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Pondelok, 9. júla 2007 - Štrasburg Revidované vydanie

18. Dohoda o prenose údajov podľa mena cestujúceho s USA (rozprava)
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  Przewodniczący. Kolejnym punktem porządku dziennego jest oświadczenie Komisji w sprawie porozumienia ze Stanami Zjednoczonymi dotyczące PNR.

 
  
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  Franco Frattini, Vice-President of the Commission. Mr President, as you already know, the United States and the European Union concluded talks on a long-term PNR agreement. I want to use this occasion to thank the German Presidency and in particular Minister Schäuble for his personal involvement in making this happen. The unanimous mandate given by the Council of Ministers has been fulfilled. The new agreement provides for a high level of data protection and important commitments on the handling of future European PNR data.

Several important interests had to be addressed. Firstly, the fight against terrorism and serious international crime, and in parallel the right to privacy and protection of fundamental civil rights, the need for air carriers to be able to comply with diverse legal requirements at an acceptable economic cost, the wider transatlantic relationship and the true international scope of these issues. The United States has agreed on a binding international agreement and by doing so they have understood the need for legal certainty.

The agreement is divided into three parts. First, an agreement signed by both parties. Second, a letter which the United States sent to the EU in which it set out assurances on the way in which it will handle European PNR data in the future. And third, a letter from the EU to the United States acknowledging the receipt of assurances and confirming that on that basis it considers the level of protection afforded by the US Department of Homeland Security to be adequate for European PNR data.

In the past, the exchange of undertakings was not binding in character. It was in my personal view, but also in the view of the Council, a major achievement of the new agreement. This agreement will be valid for 7 years, thus providing for a considerable period of legal certainty. There is not an extension of the time during which passenger data are kept from 3.5 to 15 years. There is an increase from 3.5 to 7 years of the time during which data are kept in an active file. The further period of 8 years that was already provided for in the previous agreements and that undertaking is not newly introduced in this new agreement.

The purpose for which data will be used remains the same. The number of PNR data has been reduced from 34 to 19 as a result of rationalisation and merging. Sensitive data will be filtered and made accessible only in exceptional circumstances which have been justified and will be deleted after 30 days. Those air carriers not already pushing the data will go from a ‘pull’ to a ‘push’ system as soon it becomes technically feasible. It is now up to air carriers to introduce new technologies as soon as possible, but both the United States and the EU agree that this system should be a ‘push’ system and no longer a ‘pull’ system.

The Commissioner for Justice, Freedom and Security and the United States Secretary of Homeland Security will be responsible for the review system. Finally, the United States has accepted a review system which was likely to be agreed at the beginning of our negotiations.

Protection given under the United States Privacy Act will be extended through administrative procedures to non-US citizens, in particular with regard to redress and correction, and, therefore, EU citizens will be entitled to protection under that Act. That was not the case under the previous agreement.

Common efforts are needed in order to protect our societies, including our human rights, from attempts by terrorists to undermine them. The recent events in London and Glasgow have shown that terrorism will stay with us for some time. That is why, as I have already announced, I will present a package in the autumn, which will include new measures – both legislative and operational – aimed at improving and increasing our capacity to cooperate at an international level against terrorism. I shall also propose that the EU Member States establish a European PNR system at national level in as many Member States as possible.

 
  
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  Carlos Coelho, em nome do Grupo PPE-DE. – Senhor Vice-Presidente da Comissão, Senhoras e Senhores Deputados, quero começar por felicitar o Vice-Presidente Frattini e a Presidência alemã pelo esforço colocado na conclusão deste Acordo PNR. Era necessário evitar o vazio jurídico que colocaria em dificuldades as companhias europeias e fragilizaria as garantias dos nossos cidadãos.

Sempre defendemos a existência de um acordo internacional ao nível da União Europeia, em vez de 27 acordos bilaterais, porque a União pode ter uma posição mais forte não só na prevenção e na luta contra o terrorismo, mas também na protecção dos direitos fundamentais. Por isso o Grupo PPE apoiou a atribuição de um mandato à Comissão para que pudesse reiniciar as negociações. Sabemos bem que eram negociações difíceis e sabemos também que o desejo de uma solução mutuamente aceite foi mais forte do lado europeu do que do lado americano.

Lamento porém, que este acordo seja composto por três partes: um acordo e duas cartas, sendo que o carácter vinculativo de todas elas não é igual. Há vários aspectos que sofreram uma evolução positiva e o Vice-Presidente Frattini fez referência a várias delas, mas existem outras que ficaram muito aquém das nossas expectativas. Destaco assim: primeiro, felicito a redução do número de dados PNR; felicito a passagem do sistema pool para o sistema push que foi agora referido. Sabemos que há 13 companhias aéreas que já implementaram o sistema, mas muitas outras ainda não. Gostaria de saber que tipo de iniciativas é que a Comissão está a preparar para ajudar e incentivar as companhias aéreas para procederem a essa alteração.

Continuo a não conformar-me com aquilo que considero uma duração exagerada das condições de armazenamento dos dados. Felicito a consagração da obrigação de informar adequadamente os passageiros e saúdo as formas de recurso para passageiros, que prevêem a possibilidade de rever e corrigir dados mantidos pelas autoridades americanas, embora continue a não existir um mecanismo legal sólido que permita aos cidadãos europeus recorrer no caso de uso incorrecto dos seus dados pessoais.

Receio que as medidas adicionais para a protecção de dados sensíveis não sejam suficientes e lamento que não seja totalmente garantida a utilização dos dados por outras agências americanas.

Muito foi feito, Senhor Comissário, mas muito ainda há a fazer e espero que o mecanismo de controlo que os senhores acordaram permita corrigir alguns dos aspectos negativos que ainda subsistem.

 
  
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  Σταύρος Λαμπρινίδης, εξ ονόματος της ομάδας PSE. – Κύριε Αντιπρόεδρε, ειλικρινά θα ήθελα σήμερα να μπορούσα να σας συγχαρώ για την επίτευξη συμφωνίας με τις ΗΠΑ· η πολιτική μου ομάδα γνωρίζει πόσο σκληρά εργαστήκατε και μάλιστα υπό την απειλή των ΗΠΑ, ότι ελλείψει συμφωνίας θα επέβαλαν μονομερώς στις αεροπορικές εταιρίες ακόμη χειρότερους όρους.

Δυστυχώς, αυτό που έχουμε στα χέρια μας, πρώτον δεν είναι συμφωνία με τις ΗΠΑ. Είναι στην πραγματικότητα συμφωνία με τις ΗΠΑ και με όποιες άλλες χώρες αποφασίσουν μονομερώς οι ΗΠΑ να τους μεταφέρουν τα προσωπικά δεδομένα ευρωπαίων επιβατών.

Δεύτερον, είναι μια συμφωνία που περιέχει δεσμεύσεις μόνο για την Ευρώπη και όχι για τις ΗΠΑ.

Τρίτον, ακόμη και εκεί που θέτει κάποια όρια η συμφωνία αυτή, τα όρια αυτά είναι τόσο ασαφή και τόσο γεμάτα με νομικά κενά ώστε στην πράξη να επιτρέπεται στις ΗΠΑ να κάνουν σχεδόν ό,τι επιθυμούν.

Γίνομαι πιο συγκεκριμένος: Πρώτον, η συμφωνία και η επισυναπτόμενη επιστολή των ΗΠΑ δηλώνει ότι η Αμερική θα μπορεί να μεταβιβάζει σε όποια τρίτη χώρα επιθυμεί τα στοιχεία που της μεταβιβάζουμε εμείς, χωρίς καν την υποχρέωση να μας ενημερώνει. Στην πράξη δηλαδή, η Ευρώπη υπογράφει συμφωνία PNR όχι μόνο με τις ΗΠΑ αλλά και με όποιες άλλες χώρες της γης αποφασίσουν οι ΗΠΑ, χώρες που δεν μπορούν να λάβουν απευθείας από την Ευρώπη σήμερα τα δεδομένα των Ευρωπαίων πολιτών, αφού δεν έχουμε υπογράψει εμείς συμφωνία μαζί τους. Μα περιείχε πράγματι μια τέτοια εξουσιοδότηση η διαπραγματευτική σας εντολή από το Συμβούλιο, να επιτρέψετε δηλαδή την ανεξέλεγκτη μεταβίβαση ευρωπαϊκών δεδομένων από τις ΗΠΑ εκεί που η ίδια η Ευρώπη δεν μπορεί να το κάνει;

Δεύτερον, ενώ η Ευρώπη δηλώνει ρητά ότι δεσμεύεται από τη συμφωνία, οι ΗΠΑ δηλώνουν ρητά ότι δεν δεσμεύονται από τη συμφωνία. Δεσμεύονται μόνο από τις μονομερείς διαβεβαιώσεις της επιστολής τους και από τους αμερικανικούς νόμους, οι οποίοι, αν αλλάξουν, επιφέρουν αυτομάτως αλλαγές και στη συμφωνία.

Τρίτον, όσον αφορά την ενημέρωση των επιβατών για τη χρήση των στοιχείων τους, δεν προβλέπεται υποχρέωση των κυβερνήσεων να διασφαλίσουν την ενημέρωση αλλά απλή προτροπή προς τις αεροπορικές εταιρίες να το κάνουν. Μα η ενημέρωση των πολιτών είναι ρητή επιταγή των ευρωπαϊκών νόμων. Γιατί την εγκαταλείψατε;

Τέταρτον, αν οι ΗΠΑ παραβιάσουν τη συμφωνία, η μόνη επιλογή της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης είναι να την καταργήσει εντελώς. Πώς θα γίνει αυτό, κύριε Επίτροπε, όταν, ακόμη και αν 26 από τα 27 κράτη θεωρήσουν ότι παραβιάσθηκε και ένα θεωρήσει ότι δεν παραβιάσθηκε, δεν μπορεί να καταργηθεί η συμφωνία σε ευρωπαϊκό επίπεδο;

Πέμπτον, οι αποκαλούμενοι θεμιτοί σκοποί χρήσης των δεδομένων είναι ανεξέλεγκτοι. Ενώ στην αρχή της επιστολής περιορίζονται στην καταπολέμηση της τρομοκρατίας και σοβαρών εγκλημάτων, αμέσως μετά επιτρέπεται κάθε χρήση σε οποιαδήποτε ποινική διαδικασία ή όπως αλλιώς απαιτείται από τους νόμους των ΗΠΑ – δηλαδή σχεδόν για τα πάντα.

Αυτό δεν είναι διεθνής συμφωνία, τουλάχιστον όπως οι πολίτες αντιλαμβάνονται τον όρο. Ελπίζω να αλλάξει στα καίρια αυτά σημεία προτού υπογραφεί.

 
  
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  Sophia in ‘t Veld, on behalf of the ALDE Group. – Mr President, first of all I note that the Council Presidency is absent during this important debate, which is remarkable as it was responsible for the negotiations. I am therefore thankful for the presence of Mr Frattini.

However, I would like to start by objecting to the implicit link that Mr Frattini makes with the failed terrorist attacks in the UK last week. I find that distasteful: it has nothing to do with PNR.

That brings me to an important point that this House has emphasised many times and that is the need for an evaluation. We need evidence that the use of PNR data leads to greater security and that they are not used only to catch people who commit document fraud, drug smuggling or whatever. We need evidence and not just anecdotes.

Mr Frattini says that this is a good agreement. Well, it serves two purposes: firstly, to legalise the transfer of data by carriers and, secondly, to provide, as he has said, a high level of data protection. Well, it fails miserably on the second objective; it is not legally binding, it explicitly states that it does not confer any rights on any person or any party. Well, how much clearer can it get? Then, it looks good superficially, but it is full of loopholes, open definitions and exceptions, when it comes to purpose limitation, for example, or the retention periods, which are going up to 15 years and maybe even more, and they will be applied retroactively. I am not a lawyer, but that strikes me as distinctly funny.

The reduction from 34 to 19 data is an insult to our intelligence. If you look at the data, it is not a reduction: the 34 are merged into 19 data fields. I am not stupid. We may not have any powers here but we are not stupid.

Then with pull to push: we got that promise back in 2004. We still do not have it! It is technically feasible, so why do we not have it?

Democratic oversight is completely lacking. This House may not have competences any more, but the national parliaments are completely excluded. Some of the national parliaments will get to approve the agreement, but they can only say ‘yes’ or ‘yes’, because they do not have time, they do not get all the necessary information – only very summary information – and it has just been pointed out that if one national parliament says ‘no’ then there is no agreement and no parliament will want to take that responsibility, so they have their backs against the wall.

With regard to the Privacy Act, it is good that it now covers European citizens. We asked for that many times. However, we all know that the Bush Administration uses all sorts of exceptions and exemptions to the Privacy Act, which, incidentally, affects American citizens as it does European citizens.

To conclude, concerning Mr Frattini’s proposal on a European PNR scheme – which is not a real proposal because he floated it at a press conference rather than putting a real proposal before this House, I think the timing – last week – was wrong and I would like to know what the justification is for such a scheme. We do not even know what purpose the PNR agreement with the United States serves. We do not know how many terrorists were caught, how many attacks were prevented and how many false positives there have been. We have insisted on an evaluation before signing a new agreement.

Finally, I would like to recommend that the PPE-DE Group support the joint motion for a resolution that we will negotiate tomorrow, read the agreement very carefully and read between the lines, because it is not as good as it looks.

 
  
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  Kathalijne Maria Buitenweg, namens de Verts/ALE-Fractie. – Voorzitter, dit is de derde overeenkomst die we in dit Parlement bespreken over de overdracht van passagiersgegevens aan de Verenigde Staten en het wordt er allemaal niet beter op. Commissaris Frattini, u zegt dat de gegevens alleen gebruikt worden voor de strijd tegen terrorisme of tegen de ernstige internationale misdaad. U kent het akkoord goed. U weet dus ook dat in bijlage II staat, zoals ook de heer Lambrinidis zei, or otherwise required by law, by US-law that is. En dat maakt het natuurlijk aanmerkelijk wijder.

In het algemeen vind ik dat u het ook hier niet beter moet voorstellen dan het is. Dat komt ook bij de gegevens, zoals Sophia in 't Veld net al zei. Ik heb hier de twee bijlagen voor me. Een oude bijlage bij de oude overeenkomst en een nieuwe bijlage bij de nieuwe overeenkomst. Dus de ene met de 19 informatievelden en de andere met de 34 informatievelden. Heel graag hoor ik zo meteen van u welke gegevens volgens u nu niet meer aan de Verenigde Staten gaan worden overgedragen. Ik wil dat heel specifiek weten, want volgens mij is er niet één informatieveld dat niet meer aan de Verenigde Staten zal worden overgedragen, laat staan dat het er 15 zijn.

Het andere punt. Over de push and pull. Ook hier heb ik er genoeg van dat er gedaan wordt alsof dat nu zo'n grote vooruitgang is. Twee keer eerder hebben de Amerikanen dat voorgesteld en nu heeft u weer opnieuw moeten onderhandelen opdat zij gewoon hun eigen woord nakomen. Dat is toch onacceptabel in de transatlantische betrekkingen.

Als laatste: ik vandaag nog gekeken op de website van het DHS om te kijken hoe je nu je verhaal kan halen. Daar zeggen ze: als u denkt dat u verdacht bent en dat u op een lijst staat om niet meer tot een vlucht te worden toegelaten, dan kunnen wij u niet laten weten welke gegevens wij over u hebben, maar dan moet u aan ons laten weten waarom u denkt dat u verdacht bent. Dat is toch geen manier om normaal verhaal te gaan halen! Dan zou ik dus moeten gaan zeggen: ja misschien ben ik dan wel vegetariër, maar daaruit kunt u werkelijk niets afleiden. Het is toch absurd dat je zelf geen toegang hebt tot de informatie waarop je blijkbaar wel wordt afgerekend.

 
  
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  Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert (ALDE). – Voorzitter, na eindeloos veel debat, trekken en duwen, had ik hoop op een adequate uiteenzetting als het gaat om de doeltreffendheid, ofwel de veronderstelde effectiviteit van een overeenkomst als deze. Echter, die hoop verdween als sneeuw voor de zon toen ik de overeenkomst onder ogen kreeg, de overeenkomst die met zoveel bombarie en triomf door onder meer de heer Schäuble, maar ook door uzelf werd aangekondigd.

Met geen woord is er gerept over die veronderstelde effectiviteit. Hoeveel terroristen zijn op basis van de bestaande interimovereenkomst inmiddels staande gehouden? Natuurlijk, net als de Commissie, begrijp ook ik het belang van het hebben van een overeenkomst, en niet in het minst vanwege de positie van de Europese luchtvaartindustrie. Rechtszekerheid is voor iedereen van belang. Maar regelgeving om de regelgeving is geen doel op zich.

Na het lezen van deze overeenkomst ben ik vooral van mening dat het sigaar-uit-eigen-doosgehalte heel erg hoog is. Het is en blijft voor mij volstrekt onbegrijpelijk waarom wij ons als Unie in zo'n underdogpositie laten duwen. Aan de volhardendheid die onze voorvechtster Sophie in 't Veld aan de dag legt, kunnen zowel Raad als Commissie nog een puntje zuigen. Alle lof dan ook voor Sophie en haar tomeloze inzet.

Tot slot, de strijd tegen terrorisme is natuurlijk een belangrijke. Maar ik kan me niet aan de indruk onttrekken dat we in dezen de realiteit uit het oog dreigen te verliezen. Deze overeenkomst is niet goed genoeg. Verre van dat.

 
  
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  Sarah Ludford (ALDE). – Mr President, I am afraid that I am going to continue in a slightly sceptical line, but first of all a question to the Commissioner. Could he please tell us what is the legal basis of this agreement from the EU side? The only reference I can find to any legal instruments in it are to US Statutes. I do not find any reference to legal bases from the Treaties. I remember talk of Articles 24 and 38 earlier on. If Article 38 is one of them, then why is the European Parliament not formally consulted?

Secondly, we hear a lot about needing this to fight terrorism. If terrorism is such an important priority of the EU, why have we gone four months without a counter-terrorism coordinator?

Thirdly, this agreement is about collecting a huge amount of data on everyone, as a basis for profiling, data mining etc., but we have very poor implementation of targeted measures against terrorism.

The Director of Interpol has just launched what has been called in the press an ‘unprecedented attack on the UK’ for failing to check visitors against the Interpol database of stolen passports. When the Commission produced a report last year on the common position of January 2005, it was distinctly unimpressed by Member States’ achievements. Only a small number of Member States had established infrastructures for authorities to search the Interpol databases – 8 of the 25 Member States did not respond to the Commission’s inquiries – and very few Member States had made sure that their law enforcement authorities searched the database. Member States are completely ignoring their obligations.

Finally, we have the EU APIS Directive of 2004, which should have been implemented last year. Could the Commissioner tell us whether the Member States have implemented this Directive, why it is concerned only with illegal immigration and why it does not provide for visitors to be checked against terrorist watch lists? There are plenty of measures out there which are being completely unimplemented by Member States. Let us do that first before we have mass surveillance of the whole population.

 
  
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  Franco Frattini, Vicepresidente della Commissione. Signor Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, ringrazio tutti coloro che sono intervenuti, anche se non condivido la maggior parte degli interventi, voi sapete che io mi esprimo sempre con assoluta franchezza.

Onorevoli deputati, gli accordi si fanno in due. Gli Stati Uniti hanno il potere di concordare o di rifiutare un accordo. Noi avevamo il dovere, in primo luogo, di chiedere un mandato al Consiglio dei ministri, mandato che ci è stato dato e all'interno del quale abbiamo operato. L'accordo è stato approvato dagli Stati membri – da chi cioè ci aveva attribuito il potere di negoziare – i quali hanno evidentemente ritenuto che tale accordo fosse uno strumento immensamente migliore dell'eventualità di non avere affatto un accordo dopo il 31 luglio di quest'anno, cioè tra pochi giorni.

Francamente, avrei voluto ascoltare da chi ha criticato aspramente tale accordo almeno una riflessione sulla conseguenza di non averne alcuno. Qualcuno di voi può immaginare che le compagnie aeree avrebbero negoziato bilateralmente con gli Stati Uniti, ottenendo un maggior livello di protezione dei dati personali? Credo che nessuno possa neanche immaginare che ciò sarebbe accaduto. La protezione dei dati personali dei cittadini europei sarebbe stata gravemente a rischio se fosse mancata la certezza delle regole giuridiche.

Come voi sapete, si tratta per la prima volta di un accordo vincolante, a differenza del precedente, il quale non aveva impegni vincolanti ma unilaterali. In tale accordo abbiamo riconosciuto il principio "push", chiesto a più riprese da questo Parlamento, quale criterio fondamentale. Se alcune compagnie aeree hanno dichiarato di non essere ancora in grado di passare dal sistema "pull" al sistema "push", ciò non dipende né dagli Stati Uniti né dall'Europa, bensì dal fatto che alcune di esse non sono ancora state tecnicamente in grado di cambiare il sistema. Poiché altre sono state in grado di farlo, ciò dipende dalla capacità tecnica e dalla buona volontà e noi le aiuteremo a compiere questo passo.

Noi abbiamo stabilito il criterio del sistema "push": tuttavia, se una compagnia aerea dichiara di non essere tecnicamente in grado di attuarlo, occorre valutare altre proposte. Possiamo bloccare per quella compagnia aerea il diritto di atterraggio? Io sono pronto a esaminare delle proposte ma abbiamo anche fissato una data, ossia la fine di quest'anno, la quale sembra tecnicamente fattibile, dal momento che la IATA (l'Associazione internazionale per il trasporto aereo) ci ha detto che è ragionevole pensare che entro sei mesi tutte le compagnie aeree saranno tecnicamente in grado di introdurre il nuovo sistema. Si tratta unicamente di una ragione tecnica.

Abbiamo stabilito la distruzione dei dati sensibili entro trenta giorni, il che non era previsto in precedenza; abbiamo stabilito che ai cittadini europei si applicherà la legge americana sulla privacy, che in numerosi dibattiti in questo Parlamento era stata indicata come una condizione importante e rigorosa: i cittadini europei potranno richiamarsi alla stessa legge dei cittadini americani qualora il Dipartimento americano abbia violato l'uso dei loro dati. Questo elemento non era presente, io sto citando dati di fatto.

L'onorevole Lambrinidis ha fatto un richiamo corretto ai paesi terzi. È vero che i dati in questione possono essere trasmessi ai paesi terzi ma, come già sapete, è stato previsto che il potere di controllo sul loro uso corretto sia lo stesso. Il fatto che vengano trasmessi a un paese terzo non pregiudica il potere di controllo: il paese terzo utilizzerà quei dati secondo le stesse regole stabilite nell'accordo in oggetto e nell'ambito della stessa facoltà, che noi conserviamo, di verificare se i dati sono stati o meno utilizzati correttamente.

Qualcuno ha chiesto a proposito della possibilità di denunciare l'accordo: questa possibilità ovviamente esiste, in caso di violazioni sostanziali e voi conoscente perfettamente la base giuridica adottata. L'articolo 24 del trattato è una base intergovernativa e non, purtroppo, una base comunitaria perché la Corte di giustizia dell'Unione europea ha deciso così. In precedenza era stato negoziato un accordo su una base che prevedeva la vostra piena partecipazione come Parlamento europeo. Purtroppo, una sentenza della Corte di giustizia ha stabilito che la base giuridica non era corretta e, come sapete, tutto è riconducibile a tale sentenza.

È vero, onorevole Lambsdorff, molti Stati membri non si adeguano alle norme europee, che dovrebbero invece pienamente applicare. Lei sa perfettamente non solo che io ho pubblicato, pochi giorni fa, lo stato dell'arte paese per paese ma anche che ho avviato delle procedure di infrazione e non credo di dover attendere lo svolgimento di queste ultime per adottare proposte utili per combattere il terrorismo.

Non condivido l'opinione di chi afferma: "Prima facciamo altre cose e poi occupiamoci del terrorismo". Il terrorismo è una drammatica minaccia attuale. Credo che questo accordo avrebbe potuto essere migliore se fossimo stati da soli a negoziarlo ma poiché gli accordi si fanno in due, esso è un compromesso e, nella logica del compromesso, il Consiglio dei ministri ha unanimemente adottato un parere favorevole. Io credo che abbia fatto bene a farlo e la Presidenza tedesca, che ha tanto lavorato a questo accordo, ha ottenuto il giusto riconoscimento.

Si tratta di un accordo vincolante che sicuramente aiuterà a combattere il terrorismo, o meglio ancora, a prevenirlo. Nessun membro della commissione LIBE può infatti dimenticare che il Ministro degli Interni degli Stati Uniti è venuto in Parlamento, consegnandovi degli elementi e in alcuni casi dei fatti precisi di sospetti terroristi che sono stati bloccati grazie ai dati PNR. Si è trattato di pochi casi, che riguardano tuttavia persone che erano state fermate grazie ai dati PNR e sono state poi coinvolte in attentati con esplosivi in altre parti del mondo.

Credo che nonostante le molte valutazioni di impatto che abbiamo fatte e che potremo fare, l'accordo in oggetto, che garantisce certezza del diritto, sia infinitamente meglio dell'assenza di un accordo. Mi spiace se non siamo d'accordo su questo punto ma io ho il dovere della sincerità.

 
  
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  Kathalijne Maria Buitenweg (Verts/ALE). – Mr President, we are lacking an important piece of information. The PPE-DE Group is basing its positive opinion partly on the fact that the amount of data now being sent to the US is reduced from 34 to 19. I have challenged the Commission to say which of the 15 pieces of information are no longer being transferred to the US, because as far as I see it – and the rapporteur Sophia in 't Veld also mentioned this – most of the fields are merged so that the change is mainly cosmetic. I would like to be convinced that the opposite is true. I would like the Commission to list the 15 information fields which are now no longer being transferred to the US.

 
  
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  Przewodniczący. Zamykam debatę.

Glosowanie odbędzie się w czwartek 12 lipca 2007 r.

 
Právne upozornenie - Politika ochrany súkromia