Texto íntegro 
Procedimiento : 2011/2926(RSP)
Ciclo de vida en sesión
Ciclos relativos a los documentos :

Textos presentados :

O-000306/2011 (B7-0670/2011)

Debates :

PV 14/12/2011 - 6
CRE 14/12/2011 - 6

Votaciones :

Textos aprobados :

Miércoles 14 de diciembre de 2011 - Estrasburgo Edición revisada

6. Proyecto de cuadro de indicadores para la supervisión de los desequilibrios macroeconómicos (debate)
Vídeo de las intervenciones

  Πρόεδρος. - Το επόμενο σημείο είναι η συζήτηση σχετικά με προφορική ερώτηση προς την Επιτροπή σχετικά με σχέδιο πίνακα αποτελεσμάτων για την επιτήρηση των μακροοικονομικών ανισορροπιών της Sharon Bowles, εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής Οικονομικής και Νομισματικής Πολιτικής (Ο-000306/2011 – Β7-0670/2011)


  Sharon Bowles, author. − Madam President, I would like to thank the Commission for having given Parliament time to express its views on the draft scoreboard. The relevant recital of the regulation specifies that the Commission should seek comments from the competent committee of the Parliament before adopting the scoreboard. This oral question, with the accompanying motion for a resolution, is the response to this consultation.

As you know, Parliament has been very engaged on this topic. There was a very protracted debate in Parliament, and with the Council, in order to reach the final text in codecision on the ‘six-pack’, so this is a very sensitive subject for us. The scoreboard is an important tool for observing potential imbalances, even though the definitive measures are in any subsequent in-depth studies.

Parliament attached a high importance to the indicators having both upper and lower thresholds where appropriate, and envisaged this form of comparison as useful. In the draft, this is not the case for most of the indicators. Of course it is not always appropriate to have both thresholds, but the working document does not explain the reasoning why there are not both in the majority of instances, and it would be helpful to have elaboration on that.

The issue of current account surpluses was also a matter contained in the Commission declaration. In particular, it said ‘macroeconomic surveillance covers countries with current account deficits and surpluses, with appropriate differentiation as regards the urgency of policy responses and the type of corrective actions required’.

Now of course the EU is not a closed economy – and it is very important that it is not – but, with regard to one another, we need to aim for better balance within a framework of promoting competitiveness. It is also noted that the Commission working document refers to available economic literature, but no references are given. We consider that references, and a more complete explanation of the methodology, are appropriate.

Spill-over effects were also a significant part of our discussion and one of the objectives of budgetary coordination, and so we ask how the Commission intends to deal with spill-over effects in the scoreboard.

I think it is reasonable to consider the scoreboard as a ‘work in progress’, and it is noted that by the end of 2012 it is intended to set a new set of thresholds relating to financial sector indicators. There is clearly a potential relationship here with the European Systemic Risk Board dashboard indicators. For my part, I suggest that domestic SIFIs may be one area to look at for inclusion in the macroeconomic scoreboard.

Also with regard to work in progress, not all of the elements specified for economic reading of the scoreboard in Article 4 have yet been taken into account. We look for all of these to be included in the economic reading of the scoreboard, most notably in relation to employment, drivers of productivity and the role of energy.

And now, more generally, how does the Commission intend to implement the scoreboard as part of the agreed regulation on the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances? In particular, how does it intend to implement the assessment of Member States showing large account deficits or surpluses as part of the annual alert mechanism report? What measures will the Commission take to make sure that it has timely statistics of the highest quality for inclusion in the scoreboard and its economic reading?

Finally, and as must be evident from what I have said concerning literature references and methodology, I would like to stress that a transparent implementation of this new policy instrument is of utmost importance throughout the procedure. Therefore I urge in this respect that the Commission ensures that any updates or reports on the functioning of this instrument are formally addressed both to the European Parliament and to the Council, and on an equal basis.


  Olli Rehn, Vice-President of the Commission. − Mr President, now that the legislation for reinforced economic governance, the ‘six-pack’, has entered into force – which it did yesterday – we must hasten its implementation. On the fiscal side this is already a work in rapid and serious progress. On the macro side we need to move on as well. I therefore welcome your draft resolution on the envisaged design of the scoreboard for the surveillance of macroeconomic imbalances as well as your oral question, which in fact consists of nine questions, to which I shall try to respond in my remaining two minutes and seven seconds.

Following your resolution tomorrow, and as the Commission received the views of the Council and the European Systemic Risk Board respectively in November, we can now finalise the design of the scoreboard without any further delay, and in full compliance with democratic principles.

The final scoreboard will become part of the alert mechanism report, which is currently scheduled for adoption by mid-January. It will be discussed in Ecofin and the Euro Group in January/February. Taking due account of these discussions, the Commission will launch in-depth reviews of the Member States for which they are needed. These in-depth reviews will analyse macroeconomic imbalances and provide the basis for any recommendations to be addressed to Member States.

Let me underline the key difference between fiscal and macroeconomic surveillance, and between the Excessive Deficit Procedure and the Excessive Imbalance Procedure: both are preventive, but macroeconomic surveillance is even more preventive than fiscal surveillance, and as such is necessary for economic stability and fiscal sustainability. This we have seen, for instance, in the cases of Ireland or Spain, both of which had sound public finances prior to the crisis. Once the crisis hit with its full force, however, their serious macroeconomic imbalances led to a very serious fiscal crisis which then turned into a recession in the real economy and led to high unemployment, with very serious social and human consequences. Moreover, while fiscal surveillance is highly numerical and quantifiable, macroeconomic surveillance requires a thorough economic reading and is much more qualitative.

This means that, when we propose countries for an in-depth study, it will not imply that they face an imminent crisis. Instead, it means that for these countries there is a risk of imbalances which, if confirmed, would clearly need to be addressed effectively. In other words, it serves as an essential early-warning system and a strong call for pre-emptive action to correct the build-up of those imbalances.

This brings me to the further aspects of your oral question, especially the regulation’s equal application to all Member States. The assessment of Member States’ current account balances is an essential element of the economic analysis of the alert mechanism report. The Commission stands fully by its declaration to the European Parliament on 28 September stating that ‘macroeconomic surveillance covers countries with current account deficits and surpluses with appropriate differentiation as regards the urgency of policy responses and the type of corrective actions required’.

To conclude, let me also recall that all 27 Member States will be subject to surveillance. Thus all Member States will benefit from its findings, both on their own account and jointly for the common good of the European Union. I am certain that the United Kingdom will also want to participate in this work; we for our part want to – and indeed will – involve each and every Member State of the European Union. The regulation applies to all and we continue to work for the benefit of each and every Member State and the whole European Union, even though that sometimes seems to be forgotten in the midst of the most heated debates of the day.


  Herbert Dorfmann, im Namen der PPE-Fraktion. – Frau Präsidentin, geschätzte Kollegen! Wir haben hier im Haus lange um die economic governance, um das Sixpack gerungen. Gestern ist dieses Gesetzespaket nun in Kraft getreten. Damit haben wir ein Bündel an Maßnahmen, um wirtschaftliche Fehlentwicklungen in Mitgliedstaaten frühzeitig zu erkennen.

Im Bereich der makroökonomischen Aufsicht stand hier im Parlament immer das scoreboard im Zentrum der politischen Diskussion. Das Parlament hat sich letztlich dafür entschieden, im Gesetzestext nur Grundlinien festzulegen und der Kommission die Aufgabe zu übertragen, das scoreboard auszuarbeiten. Nun liegt diese Arbeit der Kommission vor. Die vorgeschlagenen Parameter können ein richtiger Weg sein, um das erwünschte Ziel dann auch zu erreichen.

Bereits in unserer politischen Diskussion hier im Parlament haben wir über den symmetrischen Ansatz des Sixpacks diskutiert. Aber eine solche symmetrische Betrachtungsweise geht auch von dem Ansatz aus, der nicht ganz richtig ist, dass die Europäische Union ein in sich geschlossener und bilateraler Markt sei. Wenn jemand zu viel exportiert, dann bedeutet das automatisch, dass ein anderer zu wenig exportiert? Ich denke nicht. Ist das Problem jener Mitgliedstaaten, die derzeit schwierige ökonomische Zeiten durchleben, wirklich darauf begründet, dass andere Mitgliedstaaten im Vergleich erfolgreicher auf dem Binnenmarkt oder in der Welt tätig sind? Das würde im Umkehrschluss dann auch bedeuten, dass es kein Problem ist, wenn Mitgliedstaaten ihre Hausaufgaben in der Wirtschaftspolitik nicht machen – Hauptsache, die anderen Staaten machen sie auch nicht. Mit einem solchen Ansatz würden wir nicht weit kommen.

Das scoreboard wird sich entwickeln. Es braucht Zeit, neue Indikatoren werden in den nächsten Jahren eingebaut werden, und auch die Grenzwerte werden sich wohl mit wirtschaftlichen Entwicklungen verändern. Deshalb hat das Parlament auch vorgesehen, dass wir eine Aufgabe haben, diese Entwicklung zu beobachten und zu beurteilen. Mit dieser Fragestellung an Sie, Herr Kommissar, machen wir das auch. Als Startgrundlage erachten wir in der Europäischen Volkspartei die Vorlage der Kommission als brauchbar und nützlich. Ich bin überzeugt, dass sie ihren Weg gehen kann und dass sie zum Erfolg führen kann. Deswegen werden wir dem auch zustimmen.


  Άννυ Ποδηματά, εξ ονόματος της ομάδας S&D. – Κυρία Πρόεδρε, κύριε Αντιπρόεδρε της Ευρωπαϊκής Επιτροπής, στο χθεσινό φύλλο τους οι Financial Times δημοσίευσαν ένα πολύ ενδιαφέρον άρθρο με τίτλο «Γιατί η συμφωνία της 8ης Δεκεμβρίου για τη δημοσιονομική ένωση θα αποτύχει;». Με μια σειρά από λογικά και αυτονόητα, θα έλεγα, επιχειρήματα, πολλά από τα οποία έχουν υποστηριχθεί και υποστηρίζονται εδώ και καιρό απ’ το Ευρωπαϊκό Κοινοβούλιο και ιδιαίτερα απ’ την ομάδα των Σοσιαλιστών και Δημοκρατών, η εφημερίδα επισημαίνει ότι είναι αντιπαραγωγική η μονομερής εμμονή στη δημοσιονομική πειθαρχία, γιατί, όπως σημειώνει, η ορθή δημοσιονομική συμπεριφορά και πάλι μπορεί να συνδέεται με τεράστιες ανισορροπίες και με οικονομική αναποτελεσματικότητα. Επικαλούμενος δε ο αρθρογράφος το παράδειγμα της Γερμανίας, η οποία όπως γνωρίζετε πέρυσι είχε πλεόνασμα στο ισοζύγιο τρεχουσών συναλλαγών της τάξης του 5,7% του ΑΕΠ, μεγαλύτερο και απ’ αυτό της Κίνας, σημειώνει επί λέξει ότι το σύμφωνο της δημοσιονομικής ένωσης θα αποτύχει, γιατί δεν προσφέρει καμία απολύτως εξήγηση για το πώς ακριβώς αυτό το γερμανικό πλεόνασμα θα ανακυκλωθεί, όταν ολοένα και περισσότερες ευρωπαϊκές χώρες, χώρες του Νότου αλλά όχι μόνο, θα παραμένουν θρησκευτικά προσηλωμένες στην αυστηρή δημοσιονομική πειθαρχία και ορθοδοξία. Γι’ αυτό, κύριε Αντιπρόεδρε της Επιτροπής, θεωρούμε την αντιμετώπιση των μακροοικονομικών ανισορροπιών όχι μία αποσπασματική συμφωνία αλλά μία βασική αρχή η οποία, πέρα από το πακέτο της οικονομικής διακυβέρνησης, πρέπει να συνδεθεί άρρηκτα και με το νέο δημοσιονομικό σύμφωνο, τη δημοσιονομική ένωση όπως αποκλήθηκε. Θα ήθελα να υπενθυμίσω ότι κομβικό σημείο για την επίτευξη συμφωνίας στους δύο κανονισμούς ήταν η σαφής δήλωση –δική σας, της Ευρωπαϊκής Επιτροπής– ότι η διαδικασία θα αφορά τόσο σε κράτη μέλη με πλεονάσματα όσο και σε κράτη μέλη με ελλείμματα καθώς επίσης και σε ανώτατα και κατώτατα όρια, ώστε να υπάρχει συμμετρία, και αυτό δεν είναι μία δογματική αρχή· είναι μία προϋπόθεση για να εξασφαλίσουμε ότι η διαδικασία θα έχει πραγματική οικονομική σύγκλιση και ισορροπία.

(Η Πρόεδρος διακόπτει τον ομιλητή)


  Carl Haglund, on behalf of the ALDE Group. – Madam President, I think the Commissioner explained very well why we need this macroeconomic surveillance. The economic crisis proved that macroeconomic imbalances can also put the European economy at stake, despite sound – or at least fairly sound – public finances.

I also think that we did a fairly thorough job in this House of working on the macroeconomic surveillance part. In my view we achieved a very good overall result, and this is now the practical implementation of that result. Personally I am convinced by the work done by the Commission (my group is also very supportive) and the initial proposal on the table.

I think it is important to note that this is just the starting point of macroeconomic surveillance. Some have wanted to give this scoreboard too large a role in the overall process. We should remember that the scoreboard is designed as an alert mechanism. The actual macroeconomic surveillance and assessment will be done through in-depth studies, where we will then assess whether there is a problem that has to be addressed.

Another issue that should be mentioned is the fact that the ownership of this process should not be in the Commission. I have no doubt that the Commission wants to own it, but the fact of the matter is that the ownership should and will be in the Member States. The Member States will be the ones who have the ownership of working with a possible macroeconomic imbalance, together of course with the good guidance and good advice of the Commission. But the ownership of the process will and should be in the Member States. That is the only way for this process to work, and this is something we should emphasise.

Finally, I think we should all be happy with the fact that the ‘six-pack’ legislation, which this was a part of, came into force this week. This is an important step in solving the crisis. We should all be happy about this and about the fact that the Commission is taking this work very seriously.


  Philippe Lamberts, au nom du groupe Verts/ALE. – Madame la Présidente, Monsieur le Commissaire, en affaires, en politique, comme dans la vie – à mes yeux –, la confiance est la base de tout. Cette confiance, je pense que vous et votre direction générale l'avez trahie.

Vous l'avez trahie sur trois points. Premièrement, lorsque nous vous avons fait confiance en disant: "Le Parlement renonce à son droit de codécider des indicateurs", nous vous avons fait confiance sur la base d'une feuille de route. Un des éléments de cette feuille de route, était que le Parlement serait étroitement consulté. Ce qui s'est produit, c'est que, à sa grande habitude, la DG ECFIN s'est mise en ménage et au lit avec le Conseil, et lorsqu'ils ont produit ensemble leur bébé – et je ne veux pas savoir comment –, ils ont montré ce bébé au Parlement en nous demandant: "Êtes-vous satisfaits?". Ce n'est pas une manière de consulter les gens. Je ne suis pas pour les ménages à trois, mais je trouve que dans ce cas, franchement, vous avez choisi votre partenaire et je pense que vous avez mal choisi.

Sur le fond, vous nous dites: "Pays en surplus, pays en déficit, ce n'est pas la même chose". Bien sûr. Mais lorsque, clairement, il nous est dit: "Les pays en surplus ne seront jamais sanctionnés", cela équivaut à dire que les surplus excessifs ne sont pas dangereux. Je suis désolé, mais dire cela c'est ignorer que les surplus excessifs sont aussi dangereux que les déficits excessifs. Oui, il faut s'y attaquer avec la même force.

Enfin, sur la compétitivité, la DG ECFIN montre que, finalement, son obsession demeure la même: le seul facteur qui empêche la compétitivité des entreprises en Europe, ce sont les salaires. Il faut s'attaquer aux salaires comme si c'était l'alpha et l'oméga.

L'Europe ne sera jamais la Chine. Nous ne serons jamais les champions des bas salaires. Nous devons gagner la bataille de la valeur.


  Jürgen Klute, im Namen der GUE/NGL-Fraktion. – Frau Präsidentin, Kolleginnen und Kollegen! Seit gestern ist der neue Überwachungsmechanismus für wirtschaftliche Ungleichgewichte in Kraft. Inzwischen liegen auch die konkreten inhaltlichen Regulierungen vor. Welche Entwicklungen sieht die Kommission nun als gefährlich an, welche wirtschaftlichen Probleme will Sie korrigiert wissen? Ein Wachstum der Lohnstückkosten in den Euro-Ländern von mehr als 3 % pro Jahr gilt der Kommission als Problem. Ein Grenzwert für sinkende Löhne ist hingegen nicht vorgesehen. Billig, liebe Kommission, heißt nicht gleich gut. Es reicht nicht, die Mitgliedstaaten darauf zu trimmen, Wohlstand auf Kosten der Handelspartner zu erreichen. Ohne Investitionen in Bildung, Gesundheit und Energieeffizienz können wir unsere Arbeitnehmer zwar ausbeuten bis auf die Knochen, wirtschaftliche Erfolgsgeschichten werden wir so aber nicht schreiben.

Ein weiteres Beispiel aus dem scoreboard: Der Verlust von Exportmarktanteilen soll überprüft und sanktioniert werden. Das ist Unfug. Bei zunehmendem Welthandel nehmen Europas Anteile statistisch gesehen zwangsläufig ab. Der Indikator bestraft folglich die Länder, die bereits im Welthandel verflochten sind. Deshalb meinen wir, die Kommission sollte dieses scoreboard zurückziehen und einer Generalüberholung unterziehen.


  Claudio Morganti, a nome del gruppo EFD. – Signora Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, stiamo discutendo oggi di regole che probabilmente cambieranno presto, dopo la riforma dei Trattati imposta nell'ultimo vertice dalla Francia e soprattutto dalla Germania.

Siamo arrivati a questa difficile scelta anche se già in passato vi erano regole per prevenire gli squilibri macroeconomici attraverso il Patto di stabilità e crescita; sottoscritto nell'ormai lontano 1997, questo accordo è però divenuto carta straccia proprio quando la Francia e la Germania hanno sforato i parametri, rendendo di fatto il tutto privo di alcun valore.

Personalmente non sono affatto entusiasta che Bruxelles ci faccia da cane da guardia, ma se regole devono esserci, è giusto che queste valgano per tutti e tutti devono avere lo stesso trattamento, compresi i due Stati che oggi ci vogliono fare la lezione.

In Europa, tutti gli Stati e tutti i popoli devono avere pari dignità e le regole vanno decise, e rispettate, da tutti.


  George Sabin Cutaş (S&D). - Tabloul de bord pentru supravegherea dezechilibrelor macroeconomice constituie un element necesar pentru coordonarea politicilor economice şi sociale şi pentru promovarea convergenţei între statele membre. Acest instrument trebuie să conţină o analiză completă a acestor dezechilibre incluzând, în egală măsură, deficitele şi excedentele de cont curent. Nu trebuie să uităm că menţinerea unor excedente de cont curent semnificative şi susţinute creează obstacole în calea politicilor de ajustare pe care economiile cu deficit trebuie să le adopte.

Totodată, problema diferenţelor de competitivitate dintre statele membre nu poate fi remediată prin reducerea salariilor şi diminuarea protecţiei sociale. Astfel de măsuri nu fac decât să fragilizeze societatea, să promoveze sărăcia şi stagnarea economică.

Uniunea Europeană are nevoie de investiţii masive pe termen lung în infrastructură, în tehnologie şi, în special, în tehnologia verde pentru a încuraja crearea de locuri de muncă şi a favoriza creşterea economică.


  Ilda Figueiredo (GUE/NGL). - Senhora Presidente, com a entrada em vigor do pacote da chamada governação económica, o que se pretende é insistir no aprofundamento da integração capitalista com os resultados que já são bem conhecidos: o aumento do desemprego, o aumento da pobreza e das desigualdades sociais. E o que se está a passar, mesmo neste processo que, hoje, aqui, o demonstra bem, é que o que se pretende é, de facto, aumentar esta exploração dos trabalhadores à custa da redução dos salários reais e outras remunerações do trabalho, facilitar a acumulação do capital, agravar as desigualdades sociais. Mas mais, pretende também pôr em causa os interesses dos países com economias mais débeis, impondo-lhes garrotes permanentes e sujeitando-os ainda a multas que poderão agravar toda a situação existente. É uma ingerência inaceitável e é também um desprezo pelos princípios mais básicos da democracia, como este debate demonstrou perante o Parlamento Europeu.


  Franz Obermayr (NI). - Frau Präsidentin! Ich spreche mich vehement dagegen aus, Überschüsse dem Ungleichgewichtsverfahren zu unterwerfen, geschweige denn zu sanktionieren. Die Leistungsbilanz ist einer der zehn Indikatoren der Makroökonomie, und es wäre pervers, diese zu bestrafen und genauso zu behandeln wie Defizite. Wachstum lässt sich eben nicht planwirtschaftlich wie in der Sowjetunion regeln. Ohne die leistungsstarken Länder wäre die Eurozone wohl schon viel früher zusammengebrochen. Wenn die Ungleichgewichte zu groß sind – das denke ich auch –, dann müssen wir halt eine Hart- und eine Weichwährungszone bilden.

Eine Währung muss die Wirtschaftskraft des Landes widerspiegeln. Wie Planwirtschaft wird es aber nicht funktionieren, sondern nur mit entsprechend gedrehten Währungszonen. Österreich, Deutschland, die Niederlande, Luxemburg und eventuell Frankreich – das ist die eine Sache, und die anderen Volkswirtschaften müssen entsprechend auch ihre Währungen abwerten können.


  Phil Prendergast (S&D). - Madam President, I can only hope that the unsustainable nature of the path chosen has become as evident as it is ultimately self-defeating for the whole Union.

Stuck with the same currency with no possibility for competitive devaluation, peripheral countries found themselves confined to wage deflation and to growth trends fed by financial credit from the centre, where competitiveness owes a lot to cheap wages as well. Our problems have no easy solutions, but we at the edge of the eurozone have sustained severe economic pain, only to be promised more of it by the recent political developments such as the ‘six-pack’ tightening of the Stability and Growth Pact.

Where is the solidarity side of that grand bargain? Is it just more loans at rates barely below those demanded by extortionate, speculative market players? We need reform that works both ways and serves all of our citizens.


  Jaroslav Paška (EFD). - Súčasťou procedúry a prevencií náprave makroekonomických nerovnováh má byť aj mechanizmus varovania členských štátov, ktoré vykazujú vysoký deficit alebo prebytok bežného účtu. Základným predpokladom pre výkon dohľadu nad makroekonomickými nerovnováhami má byť aj hodnotiaca tabuľka obsahujúca potrebné údaje o hospodárskom riadení štátov. Vzhľadom na závažnosť rozhodnutí, ktoré budú rezultovať z údajov zachytených v hodnotiacej správe, je dôležité, aby všetky zaznamenané štatistické údaje boli objektívne a poskytovali potrebnú výpovednú hodnotu. Preto som presvedčený, že je nesmierne dôležité zvoliť takú metodiku zberu vstupných údajov pre hodnotiacu tabuľku, ktorá neumožní ich kreatívne modifikovanie v procese zberu, aby Komisia disponovala korektnými a objektívnymi podkladmi pre svoju prácu. Len na základe správnych údajov je totiž možné robiť správne hodnotenia a to by malo byť aj úsilím Komisie.


  Olli Rehn, Vice-President of the Commission. − Madam President, I should like to thank the Members for a very serious and substantive debate and for their support for this regulation and for the Commission’s actions in this regard.

Concerning the question posed by Ms Bowles on the literature behind this scoreboard, the Commission is currently working on background papers that will explain the economic rationale underlying the choice of indicators, including the relevant economic literature and the determination of thresholds. I can commit myself, the Commission, and even DG ECFIN to providing you with these background papers concerning the underlying economic rationale.

Ms Podimata referred to a certain British financial media source. I do not think its words are sacrosanct. I recall, for instance, that in that source the euro area was not described as a small open economy, but I have a feeling that some commentators consider that the euro area is a large, closed economy. It is not a large closed economy. Instead it is a large open economy that trades a very large share of its GDP with the rest of the world. This has obvious implications for the construction of our analytical mechanism of macroeconomic imbalances.

The legislation enshrines the approach of intelligent symmetry, whereby surveillance covers both deficits and surpluses, but clearly underlines that there is greater urgency in tackling large deficits. Moreover, policy responses need to be differentiated. I refer to the alert mechanism report which, in Article 3.2, states ‘The assessment of Member States showing large current account deficits may differ from that of Member States that accumulate large current account surpluses’.

I think the background noise suggests that it is time to close this debate. It is not very conducive to analytical debate on macroeconomic imbalances, so I suggest we continue our dialogue in the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs shortly.


  Πρόεδρος. - Έχω λάβει 1 πρόταση ψηφίσματος(1) που κατατέθηκε σύμφωνα με το άρθρο 115, παράγραφος 5 του Κανονισμού

Η συζήτηση έληξε.

Η ψηφοφορία θα διεξαχθεί την Πέμπτη 15 Δεκεμβρίου 2011 στις 11.30.




(1)βλ. Συνοπτικά Πρακτικά.

Aviso jurídico - Política de privacidad