Presidente. − Segue-se o relatório da Deputada Ieke van den Burg e do Deputado Daniel Dăianu, em nome da Comissão dos Assuntos Económicos e Monetários, sobre o seguimento do processo Lamfalussy: futura estrutura de supervisão [2008/2148(INI)] (A6-0359/2008).
Ieke van den Burg, rapporteur. − Mr President, since 2002 I have been dealing with the issue of stability and supervision on the financial markets. Already at that time, in a report for Parliament on prudential supervision, I pleaded for a strong system of European supervision comparable to the European system of central banks.
Thank God we have the euro and the ECB in these turbulent times, but it is all the more embarrassing that we do not have this strong supervisory architecture. At the time I could not get a majority of Parliament behind a revolutionary reform; everyone was speaking about evolution. Nevertheless, when I have spoken over the years with a number of supervisors and other high-level representatives from the industry and supervision, people told me: ‘We cannot say this publicly, but you are right that something more has to happen; a real crisis situation will show that this is not sufficient’.
So we needed a crisis to create the sense of urgency. Needless to say, I would have preferred to avoid such a crisis and I wish that we had been better prepared. But the crisis is there now and the tsunami that Mr McCreevy still did not want to look at some weeks ago, when we dealt with the Rasmussen and Lehne reports, is there and it is unprecedentedly heavy, I would say.
I would now expect this momentum to be there, but I am disappointed and embarrassed that what we are doing in the European Union is too little, too late. The whole world is watching but we are not managing to really get a common approach. Even economists and commentators that were the cheerleaders of this wonderful innovative financial engineering that should not be hindered by regulation are almost unanimous in their disappointment at what Europe’s leaders have done so far. I could refer to the editorial in yesterday’s Financial Times for instance, where they say: ‘Thus far, Europe’s leaders have displayed a purely declaratory brand of unity, jointly proclaiming that they will each take care of the problems in their own back yards.’ So the Financial Times also concluded that we need a conductor and not only solo singers.
Tomorrow I think there is an opportunity for Parliament to show that we not only sing our own arias of regret and anger and play the blame game, but we can make a real contribution constructively to establish leadership and pick up on very concrete proposals that the European Commission could immediately initiate.
It may look quite technical for many other Members of Parliament but I can assure you that these have been well thought through and well prepared by us in the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs. It only needs leadership and courage from you, Commissioner, to give the green light and to start up the process. You should not listen too much to the City lobbyists keeping you from doing things, and of course you should listen to experts – but the political responsibility is with you to take these initiatives.
Mr Barroso has already mentioned some short-term measures. I am happy with what he said about a wise persons’ group but, here again, this was something that we in Parliament proposed two years ago, and we did not get your support for this. In relation to the CRD proposals, the measures for the credit-rating agencies: it is not quite clear to me what measures you are going to present on the recommendation on executive pay. Here, I hope, you are not listening only to the weak proposals of the Ecofin Council but that you are prepared to move a bit further. Finally, on the supervision: it is not only long-term measures for the wise persons’ group; we should already start with something now. Concerning my Amendments 5, 6 and 7: I hope there will be support for a proposal which immediately leads to an independent chair and vice-chair for the European supervisory structure.
Daniel Dăianu, rapporteur. − Mr President, I am going to use this moment just to say a few words on issues which seem to frame the public debate on regulation and supervision.
Firstly, free markets are not synonymous with no regulations. A lax monetary policy can lead to higher inflation and eventually to recession but cannot by itself cause the meltdown of a financial system. The features of the financial system that have brought the threat of collapse are structural traits of the new financial system.
The root cause of this crisis is an inadequately regulated financial system. Mortgages are not toxic per se; badly constructed securities based on them are toxic. The packaging of financial products can bring a lot of opacity to markets. Compensation schemes that make behaviour irresponsible: that is toxic. Misleading models are toxic; extreme leveraging is bad. Not to address these problems would be terribly wrong.
Not all financial innovation is benign. It is baffling therefore to hear that fresh regulation is bad because it would stifle financial innovation.
Building up proper regulation and supervision is not about bringing in socialism. It is about what kind of market economies we want to live in. That may lead to the recreation of elements of state capitalism, I agree, and that is for discussion.
Relying on industry-led initiatives is quite insufficient, for such initiatives frequently serve vested interests.
Why is it that we fail to learn from previous crises? Clearly, vested interests can have a long arm and try to influence regulations and supervision, including the behaviour of people like us.
Do moral values matter? Yes, I believe they do matter. The mess that we are in today is also because some believed that moral values do not matter in business. Regulators and supervisors should understand that there are systemic risks. They should always be alert to financial stability.
Strains and crises cannot be entirely avoided, but we can limit the damage they cause. We need comprehensive answers to crises and genuine coordination among the EU, US and other major financial centres, particularly during bad times.
Charlie McCreevy, Member of the Commission. − Mr President, let me start my remarks with the situation on financial markets. We are in the most serious crisis in living memory. What started as a sub-prime crisis has now moved way beyond this to embrace the whole economy. Fears about the ability to raise financing are creating even greater lack of confidence among all economic actors. Unless there is a rapid unfreezing of lending, we face a continued downward spiral with obvious impact on economic activity. Freeing up lending is the number one priority today. The measures taken by central banks today will be an important contribution to unblocking the flow of lending.
One thing we have seen over the past few weeks is that no economy or financial market is immune from what is taking place.
At ECOFIN yesterday the concern of Finance Ministers was evident. We recognised the need for governments to intervene to shore up the financial markets, whether it be by capital injections, guarantees or other means. There is no silver bullet here. Strong, fast responses are essential.
For its part, the Commission is showing its capacity to respond quickly. I will be bringing to the college next week amendments to the deposit guarantee scheme which will increase the minimum level of protection, as well as requiring Member States to put in place procedures for rapid pay-out.
At Ecofin yesterday it was agreed that Member States would increase the current level to at least EUR 50 000, with many going beyond this to EUR 100 000. This reflects to a degree the differences in average savings in Member States.
In addition, we are urgently putting into place changes to our accounting rules to ensure banks in the EU can avail themselves of the same flexibility that is offered to banks in the United States, namely the option for individual banks, if they wish, to move assets from their trading books to their banking books. This is a comitology measure to which I hope Parliament will be able to give its agreement as a matter of urgency. In the mean time, I would hope that national supervisors would apply these new provisions already so that banks who wish to could avail themselves of this new possibility for their third-quarter results. In addition there is the IASB’s acceptance of the US SEC’s clarification of the use of fair-value accounting when there is no active market information. This is also highly relevant for banks and should be used for third-quarter reporting.
We are, of course, continuing to work for the rapid implementation of the Ecofin road map to strengthen the European Union’s capacity to prevent and manage future financial crises. Overall the implementation of these initiatives is on track.
In times of crisis, politicians need to be seen to do things so as to reassure the public. Things are no different here in Brussels, except that our margin for manoeuvre is more limited. We do not have access to the financial resources that are necessary to combat this crisis. It is central banks and finance ministers who control the purse strings. What we have do is endeavour to maximise a common approach by Member States. There can be no doubt that, by working together, Member States are in a much stronger position to counteract the downward spiral we are currently in. We must continue to assist Member States to work towards common goals and shared approaches. Where we have the tools, we will continue to move forward quickly with any necessary measure.
Turning now to your report on the ‘Lamfalussy follow-up and future structure of supervision’, I would like to congratulate the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee – in particular Mrs van den Burg and Mr Dăianu – for their excellent work in producing such a thought-provoking and wide-ranging report. It highlights many of the challenges facing us now in the context of the current financial crisis. Innovative and well-thought-through proposals for regulatory and supervisory reform are crucially needed in the current situation.
You include in your report quite a demanding list of recommendations of where legislative action will be needed. It is heartening to see that so many of the issues you highlight are those that the Commission is also prioritising. In many cases, work is either ongoing or is planned on initiatives corresponding to the recommendations.
Let me mention here some of our most important ongoing initiatives, such as the Solvency II proposal, the proposals for revisions to the Capital Requirements Directive, which was adopted by the college of Commissioners last week, and the legislative proposal on credit-rating agencies, due shortly.
This reflects many of the recommendations put forward in your report.
The proposal for amendments to the Capital Requirements Directive covers critical areas and will fundamentally strengthen the regulatory framework for EU banks and the financial system. I hope you will fully support us on this. Reaching agreement by next April is essential.
Soon we will also go forward with a proposal on credit-rating agencies. The proposal will aim to introduce a legally binding authorisation and robust external oversight regime, whereby European regulators will have to supervise the policies and procedures followed by the credit-rating agencies. The Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) will play a strong coordination role.
On the EU supervisory framework, we are working on a revision of the Commission’s decisions establishing the three committees of supervisors. By the end of the year, these committees will be assigned specific, practical tasks, such as (i) mediation, (ii) drafting recommendations and guidelines, and (iii) an explicit role to strengthen the analysis and responsiveness to risks to the stability of the EU financial system.
Also, we have now to think about the longer-term vision of European supervision. Current events are showing its limitations today. The European Central Bank’s handling of the crisis has been exemplary. We now have to reflect seriously on how our supervisory arrangements for the cross-border financial institutions are constructed. As President Barroso announced earlier, we want to establish a high-level group to work through the various options and make recommendations on how we should proceed.
This takes up the suggestion in your report of a high-level group to tackle European supervisory arrangements.
I have been around here long enough to know that agreement on reforms to supervisory arrangements will not be easy.
But if we do not draw the lessons from the current crisis, then we are doing a great disservice to the European Union. This reflection should not blind us to the necessity to take the pragmatic steps to strengthen supervision that we have put forward in the Solvency II proposal and in the Capital Requirements Directive. Colleges of supervisors are essential.
The time ahead will be fraught. All of us have to take our respective responsibilities. Now is the time for us to show that, by working together, we can confront the challenges. I look forward to the strong support of Parliament in this regard.
Piia-Noora Kauppi, on behalf of the PPE-DE Group. – Mr President, I think it was Mrs Tumpel-Gugerell who said in Nice in mid-September that the worst mistake we made was not to include the financial supervisory architecture into the Maastricht Treaty. We should have dealt with this issue already, together with EMU final phase decisions.
I completely agree with this view, and Mrs Tumpel-Gugerell is definitely not the only one who has said this. But whom are we to blame for the lack of progress on supervisory architecture? I do not think it is the Community soldiers we need to blame – and by Community soldiers I mean the European Commission, which has delivered, and also Parliament: as Mrs van den Burg said, we have been dealing with this issue since the beginning of 2000, and we have made several proposals to the Council, but the Council seems totally reluctant to move.
I still wonder how it was possible to have the Lamfalussy regime in place. Maybe it was the deal between the UK and Germany to offer the CESR location to Paris which finally made the difference, but I think that in Council they have been totally unwilling to move forward on this issue. So now it is the right time; maybe it is too limited and too late, but at least something is also now being done in the Council.
Parliament has made several very important proposals. In order of priority, these three are the most important:
First, the mandatory colleges for all cross-border financial institutions, with legally binding rules on how they operate, how they share information and what kind of decision-making procedures they use.
Second, improved legal status for the Level 3 Committees, and more effective working methods for them too. Maybe on this issue, the Commission could give a little bit more room for manoeuvre to Level 3 Committees, so that they would not only be consultative but also decision-making bodies in the future.
And third, strengthening the role of the ECB in financial stability. The ECB should get more information. It should be linked to CESR and CEOPS and they should work more together.
Finally I want to say something about the transatlantic dialogue. Now is not a good time to put the transatlantic financial services on hold. I know this is not the fault of the Commission but it mainly depends now on US actions, but I think the more you can do to keep that discussion going, the better it is. It is very important for the future…
(The President cut off the speaker.)
Antolín Sánchez Presedo, en nombre del Grupo del PSE. – Señor Presidente, no podemos cerrar los ojos. La actual crisis revela un déficit de supervisión y de gobernanza económica en los mercados financieros.
Los ciudadanos tienen claro que identificar riesgos y prevenirlos es mucho mejor que corregirlos cuando se han traducido en desequilibrios y han ocasionado daños en los mercados financieros y en la economía real. Los tiempos en que una parte importante de estos mercados financieros funcionaba con opacidad y descontrol o abandonados al juego irresponsable de operadores imprudentes o sin escrúpulos deben terminar.
La libre circulación de capitales, lo mismo que la Unión Económica y Monetaria, la creciente complejidad en el ámbito de los servicios financieros y la globalización exigen ir más allá de un marco de supervisión nacional. Hay que avanzar hacia una supervisión europea. La Unión Europea no puede estar ausente y al margen de conceptos nuevos como la macrosupervisión, como los riesgos sistémicos, como la estabilidad financiera global, como la necesidad de participar en la gobernanza económica global.
Por lo tanto, es necesario avanzar hacia una supervisión europea y hacerlo decididamente. No hacerlo será un grave error estratégico, cuando el poder mundial está cambiando. Será necesario vencer las inercias para desbloquear Solvencia II y, por lo tanto, habrá que rectificar y aceptar un enfoque europeo integrado.
Garantizar coherencia y equidad en la solución de diferencias entre autoridades o entre los diferentes sectores financieros exige abandonar el unilateralismo y evolucionar hacia un sistema europeo auténticamente operativo. No se pueden solucionar las diferencias entre dos autoridades por la decisión de una de ellas solamente; no se puede ser juez y parte simultáneamente.
Por eso, apoyo calurosamente el informe van den Burg y Dǎianu. Agradezco que mis enmiendas hayan sido tomadas en consideración y hayan inspirado algunos de los compromisos, y espero que triunfen sus propuestas más ambiciosas. Será bueno para nuestros ciudadanos e indispensable para los mercados financieros.
Wolf Klinz, im Namen der ALDE-Fraktion. – Herr Präsident, Herr Kommissar, liebe Kolleginnen und Kollegen! Zu Beginn dieses Jahrzehnts hat Baron Lamfalussy einen Bericht vorgelegt, in dem er vorgeschlagen hat, wie die Aufsichtsbehörden in Europa besser und intensiver zusammenarbeiten könnten. Der Rat hat diese Vorschläge damals begrüßt, geschehen ist in der Praxis nichts. Wenn die Finanzkrise, die wir zurzeit durchleben, etwas Positives hat, dann vielleicht, dass das Thema der Aufsichtsverbesserung hoch oben auf der Tagesordnung steht.
Aber es ist schon überraschend, dass es eines Berichts des Ausschusses für Wirtschaft und Währung gemäß Artikel 39 bedarf, damit sich die Kommission mit diesem Thema wirklich aktiv auseinandersetzt. Feststeht, dass wir uns nur dann erfolgreich den Herausforderungen eines integrierten und wachsenden Finanzmarktes stellen können, wenn die Aufsicht zunehmende Konvergenz entwickelt und sich zunehmend integriert. Es sind inzwischen 58 von 100 Finanzkonglomeraten grenzüberschreitend tätig. Das zeigt allein schon, was es zu tun gilt!
Der Bericht der beiden Berichterstatter weist in die richtige Richtung, Piia-Noora Kauppi hat darauf hingewiesen: weitreichende Einführungen von Kollegien zur Aufsicht von grenzüberschreitend tätigen Finanzkonglomeraten, Stärkung der Stufe-3-Ausschüsse. Das ist in Ordnung, es sollte allerdings dabei berücksichtigt werden, dass die kleinen Mitgliedstaaten sehr häufig nur als Gastlandaufsicht in diesen Kollegien vertreten sind, und dass es deshalb besonders darauf ankommt, ihre Interessen angemessen zu berücksichtigen.
Kurz- und mittelfristig gibt es wahrscheinlich keine anderen Ansätze zu einer Verbesserung der Situation. Mittel- bis langfristig reicht das nicht aus. Wir müssen ein System haben, das tatsächlich die Bezeichnung einer europäischen Aufsicht verdient, und dieses System sollte sich am System der Europäischen Zentralbanken orientieren.
VORSITZ: MECHTILD ROTHE Vizepräsidentin
Pierre Jonckheer, au nom du groupe Verts/ALE. – Madame la Présidente, Monsieur le Commissaire, j'ai indiqué tout à l'heure, au nom de mon groupe, que nous soutenions les conclusions du Conseil ECOFIN. Je constate que les bourses plongent encore aujourd'hui, toutes les places européennes sont en chute, et en chute forte. Ces dispositions sont donc insuffisantes.
Sur les questions des responsabilités, je peux m'accorder avec Mme Kauppi sur le fait qu'au Conseil, effectivement, on a rencontré beaucoup de résistance, mais il est clair qu'au sein de la Commission, et vous en particulier, vous n'avez jamais été un fan – c'est le moins qu'on puisse dire – de plus de régulation au niveau européen. Tout votre mandat a été dominé par cette idée de self regulation liée au secteur. Et c'est la raison pour laquelle nous avons un retard considérable en matière de législation européenne sur les sujets dont on discute aujourd'hui.
Pour le rapport qui est soumis au vote demain, mon groupe soutiendra tous les amendements qui ont été proposés, notamment par la rapporteure Mme van den Burg, qui visent aussi, de notre point de vue, à ce qu'il y ait des dispositions plus contraignantes en matière de titrisation et des mécanismes qui handicapent les flux spéculatifs, et qui font que les comités Lamfalussy de niveau 3 soient un peu l'embryon de cette supervision européenne, de cet organe de supervision européenne que nous souhaitons.
C'est dans cette direction-là que nous devons avancer et je pense que la Commission, qui a le monopole de l'initiative législative, a failli à son devoir au cours de cette législature. De ce point de vue, les bonnes paroles c'est bien, mais vous avez très très peu de temps pour rattraper le temps perdu.
John Purvis (PPE-DE). - Madam President, I appreciate the co-rapporteurs’ willingness to work towards a consensus on this report. It is still not perfect as far as I am concerned – they will probably be pleased to hear that! – but it is much more appropriate than it was, and I feel we can be justified in supporting it.
I raise two particular points. Securitisation is seen as one of the demons of the current financial crisis, and now it seems to be seen as a necessary solution that we require originators to retain a percentage of their products. The Commission is proposing 5% in its capital adequacy review. We must at the very least have an impact assessment of this idea. I hazard to suggest that the only result will be to clog up the financial markets, and investors may even be tempted to omit full due diligence because of it. What really matters is being able to trace back originators through intermediate repackages and hold them to account for any misrepresentation, negligence or incompetence.
And the second matter is the way of settling disputes or disagreements in the colleges of supervisors. The rapporteurs have suggested a rather complex and formal appeal process with chairmen and vice-chairmen and a new bureaucracy. Surely such situations must be resolved quickly, and we have proposed therefore that the parties to any disagreement which cannot be resolved amicably should agree mutually on a mediator whose decision, at least in our view, should be final.
Lastly, Commissioner, I appreciate the introduction that you gave to your speech on the present crisis and am sorry you were not present during the previous debate with Mr Almunia and Mr Jouyet, when all these matters were represented by the Members of this Parliament, including myself. Maybe you can read through those speeches at great length and give us a response to our points of view.
Sharon Bowles (ALDE). - Madam President, this report is ambitious but also realistic. It analyses the causes of the financial turmoil and proposes future changes. Many of these changes, as others have said, would have been suggested without the present situation, because there was already a view that the Lamfalussy process had not progressed as far as it could or should have done.
So this is about the next generation of supervision, rather than a fix for the current crisis – though we think it will help prevent any similar occurrence, and now there should be more willingness at Member State level to have formal integrated decision-making structures.
But I reiterate that it is important for regulation to be smart. The solution to our current problems, and the calmer future when it arrives, will not take the form of regulatory spam with thousands of compliance tick boxes, which, as we now know, causes it to be pushed off to specialist departments to do the ticking, without proper ‘hands-on’ at board level.
We should have clear, simple rules. Some, yes, fuller in scope, but rules that do not swamp the big picture, so that those at the top are properly accountable and know what is going on.
Finally, as part of crisis resolution, we need improvements on winding up, but that is not just in crisis situations: we also need to look at cross-border winding up in normal times. Here again we may need to tread on territory that makes Member States uncomfortable, but it has to be faced.
Margarita Starkevičiūtė (ALDE). - Madame la Présidente, first of all allow me to disagree with those saying that we are not able to deliver an EU-wide response to the financial crisis. We responded by bold actions at national level where they were needed. Because our national financial markets differ, we have room for manoeuvre in stressful times, taking into account the different level and scope of our financial markets in Member States. In Vilnius we do not have a City, so our actions are different.
Somehow I am not surprised that the Commission proposals are based on the needs of cross-border financial groups; I have been a Member of the European Parliament for five years. What does surprise me is that the Commission cannot figure out that the cross-border group model cannot survive during downturns in the economy. We are witnessing this now. Business leaders have to come up with plans to modernise their model by adding flexibility at subsidiary levels, to reflect the diversity of needs of the real EU economy. The EU supervision and regulation system has to ensure the smooth restructuring of the financial industry. The starting point for reform has to be an answer to the question: ‘Which treasury will pay for the bail-out bill in the end?’ This is in the interest of the stability of the whole European Union.
However, I would like to ask my colleagues not to forget one small neighbour of the European Union which is closely related to us – Iceland. We have left them on their own.
Olle Schmidt (ALDE). - Fru talman! Finanskrisen slår nu mot Europa med full kraft. Det beslut som Europas finansministrar tog igår om en gemensam lägsta nivå på insättningsgarantin är ett viktigt steg. Likaså de räddningsaktioner av enskilda banker som skett. Dagens koordinerade räntesänkning av flera centralbanker är nödvändig för att återupprätta förtroendet för finansmarknaden. Dessa åtgärder är riktade och måste lösa en kris här och nu.
Vi beslutsfattare behöver också ta ett ansvar för en långsiktigt fungerande marknad. Det innebär att vi måste agera metodiskt och tydligt när det gäller ny lagstiftning som vi tar fram så att den också skapar goda möjligheter till tillväxt. Betydelsen av konsekvensanalyser är inte mindre på grund av finanskrisen, tvärtom är det i dag ännu viktigare.
De förslag som här presenterades i Lamfalussyprocessen innebär en bättre koordinering av europeisk tillsyn och är ett viktigt steg för en bättre europeisk marknad. Jag vill tacka de båda kollegerna, framför allt Ieke van den Burg som har gjort ett storartat arbete under många år och varit väldigt envis. Det är bra när politiker är det!
Förslagen bygger på redan existerande system som också måste bli bättre och effektivare, utan att ekonomin bromsas. Vi får inte blanda ihop vårt ansvar att reagera och krishantera snabbt med ett ännu större ansvar – det att våra regler måste fungera, inte bara i dessa kristider utan även vara till gagn för Europas framtida tillväxt.
Protektionism är aldrig svaret och detta är inte slutet för den globala ekonomin.
Avril Doyle (PPE-DE). - Madam President, I should like to welcome Commissioner McCreevy. I have listened to many colleagues’ reaction to the Irish response to our banking confidence crisis and liquidity problems and the follow-through from other countries in the days since, because, having criticised the Irish, they then had to follow on. It is more than ironic that we now debate today the supervisory architecture for financial services in Europe. I do not know if you could call it a happy coincidence or too little, too late.
Would things have been so much different if we had had some sort of supervisory architecture in place, particularly in terms of the rating agencies? It seems to me, when you go back to the first base, that they are really the cause of many of the problems. They allowed the sub-prime crisis to get out of control by continuing to give strong ratings to institutions that had packaged these devious products and sold them on. Hence the problem we have with us today.
Let us be sure that our response reflects cool heads and proper thinking, given the crisis within which we are talking.
Harald Ettl (PSE). - Frau Präsidentin, Herr Kommissar! Wann, wenn nicht jetzt, ist es notwendig, die europäische Aufsicht zu verbessern? Alle Vorzeichen sind klar, wir haben Handlungsbedarf, wir haben hier etwas zu tun. Die Vorkehrungen zur Überwachung der Finanzmarktstabilität sind absolut notwendig. Wir brauchen strengere Überwachungsregelungen für die makroökonomische Politik und die Finanzmarktaufsicht, speziell auch durch die Europäische Zentralbank.
Schlüsselparameter für das Treffen von Entscheidungen mit qualifizierter Mehrheit in den Kollegien der Aufsichtsführung für eine grenzüberschreitende Gruppe in den europäischen Aufsichtsbehörden sind absolut notwendig. Die Größe der Mitgliedstaaten haben wir natürlich gesondert zu behandeln und zu bewerten. Ein kleineres Land darf von einem größeren nicht überfordert werden. Die Entstehung einer Struktur auf EU-Ebene, die gesetzlich gestärkt wäre, um Blockaden zu durchbrechen und Konflikte zwischen nationalen und sektoralen Aufsehern zu lösen, ist absolut notwendig. Wir müssen auf Stufe-3-Ebene alle Managementmöglichkeiten ausnützen, um hier zu einer besseren Gestaltung zu kommen.
Czesław Adam Siekierski (PPE-DE). - Pani Przewodnicząca! Główną przyczyną obecnej zapaści w sektorze finansowym jest nieodpowiedzialność instytucji finansowych, niewłaściwe zarządzanie ryzykiem, złe pożyczki oraz dopuszczenie do nadmiernego zadłużenia bez odpowiednich gwarancji, co w konsekwencji doprowadziło do utraty płynności. Nieefektywny był także cały system nadzoru. Wydaje się, że obecne rozwiązania nie nadążają za dynamiką przemian w światowych finansach. Konieczna jest zatem aktualizacja, tak aby złagodzić potencjalne skutki kolejnych kryzysów w przyszłości. Biorąc pod uwagę obecną trudną sytuację na rynkach finansowych, należy nadać absolutny priorytet pracom legislacyjnym nad ustanowieniem spójnych i skutecznych środków nadzoru. Równocześnie uznając fakt coraz większej integracji i rosnących tu zależności poszczególnych rynków finansowych, należy zapewnić maksymalną kompatybilność nowego systemu europejskiego z systemem amerykańskim, japońskim czy chińskim.
Charlie McCreevy, Member of the Commission. − Madam President, can I briefly respond to a few points made. One relates to the previous debate, referred to by Mr Purvis. I was not invited to the previous debate. I would seldom pass up an opportunity of coming to the European Parliament to hear regular fans of mine on the Left praise my contribution to all things European. I could never miss an opportunity to hear people as eminent as Mr Schulz and Mrs Berès and many others speak about me in such glowing terms, so if I had been invited I would have gladly been here.
Regarding European solutions, I should like to give two examples.
My predecessor initiated an item regarding pay; this was issued in the form of a recommendation, which is possibly the one of the softest instruments that the EU has at its disposal. That was the only chance it had of having anything accepted, because the competence in this regard lies with Member States. We produced a report about a year and a half ago, but only one Member State has implemented most of the recommendations. The others have, by and large, ignored it. The Member State that implemented it – to give credit where credit is due – was Holland. I am not saying it has implemented every exact letter of it, but it is the only Member State that has gone down that particular road.
So a European solution was there. A lot of comment is being made at the present time about the bonus culture and executive remuneration. We tried to come forward with a type of European solution, which was put forward by Mr Bolkestein – I think it was technically me who put it into effect but I give credit to Mr Bolkestein for initiating it. That is what we did, and that is what our report shows.
Secondly, regarding supervision – the main subject of this report – I have spoken on many occasions in the Parliament and elsewhere about the issue of the cross-border supervision of financial institutions. I have spoken at Ecofin and at press conferences. It is practically impossible to move forward on this particular issue because Member States do not want us to have a European solution to this.
However, I should like to point something out to Members of the European Parliament.
Last year I initiated the Solvency II proposal regarding insurance, and advanced the idea of colleges of supervisors, group supervision and group support. Both in the Council of Ministers and in the negotiations with the European Parliament, it has been watered down considerably. If we are to get this directive through in the lifetime of this particular legislature, a lot of heavy lifting will have to be done with the Council of Ministers because there are large divergences, not only on those particular items but on other items as well.
Although I have been in politics for all of my adult life, and have ceased to be amazed at contradictory positions that politicians may adopt – and no doubt, if you look over my long political career, you might find some of them as well – I still find it totally ironic and amazing that, when we advocate a European solution, for example regarding supervision to do with Solvency II, the people who advocate European responses – both Ministers and Members of the European Parliament – are often the same people who come back and lobby for their own national state positions when a particular piece of legislation comes before them.
Those of us who were brought up in the Catholic religion know the prayer of Saint Augustine which says more or less, ‘Make me pure, but not just yet’. It is a bit similar here. This does not surprise me because I have been a politician for all of my adult life so I am used to that type of irony, to put it in its politest terms.
Be that as it may, there are only 44 or 45 cross-border financial institutions and we have a supervisory system which is way out of date for such operations.
Finally, may I make this point regarding the current crisis, which I have spoken about here and in other forums including press conferences. There is not one single magic bullet solution to all of this. If there had been, it would have been found long ago. These are unprecedented times and unprecedented responses have been given, both on this side of the Atlantic and in the United States.
Can I just remind Members here – and I am sure President Barroso did so as well in his contribution – that we in the European Commission do our best to coordinate and encourage Member States to give a total response. But, as I said in my opening remarks, these responsibilities lie with Member States, with Member States’ central bankers and with Member States’ ministries, because they are the elected people. They are the people who are in control of taxpayers’ monies and they are the people who must give the responses.
We have attempted – and we have succeeded somewhat – to get a European response in some of these particular areas. May I finally make the point that we must remember the structure of Europe. We are not a federation like the United States. We are not a central government, as found in the 27 Member States, and therefore we can only act to the limit of the powers that are given to us.
Ieke van den Burg, rapporteur. − Madam President, there is a lot of material for debate.
If I may quote the Commissioner on some of the things that he said, I should like to start with his statement that, in times of crisis, politicians should do something.
I think they should do it much earlier. Before a tsunami comes over us, we should take the measures and be proactive and prevent this type of thing from happening. So I agree with what others have said: if we are starting to act now, it is too little, too late.
My second point is this issue of the supervisory steps to be taken. You mentioned the Solvency II example where you also accuse us, Parliament, of weakening these proposals on group supervision. I do not think it is a weakening of the structure that has been proposed, as I think my colleague Mr Sánchez Presedo has mentioned already. What is proposed in fact by the Commission is a system of group supervision where lead supervisors, which often are the big Member States, take the lead in the process of a college.
I support the idea is that we should create colleges and that we should take some of these supervisory issues at a common, joint, level, because these cross-border groups act at the joint level. But the point is that there may be conflict between the interests of these lead supervisors of one national Member State and the supervisors of a host Member State, a big part of whose markets may dominated by this other group.
So in these cases of conflict, it is not fair to just say that you can have a sort of voluntary mediation by the Level 3 Committees followed simply by advice to the lead supervisor, and then in the end the lead supervisor can either comply or explain that he is deviating from this advice.
This is what is worrying the host Member States, and that is why you cannot stick solely to national supervisors dealing with this. There you need a neutral, impartial, independent arbiter at European level, and this is what I have already proposed in this report: not a bureaucratic supervision structure, just something to build on the present structure simply by adding to the other chairs of these three Level 3 Committees an independent chair and an independent vice-chair to act together with these Level 3 Committees and to deal in a binding way with the resolution of conflicts that may remain between supervisors.
This is what I think should be the guarantee to enable host Member States, smaller Member States in particular, to give their assent to this type of group supervision and these mandates to lead supervisors.
So this extra level, the extra add-on that we need to solve this problem, as well as for the short term, is in Amendment 7 that I have tabled for the vote tomorrow.
Another issue is the role of these supervisory committees as compared to the Commission. I also have the impression, like Mrs Kauppi, that in the Commission you would only prefer to have these supervisors as advisors and not really have an independent role for them to play, for instance in the international connection, in connection with the IASB standard-setting board or the FSF.
A direct question to you. We have been told that Mr Barroso was very proud that now the Commission is invited to this financial stability forum, but that although you were invited last week you did not go to that meeting. Maybe you can directly respond to say whether this true or not?
A final thing, on the executive pay recommendation, the only thing you have mentioned is that this is soft law and one Member State is following up on this. There is room to come up with stronger proposals, so please come up with your proposals.
Daniel Dăianu, rapporteur. − Madam President, let me say something which, in my view, has not been properly outlined. Regulation and supervision is not only about the building; it is about the object: what we regulate and supervise – and that is the crux of the matter.
We could have had an independent, EU-wide oversight body regulating in Europe and we would still have experienced the eruption of the crisis, because the problem is that the flaw lies in the financial system, not necessarily in the non-existence of a unique body of oversight and supervision.
Secondly, we are going to experience a very severe recession. We have to recapitalise the banks, and this will cost a huge amount of money. It is going to put tremendous pressure on public budgets, and I am asking myself – because we have to look at the broad picture – what is going to happen. I think that the current crisis shows that the size of the EU budget is nothing when the time comes to intervene and do something, so we have to rethink the EU budget.
(The President cut off the speaker.)
Die Präsidentin. − Die Aussprache ist geschlossen.
Die Abstimmung findet am Donnerstag, 9. Oktober, statt.
Schriftliche Erklärungen (Artikel 142)
Elisa Ferreira (PSE), por escrito. – Na ausência de mecanismos eficazes ao nível europeu, assistimos a uma cascata de intervenções financeiras de emergência, frequentemente desarticuladas e mesmo concorrenciais por parte dos diferentes países.
A acção a nível europeu surge de forma reactiva, "à posteriori", tentando evitar danos maiores, a confiança dos cidadãos na Europa sai debilitada.
A regulação deve ser pensada em tempos de bonança; nem os cidadãos nem nós, seus representantes eleitos, compreendemos a apatia da face às múltiplas iniciativas concretas deste Parlamento.
Hoje, no meio da turbulência não é o momento adequado para apurar responsabilidades.
Uma conclusão é segura, porém: há que mudar as regras do sistema.
O texto que amanhã vamos votar é uma peça central para a melhor regulação e supervisão dos mercados financeiros na União Europeia. É uma resposta proactiva deste Parlamento; não uma reacção a eventos recentes - eles só vieram, infelizmente, confirmar a sua pertinência.
Muitos dos que se opuseram politicamente a um mínimo de transparência, regulação e supervisão dos novos instrumentos financeiros estão hoje calados ou mudaram de discurso.
Esperemos que a Comissão vá finalmente assumir as responsabilidades de iniciativa que lhe cabem, reforçando a solidez das instituições financeiras europeias e ajudando a devolver alguma confiança aos cidadãos.
Cătălin-Ioan Nechifor (PSE), în scris. – Criza financiară care a cuprins aproape întreaga planetă trebuie să fie analizată la nivelul instituţiilor Uniunii Europene. Este inadmisibil ca cea mai tânără organizare teritorială din lume, Uniunea Europeană, să nu poată interveni în identificarea unei soluţii acceptabile de către toate părţile şi insist în crearea unor instrumente de acţiune rapidă, aşa cum este definit şi grupul de studiu la nivel înalt al CE. Trăim în prezent momente istorice, fără precedent.
Suntem în pragul unui colaps financiar care pune în pericol atingerea obiectivelor asumate de către UE, atât pentru cele 27 de state membre, cât şi pentru celelalte state de pe planeta noastră. Orice moment pierdut în proceduri administrative şi birocratice înseamnă pierderi uriaşe ale sistemului bancar internaţional, ale burselor financiare de pe toate continentele, precum şi degradarea standardului de viaţă pentru toţi locuitorii. Europa este obligată să ia atitudine şi să devină un port drapel al luptei pentru stoparea actualei crize financiare.
Avem acum nevoie să demonstrăm funcţionalitatea sistemului şi a instituţiilor europene, avem nevoie de coordonare şi colaborare între guvernele statelor membre, Comisia Europeană şi Parlamentul European. Avem maturitatea şi expertiza necesară pentru a interveni în rezolvarea unei situaţii periculoase pentru viitorul Uniunii Europene, dar şi al umanităţii.