att andra råkar ha steniga kuster”.

  David Martin, on behalf of the PSE Group. – Mr President, I welcome the Green Paper as it is clear that our trade defence instruments are in need of reform.

The vast majority of stakeholders are unhappy with the status quo. As they stand, anti-dumping and anti-subsidy investigations lack transparency, consistency, objectivity and are over-politicised and inappropriate to the realities of a modern economy adapting to the forces of globalisation.

While it is probably impossible to create a totally objective process, there can and must be improvements to the current investigation procedure in order to depoliticise it and ensure that the interests of all European citizens are best served.

In order to do this, as the Commissioner has indicated, we must redefine and give greater weight to the Community interest. If the European Union is to become more relevant to people’s lives, it must take genuine steps to look after citizens’ interests. This, of course, means the protection of jobs against unfair and anti-competitive behaviour. However, too often the narrow interests of an outspoken group of producers have won out against the interests of the millions of consumers who stand to gain from the process of globalisation and whose voice has often not been heard.

Moreover, the potential damage to European companies who set up global supply chains in order to remain competitive in a globalised economy must also be given greater consideration when considering the Community interest. In terms of the process of anti-dumping investigations, there is widespread dissatisfaction across stakeholders with the access they currently enjoy even to non-confidential documents and information.

The use of analogue countries must also be questioned. I am referring in particular to last year’s shoe case where the Brazilian economy was used to make comparisons with China, whereas in reality their two economies are as comparable as their football teams.

I would also be eager for the Commission to investigate the viability of expanding trade defence instruments to deter environmental and social dumping in order to ensure that an unfair advantage is not obtained through the abuse of the environment or through failure to ensure decent labour standards.

  Gianluca Susta, a nome del gruppo ALDE. – Signor Presidente, signor Commissario, onorevoli colleghi, l'interrogazione che stiamo discutendo e di cui condivido il contenuto è un richiamo forte al governo europeo, affinché l'Unione, senza rinunciare al proprio impegno per rilanciare il dialogo multilaterale, per aprire i mercati, per definire regole che incoraggino lo sviluppo e non lo frenino con ostacoli non tariffari, non intraprenda atti unilaterali che ci penalizzano al di là del voluto nei confronti, non solo dei paesi emergenti, ma anche delle grandi nazioni sviluppati, Stati Uniti in testa.

Rilancio della competitività e coerenza con la Strategia di Lisbona, apertura dei mercati, tutela dei consumatori, anche con l'introduzione dell'obbligatorietà del "made in" sulle merci importate, efficacia delle misure poste a difesa dell'effettività della libera concorrenza, sono tutti elementi inscindibili tra loro. Ribadiamo la nostra contrarietà ad un utilizzo distorto delle misure antidumping e a forme di mascherato e non concordato protezionismo, presentato come lotta alla concorrenza sleale, che i nostri concorrenti nel mondo ci imputano. Chiediamo tuttavia che la revisione delle norme antidumping da parte dell'Unione europea non sia un appoggio indiretto a coloro che, nel mondo, non sono schierati a favore della liberalizzazione.

In questa fase e ancora per un bel po' di tempo, credo, più che mai liberalizzazione e regole devono essere strettamente legate nell'interesse stesso del mercato. Ma occorre che le regole siano oggettive, come si è fatto per la definizione di quelle che presiedono alla concorrenza, certe, accessibili, efficaci e applicabili facilmente. Per questo occorre ridurre al minimo la discrezionalità nell'applicazione delle misure di difesa e che le piccole e medie imprese possano davvero far valere le regole quando i prezzi vengono alterati in modo abnorme.

Signor Commissario, noi auspichiamo che il governo europeo tenga conto di queste considerazioni, nella consapevolezza che l'economia reale dell'Europa ha bisogno di sentirsi parte di una comunità forte che la incoraggia, che la spinge ad accettare le sfide di un mondo sempre più globale ma che la difende rispetto a chi usa la violazione delle regole, per perseguire ingiustamente il proprio a scapito dell'altrui sviluppo.

  Zbigniew Krzysztof Kuźmiuk, w imieniu grupy UEN. – Panie Przewodniczący, Panie Komisarzu! Z zadowoleniem przyjmuję rozpoczęcie dyskusji na temat reformy instrumentów polityki handlowej Unii Europejskiej.

Obecny system instrumentów ochrony handlu, niezmieniany w ciągu ostatnich kilkunastu lat, nie jest już dostatecznie skuteczny, żeby przeciwdziałać negatywnym skutkom postępującej globalizacji. Ponieważ problem jest zbyt rozległy, żeby omówić go tutaj szczegółowo, chciałbym zwrócić uwagę na te kwestie, które powinny zostać zmienione.

Po pierwsze, podstawą do nałożenia przez Komisję ceł antydumpingowych na import jakiegoś produktu jest wykazanie, że jego cena na rynku Unii nie przekracza kosztów jego wytworzenia. Komisja bada więc przede wszystkim ceny czynników produkcji, np. płace, ceny materiałów, energii itd., nie bada natomiast czy przedsiębiorca ponosi koszty składek na ubezpieczenie społeczne pracowników, ani czy ponosi koszty przestrzegania norm ochrony środowiska. W ten sposób trudno jest stwierdzić, że podawane koszty są niepełne, a tym samym cena towaru, która ich nie uwzględnia, jest ceną sztucznie zaniżoną.

Po drugie, bardzo często stosunkowo wysokie ceny jakiś produktów pochodzących z Unii i, tym samym, brak konkurencyjności na rynku światowym, wynikają z konieczności spełnienia bardzo wysokich standardów, np. w zakresie dobrostanu zwierząt. Unia Europejska powinna się domagać, aby produkty tego rodzaju sprowadzane na rynek Unii Europejskiej z krajów trzecich, także spełniały tego rodzaju standardy.

Po trzecie, Komisja Europejska jest bardzo ostrożna w sprawie stosowania tzw. klauzul ochronnych, które mają na celu ochronę rynku Unii przed nagłym zalewem unijnego rynku przez dany rodzaj produktów. Tymczasem, instrument ten jest znacznie szybszy i łatwiejszy w użyciu niż cła antydumpingowe.

Wreszcie po czwarte, Komisja powinna się także starać, aby skrócić do niezbędnego minimum czas pomiędzy rozpoczęciem danej procedury, a wprowadzeniem w życie danego instrumentu ochrony handlu. W tej chwili ten czas wynosi wiele miesięcy, np. w sprawie ceł antydumpingowych aż 9 miesięcy, co naraża europejskich producentów na ogromne straty.

  Carl Schlyter, för Verts/ALE-gruppen. – Herr talman! Frihandel duger inte om den är orättvis, och handelspolitiska skyddsåtgärder är ett försök att göra den mera rättvis. Jag tycker att kommissionen lägger lite för mycket fokus på multinationella bolag och jag är orolig för en omdefiniering av gemenskapsintresse. Jag vill förtydliga att om ett EU baserat transnationellt företag är inblandat i social dumpning eller miljödumpning, själv eller via dotterbolag och underleverantörer, så kan de inte räknas som ett gemenskapsintresse enbart för att de är EU registrerade. De måste straffas för en sådan praxis.

I övrigt innehåller grönboken många intressanta frågor som vi skall diskutera, t.ex. ökad öppenhet och mer inflytande för småföretag och frivilligorganisationer: En viktig dimension saknas dock: Grönboken är inte tillräckligt grön. Jag saknar hela dimensionen om miljödumpning, låt mig påminna om punkt 11 i Muscardini-betänkandet från oktober: ”Europaparlamentet uppmanar kommissionen att överväga om det skulle vara lämpligt med en genomgripande översyn av bestämmelserna för användning av handelspolitiska skyddsåtgärder inom ramen för WTO”. Detta med syftet att inkludera icke efterlevnad av globala överenskommelser och avtal om miljö och sociala frågor som en form av dumpning eller subvention.

Länder som har en svag miljölagstiftning eller saknar miljöskatter som konkurrenter har måste nämligen anses subventionera eller dumpa produktionskostnader precis som er traditionell dumpning. Detta kommer att bli ett växande problem när den globala ambitionsnivån ökar. Då skall det inte finnas några frizoner för miljöförstörelse som underminerar det globala miljöarbetet. Vi måste t.ex. införa en Kyototariff för länder som inte lever upp till Kyotoavtalet. Sedan får andra dras inför WTO och kanske vinner vi, kanske förlorar vi. Många anser WTO vara mäktigt, men en sak är säker: Klimatet struntar fullständigt i WTO och kommer att förändras oavsett vad WTO tycker, om vi inte inför klimatåtgärder i handelspolitiken.

En slutkommentar: Om vi nu skall ha solidaritet och vi har en 1 procentgräns, när skall då Malta kunna tillämpa dessa skyddsåtgärder, när uppnår de mer än en procent av den interna handeln?

  Béla Glattfelder (PPE-DE). – A szabadkereskedelem akkor működik jól, ha a szabályait betartják. Ez azonban nincs mindig így. Az EU-val, az EU termelőivel szemben egyre gyakrabban alkalmaznak nem fair kereskedelmi gyakorlatot, dömpinget. Több dömpingügyben bebizonyosodott, hogy a fogyasztók helyett a kereskedők profitálnak. Nem indokolt, hogy az EU felvizezze a jelenlegi kereskedelmi szabályait. Nem fogadható el, hogy azokat a cégeket büntessük, akik Európában maradtak, akik megőrizték az európai munkahelyeket, és azokat jutalmazzuk, amelyek kivitték a termelésüket.

A tisztességtelen versennyel szembeni védelemre szükség van. A tisztességtelen kereskedelemmel szembeni szabályokat nem fellazítani, hanem alkalmazni kell. Különösen igaz ez olyan országok esetében, amelyek nem piacgazdaságok, például az állam bonyolult és nehezen áttekinthető módon támogatja az exportra termelő vállalatokat. Ráadásul Kína az egyre növekvő kereskedelemi bevételeit nem a demokrácia kiépítésére, nem a szegénység csökkentésére, a környezetvédelemre, a CO2 kibocsátás csökkentésére fordítja, hanem fegyverkezésre. Kína idén 18%-kal növeli a hadikiadásait. Ez a hivatalos adatok szerint eléri a 45 milliárd dollárt. Ráadásul egyes biztonságpolitikai szakértők szerint a fegyverkezésre fordított kiadásaik valódi összege ennek a háromszorosára rúg.

Tisztelt biztos úr! Nincs sok értelme annak, hogy az európai munkahelyek megszüntetésével Kína fegyverkezését támogassuk.

  Kader Arif (PSE). – Monsieur le Président, chers collègues, je tiens à remercier nos collègues Barón Crespo et Guardans Cambó d'avoir pris l'initiative de cette question orale à la Commission.

En effet, le thème de nos instruments de défense commerciale constitue un enjeu capital, non seulement pour assurer la protection effective des producteurs européens contre des formes de concurrence déloyale, mais également dans le cadre du débat plus large sur la place de l'Union européenne dans une économie mondialisée et sur les règles qu'elle souhaite promouvoir pour la réguler.

À cet égard, alors même que l'Union européenne a toujours défendu le système multilatéral de l'OMC, il semble pour le moins surprenant que la Commission lance une telle consultation publique et envisage une réforme potentiellement importante de nos instruments de défense, alors que les négociations à l'OMC sur les mesures antidumping, antisubventions et de sauvegarde n'ont pas encore abouti et que leurs résultats auront un impact sur la façon dont ces instruments seront utilisés.

Je tiens ainsi à rappeler à la Commission qu'elle a elle-même commandé une étude sur l'évaluation des instruments européens de défense commerciale et que celle-ci a conclu que le statu quo est à la fois la solution la plus raisonnable et la plus adéquate pour répondre aux préoccupations de toutes les parties. Cette étude soutient également l'idée qu'il n'y a visiblement aucun besoin urgent à l'heure actuelle de revoir ou d'altérer les instruments communautaires de défense commerciale existants.

J'aimerais donc savoir quels changements concrets la Commission envisage et comment le Parlement sera associé à tous les stades de ce processus. J'appelle donc la Commission à prendre en compte ces différents éléments, de même que l'avis des députés et les résultats de la consultation publique qu'elle a lancée pour la rédaction de ses futures propositions, dans le cadre des prochaines discussions au Conseil.

  Leopold Józef Rutowicz (UEN). – Zielona księga i debata na temat instrumentów polityki handlowej mają duże znaczenie dla gospodarki i mogą nam przynieść znaczną wartość dodaną.

Zagraniczna polityka handlowa musi sprawnie reagować na wszelkie zmiany, które mają miejsce w produkcji i zbycie towarów na rynku zewnętrznym i wewnętrznym Unii Europejskiej. Przykładowo, nasz rynek w ramach porozumień może promować zakup składników biopaliw, których zbyt ma duże perspektywy rozwoju, a ograniczać import, który zmniejsza np. produkcję przemysłu cukrowniczego. W naszych wzajemnych związkach powinniśmy pomagać naszym dostawcom, którzy w ramach umów promocyjnych lub stowarzyszeniowych mogliby uruchomić produkcję związaną z naszymi potrzebami.

Nasze działania w zakresie dumpingu są długotrwałe i niezdecydowane, więcej szkodzą niż pomagają. Przykładem może tu być sprawa sprowadzonych z Chin mrożonych truskawek. Załatwienie ochrony antydumpingowej trwało kilka lat, co spowodowało likwidację i upadłość wielu plantacji. Analiza sprawności działania i radykalne ograniczenie istniejących procedur biurokratycznych mogą doprowadzić do ustalenia jasnych reguł pracy i odpowiedzialności za właściwe i szybkie załatwienie wniosku.

Następnym problemem w Unii Europejskiej jest określenie zasad wspólnej polityki handlowej, by na zewnątrz nie doprowadzać do nieuczciwej konkurencji. Tematy, na które zwróciłem uwagę wymagają stałego monitorowania. Za sprowokowanie dyskusji na ten temat bardzo dziękuję kolegom.

  Daniel Caspary (PPE-DE). – Sehr geehrter Herr Präsident, geschätzter Herr Kommissar, geschätzte Kollegen! Die Europäische Union muss sich genau überlegen, wie sie ihre eigenen Interessen besser durchsetzen kann. Die Strategie, sich durch verfrühte Zugeständnisse spätere Vorteile zu verschaffen, führt sicherlich nicht zum Erfolg. Vielmehr muss es im Sinne eines freien und fairen Wettbewerbs sein, dass die Regeln eingehalten werden. Unfaire Handelspraktiken dürfen deshalb nicht geduldet werden. Wirksame Handelsschutzinstrumente sind deshalb zweifelsohne unverzichtbarer Bestandteil der europäischen Strategie zur Steigerung unserer Wettbewerbsfähigkeit. In diesem Sinne möchte ich auch dem Kollegen Glattfelder ganz herzlich zustimmen: Die Schutzinstrumente dürfen nicht weiter verwässert werden.

Aus meiner Sicht, Herr Kommissar, ist der Zeitpunkt des Grünbuchs sehr ungünstig, da den Ergebnissen der derzeitigen multilateralen Verhandlungen über die Handelsschutzinstrumente nicht vorgegriffen werden sollte. Es sollte vor dem Abschluss dieser Verhandlungen — egal, ob erfolgreich, was ich mir wünsche, oder erfolglos — keine Reformen in Europa geben.

Das Zweite: Die bisherigen Instrumente haben sich grundsätzlich bewährt. Die Reformen sollten daher an der Verbesserung des bestehenden Systems orientiert sein, sofern Reformen überhaupt sein müssen.

Wir brauchen eine klare Unterscheidung — wie Sie zu Recht angesprochen haben — zwischen echtem Dumping und wettbewerbskonformer Preisgestaltung. Antidumpingmaßnahmen dürfen nicht zu protektionistischen Zwecken missbraucht werden. Aber andererseits sollte der langfristige Erhalt europäischer Produktion nicht scheinbaren kurzfristigen Konsumenteninteressen geopfert werden. Es muss auf der Verfahrensseite sichergestellt sein, dass eine möglichst objektive Bewertung der Fälle erfolgt und diese frei von nationalen Sonderinteressen im Rat ist. Ich bin der festen Überzeugung: Während Drittländer intensiv und oft missbräuchlich Handelsschutzinstrumente gegen uns einsetzen, dürfen wir unsere nicht lockern.

Das alles geht mit den bestehenden Regeln, wenn sie denn nur richtig angewendet werden. Ich bitte Sie deshalb, in diesem Sinne sehr sensibel zu sein, und ich empfehle die anregende Lektüre meines jüngsten Berichtsentwurfs zum Thema externe Handelsstrategie, in dem ich ebenfalls auf das Thema der Handelsschutzinstrumente eingehe.

  Παναγιώτης Μπεγλίτης (PSE). – Κύριε Πρόεδρε, ευχαριστώ ιδιαίτερα τον Επίτροπο, κ. Mandelson.

Πιστεύω, κυρίες και κύριοι συνάδελφοι, ότι η αποψινή συζήτηση αναδεικνύει έναν εσωτερικό στρατηγικό διχασμό στην Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση. Πιστεύω ότι, όπως έδειξε και η παρέμβαση του κ. Fjellner, από τη μια πλευρά υπάρχει η Ευρώπη των μεγάλων εμπορικών δικτύων προστασίας των καταναλωτών, από την άλλη η Ευρώπη των παραγωγικών δυνάμεων, της προστασίας του παραγωγικού και βιομηχανικού ιστού, της απασχόλησης, της υπεράσπισης των εργαζομένων. Πρέπει να συμφιλιώσουμε αυτές τις δύο στρατηγικές προσεγγίσεις για το καλό της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης. Κανείς ασφαλώς δεν θέλει να μετατρέψει την Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση σε ένα προστατευτικό φρούριο. Από την άλλη όμως πλευρά θα ήταν ψευδαίσθηση να πιστεύουμε ότι η Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση μπορεί να παραμείνει αφοπλισμένη μπροστά στις προκλήσεις και τις αρνητικές συνέπειες της παγκοσμιοποίησης. Μπορεί να παραμείνει αφοπλισμένη απέναντι στις πρακτικές αθέμιτου διεθνούς εμπορικού ανταγωνισμού, απέναντι στο κοινωνικό και περιβαλλοντικό ντάμπινγκ ορισμένων αναδυόμενων οικονομιών στον αναπτυσσόμενο κόσμο.

Πιστεύω ότι η Πράσινη Βίβλος που παρουσιάζει ο κ. Mandelson μπορεί να αποτελέσει μια καλή βάση για περαιτέρω συζήτηση. Χρειαζόμαστε τα μέτρα εμπορικής άμυνας υπό τη βασική προϋπόθεση ότι θα είναι αποτελεσματικά, ότι θα βοηθήσουν στην υπεράσπιση των εμπορικών συμφερόντων της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης, ότι θα βοηθήσουν στην υπεράσπιση της αρχής της διαφάνειας και της ταχύτερης διαδικασίας λήψης αποφάσεων. Εφόσον, κ. Mandelson, η πρότασή σας πηγαίνει προς την κατεύθυνση της βελτίωσης των μέσων εμπορικής άμυνας της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης, μπορούμε πραγματικά να συζητήσουμε και να συμβάλουμε θετικά σ’ αυτήν τη συζήτηση.

  Danutė Budreikaitė (ALDE). – Šiandien diskusijoms turime Komisijos žaliąją knygą, skirtą Europos prekybos apsaugos priemonėms besikeičiančioje pasaulio ekonomikoje. Komunikate susirūpinta prekybos apsaugos priemonėmis, kurios nepakenktų iškeltai gamybai. Taip pat keliamas Bendrijos interesų, iškeltų gamybų, importuotojų, vartotojų ir net besivystančių šalių interesų derinimo klausimas.

Pateikti skaičiai rodo, kad JAV, Indija, saugodamos savo rinkas, iniciavo daugiau tyrimų apsaugos priemonėms taikyti nei ES. ES sunkiai sekasi įgyvendinti Lisabonos strategiją kuriant naujas darbo vietas, katastrofiškai trūksta inžinerinių profesijų darbuotojų, mokslininkų, galinčių kurti naujas konkurencingas technologijas.

Dabartinėje situacijoje jokiu būdu negalima lengvinti apsaugos priemonių, nes tai žlugdytų ES dar esančią gamybą, ypač smulkų ir vidutinį verslą, ypač naujosiose valstybės narėse.

Be to, aš paskatinčiau Komisiją greičiau atlikti antidempingo tyrimus, nes vilkinimas jau sužlugdė Lietuvos teleskopų gamintoją „Ekraną“.

  Francisco Assis (PSE). – Senhor Comissário Mandelson, esta iniciativa da Comissão tem desde logo o mérito de promover o debate sobre um assunto demasiado complexo para convocar respostas simples. Há, na Europa, sectores mais ligados a respostas mais demagógicas e mais populistas de todos os quadrantes que julgam ter respostas simples para esta questão. São respostas simples, mas erradas.

A questão fundamental é justamente a de saber como é que a União Europeia deve usar os instrumentos de defesa comercial que estão à sua disposição para garantir o respeito pelas regras de um comércio justo e para participar activamente no processo de regulação do comércio internacional.

Há que defender um modelo económico e social europeu, mas tendo sempre como limite não cair no erro do proteccionismo. Essa é hoje a questão fundamental com que a União Europeia está confrontada.

Já tivemos aqui oportunidade de ver que há divergências naturais e interesses contraditórios dentro da própria União Europeia. Os interesses dos produtores não são necessariamente coincidentes com os interesses dos grandes importadores e os interesses imediatos dos consumidores também não têm que ser necessariamente coincidentes com os interesses de uns e de outros. O que tem de haver é uma linha de orientação que tenha sempre em conta um princípio fundamental: saber como é que União Europeia vai participar activamente, seriamente e inteligentemente no processo de regulação do comércio internacional, procurando projectar para o plano internacional, no âmbito da própria OMC, alguns valores básicos que a identificam, uma economia competitiva e ao mesmo tempo uma sociedade mais solidária e mais coesa e muito atenta à preservação de alguns valores ambientais fundamentais.

É este desafio que se coloca hoje à União Europeia, pelo que creio que a Comissão faz bem em promover este debate.

  Benoît Hamon (PSE). – Monsieur le Président, je voudrais remercier à mon tour la Commission d'avoir lancé le débat sur les instruments de défense commerciale de l'Union. Permettez-moi de féliciter mon collègue, Ignasi Guardans Cambó, de nous offrir l'occasion d'en débattre aujourd'hui.

Ce qui me frappe dans le questionnaire de la Commission, ou, plus largement, dans l'ensemble de sa réflexion sur la politique commerciale, c'est l'absence de toute mention de la question des taux de change entre l'euro et les monnaies de nos principaux partenaires commerciaux. Monsieur Mandelson, comment pouvez-vous défendre efficacement les intérêts commerciaux de l'Union européenne avec un tel rapport entre l'euro et le dollar, l'euro et le yuan et l'euro et le yen?

Ainsi, pour parler d'une industrie qui occupe le devant de la scène aujourd'hui avec des plans sociaux, des suppressions d'emplois, des menaces d'externalisation ou de délocalisation, c'est-à-dire l'aéronautique, une variation de 10 cents dans le cours de change entre l'euro et le dollar équivaut à une perte ou à un gain d'un milliard d'euros dans le résultat d'Airbus. N'est-ce pas là le premier des dumpings, celui des dévaluations compétitives de nos concurrents? Résultat: il est devenu préférable, aujourd'hui, pour Airbus, fleuron de l'industrie européenne, de produire une partie de ses avions en dehors de la zone euro afin d'être compétitif avec Boeing. Merci du cadeau!

Je vous encourage, Monsieur Mandelson, à vous tourner vers la Banque centrale européenne et à faire en sorte, aujourd'hui, qu'elle soit responsable pas simplement quand l'euro se déprécie mais aussi quand il s'apprécie. L'heure n'est-elle donc pas venue pour le Conseil et la Commission, dans le cadre des pouvoirs qui leur sont attribués par l'article 111 du traité, de prendre enfin leurs responsabilités pour que nous puissions nous doter des indispensables orientations générales d'une politique des changes?

  Peter Mandelson, Member of the Commission. Mr President, by my reckoning 85% of those who have spoken have welcomed this review and therefore I feel gratified in having taken the initiative in proposing it to the Commission. I hope that this fact and the very intelligent and, in the main, very balanced contributions that have been made to this debate will be registered in the Council and by the Presidency. I do not know whether they are represented tonight. It appears not. But, nonetheless, I am sure that this fact will communicate itself.

Now, having welcomed the review, people do differ as to whether they want to use it to water down the existing TDI or not. I am going to disappoint both those categories, both the water-downers and the anti-water-downers, by saying that the aim of the review is neither to strengthen nor to weaken our existing trade defence instruments. Instead, the purpose is to make sure that we have rules that are clear, consistent and capable of commanding consensus across the Union. I am not fully satisfied that we are striking the right balance at the moment. Hence the controversy, hence the breakdown in consensus, hence the breakdown in solidarity amongst and between Member States that we have observed in recent cases. It is my responsibility to do what is necessary, if anything can be done, to repair that solidarity and make sure that we have consensus rebuilt.

Of course, we are faced with constant dilemmas in exercising and applying these rules. One person’s legitimate protection is another person’s protectionism and that is where judgement needs to be applied on the basis of the objective analysis undertaken by the Commission.

But I have heard the call of many in this House to ensure that our anti-dumping system is clear, transparent and objective. I have heard the concerns expressed about the length and lack of efficiency of the process and I have heard those who have said that they want environmental concerns better reflected.

I am not sure whether I will ever be able to fashion a set of instruments that will enable us to use trade defence to tackle global warming or bring climate security to the world. Of course, if this is a challenge that Members of this Parliament want to set us, then we will rise to it, but I am not sure that we will be successful, just as I am not entirely sure that we will be able to use trade defence instruments to address exchange rate policy either.

I am very grateful to those who have spoken and raised very important points. My own view, just to go back to the opening speaker in this debate, is that if you want to make and sustain the case for economic openness in Europe, which I do, then the people of Europe have to feel confident that, when they are unfairly threatened or harmed by the anti-competitive behaviour of others, that they have someone on their side: that someone is us. It is the essential and growing role of the European Union and of the European Commission in this global age. It does not make our task easier, but it makes it all the more necessary and important and it is a responsibility that, for my own part, I intend to see discharged in a fair, objective and dispassionate way.

  Presidente. La discussione è chiusa.

Dichiarazioni scritte (articolo 142)

  Tokia Saïfi (PPE-DE), par écrit. – La Commission européenne a adopté un livre vert pour lancer une consultation publique sur l'application des instruments de défense commerciale (IDC) de l'Union européenne dans une économie mondiale en mutation. Cette consultation publique devrait ouvrir la voie à des propositions de la Commission visant à réformer ses instruments de défense commerciale (antidumping, antisubventions et clauses de sauvegarde).

Or, ce projet de réforme doit être envisagé avec prudence. L'Union européenne ne doit pas agir unilatéralement et avec précipitation car toute révision de ses instruments ne peut se faire en dehors du cadre légal des négociations en cours sur les disciplines multilatérales concernant les IDC au sein du cycle de Doha. En plus de la nécessité d'être en ligne avec le calendrier de l'OMC, la Commission européenne doit aussi impérativement prendre en compte que la libéralisation des échanges rend les IDC indispensables.

Les IDC se caractérisent par leur utilisation modérée et ne sont en aucun cas les garde-fous du libéralisme ou les armes du protectionnisme. Ce sont en effet des régulateurs efficaces, pour rétablir les conditions d'une concurrence loyale sur les marchés commerciaux internationaux, et limiter les conséquences négatives de pratiques illégales sur l'industrie communautaire, la croissance et l'emploi en Europe.