President. − The next item is the report by David Martin, on behalf of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs, on a proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament on the detailed provisions governing the exercise of the European Parliament’s right of inquiry and repealing Decision 95/167/EC, Euratom, ECSC of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission (2009/2212(INI)) (A7-0352/2011).
David Martin, rapporteur. − Mr President, I shall begin with some ‘thank yous’, firstly to the secretariat of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs (AFCO), and in particular Tamás Lukácsi for his assistance in drafting this report. I would also like to thank Commissioner Šefčovič and Minister Wammen from the Danish Presidency for their willingness to engage at an early stage in this process. Their contributions in the AFCO committee and to me personally have been very welcome, and I look forward to working further with both of them in order to reach an agreement which is satisfactory to all the European institutions. I would also like to thank the shadow rapporteurs from the other political groups for the very cooperative atmosphere in which we have negotiated this report.
This is an ambitious report and a very timely one since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. Back in 1995 when I was the rapporteur for this Parliament on the Maastricht Treaty, we successfully advocated elevating Parliament’s ability to hold a committee of inquiry to a Treaty-based function. Since then, the powers of the committee have not changed. Committees of inquiry are a tool for Parliament to investigate allegations of maladministration in the implementation of EU law. In their investigations, committees can speak to individuals involved and request documents to see if there have been any breaches of law or elements of corruption in the administration of the law.
I would like firstly to outline the importance of this role for Parliament in exercising its supervisory powers, before getting to the substance of the report and to the procedure. There have been three committees of inquiry in the history of this Parliament: one on the Community Transit Regime, one on bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) and, more recently, one on Equitable Life, the UK life assurance company. The Equitable Life inquiry concluded that Parliament lacked the ability to get to the truth because we could not speak to the people involved, we could not ensure access to documents and there were no consequences for false testimony. It is perhaps not surprising that the last inquiry committee struggled to uncover the truth.
We have gained significant new powers in the European Parliament over the last two decades, but our role in democratic scrutiny now needs to be brought into the 21st century. Since the Lisbon Treaty, Parliament is on an equal footing with the Council in its role as a legislator, and has significant powers of budgetary control, but in the area of democratic scrutiny we lack the tools to uncover the truth.
In the same way that most national parliaments have the tools at their disposal to uncover fraudulent implementation of national law, it is the European Parliament’s responsibility to investigate maladministration of EU law on behalf of European citizens. Fundamentally, a committee of inquiry tries to uncover the truth about the past. As that great philosopher Bob Dylan said: ‘Truth is an arrow and the gate is narrow that it passes through.’
It is not an easy task to inquire into the past and uncover the truth, and, without the ability to access documents and individuals, Parliament cannot perform this democratic duty effectively. It is a role which Parliament takes seriously and has not used frivolously. With only three committees in the lifetime of the Parliament, there should be no concerns that this tool will be overused.
So why are we reforming the rules now? Firstly, because a much-needed update to the rules has been pending since the conclusion of the Equitable Life inquiry and the recommendations that it made. Secondly, because the Lisbon Treaty has elevated the rules on committees of inquiry into a regulation. In fact, under Article 226 of the Lisbon Treaty, Parliament has the unusual role of policy initiator. We are acting here in what is usually the Commission’s role, and my report is the policy proposal to which the Council and Commission must give their consent.
There are three important elements of a European Parliament committee of inquiry which are addressed in my proposed reforms. The first is the ability to speak directly to the individuals involved in the issue. A major problem identified in the Equitable Life inquiry was the inability to request specific individuals. Instead, in many cases, the institutions in question would send a spokesman. I think it is vital that, when we are looking into decisions which were taken, we are able to speak directly to those who were involved, or to the experts on a particular issue.
The second issue is access to documents and the ability of a committee of inquiry to see documents which are directly related to the inquiry. Thirdly, the ability of a committee of inquiry to visit the Member State and to see for itself the context of the investigation is vital.
Now we know from past inquiries that without any form of sanction for refusal to testify, for false testimony or for bribery, the committee lacks teeth and can lack legitimacy. What we are proposing in this report is to give the European Parliament the same basis for sanctions that exists in many Member States, and my report was based on very detailed studies of national parliaments’ committees of inquiry.
I think it is also important to note that, of course, Parliament is not a court. Any sanctions for false testimony or bribery would have to be enacted by the Member States under an agreement reached in this reform.
With regard to the final conclusions of a committee of inquiry, however, the remit is simple: to uncover the truth. We do not hand down sanctions, we do not hand down sentences, we do not take any legal action. That would be for others, based on our recommendations.
I look forward to working with the other Institutions and with my colleagues in finding a satisfactory conclusion to this report and I am optimistic that the three Institutions can agree.
Nicolai Wammen, President-in-Office of the Council. − Mr President, honourable Members, Mr Vice-President of the Commission, the right of inquiry is an important feature of the European Parliament’s supervisory powers, allowing it to set up committees of inquiry to investigate alleged maladministration in the implementation of Union law.
Whilst the Lisbon Treaty has not materially changed the specific subject matter covered by Parliament’s right of inquiry, it has introduced changes in the procedure for establishing the detailed provisions governing the exercise of that right. Such provisions shall now be determined by Parliament, acting on its own initiative after obtaining the consent of the Council and the Commission. The Presidency fully respects Parliament’s right of initiative on this matter and has therefore closely followed the work of Mr Martin’s report.
Likewise the Presidency has worked hard within the Council to be ready to begin formal trialogue negotiations with Parliament. During the exchange of views I had on this topic with the Constitutional Affairs Committee (AFCO) in January, I indicated that, coming from a country with a tradition of transparency and strong parliamentary scrutiny, I will approach this matter with an open mind and a willingness to find a reasonable compromise.
The contacts that have taken place between the rapporteur and the Presidency following the vote in AFCO on the Martin report have provided an excellent opportunity to discuss the matter further and to improve our respective understanding of each other’s viewpoint. I would like to thank Mr Martin for his willingness to listen to the Council’s concerns and for the constructive dialogue which he entered into with the Presidency. There is no reason to hide the fact that this matter is sensitive for all the Institutions concerned. However, I am confident that the contacts which the Presidency had with Mr Martin will provide a good basis for further inter-institutional contacts.
Without entering into much detail on the draft report, I would like to highlight two points which are of particular importance to the Council. Firstly, the Council believes that the fundamentally political nature of Parliament’s right of inquiry should be reflected in the proposed new rules. This is crucial in order to avoid any interference with court proceedings. It also means that committees of inquiry cannot be vested with prerogatives of a quasi-judicial nature.
Secondly, the principle of attribution of competences, which is also enshrined in the Treaties, has to be fully respected. This implies that, in the framework of their investigations, the committees of inquiry should avoid any overlap with the competences of other Institutions or of Member States.
Mr President, honourable Members, Vice-President of the Commission, I look forward to further contact with Mr Martin and with Parliament’s negotiating team on this issue, and let me assure you that the Presidency will do its utmost to reach a compromise which will be acceptable to all three Institutions and will allow Parliament to exercise its right of inquiry in the most efficient possible way.
Maroš Šefčovič, Vice-President of the Commission. − Mr President, the Lisbon Treaty included many innovations for the European Parliament, one of which is Parliament’s new right of initiative to set the ground rules for Committees of Inquiry. This clearly puts democracy in the driving seat and we should all applaud that.
It is now our joint responsibility to implement this new provision as soon as possible, in constructive cooperation between the three institutions, with common sense and in full respect of the letter and the spirit of Article 226 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
The Commission has always defended the need for strong parliamentary oversight. Therefore, nearly a year ago, we engaged in the first discussions on Mr Martin’s draft report. I very much appreciated his cooperative spirit and good collaboration with the Presidency and Minister Wammen. At that time we drew your rapporteur’s attention to some of the problematic elements of the initial draft, but only a few of our concerns have been reflected in the outcome of the final vote in the Committee on Constitutional Affairs. Likewise, the Hungarian Presidency and now the Danish Presidency have also expressed certain concerns and I very much welcome your rapporteur’s openness to taking some of these on board.
We welcome Parliament’s readiness to seek a constructive solution, which is clearly reflected by the set of compromise amendments Mr Martin tabled with a view to today’s vote, which try to accommodate some of the main concerns previously expressed by the Council and the Commission. But it is probably no secret that there are still some key elements to be discussed before the necessary consent of the Commission, foreseen by Article 226, can be given.
Let me mention some of the important elements for the Commission. We believe that the scope of the future regulation should remain the same as in the current decision. Indeed, as Article 226 states, the European Parliament may only set up Committees of Inquiry in the course of its duties and, pursuant to Article 13 of the Treaty on European Union, it shall act within the limits conferred on it in the Treaties. The Commission explicitly welcomes your compromise amendments in this regard.
We should also not forget that changes in Article 226 concern only the procedure and the type of act, not the mandate of a Committee of Inquiry, and that Committees of Inquiry are a fundamentally political rather than legal tool, at Parliament’s disposal for the exercise of political control. This is why I believe further discussions will be necessary also on the investigative tools proposed in the Parliament draft, which still appear rather excessive.
Last but not least, let me also mention Article 17 of the draft regulation, which concerns the hearing of officials and other servants of the EU and of Member States. Your compromise amendments address some of our key concerns as regards the issue of ‘freedom to testify’ and we can accept the inclusion of a ‘comply or explain’ procedure, but a certain perplexity still remains on our side as regards the different treatment of national and EU officials that you propose, which in our view, cannot be objectively justified.
Against this background, the Commission welcomes your intention to vote today only on the report, including some additional amendments, but not on the legislative resolution. This gives the three institutions the chance to engage in constructive trilateral discussions after the vote, so as to agree on a text to which the Council and Commission could easily give their consent according to Article 226, after Parliament has voted on the legislative resolution.
I very much look forward to working with you and with the Council in order to achieve an early and successful conclusion on this important file.
Rainer Wieland, im Namen der PPE-Fraktion. – Herr Präsident, meine Damen und Herren! Ein Organ, das für Rechtsetzung zuständig ist, muss auch für Rechtsumsetzung zuständig sein. Es kann nicht nur um den acquis communautaire gehen, es muss auch um die application communautaire, um die Rechtsanwendung gehen, und hier haben wir innerhalb der Union teilweise erhebliche Schieflagen. Die Arbeit des Untersuchungsausschusses zur Krise der „Equitable Life Assurance Society“ hat materiell Erstaunliches zu Tage gebracht, es hat sich aber auch gezeigt, dass unser Instrument durchaus noch verbessert werden kann. Deshalb ist dieses Dossier ein wichtiger Schritt voran.
Ich will in aller Kürze die fünf für meine Fraktion wichtigen Punkte nennen. Erstens: Wir verstehen, dass Kommission und Rat Bedenken haben, wenn im wohlverstandenen Interesse ein Grund dafür vorliegt, dass Beamte und Minister nicht aussagen. Aber die Entscheidung darüber kann keine Entscheidung nach Gutsherrenart sein; sie muss gerechtfertigt und erklärt werden.
Zweitens: Es kann nicht der Disposition einer Person, die angehört wird, anheimgestellt sein, ob sie nichtöffentlich oder öffentlich auftritt. Drittens: Jeder, der dann aussagt, muss selbstverständlich die Wahrheit sagen. Viertens: Wir erwarten von den Mitgliedstaaten, dass diejenigen, die nicht die Wahrheit sagen, mindestens so sanktioniert werden wie diejenigen, die vor den entsprechenden nationalen Einrichtungen nicht die Wahrheit sagen.
Fünftens – dies betrifft den Änderungsantrag 31 meiner Fraktion – ist wichtig, dass am Ende der Arbeit eines Untersuchungsausschusses auch ein Minderheitenvotum stehen muss. Ich bedauere sehr, dass dies vom Präsidenten oder seiner Verwaltung für unzulässig erklärt worden ist, und ich halte diese Entscheidung auch nicht für richtig.
Ein letztes Wort: Es wurde sowohl vom Rat als auch von der Kommission die Freude über die Bereitschaft des Parlaments zum Kompromiss geäußert. Ich wäre froh, wenn am Ende des Tages diese Freude über Bereitschaft zum Kompromiss nicht nur einseitig verteilt wäre.
Roberto Gualtieri, a nome del gruppo S&D. – Signor Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, la relazione Martin apre la strada alla piena attuazione della disposizione dei Trattati che disciplina un potere d'inchiesta, essenziale allo svolgimento di una delle funzioni fondamentali di un parlamento: il controllo politico.
Il Trattato di Lisbona ha introdotto una procedura legislativa speciale e per questo auspichiamo che nel negoziato entrambe le Istituzioni – Consiglio e Commissione – si attengano allo spirito di una norma, che affida esplicitamente il potere d'iniziativa e quello regolamentare al Parlamento, limitando il ruolo di Consiglio e Commissione alla semplice espressione di un consenso.
La relazione Martin fa tesoro delle esperienze precedenti di commissioni temporanee d'inchiesta che ne hanno evidenziato i limiti di questo strumento e propone significative innovazioni. I negoziati informali con la Presidenza danese e con la Commissione hanno portato a proposte di compromesso soddisfacenti, che vanno incontro ad alcune delle richieste degli Stati membri e della Commissione, ma che non limitano il diritto del Parlamento di chiedere conto alle istituzioni comunitarie e nazionali della corretta implementazione della legislazione europea e di identificare le eventuali situazioni di cattiva amministrazione.
Si possono ulteriormente precisare alcune formulazioni: ma è essenziale che non si transiga su un punto e cioè che le commissioni d'inchiesta devono avere la possibilità di accesso ai documenti e alle persone. Ciò non ha nulla a che fare con compiti giudiziari ma, appunto, con la piena attuazione del diritto politico chiaramente sancito dai Trattati: il diritto di controllo politico.
Anneli Jäätteenmäki, ALDE-ryhmän puolesta. – Arvoisa puhemies, kiitokset esittelijä David Martinille erittäin hyvästä yhteistyöstä.
EU tarvitsee hyvää hallintoa, läpinäkyvää hallintoa ja demokraattista hallintoa. Siihen kuuluu se, että parlamentilla on oikeus saada lainsäädäntöön liittyvät asiakirjat. Tästä neuvotellaan juuri tällä hetkellä eikä hyvältä näytä, sillä komissio ja neuvosto ovat vastahankaan.
Mutta nyt käsitellään toista ulottuvuutta eli sitä, minkälaiset valtuudet parlamentilla on valvoa hallintoa tutkintavaliokunnan kautta. Tämä on poliittista valvontaa, tämä ei ole tuomioistuinvalvontaa, ja se ero on pidettävä mielessä, mutta parlamentilla pitää olla vahva oikeus tällaiseen poliittiseen valvontaan. Siihen mielestäni ei kuulu – kuten komissaari katsoi – että kansalliset virkamiehet ja EU-virkamiehet pitää asettaa samanarvoiseen asemaan. En kannata sitä, että kansalliset virkamiehet ovat täällä parlamentissa samassa asemassa kuin te komissaarit esimerkiksi. Ette tekään tule kansallisiin parlamentteihin tutkintavaliokuntien kuultavaksi samalla tavalla kuin kansalliset virkamiehet. Tässä on se pieni ero.
On kuitenkin tärkeää, että parlamentilla on vahva rooli eri instituutioiden valvonnassa. Vain sitä kautta me voimme vahvistaa kansalaisten luottamusta tähän EU:n toimintaan, ja siinä on paljon tehtävää. Kun tämä tutkintavaliokunta nyt on olemassa ja sen toimintaa vahvistetaan, toivon, että sitä kuitenkin – kuten tähänkin saakka – käytetään harvoin, harkiten ja vain erittäin tärkeissä tapauksissa.
Gerald Häfner, im Namen der Verts/ALE-Fraktion. – Herr Präsident, liebe Kolleginnen und Kollegen! Demokratie braucht Verfahren, und Verfahren funktionieren nur so gut, wie die ihnen zugrunde liegenden Regeln sind. Beim Untersuchungsausschussrecht sind diese Regeln absolut ungenügend, wie die bisherige Erfahrung – etwa mit dem Untersuchungsauschuss zur Krise der „Equitable Life Assurance Society“ – gezeigt hat. Deshalb brauchen wir endlich ein funktionierendes Untersuchungsausschussrecht. Wir müssen dort, wo es Missstände, Fehlverhalten, Skandale gibt, aufklären, Licht ins Dunkel bringen. An die Stelle von Kolportage oder Verdacht müssen wir Klarheit und Wahrheit stellen, genauso wie an die Stelle von Verschleierung und Verdunklung. Das ist unsere Aufgabe, und zwar im Interesse und im Namen der Bürger. Wir müssen alle relevanten Dokumente sichten können. Wir müssen alle relevanten Zeugen und Betroffenen hören können, auch vor Ort, und Nichterscheinen oder die Weigerung auszusagen oder Falschaussagen müssen ernste und wirksame Folgen haben.
Ich möchte noch einen Punkt ansprechen, der heute leider nicht zur Abstimmung steht: Die Lebenserfahrung zeigt, dass der Aufklärungswille in einem Untersuchungssausschuss nicht immer auf allen Seiten gleich stark ausgeprägt ist. Ich bedauere das, weil eigentlich unabhängig von nationalen Interessen oder Rücksichtnahmen oder parteipolitischen Interessen oder Rücksichtnahmen alle denselben Aufklärungswillen haben sollten. Aber die Erfahrung zeigt, dass gelegentlich die Minderheit sehr viel mehr und deutlicher bereit ist, Tatbestände zum Vorschein zu bringen, als die Mehrheit. Deswegen brauchen wir zwingend die Möglichkeit für Minderheitenberichte in Untersuchungsausschüssen.
Ashley Fox, on behalf of the ECR Group. – Mr President, scrutiny by this Parliament is important. Our job is not only to pass legislation – something which we do rather too much of – but also to ensure that taxpayers’ money is spent wisely, both by the Commission and by the Member States. My predecessor in the South-West of England was Neil Parish, now the Member of Parliament for Tiverton and Honiton. He was instrumental in setting up the parliamentary inquiry into the foot-and-mouth outbreak in the UK in 2001. That inquiry revealed how incompetently the last Labour Government handled that crisis.
This reform shows how inquiries should be undertaken. It contains some good parts but goes too far in granting powers to this Parliament. For example, it grants Parliament the power to summons individuals and the power to sanction those who refuse to attend. The Treaties do not grant us these powers and in my view we would be overreaching ourselves by approving this report.
I do not support the provisions relating to officials of national governments. Civil servants have a duty to provide their best advice to ministers and, having done so, to carry out those ministerial decisions. This proposal risks undermining that trust and subverting ministerial accountability, which is rightly judged by national parliaments.
If these proposals are to achieve anything it should be to introduce greater accountability to the European institutions. It is here that Parliament should concentrate its efforts by bringing the bureaucrats in Brussels under democratic oversight and control.
Helmut Scholz, im Namen der GUE/NGL-Fraktion. – Herr Präsident, Herr Kommissar, liebe Kolleginnen und Kollegen! In Zeiten des wachsenden Schwundes von Vertrauen von Bürgerinnen und Bürgern in die Europäische Union und die von ihrer Politik in vielen Bereichen ausgeübte Rechtspraxis ist der Initiativbericht des Kollegen Martin nur zu begrüßen, und ich bringe ausdrücklich die Unterstützung meiner Fraktion für diesen Initiativbericht zum Ausdruck. Es geht darum, das in Artikel 14 des Vertrags von Lissabon explizit verankerte Recht und die Aufgabe der politischen Kontrollausübung des Europäischen Parlaments in weitere praktische Schritte zu fassen. Insofern stimme ich auch nicht meinem Vorredner zu, dass wir gerade diesen Ausbau des Untersuchungsrechtes, auch des Europäischen Parlaments, nicht vornehmen sollten. Denn wie kann und soll Artikel 226 konkret in die Praxis eingreifen, wenn es notwendig wird, zeitweilige Untersuchungsausschüsse einzusetzen, um, ich zitiere:
alleged contraventions or maladministration in the implementation of Union law’
aufzudecken und abzustellen? Ein festes, real funktionierendes, transparentes und Transparenz schaffendes Untersuchungsverfahren ist notwendig.
Ja, Untersuchungsverfahren haben in der parlamentarischen Demokratie eine wichtige Aufgabe zu erfüllen. Durch sie erhalten Parlamente die Möglichkeit, unabhängig und selbständig die Sachverhalte zu prüfen, die sie in Erfüllung ihres Verfassungsauftrages als Vertretung der Bürgerinnen und Bürger für aufklärungsbedürftig halten. Ich glaube, gerade in der gegenwärtigen Situation, in der sich die Europäische Union befindet, ist das dringend notwendig.
Abschließend noch ein Gedanke: Ich schließe mich den Kollegen an, die sagen, Minderheitenvoten sind dringend notwendig.
Andrew Henry William Brons (NI). - Mr President, inquiring into executives should be one of the central functions of any parliament. However it is implicit that each parliament’s right should relate to its own executive and not somebody else’s. The European Parliament should indeed have right to question EU officials, from the humblest right up to people like Mr Barroso who are not famed for their humility.
However, there is no reason for this right of inquiry to extend to Member States. That is and should be the function of Member States’ parliaments. The committee would be able to call specific civil servants from Member States to give evidence and even obtain judicial assistance. Civil servants must at least have the right conferred by the rapporteur’s own Amendment 18 to withhold information that they would be able to withhold from their own Member State’s inquiries. Furthermore civil servants must be protected from the dilemma of being given contradictory instructions about whether they should conceal or reveal information.
Rafał Trzaskowski (PPE). - Mr President, first of all I would like to thank Mr Martin for his excellent work and also to thank the shadow rapporteurs.
Very limited powers were given to Committees of Inquiry under the Maastricht Treaty, and they were not commensurate with the stature of the European Parliament. With the Treaty of Lisbon, Parliament was endowed with political control.
When it comes to democratic scrutiny, we simply have to give teeth to our procedures. Investigators on the spot request documents; here, officials from EU institutions and Member States ask national authorities for assistance – and, yes, there are sanctions. These are not, Mr Fox, European Union sanctions; they are applied in accordance with national procedures by national authorities.
We are not dogmatic. For example, in the course of negotiations we dropped language which would have given the impression that Committees of Inquiry behave like a court. We recognise the possibility of authorisation for a given official to appear before the committee being denied by his superior, but in such cases the official should come before the committee and explain the reasons. We are flexible and open to compromise, but we will defend the prerogatives of this House commensurate with its elevated political status and its stature. We have to strengthen the democratic scrutiny by Parliament of the EU process.
Enrique Guerrero Salom (S&D). - Señor Presidente, quiero agradecer también al ponente, David Martin, el trabajo que ha desempeñado y a la Presidencia danesa la disposición que ha tenido para avanzar a lo largo de este informe.
Sabemos bien cuáles son las competencias de los parlamento clásicos: tres muy concretas: la función legislativa, la función presupuestaria y la función de control, y otra más difusa, pero muy importante: la de orientación política.
A través de la función de control, los parlamentos pueden escrutinizar y fiscalizar la actuación del gobierno y de la administración, pueden exigir la rendición de cuentas y pueden, finalmente, aplicar la responsabilidad política, si ello es necesario, mediante mecanismos ligeros o mediante mecanismos más contundentes.
El derecho de control incluye las comisiones de investigación y, por tanto, el trabajo que en estos momentos estamos tratando de desarrollar amplifica las funciones de este Parlamento, que ha avanzado mucho en el ámbito legislativo y en el ámbito de las competencias legislativas y presupuestarias, pero que se ha quedado atrás en lo que se refiere al control.
Por tanto, como todavía tenemos ante nosotros un proceso negociador después de esta votación, pido al Consejo y a la Comisión que, junto con el ponente y con este Parlamento, dotemos de capacidad de investigación a esta Casa.
Andrew Duff (ALDE). - Mr President, I agree that Parliament does not need or seek quasi-judicial powers, but we need for all that a serious capacity to be inquisitive about complex political controversies.
I look forward to the trialogue. We need to address the unequal treatment that the draft places on Commission and national officials, but we should also seek to reach an agreement on meaningful remedies for the conclusions drawn by an inquiry.
Catch-the-eye procedure
Miroslav Mikolášik (PPE) - Vyšetrovacie právomoci patria medzi štandardné právomoci rôznych demokratických parlamentov vo svete. Záujem na tom, aby zákonodarcovia mohli získať pravdivý obraz o skutočnosti, vyplýva z potreby správnej legislatívnej reakcie na spoločenskú realitu. Rozsah vyšetrovacích právomocí samozrejme súvisí s politickým významom daného parlamentu a Európsky parlament postupne dozrieva, k čomu významne prispelo prijatie Lisabonskej zmluvy. Vďaka nej sa Európska únia viac zdemokratizovala, keďže sa inštitucionálna rovnováha posunula smerom k Európskemu parlamentu priamo zastupujúcemu občanov Európskej únie. Predpokladaný návrh nariadenia sa mi preto javí ako primeraný vzhľadom na nové postavenie Európskeho parlamentu a právomoci vyplývajúce zo Zmluvy o fungovaní Európskej únie.
Mairead McGuinness (PPE). - Mr President, I want to support the comments of our rapporteur and thank him for them. I rise as the Chair of the Committee of Inquiry into Equitable Life so I have some experience of the limitations of that committee. Having said that, we did achieve results and I think it is important to understand that the reason for that inquiry was that over a million citizens lobbied us to carry out our work, which we did.
I would also ask that the Parliament look at follow-up to Committees of Inquiry. We still have not got the full outcome of the work we did on Equitable Life, and I would like the UK authorities to clarify whether all citizens affected will be paid and when they will be paid. I think we should, in this report, look not just at our procedures, which are important and where I support change, but also at the follow-up to the work of the various Committees of Inquiry, because citizens will judge us not on the report but on the action.
(End of catch-the-eye procedure)
Maroš Šefčovič, Vice-President of the Commission. − Mr President, I appreciate the opportunity to reply to some of the remarks that have been made. I think it is quite important for the regulation to be legally watertight. For instance, it is crucial to avoid the possibility of the authority of the committee being challenged in the middle of the inquiry. For this reason, we need to work together to make sure that all the provisions are legally justified and completely valid. I believe that it is in all our interests.
Mrs Jäätteenmäki and several other speakers referred to the issue of the disclosure of confidential information. I believe that this is one topic on which we need to work further to find a good solution for all three institutions. I also very much appreciate Mr Häfner’s comment. He clearly highlighted the importance of having clear rules with regard to such sensitive areas as Committees of Inquiry. I would very much like to reiterate the point made by Mr Duff, who highlighted the importance of overcoming the issue of unequal treatment between national and European civil servants. I hope that with a good cooperative approach to this issue we will find a solution that is acceptable to all three institutions.
Nicolai Wammen, formand for Rådet. − Hr. formand! Ærede medlemmer! Kommissær! Lad mig først og fremmest takke for en rigtig god debat og for muligheden for at drøfte denne sag med Europa-Parlamentet i dag. Jeg ved, at det er en sag, som har stor betydning for Parlamentet, og derfor vil jeg gerne endnu en gang sige, at Rådet og det danske formandskab fuldt ud respekterer Parlamentets initiativret i denne sag. Jeg ser frem til Europa-Parlamentets afstemning om hr. Martins betænkning. Det danske formandskab vil meget nøje undersøge Europa-Parlamentets forslag, og vi vil gøre vores bedste for at skabe en resultatorienteret proces i de kommende forhandlinger mellem institutionerne. Formandskabet vil arbejde målrettet for at finde kompromisser, der er tilfredsstillende både for Parlamentet, Kommissionen og Rådet. I denne forbindelse vil jeg gerne takke hr. Martin for det gode samarbejde og hans konstruktive tilgang til forhandlingerne. Det danske formandskab sætter stor pris på den fleksibilitet og forhandlingsvilje, som hr. Martin har udvist.
Jeg er overbevist om, at vi i samarbejde også med kommissær Šefčovič kan finde en løsning og enes om et juridisk grundlag for undersøgelsesudvalgenes arbejde. Det er vigtigt, at vi på den ene side giver undersøgelsesudvalgene mulighed for at arbejde så effektivt som muligt, men på den anden side må vi også sikre, at Parlamentets undersøgelsesudvalg arbejder i overensstemmelse med traktatens bestemmelser og respekterer institutionernes roller. På den baggrund ser jeg frem til det fortsatte samarbejde med dette Parlament med Kommissionen og i Rådet.
President. − The debate is closed.
The vote will take place shortly.
IN THE CHAIR: EDWARD McMILLAN-SCOTT Vice-President