Ausführliche Sitzungsberichte

Mittwoch, 21. November 2012 - Straßburg

13. Umsetzung der Gemeinsamen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik - EU-Klauseln über die gegenseitige Verteidigung und Solidarität: politische und operationelle Dimensionen - Cyber-Sicherheit und Verteidigung - Rolle der Gemeinsamen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungsstrategie im Fall von klimabedingten Krisen und Naturkatastrophen (Aussprache)

  Elnök. − A következő pont közös vita

– az Arnaud Danjean által a Külügyi Bizottság nevében készített jelentés a közös biztonság- és védelempolitika végrehajtásáról (a Tanács által az Európai Parlament számára készített, a közös kül- és biztonságpolitikáról szóló éves jelentés alapján) (2012/2138(INI)) (A7-0357/2012)

– az Ioan Mircea Paşcu által a Külügyi Bizottság nevében készített jelentés az EU kölcsönös védelmi és szolidaritási záradékairól: szakpolitikai és műveleti dimenziók (2012/2223(INI)) (A7-0356/2012)

– a Tunne Kelam által a Külügyi Bizottság nevében készített jelentés a kiberbiztonságról és -védelemről (2012/2096(INI)) (A7-0335/2012)

– az Indrek Tarand által a Külügyi Bizottság nevében készített jelentés a közös biztonság- és védelempolitika szerepéről éghajlatváltozás okozta válsághelyzetek és természeti katasztrófák esetén (2012/2095(INI)) ( A7-0349/2012)

  Arnaud Danjean, rapporteur. − Monsieur le Président, Madame la ministre, chers collègues, nul besoin aujourd'hui d'énumérer toutes les crises et menaces qui pèsent sur notre sécurité et qui affectent la stabilité de notre continent et de son voisinage.

L'actualité – nous venons d'en parler – nous fournit chaque jour de nouvelles raisons de considérer que le monde multipolaire de ce début de vingt-et-unième siècle est, à bien des égards, plus dangereux que celui auquel nous avons été habitués, car il est moins prévisible et moins organisé: guerre civile en Syrie, tensions israélo-arabes, terrorisme, prolifération nucléaire, affrontements et criminalité au Sahel, piraterie au large de la Somalie, poursuite d'une guerre au Congo, pour ne citer que les dangers d'aujourd'hui même.

Face à cette situation, il serait irresponsable de considérer la politique de sécurité et de défense commune comme un luxe ou comme une anecdote. C'est une politique qui est, certes, récente et encore en devenir. Plus que nulle autre politique à l'échelle européenne, c'est une politique qui repose sur les États membres, sur leur capacité matérielle et humaine, sur leurs traditions et sur leur volonté politique de partager, ou non, leur quasi absolue souveraineté en matière diplomatique et militaire.

Ce constat amène encore trop d'observateurs – et trop de collègues – à considérer la politique de sécurité et de défense commune comme une quantité négligeable ou comme une illusion inutile. Nous pensons, bien au contraire – sans naïveté et sans illusion excessive – que la PSDC est une nécessité stratégique pour l'Union européenne. C'est d'ailleurs pourquoi elle figure en toutes lettres dans le traité de Lisbonne.

L'Union européenne ne peut simplement plus se permettre de déléguer systématiquement sa sécurité et celle de son voisinage. Bien sûr, l'OTAN, qui regroupe 21 des 27 membres de l'Union, constitue toujours – et il faut s'en féliciter – la pierre angulaire de la défense collective du continent. Bien sûr, le partenariat transatlantique doit être réaffirmé et il est irremplaçable, mais ceci n'est pas exclusif d'un effort et d'une ambition de la part des pays européens eux-mêmes, bien au contraire! Les Américains eux-mêmes, qui ont amorcé un véritable virage stratégique vers l'Asie-Pacifique nous demandent à nous, Européens, d'être plus actifs, plus robustes, plus sûrs de nous-mêmes en matière de sécurité et de défense.

Ceux qui mettent en cause la PSDC, en parlant de duplication, doivent réaliser que c'est une complémentarité pragmatique et intelligente dont il est question entre l'OTAN, organisation militaire, et l'Union européenne. Il est des crises qui affectent notre sécurité et dans lesquelles l'OTAN ne peut intervenir; ce fut le cas de la Géorgie, c'est globalement aussi le cas des conflits africains, dans lesquels les États-Unis estiment ne pas avoir à intervenir, à l'image de l'exemple récent de la Libye. Ces exemples risquent, malheureusement, de se multiplier à l'avenir.

L'Union européenne a souvent la pleine légitimité pour agir, car elle place son action dans le cadre de la légalité internationale, et il est peu de pays tiers qui ne lui reconnaissent pas un rôle équilibré sans ambition unilatérale ambigüe. Elle a beaucoup de moyens pour agir; elle a la fameuse approche globale, civilo-militaire, dont elle est la seule à pouvoir se prévaloir.

Bien souvent, malheureusement, le défaut est celui de la volonté politique – volonté politique des États membres avant tout –, le manque de volonté politique – nous devons également le souligner – ou de motivation de la part de certaines institutions bruxelloises en charge de la PESC et de la PSDC, le manque de vision, parfois, la réticence à agir vis-à-vis du Conseil, la réticence idéologique, car on considère que le soft power est plus efficace que l'utilisation de la force armée, l'absence aussi, parfois, de priorité claires qui donnent trop souvent l'impression d'une navigation à vue.

Les défis stratégiques auxquels nous faisons face sont immenses et inédits: une baisse structurelle et durable des budgets de défense des pays européens, la réorientation des priorités américaines, une volatilité et une diversité extrême des menaces. Les pays européens n'ont donc d'autre choix que de subir un déclassement stratégique majeur et collectif, ou de se ressaisir et d'exploiter au mieux les potentialités, certes encore modestes, de la PSDC.

C'est certainement d'ailleurs dans le domaine des capacités que cet effort doit être aujourd'hui le plus substantiel – et nous soulignons dans le rapport les vertus du pooling and sharing (mutualisation et partage) promues par l'Agence européenne de défense, ce qui va dans le bon sens.

Les crises économiques et stratégiques ne doivent pas être – Monsieur le Président, c'est un sujet important – un prétexte au renoncement mais au contraire, une opportunité pour renforcer notre ambition commune.

(Applaudissements)

  Ioan Mircea Paşcu, rapporteur. − Mr President, Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure, nor so free. Words written in the European Security Strategy of 2003 are questionable today, confronted with increasingly complex risks and threats moving closer and closer to home. To those, we answer with a rush to slash our defence budgets, making life miserable for the defence planners, be they from NATO or the EU.

Moreover, NATO, responsible for the security of 21 of the 27 EU Member States, is confronted with the American reorientation towards Asia, forcing Europe to manage the consequences through increasing their contribution to NATO and strengthening the EU security and defence dimension.

This report is a step in that latter direction. To that effect, under the existing legal reality, the report does not ask for new instruments or new powers for the EU but argues for a more coherent and efficient interaction of the existing instruments, pointing to what the Union should do in case either one or both clauses are invoked, apart from and until the national mechanisms are activated. This way, the EU mechanisms do not substitute for the national ones. They only support and amend them, helping the Member States to deal successfully with a situation invoking the clauses.

In other words, the report is about solidarity. Any member of the EU, including those not in NATO, is entitled to respect from their organisation because solidarity is indispensable to the cohesion of the EU, acting as a deterrent of aggression too; particularly at a time when, due to the current crisis, centrifugal forces are getting stronger.

Although in practice the two clauses, mutual defence and solidarity, could be interconnected, the report takes them separately for reasons of clarity.

What the report names the mutual defence clause – because in the Treaty on European Union it is nameless – although it deals with measures in case of external armed aggression is a provision imported from the Treaty of Brussels establishing the Western European Union, which after Lisbon has been embedded into the EU’s legal basis. On the other hand, the solidarity clause is an addition following the multiplication of natural and man-made disasters both within and outside the EU.

Since Article 42(7) states that the EU NATO members rely for their security on the North Atlantic Treaty, the report underlines the importance of the relationship between the EU and NATO which should be seen as cooperative and not competitive, being instead organisations complementary to one another. To that effect, the report advocates the cohesion of the EU’s pooling and sharing and NATO’s smart defence initiatives; the creation in time of an EU headquarters; and defining today’s risks and threats in a modern way, adapted to reality.

In turn, the solidarity clause is meant to address the situations where the national capacities of a state to deal with a certain disaster are overwhelmed, to maintain a balance between preparedness and flexibility and to avoid the phenomenon of free riding when one prefers to rely more on others than on oneself.

The report, arguing for the best use of such instruments like the civil protection mechanism, the internal security strategy and the capacities of the External Action Service, supports the ongoing review of the emergency and crisis coordination arrangement and the development of an integrated situational awareness.

In conclusion, the report asks the High Representative to propose practical arrangements and guidelines for ensuring a rapid and coherent response in the event of a Member State invoking the mutual defence clause.

We also call on the Commission and the High Representative before the end of 2012 to make the joint proposal for a Council Decision, defining the arrangements for the implementation of the solidarity clause, clarifying in particular the roles and competences of different actors.

  Tunne Kelam, rapporteur. − Mr President, this is to be seen as a first comprehensive message from the European Parliament to address both cyber security and cyber defence. Since the first politically motivated cyber attacks against the state in 2007, cyber challenges and attacks have been growing at a dramatic pace and constitute a serious threat to security, stability and also to the competitiveness of different societies. The have the potential to do genuine damage.

Cyber threats and attacks have become a constant, let us say, collateral element of our everyday lives. There is still no internationally agreed model on how to respond to state-backed cyber attacks against a Member State. The report therefore urges the Commission, and especially the High Representative, to consider implementation of Article 222, the solidarity clause, or in the absence of common terminology, at least a mutual defence clause, in the case of a serious cyber attack against a Member State.

Our main message to the Commission is to come forward with a comprehensive EU cyber security strategy providing a common definition of cyber security and defence, as well as a common operating vision to enhance horizontal cooperation and coordination of cyber security and to create synergies at the EU levels. There are signals that the Commission is in the course of preparations and I hope that today’s report will encourage the Commission to complete its preparations.

Cyber security policies should not be implemented at the expense of digital freedoms which are in fact a prerequisite for fully enjoying human rights. Therefore, we call for caution while applying restrictions on citizens’ free use of cyber space, which has two billion globally connected users. It is a powerful instrument for mediating freedom and also fighting dictatorships.

At the same time, we realise that security and defence problems ultimately have to be addressed by the national governments. What do we see? We see dramatically different levels of preparedness among Member States. Only ten Member States have completed their national cyber security defence strategies, while 17 are still expected follow suit.

Some important points were made in this report. We need a coordinated assessment of cyber attacks on the EU level. We call on all EU institutions to include in their risk analysis and crisis management plans the issue of cyber crisis management. And there is a call for a back to basics. Cyber security depends not only on modern technology, but starts with elementary cyber hygiene. The great majority of cyber attacks can be prevented by providing citizens as well as civil servants with adequate education. It is high time to introduce cyber security in education, in school curricula, from the earliest possible age. Private-public cooperation is a key factor. The private sector is an important actor and we call for creation of frameworks and instruments for a rapid information change system that could guarantee anonymity of private firms when reporting cyber attacks.

VORSITZ: OTHMAR KARAS
Vizepräsident

  Indrek Tarand, rapporteur. − Mr President, as a rapporteur I have discovered huge resources in the results of the work of previous European generations in the same area and topic, namely CSDP and climate change. One is of the utmost necessity during times of a globally changing security environment and the other is around and happening every day. Hence we must live with that and cope with it.

That is why I believe our debate is very timely. It comes after Hurricane Sandy but, more importantly, it comes simultaneously with a non-paper by the Cyprus Presidency on the need to develop the military capacity of the EU, which aims to have a decision made by the Council during the year 2013.

We began the work on this report by convening a meeting of different stakeholders – with External Action Service staff, with the Commission DGs CLIMA, ECHO and DEVCO, EU military staff, the EDA and people from various other institutions. I learned a lot from those people. May I use the opportunity to thank them for their help and guidance.

Besides that, I pushed two other issues. Firstly, to appoint an EU climate security envoy within the External Action Service, following the British Government’s example – Admiral Neil Morisetti has been very successfully working for three years in this function. We also believe that this could support the German Government initiative to give an impulse to a similar function with the United Nations system. Secondly, another idea was to use the generally acknowledged perception that climate change is a threat multiplier and to use it as a platform to introduce more cooperation between Member States and the respective military in particular, up to forming a joint engineering corps for the European Union.

The shadow rapporteurs from all the political groups worked hard and many succeeded in convincing their political groups to support these ideas, whereas others disagreed and gave substantial reasons for their objections. We ended up with 17 compromises out of 150 amendments. I would like to thank all the shadows for their contributions, which made the report clearer and better, sometimes less ambitious but at the same time more pragmatic and closer to the democratic consensus which we cherish in this House.

Colleagues, thank you. I have learned a lot from you. To give just one example, Mr Van Orden asked me to be specific on the engineering corps and I was in some difficulty. Only later I discovered that this might have happened because I am only a former Soviet sergeant, but he has the experience of a brigadier. So we will have to cooperate on that in the future as we were able agree on his other concerns.

I wish to quickly highlight the three important points in this report where we achieved consensus. The Lisbon Treaty creates new provisions for implementing CSDP activities. That is why this report also describes tools which could be used, for example, in policy planning, with a coherent and logical approach to defence adapted to security challenges that we in Europe will have to face in decades to come. Also the mainstreaming of potential effects of climate on security into the most important strategies, policy documents and financial instruments, would be a success in my opinion. In the External Action Service it could also be done in the same way as the recently appointed Special Representative on Human Rights. That could also work with climate and security.

I would like to say a couple of words about duplication. We have been accused, regarding the role of the CSDP in climate-driven security threats, of duplicating the excellent work that has been done by Commissioner Georgieva and her people in the field of the Civil Protection Mechanism. We had a meeting with Commissioner Georgieva, who, as a former professor and author of many books on environmental economics, had no difficulty at all in seeing that this report is complementary to her achievements. I would like to thank her for her participation in making this report. I am excited that today’s debate is taking place and look forward to hearing every comment.

  Erato Kozakou-Markoullis, President-in-Office of the Council, on behalf of the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. − Mr President, I am honoured to speak to you today in accordance with the Treaty on the Common and Security and Defence Policy on behalf of the High Representative. The four parliamentary reports we are discussing are timely and relevant; they reflect the world we live in, where an action in a far corner of the world could have an impact in our home town.

They demonstrate that our security is interconnected in various ways. Hence I would like to express my appreciation for the amount of work which lies behind these four reports and for their quality. Your suggestions and recommendations are important to us and we are happy to have Parliament on our side as our partner but also as a fair critic. With three new missions on the ground in the Sahel, South Sudan and Horn of Africa and with two more under preparation, for Mali and Libya, we have seen some dynamic developments over the past year. We have also seen clear results from our efforts.

The number of pirate attacks off the Horn of Africa has shrunk significantly. There have only been five successful attacks this year compared to 25 last year and 47 in 2010. Security inside Somalia has also improved and the government has now extended its power over a great part of its territory previously ruled by Al-Shabaab. EUTM Somalia played an important role in this positive development as 3000 Somali soldiers will be trained by the end of this year and they are taking up their responsibility for Somalia’s security.

But despite these tangible results we must not become complacent. The High Representative has said this on numerous occasions and it is worth repeating: we must continue to resource our missions and operations properly and we must continue working towards the goals we have set out for our ongoing missions and our operations. The people that we send into the field are doing a tremendous job often in very dangerous and difficult environments. We are very grateful for their work and for their dedication. Our missions are effective and their results are sustainable only if they are part of a comprehensive approach. The example of the Horn of Africa is a good illustration of our approach. In the Horn, we employ policies and instruments in a consistent and mutually reinforcing manner. In addition to the three CSP operations and on the basis of a jointly agreed strategic framework for the region, there is strong political engagement, support for AMISOM through the African Peace Facility, development cooperation and humanitarian aid.

We also work very closely with a variety of partners, which increases our impact and also leads to a better use of our resources. The comprehensive approach is about defining a correct policy mix and the proper sequencing of instruments, both at EU level and with Member States. It is about overall consistency in our external relations, about bringing security to populations affected by conflict and alleviating poverty. As we are stepping up operational engagement in new crisis areas such as the Sahel, we must continue working in a comprehensive manner.

Let me now turn to capabilities. The CSDP allows the European Union to act, but to act we must have capabilities. Member States provide these capabilities and we all know that the financial crisis is putting a heavy burden on national budgets. Defence capabilities are particularly affected. This is why our work on pooling and sharing is so important. Synergies with wider European policies, research and development, dual use and the defence industry are also crucial.

These themes are prominent in the report by Mr Danjean. Both topics were on the agenda of the Council of Ministers of Defence on 19 November 2012 and Member States are taking a great interest. You are all aware that the President of the European Council has decided to put defence on the agenda of the European Council at the end of December 2013. This offers a very good opportunity to address these challenges at the highest political level.

There are some common themes in the four reports: the need for comprehensiveness, close coordination in-house, but also with partners, full use of the post-Lisbon set up, better use of resources and the efficiency of our efforts. Indeed, in these trying economic times, these cannot be stressed enough.

Cyber security is a case in point. The report by Mr Kelam sets out the imminent need for stepping up EU-wide preventive measures and to improve horizontal cooperation within the EU institutions and agencies. We also need to bolster public-private partnerships in cyber security. The European External Action Service and the Commission are preparing a joint Commission-EEAS communication on EU cyber security to ensure the adequate level of cyber security preparedness, also looking at cyber defence capabilities and training, as well as a coherent international cyber policy for the European Union. We have already started active international cyber security cooperation, with an emphasis on the United States and on emerging markets as well as NATO, the United Nations, OECD, OSCE and other international organisations. They need to enhance collective knowledge of climate-related security challenges, as set out in the report by Mr Tarand. Indeed, it is necessary to pursue efforts at EU and Member State level, as well as in dialogue with external partners and civil society to identify climate security needs and to further strengthen our understanding of interlinkages between climate change development, environmental degradation, natural resources, migration or conflict. The challenge is to enhance early warning and move to early preventive action.

The European Union and Member States are leading international efforts to enhance climate security by initiating policy dialogue, including at the UN Security Council level and in its bilateral relations and by supporting concrete initiatives in the fields of climate risk management and adaptation. One example is the Global Climate Change Alliance, which has a strong focus on climate adaptation in the most climate vulnerable regions of the world. Another area of work relates to the solidarity clause, which is designed for situations of major emergencies affecting the Member States. The European External Action Service and the Commission are currently working on a joint proposal to implement the clause.

The report presented by Mr Paşcu is again very timely. We concur with the main lines of the report. I would like to underline some points which seem particularly important to us. As far as structures and procedures are concerned, the EU needs to possess crisis response structures with 24/7 monitoring and response capacity, able to provide early warning and up-to-date situation awareness to all relevant actors on all types of hazards and crises or disasters. The European Union situation room and the Commission’s monitoring and information centre are ready to support the process. Also revised EU emergency and crisis coordination arrangements are suitable in this context. Responding at EU political level in a coherent, efficient and timely way to crises of such a scale and nature requires one single set of arrangements.

The four reports at hand today, on a variety of topics, all relate to European security, both internal and external. We look forward to continuing our work with you in our joint efforts to protect the security of our citizens and make the European Union an increasingly effective contributor to global peace and security. I am really looking forward to the forthcoming debate and to your comments.

  Andrew Duff, rapporteur for the opinion of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs. − Mr President, the constitutional features of these reports are two-fold: firstly, just how do we make core groups, clusters and reinforced cooperation work? – we still have not really mastered that – and, secondly, the treaty-based linkages between the Union and NATO.

Now, just on that second point, the technical cooperation appears to be quite good but we all know that political collaboration is extremely poor or weak. We all know why; it is the old intractable problem of Turkey and Cyprus. So, I think if there is anything that we are able to do to breathe real life into the CSDP, it is to resolve the Cyprus problem as soon as we can.

  Μαριέττα Γιαννάκου, εξ ονόματος της ομάδας PPE. – Κύριε Πρόεδρε, είναι σημαντικό το γεγονός ότι σήμερα, σε μια περίοδο κρίσης, το Ευρωπαϊκό Κοινοβούλιο στέλνει ισχυρό μήνυμα ευρωπαϊκής αλληλεγγύης και αποδεικνύει την βούληση και την πεποίθησή του ότι η λύση των σημερινών προβλημάτων μπορεί να προέλθει μόνο μέσω πολιτικών με πραγματικά πανευρωπαϊκή διάσταση.

Η δημιουργία μιας ολοκληρωμένης κοινής πολιτικής ασφάλειας και άμυνας στην Ευρώπη, υπήρξε όραμα δεκαετιών στην ιστορία της ευρωπαϊκής ολοκλήρωσης. Η εισαγωγή στη Συνθήκη της Λισαβόνας των δύο καινοτόμων ρητρών που είχαν προταθεί από την Ευρωπαϊκή Συνέλευση για το μέλλον της Ευρώπης κινούνται ακριβώς προς αυτή την κατεύθυνση. Το τελικό κείμενο της έκθεσης του κ. Paşcu, τον οποίο θέλω να συγχαρώ για τη δουλειά του και να ευχαριστήσω θερμά για τη συνεργασία που είχαμε όλο αυτό το διάστημα, παρουσιάζει με τρόπο ρεαλιστικό αλλά και φιλόδοξο ταυτόχρονα, συγκεκριμένες απαιτήσεις και κατευθυντήριες γραμμές σχετικά με τα μέτρα εφαρμογής της ρήτρας αμοιβαίας άμυνας και αλληλεγγύης.

Σε αυτή την πορεία, εκφράστηκαν σαφέστατα και διαφορετικές αντιλήψεις σχετικά με τον χαρακτήρα και τη φύση των δύο καινοτόμων ρητρών. Εντούτοις, οι αιτιάσεις σχετικά με το αυξημένο κόστος του όλου εγχειρήματος, τα πιθανά προβλήματα αλλά και το ζήτημα των αρμοδιοτήτων που εμπίπτουν στη δικαιοδοσία του ΝΑΤΟ εκφράζουν περισσότερο τις φοβίες ορισμένων κρατών μελών παρά την πραγματικότητα. Η αλήθεια είναι ότι η σταδιακή συγκρότηση μιας πραγματικά κοινής αμυντικής πολιτικής ασφάλειας και άμυνας θα μπορούσε να μειώσει δραστικά το δυσβάσταχτο κόστος των ευρωπαϊκών αμυντικών δαπανών χωρίς να επηρεάσει στο ελάχιστο τις δεσμεύσεις που έχουν αναληφθεί στο πλαίσιο του ΝΑΤΟ.

Κύριε Πρόεδρε, η Αντιπρόεδρος της Επιτροπής και Ύπατη Εκπρόσωπος οφείλει πλέον να υποβάλει πριν από το τέλος του 2012 την κοινή πρόταση απόφασης του Συμβουλίου για τον καθορισμό των ρυθμίσεων για τις δύο ρήτρες. Το Κοινοβούλιο αναμένει επομένως τη συγκεκριμένη πρόταση.

  Μαρία-Ελένη Κοππά, εξ ονόματος της ομάδας S&D. – Κύριε Πρόεδρε, θα ήθελα να συγχαρώ τον συνάδελφο Danjean, αλλά και όλους τους άλλους συναδέλφους για τις εκθέσεις τους που αποτελούν εξαιρετικό παράδειγμα της δημιουργικής εργασίας που συντελείται στο πλαίσιο της Υποεπιτροπής Άμυνας και Ασφάλειας του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου.

Οι σοσιαλιστές και οι δημοκράτες επιθυμούμε να υπογραμμίσουμε τη σημασία της ενδυνάμωσης της ευρωπαϊκής ταυτότητας και στα ζητήματα άμυνας και ασφάλειας. Η Ένωση πρέπει να εξασφαλίσει τα απαραίτητα μέσα και δυνατότητες που θα της επιτρέψουν να αναπτύξει τη στρατηγική της αυτονομία και την ικανότητά της να παράσχει ασφάλεια στους πολίτες της.

Στο πλαίσιο της τρέχουσας οικονομικής κρίσης ευρύτερες συνέργειες και κοινές δράσεις σ' ευρωπαϊκό επίπεδο είναι επιβεβλημένες και λειτουργικά χρήσιμες. Θα πρέπει όμως να επιτρέψουν και την αποδέσμευση πόρων σε εθνικό επίπεδο οι οποίοι θα μπορέσουν να χρησιμοποιηθούν σε κρίσιμους κοινωνικά τομείς. Πρέπει, όμως, από την άλλη να έχουμε τη δυνατότητα να εξασφαλίσουμε αποτελεσματική άμυνα και ασφάλεια στους πολίτες της Ευρώπης και αυτό είναι το μεγάλο στοίχημα.

  Graham Watson, on behalf of the ALDE Group. – Mr President, I wish to concentrate my remarks particularly on the Tarand report that we have debated in this House. I congratulate Mr Tarand on the work that he has done.

The issue of climate change has been overshadowed in public debate by other security concerns, especially in North Africa. But there have been three reports this week: the World Bank’s estimate of a 4° temperature rise by the end of the century, the United Nations saying action to curb emissions is falling short of what is needed and the European Environment Agency reporting that the effects of climate change are already being felt here in Europe, as I have seen in my constituency in South-West England in the last day or two.

Climate change is not only adding to the costs of government, it is aggravating the threats to peace and security as the greater impact of climate change beyond our borders causes war about water and adds to the number of climate refugees.

This has been acknowledged by High Representative Solana some five years ago, by our foreign ministers last year and again by the Council Presidency today, yet no action has been forthcoming. I call on the Council to reinvigorate the informal Steering Group on Climate Change and to establish a climate envoy because, without that, very little will happen.

  Tarja Cronberg, on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group. – Mr President, I join in the congratulations for the two defence reports. Both reports reflect some of the difficulties and unclear aspects of the European Common Security and Defence Policy. Therefore I strongly underline the need to define the roles and competences of the different actors.

The Danjean report talks about strategic autonomy and strategic decline, which the report assigns to the lack of funds and the reduced defence budgets. The Greens see these more as a result of lack of cooperation, sometimes mismanagement and even a result of wrong priorities. The Paşcu report talks about the mutual defence clause, and mutual assistance clause. At the same time it is very difficult, and I understand the difficulty, to relate these to the NATO defence clause, and in particular for those six EU Member States which remain outside NATO.

Secondly, there is the question of the nuclear umbrella, nuclear weapons. As we know, NATO is a nuclear alliance. What is the role for British and French nukes in the context of European defence?

The management and decision-making structures and procedures for the so-called defence clause are very clear and I hope that the appeal for the High Representative to clarify these issues will be taken seriously.

  Geoffrey Van Orden, on behalf of the ECR Group. – Mr President, I have a simple question to the Council and the Commission: why does the European Union not concentrate its crisis-management efforts on the civil and humanitarian contributions that it makes, instead of trying to play soldiers? By doing less, better, the EU might have a chance of actually getting something right.

Of course, European countries must do more militarily: they are NATO allies. But we do not need the EU to be involved to bring that about.

I have the greatest respect for my friend Mr Danjean, but his Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) report is just another chapter in the litany of European integration: little to do with practical capability and all about ‘lending political credibility and visibility to the Union’s actions while also allowing political control’.

I come back to my point about getting the civil side right. Even a CSDP enthusiast such as Mr Danjean wonders why the European Union Aviation Security Mission (EUAVSEC) to improve airport security at Juba in South Sudan is categorised as a CSDP mission rather than a straightforward Commission project under the instrument for stability. The same might be said of 10 out of the 13 other so-called CSDP missions which are purely civilian in nature. I go further: the police training mission in Afghanistan has been a catalogue of errors. The EUR 500 million EULEX mission in Kosovo, according to the European Court of Auditors, has achieved more or less nothing.

Few of the EU’s costly and distracting CSDP missions stand up to critical scrutiny. May I just say that I hope other Prime Ministers will support the British Prime Minister tomorrow when he calls for cuts in the EU budget. While some CSDP action is useful, the EU’s External Action Service and its wasteful foreign forays offer immediate scope for savings.

(The speaker agreed to take a blue-card question under Rule 149(8))

  Andrew Duff, blue-card question. − Mr President, if I could enquire of Mr Van Orden, I read the Court of Auditors’ report on EULEX, exposing the fact that it was poorly resourced and poorly sustained by Member States as being the true cause of its relative – and I stress the word relative – lack of success so far. I am sorry that it is being depleted further because of the present budgetary cuts.

  Geoffrey Van Orden (ECR), blue-card answer – Mr President, all I would say is that I think, as far as the European Court of Auditors is concerned, in that particular instance they had nothing positive to say, and the effect of a lot of the action was to embed a corrupt, predatory elite, allow organised crime to prosper and ruin a customs service that previously seemed to work perfectly well. That seems to be the consequence.

Now we are talking about getting it right. This is my very point. If the European Union actually focused its efforts on these civil missions, to try and get them properly organised and effectively administered, then we might be getting somewhere. My objection is to all this playing around in so-called CSDP and all this sort of military activity using the cloak of civil action in order to justify it.

  Sabine Lösing, im Namen der GUE/NGL-Fraktion. – Herr Präsident! Die EU hat den Friedensnobelpreis bekommen, und ich möchte ihre Leistungen, wie bei der Aussöhnung nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg, gar nicht in Frage stellen. Doch die vorliegenden Berichte sprechen eine andere Sprache. Die sogenannte Beistandsklausel macht die EU faktisch zu einem Militärbündnis, und die Solidaritätsklausel schließt militärisches Eingreifen in Mitgliedstaaten bei von Menschen verursachten Katastrophen ein.

Da frage ich hier in diesem Saal: Wäre ein europaweiter Generalstreik solch eine von Menschen verursachte Katastrophe? Werden demnächst Soldaten aus Deutschland gegen streikende Arbeiter in Griechenland vorgehen? Die Umsetzung der Forderungen im Jahresbericht der GSVP würde einen Quantensprung der militärischen Entwicklung der EU bedeuten, eine Ausweitung der militärischen Interventionen weltweit, und dann wohl auch mit einem robusten Mandat.

Vieles, wie die Verpflichtung der Mitgliedstaaten zur Aufrüstung, ist die Umsetzung des Vertrags von Lissabon. Und ich sage hier, dass die Linken in Europa recht daran taten, diesen Vertrag abzulehnen, und sie werden nicht aufhören, sich für eine Veränderung dieser vertraglichen Grundlagen einzusetzen.

  Надежда Нейнски (PPE). - С оглед на множеството нови предизвикателства пред световната и европейска сигурност е време Европейският съюз да доразвие и подсили общата си политика за сигурност и отбрана. Конкретен пример е въпросът какъв е потенциалният ефект на климатичните промени, природните бедствия и военните кризи върху европейската сигурност и как Съюзът трябва да бъде подготвен да реагира? Моето мнение е, че ние трябва да изградим европейски военен капацитет, но също така смятам, че той не трябва да бъде нашият първи избор и да посягаме към него в случай първо на природни бедствия. Също така не увеличаване на администрацията и създаване на нови политики, а по-добра координация и подсилване на съществуващите вече инструменти ще доведат до по-ефективна реакция при кризи, при ограничения бюджет, с който разполагаме. Дами и господа, силата на Европейския съюз е в това, че сме лидер в предоставянето на хуманитарна помощ в случай на бедствие и че си сътрудничим с множество партньори с цел гарантиране сигурността на нашите граждани и хората по света. Общата политика на сигурност и отбрана може да допълни, но не и да замени тези добре работещи инструменти на Съюза.

  Luis Yáñez-Barnuevo García (S&D). - Señor Presidente, debatimos hoy cuatro informes que suponen una revitalización de nuestra política común de seguridad y defensa. Es una clara señal del convencimiento de que nuestra seguridad y defensa tienen una clara dimensión europea, frente a los sectores minoritarios euroescépticos, que también campean en esta Cámara.

El informe del señor Danjean —al que quiero agradecer su espíritu de búsqueda de consenso durante la elaboración del mismo— contiene importantes aportaciones del Grupo S&D. Entre otras, las referencias al multilateralismo efectivo, al principio de la responsabilidad de proteger o al concepto de seguridad humana. Y quisiéramos ver estos aspectos incluidos en la posible revisión de la estrategia europea de defensa.

Hemos señalado también que una política común de seguridad y defensa fuerte es igualmente de interés para nuestra alianza transatlántica. Debo destacar otro de los retos que está adquiriendo importantes dimensiones para nuestra seguridad global. Es el de la ciberseguridad y la ciberdefensa, aspectos tratados en un informe que también debatimos hoy y cuyas sugerencias esperemos sean incluidas en la nueva estrategia europea de ciberseguridad.

En un contexto de severa crisis económica y financiera, en el que los Estados miembros se están viendo obligados a recortar sus presupuestos en materia de defensa, es cuando más necesarios son los proyectos europeos de «Pooling and Sharing». Por eso, es más importante que nunca reforzar el papel de la Agencia Europea de Defensa, que se ve muy contestado hoy.

Concluyo afirmando que podemos relanzar la seguridad y defensa europeas y hacerlo con el proyecto del Presidente Van Rompuy para el Consejo de diciembre de 2013. Muchas gracias a los cuatro ponentes.

  Norica Nicolai (ALDE). - Felicitându-i pe cei patru raportori, nu pot să nu îmi exprim regretul, pentru că fiecare raport merita o dezbatere. Fiecare raport aduce o valoare adăugată politicii noastre de securitate şi de apărare comune. Am să vorbesc despre principiu, spunându-vă că Tratatul de la Lisabona dă şansa, juridic vorbind, acestei politici comune. Nu trebuie să ne mai îndoim de această şansă, dar trebuie să ne îndoim de capacitatea noastră de a pune în aplicare această şansă, pentru că nu este posibil, deşi au trecut câţiva ani de când suntem sub puterea acestui tratat şi de când vorbim despre mai multă Europă sau despre o Europă mai bine condusă, să nu dăm operaţionalitate clauzelor la care ne-am angajat.

Lucrul acesta vulnerabilizează poziţia Uniunii, care doreşte să fie un actor relevant atât în materie de politică externă, cât şi în materie de securitate globală. Dacă dorim mai multă Uniune, mai multă Europă, înseamnă că trebuie să dăm o şansă majoră politicii de securitate şi de apărare comune, nu să judecăm lucrurile sectorial, aşa cum, din păcate, s-a întâmplat şi astăzi.

  David Campbell Bannerman (ECR). - Mr President, this resolution is completely unacceptable. It is the equivalent of sending EU tanks across national borders. There is no acceptable EU role in these vital, strategic and offence responsibilities, and no role for Commission legislation.

Just look at the language. The EU ‘should be a global political player on the international scene’ it says, ‘to protect its interests in the world and to ensure the security of its citizens’. All under the roof of a single political authority. It says, the EU has ‘an important role to play as security provider for the Member States’ and it wants mergers of European businesses to contribute to European defence industry.

Well, here is the real aim of this shameful BAE/EADS merger proposal.

But worst of all, it wants to take the EU to war. It talks of having the ‘full range of possibilities for action on the international scene’, of intervening ‘in all types of crisis, including […] high intensity conflicts’ – and that means war.

No, this resolution must be stopped in its tracks.

  Willy Meyer (GUE/NGL). - Señor Presidente, mi Grupo parlamentario, con las opiniones minoritarias, quiere impugnar la actual orientación de la política de seguridad, no solamente de la Unión Europea sino también a nivel internacional.

Creemos que ha llegado el momento de desmilitarizar la seguridad, y la OTAN, uno de los pilares de la defensa de la Unión Europea, va en sentido contrario. Desde 1999, en la Cumbre de Washington, aprobó un concepto estratégico que permitía una intervención militar al margen del Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas y, además, dar una respuesta militar a fenómenos como el terrorismo y la delincuencia organizada, que eran hasta entonces materias de respuesta civil.

Nosotros creemos que la militarización no es lo que necesita el mundo; no es la respuesta que requieren esas 70 000 personas que mueren diariamente por desamparo, mientras se gastan en el mundo 4 000 millones de dólares diarios.

Ha llegado el momento de la desmilitarización y, por eso, queremos dar otra orientación a través de nuestros informes minoritarios.

  Elmar Brok (PPE). - Herr Präsident, Herr Kommissar, Herr Vertreter des Europäischen Auswärtigen Dienstes, meine Damen und Herren! Gerade der letzte Punkt ist ein Hinweis darauf, was wir anders machen müssen. Wenn wir Parallelstrukturen beseitigen und bei Beschaffung, Forschung und anderen Dingen Synergieeffekte nutzen, wenn nicht mehr jeder alles tun muss, sondern wir unsere Aufgaben in Arbeitsteilung durchführen, können wir mit weniger Geld mehr erreichen. Wenn Sie sehen, dass wir in Europa Armeen haben, bei denen 60, 70, 80 % der Angehörigen Verwaltungsarbeit machen, und wenn wir sehen, wie viele Soldaten es in Europa gibt und wie viele davon wirklich einsatzfähig sind, dann wird deutlich, wie viel Geld hier verschwendet wird. Die Mitgliedstaaten sagen, beim europäischen Haushalt müsse man streichen, doch wir könnten im Verteidigungssektor durch die Nutzung der Synergieeffekte, der Kooperation, der Arbeitsteilung so viel Geld einsparen, dass es ein Mehrfaches dessen wäre, was wir gegenwärtig an Einsparmaßnahmen beim normalen Haushalt diskutieren.

Ich glaube, dass aus diesen Gründen manche nationalen Eigenheiten, Gewohnheiten und Eitelkeiten diskutiert werden müssen. Wir müssen durch die Erkenntnisse der nationalen Haushaltspolitiker zu dieser besseren europäischen Darstellung auch im Bereich der Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik kommen, um auf diese Weise handlungsfähig zu sein.

Ich war vorige Woche in Moskau: Dort lachen sie über uns, weil wir nichts zusammenbekommen. Um nicht nur der global payer, sondern auch der global player zu sein, sollten wir gerade in dieser Frage zusammenfinden!

  Justas Vincas Paleckis (S&D). - Sveikinu puikiai padirbėjusius pranešėjus, ypač Indreką Tarandą.

Europos Sąjunga dar prieš ketverius metus paskelbė, kad didžiausia grėsmė žmonijai – klimato kaita. Liko tik septyneri metai, kad užkirstume kelią nepataisomai klimato kaitos žalai. Užgriuvusi krizė, deja, nustūmė šią opiausią problemą į šalį. Visuose svarbiausiuose ES dokumentuose privalėtume atsižvelgti į klimato kaitos poveikį pasaulio saugumui ir sukurti tarpinstitucinę darbo grupę, kuri padidintų ES ir jos valstybių pajėgumus numatant ir likviduojant klimato kaitos sukeltas gamtines katastrofas ir jų pasekmes. Būtina geresnė ES valstybių, Europos Komisijos, JAV, taip pat Kinijos, Indijos, Rusijos, Brazilijos bendradarbiavimo koordinacija. Reikalingas išankstinio įspėjimo mechanizmas ir Europos, ir planetos mastu. Pasaulio valstybių, ypač didžiųjų, kariuomenės turėtų efektyviau naudoti energijos resursus ir taip prisidėti prie klimato kaitos stabdymo.

  Michael Gahler (PPE). - Herr Präsident! Der Kollege Brok hat eben zu Recht auf den Mehrwert hingewiesen, den wir erzielen könnten, wenn wir im Bereich Sicherheit und Verteidigung mehr kooperieren würden. Im Bericht Danjean sind einige Beispiele aufgeführt, z. B. fordern wir von den Mitgliedstaaten eine stärkere Kooperationsbereitschaft beim pooling und sharing, wie auch in den Ratsschlussfolgerungen vom Beginn dieser Woche bekräftigt wurde.

Hierzu legte der Europäische Militärstab 2011 eine Liste mit ca. 300 Projekten vor. Aktuell verfolgt die EU lediglich elf Projekte. Man muss sich fragen, was denn aus den anderen geworden ist. Warum sind die Mitgliedstaaten nicht bereit, Verantwortung als lead nations zu übernehmen?

Anderes Beispiel: Im Mai 2012 präsentierte Lady Ashton auf dem NATO-Gipfel in Chicago das Projekt zur Luftbetankung als einen wesentlichen Beitrag zur Füllung von Fähigkeitslücken von EU und NATO. Auch in den jüngsten Ratsschlussfolgerungen wurden erneut die Fortschritte in diesem Feld hervorgehoben. Ich frage mich aber, welche Fähigkeitslücken sind denn bisher konkret geschlossen worden?

Handelt es sich bei diesen bisherigen Schritten der Mitgliedstaaten nicht nur um substanzlose Ankündigungen? Meiner Kenntnis nach wird Frankreich lediglich bestehende Luftbetankungsfähigkeiten ersetzen. Deutschland unterstützt zwar diese Initiative, gleichzeitig wird jedoch national kein Mehrbedarf an neuen Luftbetankungsfähigkeiten erkannt.

Anfang der Woche haben Großbritannien und Deutschland nicht die Absichtserklärung zur Umsetzung einer europäischen strategischen Lufttransport- und Beteiligungsinitiative unterschrieben. Wie passen also diese Ankündigungen und die Unterlassungen zusammen? Ich hoffe, dass die Ratsschlussfolgerungen, die sich auch auf den Gipfel zur Verteidigung im nächsten Jahr beziehen, dann auch mit dazu führen, dass sich Forderungen des Parlaments aus diesem Bereich im Gipfeldokument wiederfinden.

  Ana Gomes (S&D). - Senhor Presidente, a recessão não pode justificar o desinvestimento dos Estados-Membros na segurança e defesa neste mundo mais perigoso porque desregulado. É precisamente por causa da crise e dos desafios que enfrentamos à escala global que a União Europeia tem de coordenar e integrar em segurança e defesa as políticas, recursos e capacidades.

Isto implica avançar no quartel-general permanente e reunir e partilhar recursos humanos, equipamentos mas também meios financeiros. A regra os custos recaem sobre quem neles incorre impede alguns Estados de contribuir mais em forças e capacidades civis e militares para as missões CSDP. As recomendações deste Parlamento nos relatórios aqui presentes - operacionalização da cláusula de solidariedade, ciberdefesa, implicações de segurança das alterações climáticas - são essenciais para a União Europeia ter autonomia estratégica e servem também para os europeus desta forma assumirem os compromissos que têm no quadro da NATO, da ONU e das outras parcerias estratégicas como fornecedores de segurança à escala global.

  Krzysztof Lisek (PPE). - Dziękuję bardzo Panie Przewodniczący za to, że wreszcie mogę zabrać rzeczywiście głos. Szanowny Panie Przewodniczący! Pani Minister! Panie Komisarzu! Wspólna polityka bezpieczeństwa i obrony to dobrze brzmi. I słusznie, że tak brzmi, ale zdajemy sobie chyba wszyscy sprawę – bo słuchając kolegów z różnych grup politycznych, odnoszę takie wrażenie, że w większości wypadków mamy wspólny pogląd – że ta polityka, wspólna polityka bezpieczeństwa i obrony, to jest dzisiaj jeszcze wielkie wyzwanie, związane z tym, że po pierwsze, świat jest niebezpieczny, a po drugie, że nie realizujemy jej jeszcze w pełni. I niestety z żalem trzeba przyznać, że niestety nie wszystkie kraje Unii Europejskiej, w tym jedno z największych państw Unii Europejskiej, partycypują w rozwoju wspólnej polityki bezpieczeństwa i obrony. Przyznaję to z żalem.

Ale mimo wszystko dobrze się dzieje, że spotykają się ministrowie, dobrze się dzieje, że na przyszły rok zaplanowano Radę Europejską w sprawie polityki bezpieczeństwa i obrony. Dobrze się dzieje, że ministrowie prawie wszystkich największych państw Unii Europejskiej składają pewne propozycje dotyczące wspólnej polityki bezpieczeństwa i obrony. Te propozycje padają również z naszych ust – z Parlamentu Europejskiego – i mam nadzieję, że zarówno liderzy państw członkowskich, jak i Komisja Europejska, jak i Wysoka Przedstawiciel wsłuchają się w nasze propozycje, bo jesteśmy jednym z organów, które wspierają wspólną politykę bezpieczeństwa i obrony.

Catch the eye

  Petru Constantin Luhan (PPE). - Mr President, I am pleased that my amendment on considering the need for the EU to develop a ‘white hat’ strategy was adopted by the committee responsible. With cyber criminals getting better at breaking into protected networks, I strongly believe that the only real way to win the battle is to have people with similar knowledge and expertise fighting against them. I would remind you of some statistics: more than one million people become victims of cyber crime every day, and the cost of cyber crime, as estimated by the Commission, could reach a total of USD 388 billion worldwide. Therefore, as I have stated in all my speeches, I believe ‘white hat’ hackers need to be hired and trained for future cyber warfare.

  Silvia-Adriana Ţicău (S&D). - Aş vrea să mă refer la raportul dlui Kelam. Infrastructura de comunicaţii şi tehnologia informaţiei face parte din infrastructura critică europeană. Multe incidente informatice apar datorită lipsei de rezilienţă şi robusteţe a infrastructurii reţelelor private şi publice, a bazelor de date slab securizate şi a altor defecte ale infrastructurii critice de informaţii. Solicităm statelor membre să îşi dezvolte strategii naţionale de securitate şi apărare informatică, să asigure formarea de ingineri specializaţi în protecţia sistemelor de informaţii şi să investească în cercetarea şi inovarea aferentă securităţii informatice.

ENISA sprijină statele membre prin schimbul de bune practici în domeniul securităţii informatice, precum şi pentru dezvoltarea, implementarea şi întreţinerea strategiilor naţionale de securitate informatică. Dorind o Agenţie ENISA puternică, Parlamentul solicită extinderea mandatului agenţiei pe plan operaţional şi internaţional. Solicităm Consiliului şi Comisiei flexibilitate în acest sens, întrucât, în caz contrar, actualul mandat al ENISA expiră în septembrie 2013.

  Elena Băsescu (PPE). - Tratatul de la Lisabona a oferit Uniunii instrumente noi de acţiune pe plan extern, fapt ce a consolidat profilul internaţional. În cadrul politicii de securitate şi apărare, există posibilitatea organizării unor misiuni civile sau militare în zonele sensibile. Deşi au existat misiuni în zone precum Ciad, Congo, Somalia, Uniunea nu s-a implicat suficient în conflictele îngheţate de la graniţele sale. Conflictul din Transnistria, care durează de mai bine de 20 de ani, este cel mai bun exemplu. Deşi existau aşteptări mari din partea noii conduceri de la Tiraspol, ele au fost risipite încă după primele runde de negocieri, iar angajamentul politic de a obţine progrese în rezolvarea conflictului s-a dovedit a fi nesincer. De aceea, cred că Uniunea, prin intermediul Înaltului Reprezentant, ar trebui să se implice mai mult în soluţionarea conflictului, prin înlocuirea misiunii militare de menţinere a păcii cu una civilă.

  Janusz Władysław Zemke (S&D). - Otóż bardzo chciałem podziękować. Ja się chciałem zgodzić z tezami tych materiałów, które dzisiaj były przedstawiane na początku tej debaty, chcę jednak zwrócić uwagę na fakt, że odnotowujemy w Europie niewystarczający postęp, jeśli chodzi o wspólną politykę bezpieczeństwa i obrony.

Są dwie podstawowe przyczyny tego niekorzystnego zjawiska. Przyczyna pierwsza polega na tym, że utrzymuje się dalej niechęć grupy państw do angażowania się we wspólne europejskie przedsięwzięcia w sferze bezpieczeństwa i obrony. Te państwa uważają, że Europie starczy tylko NATO. Jest to moim zdaniem opinia błędna.

Drugi powód jest to brak dostatecznych efektów w tworzeniu wspólnych zdolności. Myślę tutaj głównie o potencjale w obszarze transportu powietrznego, o zdolnościach do tankowania w powietrzu czy o koniecznej flocie samolotów bezpilotowych. Chciałem w związku z tym zwrócić uwagę na fakt, że mamy za dużo słów, a za mało czynów.

  Inês Cristina Zuber (GUE/NGL). - Senhor Presidente, os relatórios que aqui estão em discussão confirmam claramente o reforço da componente militarista, bem como as suas pretensões imperialistas e de recolonização do planeta, que foram desenvolvidas no Tratado de Lisboa, ao estabelecer que os Estados-Membros coloquem à disposição da União capacidades civis e militares, de modo a contribuir para os objetivos definidos pelo Conselho, que estão submetidos às políticas de obrigações decorrentes da NATO, um bloco político-militar ingerencista que tem ocupado países e massacrado povos a bel-prazer dos grandes interesses económicos.

Agora vai-se ainda mais longe através do estabelecimento da mal chamada cláusula de solidariedade, que prevê que os Estados atuem militarmente num país não apenas se este estiver envolvido num conflito militar, mas se for, dizem, alvo de ciberataques ou desastres naturais.

Mas irão atuar militarmente contra quem? Com que objetivos? Este pacote de medidas vem apenas confirmar a União Europeia como bloco político-militar que através da centralização e aumento do armamento europeu, não só renega os valores da paz como constitui uma ameaça à liberdade e soberania dos povos.

(Ende des Catch-the-eye-Verfahrens)

  Erato Kozakou-Markoullis, President-in-Office of the Council. − Mr President, honourable Members, you have come up with a number of suggestions on how to improve our approach and our actions and I consider the report instrumental for our policy debate.

This has been an interesting and I think a very important debate. Not least because, in the context of looking at the economic situation that Member States and institutions find themselves in, it is absolutely vital that we discuss how best to make sure that we are able to respond to some of the crises and security threats we are faced with as individual nations, as parliamentarians and as institutions.

I am very pleased to note the relevance that the conclusions adopted on Monday by the Foreign Affairs/Defence Council chaired by the High Representative/Vice-President have in this respect and that they are in line with the contents of your reports.

Let me just remind you of a couple of key elements which are relevant to our debate today. By this I would like to convince Mr Van Orden to take a more positive view on CSDP.

Monday’s conclusions stressed that capabilities underpin the EU’s ability to act as a security provider in the context of a wider comprehensive approach. Also, the Council underlines the necessity to maximise the effectiveness of Europe’s defence expenditure in times of financial austerity, including through pooling and sharing.

It also stresses the wider impact of the defence sector on innovation, technology and growth and the need for synergies with wider EU policies in these fields

Mr Van Orden says that the EU does not need military means and can leave this to NATO. But is Operation Atalanta not an example that an EU military mission has an effect and is useful? It has an effect on piracy and it has been cooperating very well with NATO. The same can be said about our training mission in Somalia, which has had a positive effect on strengthening the Somalian Government. If I am correct, the British Government is supporting these EU operations.

I would also like to recall that the United States in their strategic review asked for greater responsibility and a greater role for the European Union as a security provider in the world.

On the issue of a special representative dealing with climate security, the European Union is already focussing political attention on climate security challenges through its established structures. The European Union is also sponsoring international debate including at the level of the UN Security Council. The priority appears to be to continue building up awareness and capacities at the multilateral level and in regional fora. In this regard, we take note of the report’s recommendation to work towards the nomination of a special envoy at United Nations level. The European Union is already coordinating its action on climate security aspects with the UN and its agencies. The nomination of a UN envoy would help this ongoing coordination and help maintain political visibility at UN level.

Let me end by saying – as the High Representative/Vice-President constantly does – how proud we are and should be of the servicemen and women who are operating in theatre at the present time. As we move towards Christmas and for us a holiday season, I am very conscious that men and women are serving across the world and especially, as was mentioned, in very dangerous places.

The High Representative/Vice-President and myself are extremely proud of the work that they do and I know that members of this House are too.

  Arnaud Danjean, rapporteur. − Monsieur le Président, c'est une satisfaction, suite à ce débat – et je voulais remercier tous les collègues qui ont participé, dans tous les groupes, à l'élaboration de ce rapport – de voir un très large consensus se dessiner sur le fait que l'Union européenne doit se donner les moyens d'une ambition internationale globale, y compris avec une politique de sécurité et de défense.

Je regrette – comme Mme la Ministre – que nos collègues britanniques restent sur une position qui est très idéologique et pas du tout pragmatique, qui se vérifie dans les faits. Ils se sont exprimés ici en représentants d'une grande nation militaire, mais il ne faut pas qu'ils se fassent d'illusion. Cette grande nation militaire va elle aussi subir, et subit déjà, un déclin stratégique considérable, avec des budgets de défense en baisse, des difficultés en termes de matériel et de ressources humaines, comme tous les pays européens.

Bien sûr, l'OTAN est un recours ultime, mais l'OTAN ne pourra pas non plus intervenir toujours et partout pour la défense des intérêts européens. Un certain nombre de pays de l'Union européenne ne font pas partie de l'OTAN. Un certain nombre de pays de l'OTAN ne seront pas toujours prêts à assumer la défense d'intérêts européens. Nous devons faire face à cette éventualité.

L'Union européenne se doit donc d'affirmer une forme d'autonomie, qui n'est pas une concurrence, une compétition ou une duplication, mais bien une complémentarité intelligente. Et c'est déjà ce qui est en cours à travers toutes les missions de l'Union européenne: plus d'une douzaine de missions sont menées aujourd'hui avec succès et sont attendues – c'est là le plus important – par les pays qui sont eux-mêmes en crise, et qui reconnaissent à l'Union européenne une légitimité qu'ils ne seraient sans doute pas prêts à accorder à un autre acteur international.

Nous devons en être fiers et nous devons réaffirmer cette ambition. J'espère que le vote assez large que nous aurons demain en faveur de ce rapport sera une aide pour que la haute représentante et le Conseil aillent de l'avant.

  Tunne Kelam, rapporteur. − Mr President, I am satisfied that there seems to be almost a consensus about the need to create a united EU cyber defence and cyber security strategy.

However, I would like to mention one fact, namely that two years ago we decided to aim for a level of at least 2 % expenditure on defence, research and development from the general defence budget. So far only one Member State has done this, whereas five Member States have spent nothing on R&D so far. In this field there are no smart solutions possible to save more money. Defence and security are costly and we have to meet these expenses.

I would also like to mention the role of the European Defence Agency and ENISA. Their role can, and should, be enhanced in assisting our Member States, in helping to pool and share the existing experience and in developing a good practice guide.

Finally, with regard to international cooperation, I think the role of the EU, and especially the Commission, is to mainstream cyber security aspects in all relations with third countries, to encourage our partners to join the Budapest Convention and to agree on minimum standards on responsible behaviour in cyber space. The EU should also assist third countries, if needed, to build their cyber security facilities.

  Ioan Mircea Paşcu, rapporteur. − Mr President, I would like to thank all colleagues who participated in this debate for their interest and opinions, including those who were pessimistic, suspicious, or even grossly exaggerating.

Those opinions are valuable, not only to me and my colleagues – Andrew Duff, from the Committee on Constitutional Affairs (AFCO), and Simon Busuttil, author of the opinion of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) – but also to the Commission and the Council who prepare to discuss these matters in more detail.

In view of the discussion, I would like to mention one more aspect which has not been touched upon in the report, namely that we should address not only the way we get into a situation triggered by the activation of the two clauses, but also, apart from staying in and being constant in our engagement, when and how we get out of it. Things should be very clear for the exit strategy, as they should be very clear for the strategy for going in.

Finally, I would like to thank publicly all the shadow rapporteurs, the European Commission, the European External Action Service, the Council, as well as NATO who have responded in kind to the open and transparent way this report has been prepared.

  Indrek Tarand, rapporteur. − Mr President, what Mr Watson said earlier proves that with goodwill and a sense of urgency we can have results, because the end of his speech was absolutely identical to the recent words of Ambassador Telemachou of Cyprus, the country holding the Presidency.

I was a shadow on Mr Kelam’s report and I always follow with interest the activities and writings of Mr Danjean, as well as Mr Paşcu, so I would like to point out that it has been a great pleasure and privilege to be part of the team in the Subcommittee on Security and Defence (SEDE). It is not yet a dream team but it has very devoted players. I hope that our four reports will be supported by majorities tomorrow.

Indeed we need political will and action for the implementation of the recommendations made in my report and in the other three reports. As has been said today by Mr Danjean, Ms Koppa, Mr Watson, Mr Paleckis and others, we urge the Council, the Commission and the External Action Service to act immediately.

I wish everybody a peaceful night before tomorrow’s vote.

  Der Präsident. − Die gemeinsame Aussprache ist geschlossen.

Die Abstimmung findet am Donnerstag, 12 Uhr, statt.

Schriftliche Erklärungen (Artikel 149 GO)

  Ágnes Hankiss (PPE), írásban. – Gratulálok Kelam úr jelentéséhez, amely az európai biztonság egyik legfontosabb jelenségét, a kiberbiztonság kérdéskörét tárgyalja. A kiberbiztonság fogalma szétválaszthatatlanul összekapcsolja a biztonság belső és külső dimenzióját, akár kiberkémkedésről, kiberterrorizmusról vagy kiberbűnözésről beszélünk. A kibertámadások globális jellegűek, ezért a hatékony védekezésnek is globálisnak kell lennie. Hangsúlyozni kell a folyamatos és szoros együttműködés szükségességét és a párhuzamosságok elkerülését az uniós intézmények, az Európai Unió, a NATO és a főbb nemzetközi szereplők, a tagországok, a polgári és a katonai védelmi erők, valamint az állami és magánszektor között. A magánszektorban felhalmozódó tudásra és képességre szükség van a hatékony védelemhez, legyen szó akár internetbiztonsági cégekről, szoftverfejlesztőkről, hardverkészítőkről, online rendszerek üzemeltetőiről. A kiberterrorizmus fő célpontjaivá válhatnak a jövőben a kritikus informatikai infrastruktúrák. Védelmük érdekében nem halogatható tovább egyrészt a közös európai fenyegetésértékelő rendszer kidolgozása, másrészt a közös európai gyakorlatok kiterjesztése mind a felkészülés, a megelőzés, a felderítés és a reagálás terén. A nemzetközi szervezett bűnözés viharos gyorsasággal helyezi át működését a kibertérbe, sokszor olyan szakértőket alkalmazva, akik katonai szervezetekben vagy titkosszolgálatok kötelékében tettek szert speciális képességre. Például az orosz és oroszajkú kiberbűnüzés figyelemreméltó vonása az, hogy a hálózatot sok esetben egykori KGB-tisztek irányítják és látják el olyan információkkal, amelyeket eredményesen lehet felhasználni zsarolásra vagy nyomásgyakorlásra.

  Marc Tarabella (S&D), par écrit. – Plusieurs pays se préparent activement à la cyberguerre en mettant sur pied des structures dédiées à la lutte informatique défensive, mais aussi à l’espionnage et aux pénétrations informatiques. De nombreux organismes publics ou privés sont quotidiennement victimes d'attaques. Des offensives informatiques de grande ampleur ont été menées ces dernières années à travers le monde. Les sociétés modernes, très informatisées, y sont vulnérables; les entreprises, les pouvoirs publics ou les infrastructures économiques et industrielles vitales en devenir en sont les victimes.

Sur le plan technique, jamais un ensemble de technologies n’avait imprégné aussi rapidement et si profondément l’activité humaine. L’essor d’un cyberespace plus sûr requiert une implication accrue des États dans la régulation des réseaux et la gestion de crise. Il est dès lors indispensable que l'Europe se profile comme la plateforme de discussion et de régulation dans ce domaine. En effet, trop souvent ces derniers temps, nous avons eu en nos mains, au Parlement européen, des textes ayant une fâcheuse tendance à tenter d'éteindre nombre de libertés individuelles, sous des prétextes divers et variés. L'Europe doit garantir à tous ses concitoyens qu'à aucun moment, la frontière entre sécurité et vie privée soit préservée et encadrée un maximum!

  Valdemar Tomaševski (ECR), na piśmie. – Panie Przewodniczący! Zwiększenie częstości występowania skrajnych zjawisk pogodowych oznacza jednocześnie wzrost kosztów dla gospodarki europejskiej, zarówno dla krajów rozwijających się, jak też tzw. stabilnych gospodarczo. Pojawianie się klęsk żywiołowych jest rzeczą oczywistą i wymaga od państw członkowskich Unii Europejskiej wspólnego podejścia do przeciwdziałania niszczycielskim skutkom kataklizmów. Priorytetem Unii w tym zakresie powinno być zabezpieczenie ludności przed utratą dostępu do słodkiej wody i żywności po wystąpieniu klęski żywiołowej. Wymaga to stworzenia perspektywicznej i zintegrowanej w skali 27 państw polityki zarządzania i reagowania kryzysowego. Dlatego należy zbadać, które kraje lub regiony są najbardziej narażone na ryzyko występowania klęsk żywiołowych. Następnie należy sporządzić listę takich krajów lub regionów i zadbać o przedstawianie corocznych sprawozdań na temat ewentualnych zagrożeń oraz propozycji łagodzenia ich skutków. Oczywiście Unia musi także współpracować w tej dziedzinie z innymi rejonami na świecie, aby mieć globalny obraz potencjalnych niebezpieczeństw. Ponadto wielkie znaczenie ma kontynuowanie i umacnianie unijnej pomocy humanitarnej nie tylko na kontynencie europejskim, ale i poza nim. Komisja Europejska powinna włączyć do swych najważniejszych strategii rozwojowych także problematykę skutecznego eliminowania zagrożeń naturalnych związanych z klęskami żywiołowymi tak, aby potencjalnie poszkodowane obszary i ich władze miały poczucie bezpieczeństwa i pewność, że otrzymają pomoc w przypadku wystąpienia klęski żywiołowej.