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Czwartek, 19 kwietnia 2012 r. - Strasburg Wersja poprawiona

11. Paszporty biometryczne
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  Presidente. − L'ordine del giorno reca la discussione su:

- l'interrogazione con richiesta di risposta orale alla Commissione sui passaporti biometrici, di Carlos Coelho, Simon Busuttil, a nome del gruppo PPE, Ioan Enciu, Henri Weber, a nome del gruppo S&D, Cornelia Ernst, a nome del gruppo GUE/NGL, Franziska Keller, Tatjana Ždanoka, a nome del gruppo Verts/ALE (O-000052/2012 - B7-0107/2012),

- l'interrogazione con richiesta di risposta orale alla Commissione sui passaporti biometrici, di Baroness Sarah Ludford, Sophia in 't Veld, Renate Weber, Alexander Alvaro, Nadja Hirsch, Louis Michel, a nome del gruppo ALDE (O-000065/2012 - B7-0108/2012), e

- l'interrogazione con richiesta di risposta orale alla Commissione sui passaporti biometrici, di Timothy Kirkhope, a nome del gruppo ECR (O-000100/2012 - B7-0112/2012).

 
  
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  Carlos Coelho, Autor. − Senhora Presidente, Senhora Comissária Malmström, caras e caros Colegas, o Regulamento 2252, aprovado em 2004,

foi um passo importante para melhorarmos e harmonizarmos as normas relativas à proteção dos passaportes e documentos de viagem. Introduzimos elementos de identificação biométricos de forma a estabelecer uma ligação mais fiável entre o documento e o seu verdadeiro titular.

Porém, a segurança dos passaportes não se esgota no passaporte em si, todo o processo é relevante, ele tem início com a apresentação dos documentos necessários para a emissão dos passaportes, o que se chama, em termos técnicos, os breeder documents, segue-se a recolha dos dados biométricos e termina com a verificação e o matching nos postos de controlo fronteiriços.

Faz pouco sentido aumentar o nível de segurança existente nos passaportes se permitirmos a existência de pontos fracos nos outros elementos da cadeia. Exemplo disso são as notícias recentemente publicadas de que cerca de 10 % dos passaportes biométricos a circular em França são falsos, tendo sido obtidos com base em documentos falsificados, ou o caso de um estudo apresentado durante uma audição do parlamento holandês, que revelou que os resultados de um teste feito por um governo local provam que mais de 20 % das impressões digitais recolhidas não puderam ser verificadas revelando assim a sua inutilidade.

Ora, a liberdade de circulação no espaço Schengen é sem dúvida um dos maiores sucessos da construção europeia, mas requer um elevado nível de segurança. Para tal, contribui a existência de passaportes e documentos seguros que funcionam de forma efetiva e eficiente. É assim imperativo encontrar soluções para os problemas que possam existir, primeiro, na confiança no processo de recolha dos dados biométricos, segundo, na fiabilidade e utilidade das impressões digitais de acordo com as faixas etárias, nomeadamente o caso das crianças e das pessoas mais idosas, terceiro, nas disparidades existentes entre os Estados-Membros relativamente aos documentos que poderão servir de base à emissão dos passaportes, os breeder documents e quarto, na forma como se procede ao matching das impressões digitais.

A Senhora Comissária sabe que o Conselho tinha ficado com a responsabilidade de enviar um questionário aos Estados-Membros que permitisse efetuar uma análise das possíveis falhas nos sistemas de identificação, bem como dos índices de erro registados, de forma a avaliar a necessidade de se introduzir um sistema europeu. Estas preocupações estavam presentes na revisão do regulamento que fizemos em 2008 e, por essa razão, o Parlamento introduziu uma cláusula de revisão em três anos, de forma a permitir que estudos necessários fossem feitos pela Comissão e se recebessem os resultados desse questionário.

A pergunta que faço, Senhora Comissária, é de saber se a Comissão já tem os resultados para nos apresentar e se, face aos mesmos, está a pensar apresentar alguma proposta legislativa que se afigure necessária.

 
  
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  Ioan Enciu, Autor. − Problemele actuale legate de numărul mare de paşapoarte biometrice falsificate sunt cauzate în mare parte de faptul că nu se acordă destulă atenţie întregului ciclu de eliberare a acestora. Aşa cum şi raportul Parlamentului European din 2008 afirmă în mod corect, nu este de ajuns să se garanteze un nivel ridicat de securitate al paşapoartelor dacă modul de obţinere al acestora nu este la fel de sigur. Problemele esenţiale care persistă, din punctul meu de vedere, ţin de fiabilitatea datelor colectate, în special la copii şi bătrâni, dar şi de multitudinea şi gradul de securitate al documentelor de origine acceptate ca probă de identitate în vederea eliberării paşapoartelor.

Cu alte cuvinte, este inutil să se producă paşapoarte sigure dacă acestea sunt eliberate pe baza unor documente false. Pentru a contracara aceste probleme, Comisia trebuie să prezinte o evaluare clară a carenţelor existente în întregul ciclu de eliberare al paşapoartelor. Cred că cel mai important element care trebuie să fie luat în considerare ţine de documentele de origine. În prezent, la nivelul Uniunii există zeci de documente diferite pe baza cărora se poate elibera un paşaport, iar multe dintre aceste documente au nivele de securitate îndoielnice, putând fi uşor contrafăcute.

De aceea, două lucruri sunt esenţiale: pe de o parte, limitarea numărului de documente de origine acceptate pentru eliberarea paşapoartelor, iar pe de altă parte instituirea de standarde minime de securitate pentru aceste documente de origine. În aceeaşi ordine de idei, o posibilitate de luat în considerare este armonizarea la nivelul UE a modelelor de cărţi de identitate naţională. Acest lucru este necesar întrucât cărţile de identitate sunt folosite cel mai adesea atât ca documente de origine, cât şi ca documente de călătorie în înteriorul UE.

În sfârşit, aş vrea, de asemenea, să subliniez încă o dată necesitatea unui studiu aprofundat al Comisiei cu privire la securitatea întregului ciclu de eliberare a documentele biometrice, întrucât acesta va avea o relevanţă deosebită în ceea ce priveşte viitoarele sisteme din cadrul Smart Borders.

 
  
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  Cornelia Ernst, Verfasserin. − Frau Präsidentin! Als bei der letzten Änderung der Verordnung zu biometrischen Pässen 2009 gefordert wurde, nach drei Jahren eine Überprüfung vorzunehmen und vier Studien vorzulegen, hat dies unsere Fraktion unterstützt. Und zwar auch deshalb, weil sie immer wieder große Bedenken aus datenschutzrechtlichen Gründen und auch wegen der Überschätzung des Nutzens biometrischer Daten in Reisepässen vorgebracht habe.

Der Glaube an die perfekte Identifikation, die Überschätzung auch dieses Mittels und – was sich somit daraus ergibt – die Unterschätzung anderer Glieder der Sicherheitskette sind wirklich problematisch. Der Umgang mit biometrischen Daten unterliegt nach wie vor diesem großen Irrtum, nämlich der Annahme, sie seien unveränderbar und am meisten vertrauenswürdig. Das ist mitnichten so. Auch diese Daten sind veränderbar im Laufe des Lebens. Bei Kindern sehen sie anders aus als im hohen Alter. Daher sind verlässliche und seriöse Studien und Schlussfolgerungen notwendig.

Gefälscht wird trotzdem fleißig. Dies haben wir nun feststellen können. Wie es die Vorkommnisse in Großbritannien und in anderen Ländern immer wieder belegen: die Chips sind überhaupt nicht sicher gegen Missbrauch. Sie werden fröhlich geknackt und können für Betroffene dauerhaften Schaden bedeuten. Auch die Standards innerhalb der EU sind außerordentlich unterschiedlich. Die Fehlerrate ist – wie in Frankreich und in den Niederlanden – sehr hoch. Immer wieder muss die Frage gestellt werden, was uns biometrische Daten nützen, wenn Dokumente gefälscht werden und in Umlauf kommen. Wenn also ein Glied in der Kette gefälscht ist und die Ausgangsdokumente unstimmig sind, dürften uns biometrische Daten nicht weiterhelfen.

Der Chaos-Computer-Club in Deutschland hat für die Demonstration einer Fälschung nur wenige Minuten gebraucht. Dazu benötigten die Freunde im Chaos-Computer-Club Leute den Deckel einer Plastikflasche, einen Sekundenkleber, eine Digitalkamera und ein wenig Holzleim, und in wenigen Minuten hatten sie den Chip geknackt! So viel zur vermeintlichen Sicherheit. Wir erwarten von der Kommission die Vorlage der Studien und natürlich auch die Ergebnisse und die Konsequenzen, die sich daraus ableiten.

 
  
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  Sarah Ludford, author. − Madam President, I would like to thank Carlos Coelho for initiating this important debate.

It is obviously very important to make travel documents more secure and we have been working on that for a decade both in the EU and of course in the US and other countries. However, as technology advances, so does the ease with which criminals can exploit weaknesses in our system. Most of my work on biometric identifiers has been done in the area of visas, but I have always expressed the concern that it would be a false illusion to put too much trust in biometrics as if somehow once they are captured and used we can have 100% faith. As has been said by others, they are only as good as not only the technology but the competence of the officials running the system and indeed the cooperation of individual applicants.

I think it is a fair question to ask where we are at. In negotiating the Visa Code in 2009, in which I was involved, Parliament successfully required that we should not fingerprint children under 12 due to the unreliability of such fingerprints. Obviously assessments will be done in the future on that.

Earlier this year Sophia in 't Veld and I asked the Commission to comment on the Dutch study that is mentioned in the question which shows that in many cases the fingerprints taken were non-verifiable and therefore useless.

The Commission responded that no major problems had been reported and drew our attention to a JRC study, due out in May, on the reliability of information stored on chips in electronic passports. The problem with this is that it has been done on the basis of voluntary information supplied by Member States, so I think that we need a study which is more comprehensive on failure rates.

According to the Visa Code the Commission should present a report in June this year including an evaluation of the collection of data and documents used for creating biometric passports. We are not just concerned about passports. We are also concerned about visas and fingerprinting practices across the range of travel and identity documents.

Unlike the Commission, the US Government Accountability Office (GAO) has in a 2010 report expressed concerns about weaknesses in the evidence-gathering chain and admitted that the US system continues to be vulnerable to fraud. If this is true of the Americans then I fear it could well be true in the EU.

 
  
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  Franziska Keller, author. − Madam President, I very much agree with the criticism that my colleagues have already expressed and I want to ask the same question about what stage this evaluation has reached, and whether it can solve the questions that we have raised and answer our concerns, such as the issues of ‘breeder’ documents and the falsified documents and biometric passports in France and elsewhere, because this is really undermining any usefulness of biometric passports.

Furthermore, biometric passports also have fundamental rights implications. It has just been ruled under French constitutional law that parts of the French biometric passport law are unconstitutional because law enforcement agencies and state authorities have access to fingerprints. Fingerprints are seen as very sensitive data because you can leave them without intending to do so. That of course calls into question whether this will be applicable in the Member States. We have also seen elsewhere in the EU that law enforcement agencies and authorities are trying to get access to fingerprints

Even when all these questions have been solved, there will still be the issue of whether it is really necessary and useful to collect all the biometric data of people who travel, and for what purpose we are collecting those data. We will have to see whether the costs of such biometric gathering will actually be compatible with any use that we get out of them, and whether the costs are appropriate and comparable with their usefulness.

I do not think under any circumstances that we should collect more and more biometric data and expand the use of biometric data before those concerns are clarified and before the Commission can prove that they are actually verifiable and that there are no huge problems and errors in collecting the data, as we heard with regard to children, older people, etc.

 
  
  

VORSITZ: ALEXANDER ALVARO
Vizepräsident

 
  
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  Roberts Zīle, author. − Mr President, I welcome the opportunity for this House to discuss the important issue of border security, be it body scanners, PNR or border agencies. This opportunity to debate standards on security and border efficiency in Europe is one that should be continued as a priority. Since this House adopted in 2004, and subsequently reviewed, the Regulation on standards for security features and biometrics in passports and travel documents, it is clear that several questions have emerged as regards flaws in the systems and potential security implications.

I would like to ask the Commission whether or not its research has shown the system to create higher levels of security and ease of travel, and whether it has proven to be effective and cost efficient. More importantly, I would like also to ask the Commission what initiatives it has taken to combat the increasing problems of cross-border fraud, identity theft, and loss of biometric passports. Both Europol and Member States’ authorities have cited stolen passports as one of the most significant security threats we face.

The final issue is this: is technology changing rapidly enough for biometric passports to keep ahead of the technical abilities of sophisticated criminals perpetrating fraud, and is a biometric system being backed up with the necessary level of border checks in order to make sure that Europe’s borders are as impenetrable as possible to criminals?

 
  
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  Cecilia Malmström, Member of the Commission. − Mr President, honourable Members, the study that you have requested, focusing on fingerprints for children below the age of 12, is currently being carried out by the Joint Research Centre. The issue of the reliability of fingerprints from elderly people was not included in the mandate and is therefore not part of this study.

In order to perform its scientific analysis, the Research Centre needed reliable data from children below the age of 12 taken twice from the same person, with an interval of at least two years. Such data could be provided only by Member States and Portugal volunteered to provide data from its national passport database. Access to the data was granted by the Portuguese authorities last November after the conclusion of the appropriate Portuguese procedure for ensuring that all the data protection aspects were duly considered. For that reason, the study is not yet finished and the final result therefore not available. There will be an intermediate report presented by the Research Centre in May this year. It will present preliminary conclusions regarding the evolution of children’s fingerprints based on limited algorithms developed by academia.

The intermediate report will be presented to the European Parliament by the June deadline specified in the Regulation. The final results will provide comprehensive information on the evolution of fingerprints of children under 12 and the technical feasibility of using them for identification and verification purposes. The final report will also include an evaluation of whether the biometric matching algorithms available on the market now or in the near future can be used effectively with children’s fingerprints. The draft final report will be available in mid-2013. Based on the final results of the study, the Commission will consider proposing amendments to the Regulation.

Regarding the technical issues related to the biometric enrolment process, these issues have been clarified in a decision from August last year amending the technical specifications for passports. Requirements for taking fingerprints are clarified by means of an enrolment guide annexed to the decision.

The Commission, as guardian of the Treaty, undertakes tests on Member States’ passports’ compliance with this Regulation and with the relevant technical specifications. While compliance testing is a standard procedure, it is currently carried out by national accredited laboratories, and the Joint Research Centre has performed and already reported on additional testing of the chips on electronic passports – provided on a voluntary basis because it is the only way we can proceed – by some Member States to the Commission.

Further reports will be issued in May this year, including a report on the compliance of the Dutch sample passports received. If non-conformity is found, the Commission will, of course, take the appropriate measures. We are also conducting a report on identity theft; this we take very seriously and, as soon as that is ready, we will report to the Parliament.

As to the last question on obtaining authentic documents, this is related to identity theft. We are aware of this type of fraud and we will report on the result of the study as soon as possible and then discuss with you the possible measures to take.

 
  
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  Agustín Díaz de Mera García Consuegra, en nombre del Grupo PPE. – Señor Presidente, señora Comisaria, gracias, Carlos. Tenemos que destacar los avances que suponen el uso del pasaporte biométrico, pero no podemos negar los problemas existentes en su aplicación, especialmente por las fragilidades detectadas en su cadena de emisión. De nada serviría dotar de grandes instrumentos técnicos a los controles fronterizos si la debilidad del sistema es grande en lo relativo a los procedimientos.

En este asunto cobra aún mayor importancia, si lo tenemos en cuenta, el equilibrio entre la lucha contra la delincuencia en la Unión, el respeto de los derechos individuales y la garantía de la libre circulación en el territorio Schengen.

La falsificación de documentos, la delincuencia organizado o el terrorismo suponen un ataque directo a nuestros ciudadanos, pero también a sus derechos personales, por lo que debemos reforzar todo el proceso de obtención y tratamiento de información de carácter personal. Tenemos que dar más seguridad al documento de viaje, estableciendo un vínculo fiable entre el pasaporte y su titular.

Están, por tanto, muy justificados los informes de evaluación por la reiterada práctica fraudulenta. Esperamos con mucho interés, Comisaria Malmström, el anunciado informe provisional de junio, y el de mediados del año 2013. Sigamos apostando por la formación de los responsables implicados, así como por la mejora e interoperabilidad de los equipamientos y documentos emitidos en todas y cada una de las etapas, sin comprometer, eso sí, ni la información ni los derechos del titular del pasaporte.

Es muy importante, señora, poder determinar el alcance de lo relativo a la toma de huellas de niños, que, como se ha dicho, está pendiente de estudio. Por eso, valoro mucho la decisión del Gobierno de Portugal de dar fiabilidad al procedimiento.

 
  
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  Sylvie Guillaume, au nom du groupe S&D. – Monsieur le Président, je tiens à saluer l'initiative de cette discussion qui nous permet de revenir sur des préoccupations qui ont déjà été exprimées par le passé sur la fiabilité des passeports biométriques.

On nous avait dit, à l'époque, que l'introduction d'éléments biométriques allait permettre d'améliorer la sécurité des documents de voyage et ce, au service de la sécurité de nos concitoyens. Une enquête récente a montré que 10 % des passeports français seraient faux car leur édition s'appuierait sur des documents extrêmement faciles à falsifier, à savoir la copie d'un acte de naissance.

Dans ce contexte, comment imaginer que la multiplication des données biométriques et autres puces sécurisées soit le meilleur moyen de protéger nos concitoyens. Les failles qui existent devraient donc nous inviter à une plus grande prudence. À force de défendre la sécurité à tout prix, en se lançant dans le recueil de données personnelles, on finit par réduire à peau de chagrin les espaces de liberté de nos concitoyens, notamment avec la création de bases de données qui pourraient être utilisées à d'autres fins que celles de l'intérêt général.

Une autre dimension que je souhaite évoquer ici, ce sont les intérêts, parfois obscurs, qui se cachent derrière de tels développements: fabricants de scanners corporels, de puces électroniques, entreprises de collecte de données et de sécurité. Tous ces lobbys industriels ont clairement intérêt à mettre en avant ces technologies à visée sécuritaire, ce qui est pour le moins préoccupant.

Devant cette logique de fichage de la population à laquelle nous assistons un peu partout en Europe, il faut être vigilant face au risque d'atteinte au droit et au respect de la vie privée. C'est pourquoi, dans ce débat, je souhaite insister sur le fait que le recours aux données biométriques doit être proportionné au but poursuivi. Une remise à plat des règles prévoyant l'intégration d'éléments biométriques dans les passeports et documents de voyage s'avère donc plus que nécessaire.

Pour conclure, concernant l'évaluation menée par la Commission sur la mise en œuvre de ces règles au niveau national, vous venez de nous donner un certain nombre de précisions fort utiles. Nous attendons donc, avec impatience, les différents rapports dont le premier qui doit intervenir, je crois, assez rapidement.

 
  
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  Sophia in 't Veld, on behalf of the ALDE Group. – Mr President, Commissioner, a lot has been said already here about the quality of the fingerprints and the whole system and different steps in the chain, but I would like to raise another issue, and that is the justification for having biometrics in passports in the first place. In the Netherlands, a recent request for access to documents revealed that the justification given at the time, namely document fraud and particularly lookalike fraud, was actually only established in between 20 and 40 cases in the course of a year in a country with nearly 17 million inhabitants.

So one wonders why this whole system – which is extremely costly and which clearly has a lot of shortcomings – had to be introduced on such a thin justification. I wonder if the Commission is going to include that element and that information in its evaluation.

 
  
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  Tatjana Ždanoka, on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group. – Mr President, we are extremely satisfied that the studies, as the Commissioner has said, are in progress. Regulation (EC) No 2252/2004 is to be amended and we are happy that Ms Malmström has just expressed the very same opinion. I will allow myself to return to history and self-citation.

The Greens as a group are of the opinion that the Commission proposal to introduce two biometric identifiers lacks crucial information on important points such as costs, proportionality, added value and security. For us it is clear that such an introduction could represent a threat to security through the risks of abuse, technological flaws and lack of transparency and data protection. This was said in this Parliament on 1 December 2004 and, as we see now, it was providential. We are very thankful to Mr Coelho for initiating this question and the debate.

 
  
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  Zbigniew Ziobro, w imieniu grupy EFD. – Panie Przewodniczący! Do południa rozmawialiśmy na temat procederu handlu ludźmi, który budzi wiele emocji i wiąże się z dramatami tysięcy, zwłaszcza kobiet i dzieci. Myślę, że właśnie zabezpieczenie granic oraz zabiegi zmierzające w kierunku zapobiegania fałszowaniu dokumentów pozwalających na przekraczanie tychże granic, to droga, która może prowadzić do skutecznego ograniczania zjawiska nielegalnego przeprowadzania ludzi, handlu ludźmi. Choć paszporty biometryczne budzą wielkie nadzieje, tym niemniej jednak sprawozdanie wskazuje jednak, iż istnieje szereg wad związanych z zabezpieczeniem i szyfrowaniem zawartych w nich danych. Dlatego trzeba zrobić wszystko, aby poprawić technologię i sposób posługiwania się tymi dokumentami. Dziękuję bardzo.

 
  
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  Simon Busuttil (PPE). - Grazzi Sur President. L-idea li nintroduċu passaporti bijometriċi kienet li, fost affarijiet oħra nagħmluha aktar diffiċli biex il-passaporti tagħna jkunu jistgħu jiġu ffalsifikati, u allura aktar faċli għaċ-ċittadini tagħna li jivvjaġġaw. Iżda lkoll nafu li anke dwar il-passaporti bijometriċi spiċċajna biex identifikajna ċerti diffikultajiet u problemi. Huwa għalhekk illi għamilna din il-mistoqsija parlamentari sabiex nitolbu lill-Kummissjoni tara u tidħol fid-dettall f'dawn il-problemi.

Illum, qed naraw x'inhuma s-soluzzjonijiet illi jista' jkollna għal dawn il-problemi. Irrid ngħid, illi l-kontroll tal-fruntieri huwa suġġett sensittiv ħafna għaċ-ċittadini tagħna. Temi bħall-immigrazzjoni irregolari, il-preżenza irregolari ta' persuni fl-Ewropa u l-ftuħ u l-għeluq tal-fruntieri tagħna iqanqlu ħafna sensittivitajiet kbar u ċ-ċittadini tagħna kemm-il darba wrewna li jriduna noqogħdu attenti għal dawn l-affarijiet. Rigward dan, il-Parlament għandu esperjenza kbira, l-iżjed dwar temi bħalma huma Schengen, fejn għandna l-kompetenza ta' nies bħal Carlos Coelho u anke s-suġġett ta' Frontex.

Il-passaporti bijometriċi huma parti oħra importanti minn din id-dimensjoni tas-sigurtà u għaldaqstant għandna kull interess illi l-passaporti bijometriċi jkunu effettivi u ma jkunux jistgħu jiġu abbużati. Jiena jidhirli li jekk nindirizzaw id-diffikultajiet li qed nidentifikaw permezz ta' dawn l-istudji, allura minn dan ikunu jistgħu jgawdu, speċjalment, iċ-ċittadini onesti li jivvjaġġaw b'mod regolari u jirrispettaw il-liġi.

 
  
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  Nessa Childers (S&D). - Mr President, after the adoption of standards for security features and biometrics in passports in 2004, Ireland’s first biometric passports, or e-passports, were issued in 2006. The introduction of e-passports was intended to ensure better protection against fraudulent use. Personal identification contained in the biometric chip of each e-passport establishes a more reliable link between the passport and its holder.

The introduction was timely. In 2010 an investigation by the Irish police proved that eight Irish passports had been forged and misused by Israeli Government operatives in the assassination of Palestinian Mahmoud al-Mabhouh. It seems likely that the passports in question were forgeries of passports issued before 2006, as the biometric data in our passports is very difficult to forge.

However, passports from other EU countries were also implicated in the cases I mentioned above. It concerns me to hear of other weaknesses in the level of passport security across the EU which could lead to similar situations arising again, and the Commission should really take the concerns of Parliament seriously.

 
  
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  Roberta Angelilli (PPE). - Signor Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, Commissario Malmström, agevolare la libera circolazione delle persone dentro e fuori i confini europei è da sempre una delle priorità dell'Unione europea, così come rafforzare sempre di più e garantire uno spazio europeo sicuro. È proprio con queste finalità che nel 2009 è stata approvata dal Parlamento la relazione dell'onorevole Coelho relativa al passaporto biometrico.

Secondo il principio "una persona, un passaporto", anche i bambini avrebbero diritto ad avere un proprio passaporto senza dover più figurare su quello dei propri genitori. Sarebbe un sistema potenzialmente più sicuro, ma questo principio "una persona, un passaporto", a quanto pare è di fatto inapplicabile, o comunque non sicuro per i minori di 12 anni, poiché è stato verificato che le impronte dei bambini di meno di sei anni non sono di una qualità tale da consentire una verifica univoca dell'identità.

Considerando che sono proprio i bambini i soggetti più esposti al fenomeno di sparizione, tratta degli esseri umani o anche di abuso sessuale, la domanda è: quali sono gli studi di valutazione effettuati in questi anni dalla Commissione proprio al fine di garantire un'adeguata tutela dei minori soprattutto quando viaggiano da soli?

 
  
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  Véronique Mathieu (PPE). - Monsieur le Président, Madame la Commissaire, chers collègues, je tiens tout d'abord à tordre le cou aux allégations non fondées de circulation en France de 500 000 à 1 000 000 de faux passeports biométriques .

La France prend très au sérieux les risques de fraude concernant les pièces d'identité. Elle ne traite pas à la légère les délits en la matière. À l'initiative de son gouvernement, l'usurpation d'identité est un délit qui est puni d'un an de prison et de 15 000 euros d'amende.

Les conditions de délivrance des titres d'identité ont été simplifiées, ce qui a permis aux préfectures de dégager des moyens supplémentaires pour lutter contre cette fraude. Ainsi, dans chaque préfecture est désigné un référent fraude. Par ailleurs, les dispositions de sécurisation de délivrance des titres d'identité ont été renforcées. Par exemple, les données d'état civil fournies pourront être vérifiées entre services administratifs autant que possible par voie dématérialisée, afin de limiter les risques de falsification. Certains actes de naissance sont également délivrés sur papier sécurisé. La même rigueur s'applique aux pièces justificatives de domicile.

Le ministère de l'intérieur s'est engagé dans la voie d'une sécurisation accrue des justificatifs de domicile avec l'insertion d'un code barre. Le traitement classique d'une demande de titre inclut la consultation autorisée des fichiers utiles, la comparaison de toutes les pièces produites lors des demandes de titre antérieures et l'éventuelle authentification des pièces justificatives.

La sécurisation de la délivrance des titres est en outre garantie par la double comparution du demandeur, en premier lieu au moment du dépôt de la demande, puis au moment du retrait du titre ainsi que du prélèvement de deux empreintes digitales. Sans compter les vérifications renforcées pour le renouvellement des titres perdus et volés à des fins comparatives avec les données conservées par les préfectures.

Par ailleurs, la France signale aux instances de coopération internationales et notamment à Interpol les passeports délivrés ou perdus et volés afin qu'ils ne soient pas utilisés à des fins frauduleuses.

Mes chers collègues, la France, tout comme le reste de l'Union européenne, s'engage …

(Le Président coupe le micro de l'orateur)

 
  
 

„Catch-the-eye“-Verfahren

 
  
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  Miroslav Mikolášik (PPE). - Obavy, ktoré vyvstali v súvislosti so spoľahlivosťou a účinnosťou biometrických pasov v Európskej únii, pretrvávajú doposiaľ a doposiaľ nebolo nájdené uspokojivé riešenie, hoci sa pasy používajú v rôznych členských štátoch už viac ako 5 rokov. Nahradenie klasických papierových pasov biometrickými, ktoré majú v sebe zabudovaný špeciálny čip s biometrickými údajmi jedinečnými pre každého jednotlivca, malo napomôcť tomu, aby neboli pasy falšované. Pôvodné používanie státisícov, niektoré odhady hovoria až o miliónoch – treba to overiť – biometrických pasov a vydávanie takýchto pasov na základe nepravých či sfalšovaných dokumentov však svedčí o tom, že minimálne bezpečnostné normy pre pasy nepostačujú na zabezpečenie overenia pravosti dokladu. Keďže sa jedná o otázku úzko súvisiacu s vnútornou bezpečnosťou a poriadkom Európskej únii, podporujem zavedenie prísnejších pravidiel týkajúcich sa nielen samotných pasov, ale aj celkového postupu pri ich vydávaní.

 
  
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  Seán Kelly (PPE). - Mr President, this morning, here in Parliament, we passed the agreement between ourselves and the United States with regard to PNR, and that should help to make travel safer for everybody. It was disconcerting to hear earlier on that 10% of French passports are falsified – even though my colleague disagrees with this. Whatever the figure, it is nevertheless safe to assume that the vast majority of those in possession of falsified passports are probably criminals of one sort or another.

If we can reduce the number of falsified passports we will make the world far safer and reduce an awful lot of the counterfeited goods and contraband, human trafficking and all sorts of terrorist activities. It was interesting that my colleague from Ireland, Ms Childers, pointed out that the falsified passports or the forgeries were prior to biometrics. Biometrics has a role to play and therefore we should do everything we can to make it safer and better for everybody.

 
  
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  Janusz Władysław Zemke (S&D). Panie Przewodniczący! Paszporty biometryczne wprowadzane są po to (bo przecież to jest proces), żeby przestępcom żyło się i działało trudniej. I wydawało się, że nic pewniejszego od paszportów biometrycznych, a tymczasem okazuje się, że także te dokumenty są coraz skuteczniej fałszowane, że przestępcy potrafią łamać indywidualne chipy i kody paszportów. Oczywiście przeciwdziałanie tym praktykom jest zadaniem policji poszczególnych państw i zadaniem straży granicznych. Muszę się jednak przyznać, że w tych dzisiejszych informacjach, także informacjach przekazanych przez panią komisarz, bardzo mi zabrakło informacji i danych o tym, co robią w tym obszarze tak ważne instytucje jak EUROPOL i FRONTEX, bo to także powinien być jeden z ich głównych celów działalności.

 
  
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  Franz Obermayr (NI). - Herr Präsident! Man hat gehofft, dass die neuen biometrischen Reisepässe Fälschungen verhindern werden, also mehr Sicherheit bringen. Aber allein in Frankreich kursieren Schätzungen zufolge ca. 1 Million biometrischer Pässe auf der Basis gefälschter Geburtsurkunden. Die Pässe wurden 2004 auf Druck der USA eingeführt, sie enthalten die biometrischen Bilder und Fingerabdrücke des Inhabers. Diese Fingerabdrücke sind zum Teil aber nicht lesbar – so eine Studie aus den Niederlanden. Mehr als ein Fünftel der dortigen Pässe waren unbrauchbar. Bei älteren Menschen, und auch bei Kindern, ist es noch schwieriger, die Fingerabdrücke richtig einzuordnen. Alles in allem scheinen die biometrischen Pässe wieder einmal ein teures, zweifelhaftes Mittel aus den USA zu sein, die Terrorismusbekämpfung zu intensivieren.

Die Ergebnisse der Dreijahresstudie werden nun vorgelegt, und man wird genau evaluieren müssen, ob diese biometrischen Pässe auch endgültig Sinn machen.

 
  
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  Petru Constantin Luhan (PPE). - Paşapoartele biometrice au fost şi sunt în continuare greu de acceptat de către populaţie. Aceasta nu acceptă cu uşurinţă lucrurile noi, mai ales dacă acestea sunt insuficient explicate. Este adevărat că, deşi, aparent, este un sistem foarte sigur de identificare a călătoriilor, există fraude datorită tehnologiilor şi diferitelor dispozitive cu ajutorul cărora hackerii fură datele de pe cipuri. Oamenii se tem că aşa cum sunt furate datele de pe cardurile bancare, la fel de uşor vor fi furate şi datele de pe cipurile cu conţinut de pe paşaportul biometric.

Cred că populaţia ar trebui informată mai bine despre ce înseamnă un paşaport biometric, precum şi despre măsurile de siguranţă pe care le prezintă acesta. Trebuie să se analizeze posibilitatea ca pe viitor să fie creat un sistem prin care dispozitivul de identificare prin frecvenţa radio, pe care îl conţine cipul din paşaport, să poată fi depistat doar de către autorităţile competente.

 
  
 

(Ende des „catch-the-eye“-Verfahrens)

 
  
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  Cecilia Malmström, Member of the Commission. − Mr President, this is indeed a very important debate. We are talking about document security, we are talking about fundamental rights, we are talking about the efficiency of different kinds of travel documents and biometrics.

In a way it is a bit unfortunate that we are having this debate today because in June I would be able to give you the answers to all the questions you have put to me. We will then have the reports and I will be happy to share the results with you; I am looking forward to having a renewed discussion when we have all this documentation.

On the question of false documents, we are of course aware of this problem. We have no confirmation of the figures that have been circulating here. I think they are wildly exaggerated, but of course it is a problem and we are in close contact with Europol and Frontex on this. As I said, right now we are conducting a study on identity theft in general, where this is an issue.

When the regulation on biometric passports was adopted there was no evaluation clause in it, so the Commission has not been asked to do a general evaluation of the usefulness and effectiveness of biometrics. However, if this is a very strong wish from the European Parliament, we would of course consider that issue seriously.

So thank you very much for the debate. I think we will get back to it very soon, when hopefully I can bring some more concrete results to the debate here.

 
  
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  Der Präsident. − Die Aussprache ist geschlossen.

Schriftliche Erklärungen (Artikel 149)

 
  
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  Andreas Mölzer (NI), schriftlich. – Mit biometrischen Pässen soll verhindert werden, dass gestohlene oder gefälschte Pässe zur Durchführung einer Straftat genützt werden. Und zur Unterstützung grenzüberschreitender Fahndungen sollen die biometrischen Daten in das europaweite polizeiliche Informationssystem der nächsten Generation eingegeben werden. Mit dem Einsatz der Biometrie soll eine zusätzliche Fälschungshürde entstehen. Natürlich könnte durch die technische Unterstützung der Grenzkontrollen ein Zeitgewinn für Reisende und Kontrolleure entstehen. Soweit jedenfalls die Theorie. In der Praxis halten Experten Pass-Biometrie für ein untaugliches Mittel gegen Terroristen – die Wahrscheinlichkeit des unerkannten Durchschlüpfens kann sogar steigen. Und die Terrorbekämpfung war ja einer der Hauptgründe für die Einführung des biometrischen Passes. Und SIS II funktioniert noch immer nicht. Und dann gibt es noch mehr als genug Länder mit herkömmlichen Pässen, die sich leicht fälschen lassen, ganz abgesehen von schlecht bewachten Grenzen. Aber genau jene werden für illegale Zuwanderung missbraucht. Anscheinend hat sich am großen Gefälle bei den Sicherheitsstandards innerhalb der EU auch mit der Einführung der biometrischen Pässe nicht viel geändert. Wir müssen also Fehlerquellen und Pass-Fälschungsmöglichkeiten ausmerzen und Grenzkontrollen vor allem entlang der Schlepperrouten verstärken. Und dafür muss FRONTEX gewappnet werden.

 
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