Volledige tekst 
Procedure : 2011/2156(INI)
Stadium plenaire behandeling
Documentencyclus : A7-0361/2011

Ingediende teksten :


Debatten :

PV 01/12/2011 - 3
CRE 01/12/2011 - 3

Stemmingen :

PV 01/12/2011 - 6.11

Aangenomen teksten :


Volledig verslag van de vergaderingen
Donderdag 1 december 2011 - Brussel Herziene uitgave

3. Jaarverslag ECB 2010 (debat)
Video van de redevoeringen

  Πρόεδρος. - Το επόμενο σημείο στην ημερήσια διάταξη είναι η έκθεση του Ramon Tremosa i Balcells, εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής Οικονομικής και Νομισματικής Πολιτικής, σχετικά με την ετήσια έκθεση της Ευρωπαϊκής Κεντρικής Τράπεζας για το 2010 [2011/2156(INI)] (A7-0361/2011)

I would like to warmly welcome the new President of the European Central Bank, Mr Mario Draghi, and on behalf of all of us in the European Parliament, wish him every success in his very difficult task.


  Ramon Tremosa i Balcells, relatore. − Caro Presidente Draghi, le auguro il benvenuto in questo Parlamento.

Madam President, I want to thank the shadows, assistants and advisers for their very good collaboration on this report. Today we shall discuss the ECB report which was largely approved in the ECON committee last month. On debt crisis management, I welcome the ECB’s interventions in the markets. If necessary, I encourage them to continue these in the next weeks. These interventions have saved the euro; without them, the situation now would be worse.

We also deplore the hesitation in management of the crisis by the European Commission and by Member States, particularly those countries lacking reforms, as that has often pushed the ECB to act. We also express worries in the report about the limits of ECB interventions; monetary policy cannot solve every problem. Every country is responsible for its own fiscal situation.

We cannot ignore that there is a growing exposure to risky assets in the ECB balance sheet. The ECB is right now a lender of last resort. For the banking sector, the ECB has been a lender of last resort since May 2010. There has been an unlimited credit flow from the ECB to euro zone banks. Those banks have been buying huge amounts of public debt from euro zone governments. This massive ECB help may have taken away, or delayed, incentives to carry out reforms in some Member States.

In the report we voted to reinforce economic governance. I believe that fiscal discipline is a precondition for more European integration. I think that national and regional budgets should be supervised at the European level. The report we voted also shares Mr Trichet’s opinion regarding the need for a European Minister of Finance to coordinate a basic common fiscal policy and to enhance the effectiveness of the euro. This debt crisis shows that in a monetary union fiscal policy cannot be exclusively left to Member States.

The report we adopted also stresses the need for a European Treasury to relieve the ECB of its quasi-fiscal role. Until then, we suggest entrusting more tasks to the European Stability Mechanism. Mr Draghi, I would welcome your views on these proposals.

Finally, concerning transparency, I call for the publication of the minutes of the Governing Council meetings, as is the case with the US Federal Reserve, the Bank of England, the Bank of Japan and the Bank of Sweden. I consider non-publication a sign of weakness of the monetary union. We need public and individual accountability in the decision-making processes. With this in mind, we will vote today for the publication of the summary of Governing Council meetings. We hope that the ECB will listen to the democratic voice of this Chamber in this respect.


  Mario Draghi, President of the European Central Bank. − Madam President, I am delighted to be making my first appearance here as President of the ECB and I am honoured to present to you the ECB Annual Report for 2010.

The first thing I wish to do is pay homage to my predecessor Jean-Claude Trichet. During all his tenure he had a very fruitful and very constructive dialogue with the European Parliament and I intend to continue on this route with the same force, the same strength that he displayed.

Today’s session is an opportunity for us to take a wider perspective on ECB policies. In that way, I will also touch on a number of the broader themes of the resolution of the European Parliament. Let me begin with a few words on the main monetary policy decisions we have taken and the challenges we have faced during 2010 and 2011.

As you know, the ECB’s monetary policy is constantly guided by the goal of maintaining price stability in the euro area over the medium term. And when I say this, I mean price stability in either direction. This applies to both the setting of official interest rates and the implementation of non-standard measures.

This autumn, tensions in financial markets have intensified again with very adverse effects on financing conditions and confidence. Downside risks to the economic outlook have increased. The weaker degree of activity is itself moderating price, cost and wage pressures. It is in this context that the ECB decided to reduce its key interest rates by 25 basis points in early November 2011.

Dysfunctional government bond markets in several euro area countries hamper the single monetary policy because the way this policy is transmitted to the real economy depends also on the conditions of the bond markets in the various countries. An impaired transmission mechanism for monetary policy has a damaging effect on the availability and price of credit to firms and households.

This is the very important monetary policy reason for the ECB’s non-standard measures. But of course, such interventions can only be limited. Governments must – individually and collectively – restore their credibility vis-à-vis financial markets.

Tensions in sovereign bond markets have been accompanied by stress in the banking sector given the financial interlinkages between governments and banks. The ECB has taken several measures in 2010 and 2011 to ensure that banks continue to have access to funding sources. This has enabled them to continue lending to firms and households.

Most importantly, the ECB has extended its policy of fully allotting liquidity demanded by banks at fixed rates against collateral. The maximum maturity of these liquidity-providing operations was first extended to six months and then later to 12 and 13 months. A new Covered Bond Purchase Programme has recently been initiated, with a size of EUR 40 billion.

In addition, liquidity in US dollars has been offered to banks for three-month periods. Yesterday, in a globally coordinated action with the Federal Reserve, the Bank of Japan, the Bank of England, the Bank of Canada and the Swiss National Bank, we have agreed to lower the price on US dollar provision in other constituencies including the euro area. We have furthermore agreed, as a contingency measure, to establish temporary bilateral liquidity swap arrangements so that liquidity can be provided in each jurisdiction in any of the currencies, should market conditions so warrant.

As the ECB’s Governing Council meets on Thursday next week, we are now in the pre-decision period, and nothing that I say should in any way be interpreted in terms of future monetary policy decisions. But as far as the current situation is concerned, there is frankly not much more to say beyond what I have said in recent statements.

We are aware of the continuing difficulties for banks due to the stress on sovereign bonds, the tightness of funding markets and the scarcity of eligible collateral in some financial segments. We are also aware of the problems of maturity mismatches on balance sheets, the challenges of raising levels of capital and the cyclical risks related to the downturn.

Let me now turn to the overall functioning of Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union. Looking back at 2010 and 2011, notable progress has been achieved in reinforcing economic governance – though I recognise that this may not be evident in times of crisis.

The European Parliament has contributed decisively to that progress, and the ECB commends its work. The ‘six-pack’, the European Semester, the Euro Plus Pact: all these initiatives have set the stage for closer coordination and more intensive scrutiny of economic policies in the EU, particularly in the euro area.

Yet we are at a difficult stage at present. We have set up these new mechanisms, but their positive effects on the credibility of government fiscal policies are not yet visible. And the government changes that have taken place in some of the more exposed countries have not yet had much of an effect on the continuing fragility of financial markets.

Fundamental questions are being raised and they call for an answer. At the heart of these questions are not only the credibility of governments’ policies and the actual delivery of the promised reforms, but also the overall design of our common fiscal governance.

I am confident that the new surveillance framework will restore confidence over time. I am also quite sure that countries overall are on the right track. But a credible signal is needed to give ultimate assurance over the short term.

What I believe our economic and monetary union needs is a new fiscal compact – a fundamental restatement of the fiscal rules together with the mutual fiscal commitments that euro area governments have made.

Just as we effectively have a compact that describes the essence of monetary policy – an independent central bank with a single objective of maintaining price stability – so a fiscal compact would enshrine the essence of fiscal rules and the government commitments taken so far, and ensure that the latter become fully credible, individually and collectively.

We might be asked whether a new fiscal compact would be enough to stabilise markets and how a credible longer-term vision can be helpful in the short term. Our answer is that it is definitely the most important element to start restoring credibility.

Other elements might follow, but the sequencing matters. And it is first and foremost important to get a commonly shared fiscal compact right. Confidence works backwards: if there is an anchor in the long term, it is easier to maintain trust in the short term. After all, investors are themselves often taking decisions with a long-term horizon, especially with regard to government bonds.

A new fiscal compact would be the most important signal from euro area governments for embarking on a path of comprehensive deepening of economic integration. It would also present a clear trajectory for the future evolution of the euro area, thus framing expectations.

On the precise legal process that brings about a move towards a genuine economic union, we should keep our options open. Far-reaching Treaty changes should not be discarded, but faster processes are also conceivable.

Whatever the approach, companies, markets and the citizens of Europe expect policy-makers to act decisively to resolve the crisis. It is time to adapt the euro area design with a set of institutions, rules and processes that is commensurate with the requirements of monetary union.


  Gay Mitchell, on behalf of the PPE Group. – Madam President, I would like to thank the rapporteur and welcome Mr Draghi on his first appearance here. I also want to welcome what he said about Treaty changes and the need for faster responses. In addition, I welcome the ECB support for liquidity across the European Union, without which we would not have been able to survive so far.

There are really serious questions facing us at this perilous crossroads in European history. The issue of eurobonds and the need for a lender of last resort is high on the agenda, whether that lender is the European Central Bank or the EFSF or some other mechanism. The hour has arrived and we cannot dither any longer. This is the difficulty that we face and, if we do require Treaty change, then let us go ahead on some pro forma basis on the presumption that that Treaty change will be approved by Member States retrospectively. If it works, they will pass it, but passing Treaty changes takes time. In some countries we may even need a referendum.

I believe we do not have that time. It may be said that there is a strict legal requirement, but this is like saying that we cannot turn the Titanic right or left because the traffic light does not permit it. Let it trundle on, crash and we will then put the lifeboats out and pick up whoever is left. The European project, and the euro in particular, cannot be allowed to go the same route as the Titanic.

In natural justice, which in my belief precedes written law, our leaders must act now. We are in peril. This is not a job for politicians. It is a job for statesmen and stateswomen. I hope that we will rise to the occasion. I think we should all be asked to read and re-read the speech that the Polish Foreign Minister made in Germany very recently. I think what he has to say is really imperative for all of us to understand and to know to secure the future of the Union.




  George Sabin Cutaş, în numele grupului S&D. – Domnule preşedinte Draghi, bine aţi venit în Parlamentul European. Doresc în primul rând să îi mulţumesc colegului meu, dl Tremosa, pentru o colaborare foarte bună în ceea ce priveşte acest dosar.

În contextul actual de instabilitate financiară, rolul Băncii Centrale este practic unul fundamental. Acţiunile întreprinse de aceasta pentru a răspunde turbulenţelor manifestate de pieţele financiare, însă, nu sunt încă suficiente, din punctul meu de vedere. Independenţa Băncii trebuie, însă, menţinută, iar aceasta trebuie să devină, practic, aşa cum aţi spus, un creditor de ultimă instanţă pentru ţările din zona euro, acţionând pentru a lupta împotriva speculaţiei, a înrăutăţirii situaţiei de criză. Practic, prin asumarea rolului său de bancă centrală, aceasta ar contribui în mod semnificativ la creşterea încrederii în soliditatea arhitecturii zonei euro.

Totodată, un rol consolidat pentru Banca Centrală Europeană trebuie completat de măsuri, aş spune, radicale, precum emiterea de obligaţiuni comune ale zonei euro, armonizarea fiscalităţii statelor membre şi întărirea Fondului european de stabilitate financiară. În acest sens, salut propunerea Comisiei din 23 noiembrie pentru emiterea de obligaţiuni comune ale zonei euro. Statele membre, cred eu, trebuie să înţeleagă că această emitere este necesară pentru stabilitatea pieţelor financiare şi că fiecare are de câştigat dintr-o soluţie bazată pe solidaritate. Aceasta ar reduce, practic, costul total al datoriei şi ar garanta lichiditatea pe pieţele financiare europene. În final, mai doresc să spun un singur lucru, în care chiar cred: moneda europeană nu poate să funcţioneze fără uniune fiscală, care, practic, să o completeze pe cea monetară.


  Sylvie Goulard, au nom du groupe ALDE. – Monsieur le Président, Monsieur Draghi, nous sommes ravis de vous voir à nouveau aujourd'hui. Je dois dire que j'aurais même aimé qu'il y ait un peu plus de collègues dans cette enceinte pour vous rendre hommage.

Tout d'abord, un point sur l'indépendance de la BCE. Je trouve très bon qu'elle ait été rappelée sans ambiguïté par Mme Merkel, M. Monti et M. Sarkozy. Nous y sommes aussi très attachés au Parlement européen. Bien sûr, le principe d'indépendance vous donne une responsabilité accrue, à vous-mêmes, aux membres du Directoire et du Conseil des gouverneurs, mais nous vous faisons confiance pour prendre ces décisions.

Toutes les spéculations actuelles sur ce que pourrait ou devrait faire la BCE mais aussi – je tiens à le dire – sur votre organisation interne, Monsieur le Président, me semblent nuisibles à l'euro et à l'indépendance de la Banque centrale.

Je voudrais toutefois insister sur un autre point qui est celui de la communication. Il est tout à fait naturel qu'il y ait un débat, et vu l'ampleur des enjeux, un débat vif entre les membres du conseil des gouverneurs. Mais une fois que les décisions sont prises, je souhaiterais, pour ma part, que, collectivement, ce soit l'esprit d'équipe qui l'emporte et que les décisions soient défendues dans l'intérêt général européen avant toute considération nationale.

Je partage le souci de ce Parlement d'avoir une transparence accrue mais, en ce moment, le problème n'est pas de publier les procès-verbaux, c'est d'éviter que certains se répandent, dans leur presse nationale, pour dire des choses qui ne sont peut-être pas conformes à ce qui a été décidé collectivement.

On dit souvent que les politiques parlent trop. On dit souvent que les femmes parlent trop. J'ai l'impression qu'il y a des techniciens de sexe masculin qui pourraient être un peu plus silencieux. Vous avez vous-même fait preuve de doigté dans votre communication; nous vous rendons hommage sur ce point.

Je tiens à insister sur le fait que nous avons un seul traité, une seule monnaie et probablement un même souci de discipline. Je souhaiterais que ce souci de discipline et de respect de la règle, Monsieur le Président, vous le trouviez à l'intérieur de votre "Maison" lorsqu'il s'agit de défendre l'unité de la Banque centrale européenne.

Pour le reste, bon courage! Nous comptons sur vous!


  Kay Swinburne, on behalf of the ECR Group. – Mr President, I would like to congratulate President Draghi on his new role and wish him well in these turbulent times.

However, the debate currently raging between Chancellor Merkel and President Sarkozy and others concerning the future role of the ECB needs mentioning. Above all else, the independence of the ECB needs to be upheld, particularly in times of crisis. Credibility is key. If euro zone members want the ECB to act as the lender of last resort, they should legitimise this role as soon as possible.

The ECB should not be a political football for point scoring between national politicians. Perhaps, as well as looking at the measures other institutions should or should not be taking, Member States themselves should be looking to get their own houses in order. I include euro zone and non-euro zone members in this plea. We passed the six-pack on economic governance two plenary sessions ago. Member States should be looking to implement it as soon as they can, introducing credible and robust measures suited to their own countries to bring their budget deficits back down to acceptable levels. Credibility really is key.


  Νικόλαος Χουντής, εξ ονόματος της ομάδας GUE/NGL. – Κύριε Draghi, ο καταστατικός στόχος της Ευρωπαϊκής Κεντρικής Τράπεζας για τη σταθερότητα των τιμών, αδιαφορώντας για τις επιπτώσεις στην πραγματική οικονομία, μέσα σε αυτές τις συνθήκες αποδείχθηκε καταστροφικός. Το υπογραμμίζει και η ετήσια έκθεση της ΕΚΤ για το 2010. Προτείνω να αλλάξει ο ρόλος της Ευρωπαϊκής Κεντρικής Τράπεζας.

Δεύτερον, το 2010 η Ευρωπαϊκή Κεντρική Τράπεζα κρύφτηκε πίσω από τον πληθωρισμό με συνέπεια: πρώτον, να μη βάλει φρένο στην εκτίναξη των spreads· δεύτερον, να μη βάλει φρένο στη δράση της μαφίας των κερδοσκόπων των οίκων αξιολόγησης, που τους πέρασε και στο καταστατικό της· τρίτον, να κρατήσει ψηλά το επιτόκιο – εσείς, κύριε Draghi, το μειώσατε κάπως κατά το τελευταίο διάστημα – σε περιόδους ύφεσης πιο ψηλά από τις Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες, πιο ψηλά και από τη Μεγάλη Βρετανία.

Τέλος, τα περί ανεξαρτησίας της Ευρωπαϊκής Κεντρικής Τράπεζας είναι πολύ συζητήσιμα. Οι ανεξάρτητοι τραπεζίτες «αγιοποιούνται» σε σημείο πρωθυπουργοποίησης, όπως έχουμε σε δύο χώρες. Επομένως, η Ευρωπαϊκή Κεντρική Τράπεζα χειραγωγείται πολιτικά. Πρέπει να αλλάξει ο πολιτικός κοινοβουλευτικός έλεγχος στην Ευρωπαϊκή Κεντρική Τράπεζα.


  Godfrey Bloom, on behalf of the EFD Group. – Mr President, I hope I may call you ‘shipmate’ in private!

I would like to welcome the President of the Bank and to thank him for turning up, even if nobody else has. I have read this report, unlike most of my colleagues probably: power to suspend credit ratings, a European Monetary Fund to exclude the IMF, a single European Treasury issuing eurobonds and a single European Finance Minister, all of which of course would be unelected. It is a manifesto for European economic dictatorship, which is why I rather suspect the British Conservative Party will welcome it with open arms. If they do not vote for it they will abstain in a marked manner, as they usually do, and talk a good story back in London.

The President of the Bank reminds me a little bit of the poem by Siegfried Sassoon, the great war poet: ‘He’s a cheery old card’ said Harry to Jack, ‘As they slogged up to Arras with rifle and pack, But he did for them both with his plan of attack’.


  Andreas Mölzer (NI). - Herr Präsident! Die EZB ist ausschließlich für die Stabilität des Euro-Geldwerts zuständig. Ihre Hauptaufgabe ist es bekanntlich, die Inflation in der Währungsunion im Zaum zu halten. Mit dem Eingriff in die Anleihenmärkte, der seit Mai 2010 erfolgte und in dessen Rahmen sie mittlerweile bereits Staatsanleihen schwer verschuldeter Euroländer in Höhe von über 200 Mrd. EUR aufgekauft hat, hat sie definitiv ihr Mandat überschritten. Die EZB mag ihre Ankäufe als für die Stabilisierung der Kapitalmärkte wichtig erachten, tatsächlich jedoch wurde damit, dass die EZB sich in der Grauzone zwischen Fiskal- und Geldpolitik bewegt, die Zinslast der Eurokrisenstaaten keinesfalls gedrückt.

Ist erst einmal die Glaubwürdigkeit verloren, verursacht dies aber bekanntlich immense Kosten. In der Krise darf die EZB den derzeitigen Irrweg meines Erachtens keinesfalls weitergehen. Wir stehen schließlich mittlerweile dank diverser Fehlentscheidungen an der Schwelle zwischen inflationärem Wirtschaftsboom und deflationärem Wirtschaftskollaps. Nun gilt es um jeden Preis, die reale Gefahr abzuwenden, dass die wirtschaftlich erfolgreichen Staaten der Eurozone auch mit in den Abgrund gezogen werden.


  Ildikó Gáll-Pelcz (PPE). - Elnök Úr! Először is tisztelettel köszöntöm Draghi elnök urat az első parlamenti látogatásán. És szeretnék gratulálni Tremosa jelentéstevőnek is ezért a kiváló munkájáért, merthogy nagyszerűen írta le és érthetően az eurózóna árstabilitását és ezenkívül mindazokat az intézkedéseket, amit az EKB 2010-ben garantálni hivatott volt.

Az EKB-nak a jövőben is kiemelt felelőssége van az Unió monetáris politikája tekintetében, annak egységessége tekintetében, és azt hogy megfelelő kamatpolitikával éljen, mint ahogy azt 2010-ben meg is tette. Véleményem szerint az EKB-nak igenis bele kell tudni avatkoznia az adósságválság leküzdésébe, és esetenként elő kell segítenie a likviditást abban, hogy felvásárolja a túlságosan kockázatosnak hitt állampapírokat. Tegye ezt annak érdekében, hogy ezek a tagállamok egy pillanatnyi levegőhöz jussanak és újra befektetés-ösztönző, gazdaságélénkítő intézkedéseket tudjanak tenni. Természetesen egy megfelelő pénzügyi felügyelet mellett kell ezt tenni.

Ugyanígy jónak tartom azt az elképzelést, meg kell vizsgálni, hogy az EKB hogyan tud szerepet vállalni abban, hogy egy európai pénzügyi alapot hozzon létre, hogy a hitelezési politikából az IMF kihagyható legyen, és ezáltal csökkenjen az egyes nemzetközi intézményektől való függősége a tagállamoknak. Jó gondolat, vizsgálandó, szükséges hatástanulmányokat elkészíteni a tekintetben, hogy az eurókötvény-kibocsátási mechanizmust a jövőben hogyan hozzuk majd létre. Emellett nagyon fontosnak tartom, mint képviselőtársam is említette, a megfelelő kommunikáció biztosítását a hitelesség érdekében. Ezért a jelentéstevőnek azt a javaslatát, amely a kormányzótanács jegyzőkönyveinek nyilvánosságra hozatalát kérte támogatom és jónak tartom. Elnök úrnak pedig a további munkájához kellő elszántságot és sok sikert kívánok.

A felszólaló hajlandó válaszolni egy kékkártyás kérdésre (az eljárási szabályzat 149. cikkének (8) bekezdése)


  Godfrey Bloom (EFD). - Mr President, Ms Gáll-Pelcz mentioned the purchase of risky assets and I am a little bit confused. I am a professional economist. With whose money would you buy these risky assets? With whose money? Where would you get the money? Is it from old age pensioners in Yorkshire – my constituency – on GBP 100 per week? Where are you going to get the money to save this already failed project?


  Ildikó Gáll-Pelcz (PPE). - Köszönöm képviselő úr kérdését. Bár nem értek egyet már magával a kérdésfeltevéssel sem, mert Ön nagyon sarkosan közelíti meg ezt a kérdést. Valójában a gazdasági helyzet válságoktól terhelt. Amennyiben az EKB ebben meghatározó szerepet nem játszik és határozottan nem foglal állást, akkor valóban, az Ön kérdése immár tényhelyzetté fog alakulni. Nem gondolom, hogy helyes feltenni azt, hogy kinek a pénzéből fogja ezt megtenni, hiszen az Unió monetáris politikája, egységes politikája erre megfelelő alapot kell, hogy biztosítson a jövőben. Ha ezt nem teszi meg, akkor valóban az eurózóna válságán túl annak bedőléséről is szeretnénk beszélni, de én ebben Önnel nem vagyok partner.


  President. − It would be amazing if Mr Bloom were not being provocative!


  Liem Hoang Ngoc (S&D). - Mes chers collègues, Monsieur le Président de la Banque centrale européenne, ce rapport annuel fait enfin tomber certains tabous. Il invite la Commission à créer une Fondation européenne de notation de crédit et à envisager la suspension temporaire de la notation des pays faisant l'objet d'une aide de l'Union. Ce rapport reconnaît le bien-fondé du rachat, par la BCE, de titres souverains sur le marché secondaire, ce qui a permis aux banques de préserver leur bilan et de continuer à emprunter sur le marché interbancaire. Une crise de liquidité a ainsi pu être évitée.

Mais, pour désamorcer la crise des dettes souveraines, il faudrait que la BCE soit autorisée à intervenir sur le marché primaire, à l'heure où il devient illiquide. L'Allemagne a elle-même dû mal à lever des fonds. Les émissions de bons italiens se font à des taux toujours plus élevés. Faute d'une telle intervention, les risques de défaut de l'Italie compromettraient sérieusement la santé des banques. Celles-ci accorderaient moins de crédits et ne parviendraient pas à respecter les nouveaux ratios de solvabilité requis.

Le rapport du Parlement souligne aussi la nécessité d'un Trésor européen, qui doit pouvoir, comme aux États-Unis, émettre des bons du trésor fédéraux à moindre taux. En cas de spéculation, la BCE doit, comme aux États-Unis et au Royaume-Uni, être autorisée à racheter ces eurobonds. Savez-vous que ces deux pays se financent à des taux historiquement bas, et ce malgré la dégradation de l'un d'eux par une agence de notation?

Mes chers collègues, la situation n'est pas celle des années 20 en Allemagne: les capacités de production sont aujourd'hui sous-utilisées. Il n'y a donc pas d'inflation par la demande. Il n'y a pas plus d'inflation par les coûts en raison de la modération salariale, ou parce que la conjoncture morose réduit le coût des matières premières malgré la spéculation. Il est temps de reconnaître que l'heure est à l'audace monétaire, faute, pour l'heure, d'admettre l'absurdité de l'orthodoxie budgétaire en période de récession.


  Ivo Strejček (ECR). - Vážený pane předsedající, dnešní debata a nejen dnešní se točí kolem toho, zda jednotnou měnu zachrání změna Lisabonské smlouvy, těsnější fiskální koordinace, závislost či nezávislost Evropské centrální banky, evropský ministr financí či Evropský měnový fond. Já se domnívám, že je třeba si položit otázku obecnější, a myslím i daleko vážnější. Jde o krizi eura nebo jde o krizi dluhovou? V tomto kontextu je třeba se ptát, zda jde o dluhy, které jsou příčinou současného stavu nebo jsou důsledkem současného stavu, a zda to jsou dluhy, které vznikaly za posledních pár let nebo jsou důsledkem vývoje v Evropě za poslední dlouhá desetiletí. V tomto případě se domnívám, že není třeba na dnešní obtíže eura pohlížet jako na krizi eura, protože tyto obtíže pouze odhalily hluboké strukturální problémy části evropského prostoru. Proto je správná výzva k tomu, aby byla vedena fiskálně odpovědná politika členských států. Nicméně v takovém případě jsme postaveni před otázku, zda-li se změní lidské chování zvyklé na velmi vysoké nároky evropského sociálního státu či evropského státu blahobytu. Pokud nebudeme mít odvahu významně reformovat, dokonce transformovat sociální stát blahobytu, a zbavit se tak těžkých rozpočtových nákladů, pak se ze současných obtíží velmi těžko dostaneme.


  Paul Murphy (GUE/NGL). - Mr President, I have here a ransom note that was sent to the Italian Government on 5 August and sets forth a detailed prescription of austerity measures that had to be implemented. Every one of these measures involves attacks on the rights and living standards of working class people. The note is signed off by you, Mr Draghi, as well as by Jean-Claude Trichet, and comes from the European Central Bank. It finishes with a line that is fairly ominous: ‘We trust that the Government will take all the appropriate actions’.

The hostage here, of course, was the threat not to buy Italian bonds. Within the Troika, the ECB has been aggressively pushing the austerity measures that have pushed people to misery in Ireland, Portugal and Greece. The ECB has also been a central co-conspirator in the silent coups that have now been carried out in Greece and in Italy, replacing elected governments with governments of bankers.

Could you now please drop the pretence that has been repeated here today, that the ECB is in some way independent? It is independent only of any democratic checks and any accountability to ordinary people. It is subservient to the interests of the capitalist classes, the rich in the core euro countries, and it has acted as their shock troops throughout this crisis.


  Claudio Morganti (EFD). - Signor Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, la Banca centrale europea ha svolto discretamente bene, per quanto possibile, il suo ruolo durante la crisi, riuscendo a mantenere bassa l'inflazione e intervenendo con l'acquisto di titoli per limitare il dissesto finanziario.

Non sono d'accordo con quanti vorrebbero cambiare la formula della BCE o dotarla di nuovi poteri: la BCE non potrà mai essere la FED perché l'Europa è differente dagli Stati Uniti. La Banca centrale non deve però più permettersi in futuro di intervenire in maniera dettagliata con le sue letterine pubbliche. È giusto che indichi gli obiettivi da raggiungere, ma i metodi di intervento vanno lasciati agli Stati membri.

Negli ultimi tempi è emerso drammaticamente il problema dei titoli pubblici. Non è ammissibile che un paese in difficoltà, gravato anche dai vincoli dell'euro, sia costretto a pagare interessi altissimi rispetto agli altri Stati europei. Si deve arrivare ad una soluzione attraverso obbligazioni europee per evitare che un paese in crisi subisca oltre al danno, la beffa.


  Alfredo Pallone (PPE). - Signor Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, Presidente Draghi, mi permetta di darle il benvenuto in questa sala nella sua veste di neopresidente della Banca centrale europea a nome della delegazione italiana del Partito popolare europeo.

Ci stiamo dando delle regole sui bilanci e su una più rigorosa disciplina fiscale, ma in questo momento servono risposte immediate e ho l'impressione che il dibattito e i tempi sugli eurobond richiedano tempo, e noi di tempo non ne abbiamo. Abbiamo invece bisogno di misure per la crescita e contro la stagnazione. Nel corso dell'attuale crisi, la BCE ha avuto un ruolo importante attraverso l'acquisto dei bond degli Stati oggetto di speculazione, tenendo bassi costo del denaro e inflazione. Forse più che altre Istituzioni europee ha agito rapidamente ed efficacemente, ma la crisi è diventata la crisi della nostra moneta comune, dell'euro, che non ha il sostegno che ogni moneta deve avere. La BCE manca dell'operatività e dell'autorevolezza di una vera banca centrale.

È indiscrezione di questi giorni l'ipotesi che la BCE possa finanziare i paesi membri in via indiretta, ossia passando attraverso il Fondo monetario internazionale, riuscendo così ad avere un ruolo di prima linea nel contrastare la crisi del debito, aggirando i vincoli fissati per statuto, ma chiedo se sia veramente così. Questo mostra ancora di più la necessità di passare dalla BCE ad una vera e propria banca centrale europea che sia organismo di garanzia, sorveglianza, ma anche emissione di moneta.

La BCE deve diventare una banca prestatore di ultima istanza, come la Banca federale americana, garante della moneta, come avviene per il dollaro e la sterlina. Questo contribuirebbe, signor Presidente, a realizzare anche l'Europa della solidarietà e degli Stati come la volevano i nostri padri fondatori, da Adenauer, passando per Spinelli, a De Gasperi.


  Edward Scicluna (S&D). - Mr President, it is not a mere stroke of bad luck that we find ourselves close to the edge of a catastrophe. It is simply a calculated act of brinkmanship on the part of all actors involved in the fate of the euro which has brought us to this point.

‘Brinkmanship’ is defined as a calculated practice of pushing a situation to the brink of disaster in order to win an advantage from your opponent. We have witnessed brinkmanship by the creditor countries in the euro zone in order to extract the best terms possible from the debtor countries by minimising moral hazard and thus ensuring that they participate fully in the austerity programme laid out for them, as per conditionality clause, and to do this with the consent of the majority of the population in one form or other; brinkmanship by the indebted countries, knowing full well that it is not in the interest of the euro zone paymaster to let them default; brinkmanship by the European Central Bank, which refuses to be drawn into the position of lender of last resort with the hope that the euro zone will find its own political solutions; brinkmanship by those in the European Parliament who spent endless hours upping the sanctions within the six-pack and making sure that this time round they securely lock the stable doors, ignoring the observation that the horse has already bolted; and brinkmanship by the Council, who earlier on in the year made such words as ‘eurobonds’ and ‘voluntary haircuts’ taboo, hoping that the six-pack would provide a silver bullet.

However, brinkmanship through a valid process has its dangers. We are in danger of going down in history as a political class who, because of being smart with these actions and strategies, presided over the collapse of the euro and global depression. Technically the solutions have been known to all who wanted to see and listen. In whatever shape or form, they include instruments which combine an element of joint liability among all euro zone Member States and a watertight solution to the moral hazard issue. So let us act collectively on these core principles, for the rest is detail. But we must act now before it is too late.


  Jaroslav Paška (EFD) - Vážený pán komisár, vážený pán guvernér, v roku 2010 Európska centrálna banka napriek nesúhlasu viacerých krajín uplatňovala mechanizmus nakupovania dlhopisov štátov eurozóny na sekundárnych trhoch. V uplynulých dňoch však po prvýkrát nedokázala tieto nákupy sterilizovať. Z medzibankového trhu potrebovala stiahnuť 203,5 miliardy eur, no dopyt po jej sedemdňových sterilizačných operáciách bol na 194,2 miliardy eur. To nám naznačuje, že európske banky držia hotovosť a neposkytujú ani centrálnej banke, ale aj to, že objem nakúpených dlhopisov začína byť príliš vysoký na to, aby ho banka dokázala sterilizovať a cez nákup dlhopisov nenavyšovala množstvo eur vo finančnom systéme. Pokiaľ by trend neúspešných sterilizačných operácií pokračoval, pre eurozónu by to znamenalo obdobu kvantitatívneho uvoľňovania, a teda aj negatívny dopad na kúpnu silu európskej meny. Preto je, vážený pán guvernér, potrebné veľmi citlivo modifikovať politiku Európskej centrálnej banky tak, aby lepšie chránila svoju menu a cenovú stabilitu eurozóny.


  Mairead McGuinness (PPE). - Mr President, I thank the rapporteur for his work on this report, although the focus of the debate is less about 2010 and more about the future. I welcome Mr Draghi to the European Parliament. His predecessor, Mr Trichet, is a household name in Ireland, and I dare say his name too will reach that status, if it has not already – although I note yesterday that our Finance Minister, Mr Noonan, said that you were a man of fewer words than your predecessor. Well, I want to thank you for your words here this morning. They were considered, as we would expect from someone in your position, but they were also very clear. They were spoken with the solemness that is required of all of us on this occasion.

We do need to restore confidence. It is a very difficult thing to do once it is sundered. I look at Mr Bloom here, who asked questions and constantly does – as you do in a democracy – and I would say ‘be careful what you wish for’ because this is not a problem for the European Union or for the euro zone: the problem we have is a global one, and if you get your wish that the euro should fail and that this House should fall, your country too will face incredible problems. I would like us, in the heat of debate, to realise the significance of words on the efforts to restore confidence. This is about people I represent who need to know that those who are elected and in power will do the right thing on their behalf.

We need to move away, and I think we have, from the blame game that has happened in the past, because we now know that this is a much bigger problem for all of us. We need the euro to succeed and the ECB to be part of the restoration of both confidence and the new measures that we will require for the future.

(The speaker agreed to take blue-card questions under Rule 149(8))


  Godfrey Bloom (EFD). - Mr President, I certainly do not want it to fail but there is a feeling in the House that we have been hit by an asteroid or a tsunami, that this is not a problem of our own making. The reason the country and the European Union is in a shambles over the euro is of our own making: we have brought this upon ourselves. It is not an act of God. When will this House wake up to the fact we have done it to ourselves? Wake up, I beg you!


  President. − We will take that as a question.



  Mairead McGuinness (PPE). - Taking my own advice, let me be calm. I could not agree with you more, but it therefore requires that if we caused the problem we have the capacity, collectively, to resolve it. Shouting really does not work; it gets you heard but nobody listens.


  President. − Thank you for a wonderfully concise reply.


  Gay Mitchell (PPE). - Mr President, I wonder if Ms McGuinness would agree with me – given the experience we have had in Ireland with economic commentators at the height of the Celtic Tiger era and since – that using the word professional and economist in the same sentence is totally unacceptable.


  Mairead McGuinness (PPE). - Mr President, may I declare something. I am an economist, an agricultural one that is. I take Mr Mitchell’s question very seriously and this is why I would ask that everybody who chooses to be involved in this debate considers the consequences of their comments. It is OK in the public house to pontificate and swallow your last drink and go home. In this Chamber and elsewhere it is important that we use words that mean something and that we follow them with action.


  Paul Rübig (PPE). - Herr Präsident! Ich möchte mich bedanken. Für manche im Haus wäre es am besten, für sich persönlich eine eigene Währung zu entwickeln und dann nur mehr eigenes Geld auszugeben. Aber in der Praxis funktioniert das ganz einfach nicht.

Wir müssen gerade bei den Finanzmärkten jetzt darauf achten, dass die Liquidität erhalten bleibt. Deshalb möchte ich Frau McGuiness fragen: Glauben Sie, dass das, was gestern geschehen ist, dass die Zentralbanken massiv Geld auf die Märkte geworfen haben, zur Stabilität beitragen wird und dass das das Ende des Double-Dips ist?


  Mairead McGuinness (PPE). - Mr President, a signal has already been given that we are prepared to defend the system. The fact that we had coordination is hugely significant. This should be a sign to the markets, which – as Mr Van Rompuy said to this House – can move at the click of a mouse, while politics requires time.

I was very happy to see the developments yesterday and I think we all agree with these. We can make this work, but I would say that we must be single-minded, focused and – as I look to Mr Bloom – careful in our comments.


  Άννυ Ποδηματά (S&D). - Κύριε Πρόεδρε, με την έκθεση του κυρίου Tremosa i Balcells, το Ευρωπαϊκό Κοινοβούλιο αναγνωρίζει πλήρως ότι η Ευρωπαϊκή Κεντρική Τράπεζα έχει παίξει ενεργό και αποφασιστικό ρόλο σε όλη τη διάρκεια της κρίσης, αφότου ξεκίνησαν οι αναταραχές στις χρηματοπιστωτικές αγορές το 2007 και το 2008, μέχρι βεβαίως τις παρεμβάσεις στις δευτερογενείς αγορές των τίτλων δημοσίου χρέους της ευρωζώνης.

Παρόλα αυτά, γνωρίζουμε και γνωρίζετε ότι η κρίση εξελίχθηκε, δεν περιορίστηκε και έχει πάρει πλέον συστημικό χαρακτήρα, και βεβαίως είναι προφανές ότι αυτό δεν αποτελεί ευθύνη της Ευρωπαϊκής Κεντρικής Τράπεζας. Όπως συστηματικά και κατ’ επανάληψη έχει επισημάνει το Ευρωπαϊκό Κοινοβούλιο, η διεύρυνση και η διάχυση της κρίσης είναι αποτέλεσμα της διστακτικότητας, της αναποφασιστικότητας και των καθυστερήσεων στη λήψη και στην εφαρμογή των κατάλληλων αποφάσεων, πρωτίστως, σε πολιτικό επίπεδο από τις κυβερνήσεις των κρατών μελών.

Κύριε Πρόεδρε, η χθεσινή απόφαση της Ευρωπαϊκής Κεντρικής Τράπεζας, στην οποία αναφερθήκατε, να συντονίζει σε παγκόσμιο επίπεδο τις κινήσεις της με τις πέντε μεγαλύτερες κεντρικές τράπεζες για να αυξήσουν τη ρευστότητα στο παγκόσμιο χρηματοπιστωτικό σύστημα, έχει αναμφισβήτητα μία θετική διάσταση. Είναι μία απόφαση που θα έχει ευεργετικά αποτελέσματα, προσωρινά. Γνωρίζουμε όλοι ότι χρειάζεται άμεσα μία ολοκληρωμένη και αποτελεσματική απάντηση στην κρίση που θα πηγαίνει πιο πέρα και θα συνδυάζεται με τους κανόνες της αυστηρότερης δημοσιονομικής πειθαρχίας, στους οποίους αναφερθήκατε, με το νέο δημοσιονομικό σύμφωνο, όπως το χαρακτηρίσατε.

Κύριε Πρόεδρε, το είπαν και άλλοι συνάδελφοι, σεβόμαστε απολύτως την ανεξαρτησία της Ευρωπαϊκής Κεντρικής Τράπεζας, η οποία ωστόσο πέρα από τη σταθερότητα των τιμών είναι ο θεματοφύλακας του ευρώ, του κοινού νομίσματος, και πρωτίστως αυτό το ρόλο καλείται σήμερα, εκτάκτως, να παίξει. Γνωρίζετε και γνωρίζουμε ότι δεν υπάρχει τρόπος να βγούμε από την κρίση χωρίς ενισχυμένο ρόλο της Ευρωπαϊκής Κεντρικής Τράπεζας. Επαφίεται, βεβαίως, σε εσάς και στο εκτελεστικό συμβούλιο της Ευρωπαϊκής Κεντρικής Τράπεζας να εξετάσετε όλες τις προτάσεις και να αποφασίσετε το πώς.


  Olle Ludvigsson (S&D). - Herr talman! Det är viktigt att konstatera att Europeiska centralbanken har gjort ett bra jobb hittills under eurokrisen. Med den senaste räntesänkningen har räntepolicyn förts tillbaka till en rimlig nivå, och stödköpsprogrammet vad gäller de svagaste euroländernas obligationer har varit nödvändigt och balanserat. Att ECB har börjat använda en större verktygslåda än den traditionella har var varit motiverat med hänsyn till förutsättningarna.

Krisen är dock inte på långa vägar över. Vi har i dag ett läge där hela valutasamarbetet är i fara. En oväntad störning skulle kunna rubba den synnerligen bräckliga balansen i statsfinanserna och på finansmarknaden. Ett Lehman Brothers 2 är tyvärr inte ett helt otänkbart scenario.

I den situationen behöver en lång rad åtgärder självfallet vidtas från politiskt håll. Samtidigt kan det dock inte råda någon tvekan om att en del av lösningen även måste vara att Europeiska centralbanken tar en mer aktiv roll. Det måste kunna bli aktuellt att banken på något sätt går in som en långivare i sista hand. Detta skulle skapa en bättre stabilitet i valutasamarbetet på både kort och lång sikt.

Ett mer aktivt agerande är naturligtvis förenat med ökade risker i bankens balansräkning. Detta måste dock vägas mot det ytterst allvarliga riskscenariot att hela det gemensamma valutasamarbetet decimeras.

Det är nu dags för flera olika aktörer att tänka om när det gäller ECB. Banken skulle kunna göra mer än vad den kan göra i nuläget. Sådana insatser skulle effektivt kunna dämpa den rådande turbulensen. Det fungerar dessutom inte att vänta och se, utan åtgärder måste vidtas nu. Tack för ordet och tack till föredraganden och till ECB:s ordförande för hans närvaro i parlamentet.


  Mario Mauro (PPE). - Signor Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, signor Presidente della Banca centrale, come avrà intuito da molti degli interventi dei colleghi, oggi paradossalmente, seppur nessuno chiede alla Banca centrale europea di tracimare dai propri compiti, le si chiede però un contributo di visione. E questo contributo di visione la Banca centrale europea può esercitarlo, certo, andando a fondo di quella che è la propria natura, e quindi svolgendo il proprio ruolo fino in fondo, ma anche aprendosi a un dialogo con questa Istituzione, perché è di tutta evidenza che nel momento in cui giudicherà le ipotesi del collega Tremosa i Balcells pertinenti e confacenti a un disegno che intendiamo svolgere in positivo, noi avremo dato la possibilità alla politica di venir fuori dal guado.

Questo mi sembra il problema di fondo: siamo in mezzo a un guado e le indecisioni possono essere fatali, e se il guado non verrà superato, in fondo a questo percorso c'è un conflitto, un conflitto dalle conseguenze imprevedibili. Le chiediamo pertanto di aprirsi al rapporto col Parlamento e di avere fiducia in questa Istituzione. Oggi non siamo pochi, ma siamo sicuramente determinati ad aiutare l'Europa a compiere il proprio progetto.


  Elisa Ferreira (S&D). - Bem-vindo a este Parlamento, Senhor Draghi. Estamos a viver circunstâncias especiais e dramáticas, e elas requerem medidas determinadas e urgentes.

A espiral entre a dívida dos Estados e a dívida dos bancos tem de ser quebrada, mas neste momento a prioridade está em defender os Estados, em garantir que os países da zona euro e o próprio euro não sejam destruídos pelas agências de rating e pelos especuladores.

No relatório que aprovaremos, Tremosa i Balcells, temos propostas para repensar a arquitectura da zona euro, criar eurobonds e um tesouro europeu, mas tudo isso demora tempo. Neste momento estamos a falar de uma emergência e, nesse contexto, a única solução está nas mãos do Banco Central Europeu.

Tecnicamente, o Banco Central Europeu sabe o que é preciso fazer. Hoje não deve ficar inibido, na sua intervenção e na sua acção, por interpretações limitadas do seu mandato. O seu mandato é salvaguardar o euro, não é tratar da inflação. Num momento destes não há dúvidas: salvar o euro e fazer o que é preciso é aquilo que este Parlamento e os cidadãos esperam do Banco Central Europeu. Boa sorte e coragem, Senhor Draghi.


  Proinsias De Rossa (S&D). - Mr President, I want to welcome Mr Draghi. Yes, certainly we need more integration but our citizens will not accept it – simply will not accept it – unless there is more democratic accountability and more social solidarity, and that has to be borne in mind. To avoid a collapse into a recession that will rival the hungry 1930s we need to save the euro. The ECB must become the lender of last resort; there is no other way, in my view, that this can be done.

When Ireland crashed it had a budget surplus and a debt-to-GDP ratio of 25%; way below the 60% ceiling. Our problem arose because we nationalised private bank debt, which pushed our debt over 100% of GDP. Those debts were owed to French banks, to British banks, to German banks and indeed to a range of others. But we cannot survive, we cannot deal with that debt, without moving beyond the issue of fiscal consolidation and all of this language we have about fiscal discipline. We need growth in Europe, we need eurobonds, and I believe most of all we need a commitment to solidarity.


  Mario Draghi, European Central Bank. − Mr President, thanks to all the honourable Members of the European Parliament for their statements and their contributions. Let me say at the very beginning that I look forward to sharing views and to exchanging opportunities to look together at the present situation and to reflect together at this very difficult contingency.

I think many of your statements really come under one heading: how do we reconstruct confidence in the euro in the euro area? This process will have three pillars: the first one is what I called the setting of an anchor in the long term.

This redesign of the fiscal rules, of the fiscal compact – meaning by this word an agreement of new fiscal rules – is necessary to create trust for all countries who are members of the euro area. This design has not been completed. I think the next few days will be very important in telling us whether we will make any progress on this path. This is very important because, as I said, this gives the long-term trust which is necessary for the other two pillars.

By the way, for the second pillar, which is the design of a financing mechanism within the euro area, we have the EFSF. It is a design in which we have to put our confidence that it will work, but some steps are still needed, as we all know.

The third pillar is the national economic policy response and frankly we are seeing much improvement on that front. As I said before, I do believe that countries are nowadays on track. We see a good future but we have to be aware that in the end what matters is the delivery of the proposed reforms. Reforms – I do not want to be misunderstood – do not have to be focused only on the budget and budgetary issues; they also have to be structural reforms, reforms that enhance competitiveness and growth.

So these are the three pillars upon which confidence can be reconstructed. I have been asked: what is the role of the ECB in all this? Some of you said the ECB should do more; some of you said the ECB should do less. Let me start by saying the ECB can act within the Treaty so the ECB should not be asked to do things that are not within the Treaty. The ECB is the lender of last resort for solvent banks. The ECB has created an enormous amount of liquidity and we see that this liquidity is now being redeposited with the ECB deposit facility, which means that it is not so much the amount of liquidity that matters, but it is the fact that this liquidity is not actually circulating through the banking channel, through the financial system, through the credit channel.

In our view, the most important thing now for the ECB is to repair the credit channel in a way that enables this liquidity to actually finance the real economy – especially the small and medium-sized enterprises which are now in difficult conditions because they are the ones who mostly need the banks’ credit. The large corporations are on average, generally speaking, able to access capital markets on their own, so they are less dependent on the banks. That is why we have to make sure that a credit channel will start to work again. We have observed serious credit tightening in the most recent period which, combined with a weakening of the business cycle, does not bode at all well for the months to come. I think this is one of the first things.

Also, some of you mentioned the SMP, the Securities Market Programme, should be more active, less active. Let me say – and I did say this a moment ago – that the rationale for having the SMP active is that you want to make sure that you repair the monetary policy transmission channels. It is not to create liquidity, it is not to subsidise governments; it is to repair the monetary policy transmission channels. That was the rationale with which it started and that is still the rationale with which we employ it. By itself it is a non-standard measure and therefore by itself it is going to be temporary, it is going to be limited. Let me be clear about what I mean by limited. It is not eternal and it is not infinite.

We have to understand that the ECB can act within the Treaty. It would be a mistake to have the ECB acting outside the Treaty; it would not be legal and it would also be a mistake because it would, especially in some parts of Europe, undermine the credibility of the ECB, which nowadays is the strongest signature in the euro area.

I take the words on communication with great pleasure. It is true always, but especially in this situation of extreme difficulty, that it does not really make any sense to have a cacophony of voices anticipating monetary policy decisions, reflecting individual views and not the collegial decision-making process. I could not agree more. I will certainly take this message to the rest of the Governing Council, but, as I said, these are opportunities and occasions that are cherished very much and I will continue cherishing them. I am very much looking forward to my next meeting with the European Parliament, which is going to be in a few days with the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs.



Mr President, dear colleagues, thank you very much for your contributions to this debate. Mr Draghi, the ECB has rightly intervened and has prevented an even bigger disaster. The ECB has saved many Europeans from again experiencing massive bank runs. It seems that the financial markets do not trust the euro zone as an irreversible monetary union.

However, the pressure of the financial markets can help force the most indebted countries to curb their budgets and to increase their competitiveness. The crisis is an opportunity for more fiscal union, to underpin monetary union. The old nation states have to lose a part of their fiscal sovereignty.

The European crisis is also a political crisis. European citizens have discovered that the European Union does not have its own instruments to act against a huge crisis and that the European Union does not have its own resources to develop its own policies. The European Commission has been greatly weakened also by a lack of democratic legitimacy. Its President should be one of the Members of this Parliament.

Mr Draghi, good luck with your work; more than ever, in the ECB we trust.


  President. − The debate is closed.

The vote will take place shortly.

Written statements (Rule 149)


  Vladimír Maňka (S&D), písomne. Bez eura by svetová finančná kríza bola pre všetky európske krajiny oveľa horšia.


Dlhodobo silná libra od roku 2008 neustále znehodnocuje a s tým rastú ceny. Bez eura by sa severné krajiny Európy nevrátili k rastu tak rýchlo. Ak by existovala nemecká marka, bola by oproti svetovým menám taká silná, že by to škodilo rastu Nemecka. Bez eura by európske krajiny, ktoré viedli nerozvážnejšie fiškálne politiky a menej sa orientovali na zvýšenie konkurencieschopnosti, museli použiť krízové ekonomické opatrenia, aké boli prijaté v Argentíne v roku 2001. Ich morálny a hospodársky úpadok by mal hrozné dôsledky.

V jednej oblasti k zlyhaniu došlo: v riadení eurozóny.

Architekti eura vybudovali menovú úniu, pričom si boli vedomí, že jednotná mena by mohla vyvolať nestabilitu v krajinách so širokou škálou rôznych hospodárskych a výrobných štruktúr. Títo architekti si možno mysleli, že kroky k väčšej politickej únii sa uskutočnia, keď budú naozaj potrebné. Ten čas nakoniec nastal dnes, keď je eurozóna plne vystavená účinkom dlhovej krízy.

Musíme vytvoriť systém, ktorý umožňuje lepšiu kontrolu nefunkčných rozpočtových politík v štátoch, ktoré sú členmi eurozóny.

Juridische mededeling - Privacybeleid