Fuldstændigt Forhandlingsreferat

Torsdag den 12. december 2013 - Strasbourg

7. Den Europæiske Centralsbanks årsberetning 2012 (forhandling)

  Elnök. − Az első napirendi pont a Gianni Pittella által a Gazdasági és Monetáris Bizottság nevében készített, az Európai Központi Bank 2012. évi éves jelentéséről folytatott vita [2013/2076(INI)] (A7-0382/2013).

Köszöntöm Mario Draghit, az Európai Központi Bank elnökét és Olli Rehn biztos urat.

  Gianni Pittella, relatore. − Signor Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, Presidente Draghi, signor Commissario, la situazione economica del nostro continente, come voi e noi sappiamo, resta drammatica nonostante i timidissimi segni di ripresa.

Si profila nell'area euro lo spettro della deflazione, segno evidente di una domanda anemica. Il quadro dell'Europa del sud, purtroppo, è ancora peggiore. Lei, Presidente Draghi, è italiano come me e credo che stia osservando con la mia stessa inquietudine le rivolte che percorrono in queste ore il nostro paese. O si cambia registro oppure lo stesso progetto di integrazione europea è a rischio, perché sfidato dal disincanto e dalla rabbia di milioni di cittadini. Prima che sia troppo tardi bisogna cambiare passo.

La BCE, Presidente Draghi, ha fatto moltissimo sotto la sua guida e ha superato importanti tabù, come riconosciamo nella nostra relazione. Penso in particolare alle operazioni ORLT che hanno permesso al sistema bancario di respirare nel breve periodo, penso anche all'annuncio del programma OMT che ha svolto una decisiva funzione di stabilizzazione delle aspettative; ora però si deve fare di più.

La catena di trasmissione della politica monetaria è ancora inceppata, come dimostrano i differenziali dei tassi di interesse e la rarefazione del credito nei confronti delle piccole e medie imprese. Anche Lei Presidente è consapevole della gravità della situazione, come ha detto nella sua conferenza stampa dello scorso giovedì, la BCE è pronta e preparata ad intervenire.

Nella nostra risoluzione riconosciamo che gli strumenti non convenzionali di politica monetaria hanno rivelato tutti i loro limiti nel sostenere l'economia reale e invitiamo la BCE a valutare l'adozione di nuove misure. Queste nuove misure devono essere indirizzate al sostegno delle piccole e medie imprese e su questo si è creata nel Parlamento una larghissima maggioranza.

Nella relazione indichiamo alcune misure: l'adozione di un programma modellato sull'esempio del "Funding for lending" realizzato in Inghilterra; l'acquisto da parte della BCE di "Abs" ed io, a titolo personale, aggiungo che non si deve avere paura di parlare di "quantitative easing" e di acquisto di titoli di Stato, acquisto che non deve servire a monetizzare il debito, ma a iniettare liquidità nel sistema.

Questa relazione, Presidente, è equilibrata. Noi non chiediamo alla BCE di attuare politiche iperinflazionistiche, vi chiediamo però di evitare la deflazione, la stagnazione che metterebbero in ginocchio l'economia europea. Queste misure da sole non saranno sufficienti se non si ha l'audacia di sdoganare una definizione troppo spesso considerata un tabù: "politica dei tassi di cambio".

Un interessante studio di un'importante banca italiana ha stimato gli effetti dell'evoluzione del tasso di cambio sul prodotto interno lordo nel nostro paese, le conclusioni sono chiare: la forza eccessiva della moneta unica è riuscita non solo ad annullare, ma addirittura a surclassare i benefici derivanti dalla riduzione dei tassi di interesse. È ora di rimettere il tema del tasso di cambio al cuore delle decisioni di politica monetaria, una politica monetaria più espansiva che, contribuendo a frenare l'apprezzamento del nostro tasso di cambio, potrebbe dare un po' di ossigeno alla manifattura senza innescare alcuna dinamica inflazionistica.

Signor Presidente, come vede, questa istituzione, il Parlamento, ripone grandi aspettative nella Banca centrale ed è anche grazie all'azione del Parlamento europeo se la BCE ha ottenuto la competenza sulla supervisione degli istituti bancari dell'eurozona. La BCE si appresta inoltre ad assumere un ruolo decisivo anche all'interno del processo di risoluzione delle banche europee: usate bene questo potere e non abusatene mai.

Il Parlamento europeo sarà sempre il custode della democrazia europea e vigilerà senza tregua affinché la vostra azione sia al servizio della società e del progetto europeo e non di una visione dogmatica della stabilità monetaria.

  Mario Draghi, President of the European Central Bank. − President, honourable Members of the European Parliament, I am very pleased to take part in this debate on the ECB annual report for 2012. Today is the last time in this legislature that I will participate in the plenary. This represents a good opportunity to take stock of the progress made over the past few years in strengthening the resilience and stability of the euro area.

To introduce the debate, I would first like to review the more recent ECB monetary policy decisions. I will then address institutional matters of particular interest to your House, as well as the progress made so far in reinforcing European Monetary Union governance. I will hence address most of the issues which the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs highlighted in its draft resolution on the ECB annual report.

Let me begin by describing the economic environment of the past years. The economic recovery that followed the post-Lehman global recession of 2008–2009 was aborted in the euro area as the sovereign debt crisis took hold. Financial stability was threatened; the viability of banks that had survived the first phase of the crisis was called into question. Credit was curtailed and the recession that ensued lasted until the first quarter of this year.

Since then, we have been experiencing a weak recovery. Weak economic activity and high unemployment have resulted in subdued inflation. Against this backdrop, and in respect of the price stability mandate that was assigned to us by the Treaty, we have lowered our key interest rates to historically low levels.

To clarify the orientation of our monetary policy going forward in an exceptionally uncertain environment, we introduced forward guidance in July 2013. We stated that we expected key interest rates to remain at present or lower levels for an extended period of time. That statement was conditional and based on an overall subdued outlook for inflation extending into the medium term, given the broad-based weakness of the real economy and subdued monetary dynamics.

In November we acted upon that conditional pledge by reducing two of our key interest rates, as price pressures have diminished further and we anticipate inflation weakness to be protracted. In keeping with these anticipations, we also reconfirmed our forward guidance in its original formulation.

Over the past two years our interest rate cuts were transmitted only unevenly across euro area countries, due to the fragmentation of financial markets along national borders. To address this problem, we adopted a series of non-standard measures. The purpose of these was – and remains – a more effective transmission of the ECB’s interest rate cuts, so that our monetary policy can reach euro area companies and households. Our measures addressed those distortions in sovereign debt markets that were due to the redenomination risk and alleviated funding pressures on euro area banks.

At our November meeting we also decided to extend the time horizon for the application of the fixed rate full allotment procedures in our liquidity operations until at least July 2015. This decision reassures our counterparties that the liquidity necessary to refinance their core activities will be forthcoming at our main refinancing rate.

As a direct consequence, bank lending rates for households and non-financial corporations have decreased at the euro area level. In this way, our measures have also helped small and medium-sized enterprises, which are the backbone of the euro area economy. We have, in addition, taken direct measures to alleviate the funding situation for SMEs through our collateral framework, and we have worked with the European Commission to further improve SME financing conditions.

Let me now turn to institutional developments and focus in particular on measures related to accountability and transparency. Since our creation, we have always gone beyond the Treaty requirements in making our work transparent and accessible. The monthly press conferences, which were without precedent at the time among major central banks, are a telling example. This year has also shown that the ECB stands ready to adapt its communication policy, where deemed necessary. For example, we have published the procedures governing the provision of Emergency Liquidity Assistance, the so-called ELA. We have started internal reflections on how to increase the transparency of the deliberations in the Governing Council without undermining independent decision-making by its members.

Our commitment to accountability and transparency has also become apparent in the agreement concluded between our two institutions on the Single Supervision Mechanism, the so-called SSM. Supervision necessitates a differentiated form of accountability from monetary policy, while preserving the independence of the ECB as a whole. The interinstitutional agreement strikes the right balance between ensuring high standards of accountability, transparency and safeguarding confidential information. I am confident that the implementation of the interinstitutional agreement will open a new chapter of successful cooperation between our two institutions.

In this context, let me also welcome your positive vote on Ms Nouy’s nomination. Following her final appointment by the Council, she will become your main interlocutor on all matters related to the SSM as of 1 January.

I would also like to address an issue which I know is as much a concern to you as it is to me: the gender balance at the ECB. Today, 17% of our management positions are filled by female staff. It is clearly not enough. This is why the Executive Board decided this summer to introduce gender targets aiming at 35% women in management positions by 2019 and this is not an empty promise. The ECB has started to implement a diversity action plan that will help us to attain those targets.

Let me now share my thoughts on the process of completing European Monetary Union. As this legislature comes to the end of its term, it is an opportune time to reflect on what we have achieved in such a short space of time. Not so long ago, the euro area was facing an uncertain future. In the meantime, doubts about the integrity of the single currency have dissipated. Notably, a road map for a genuine EMU has been outlined that encompasses four pillars: banking union, fiscal union, economic union and, ultimately, political union.

Through a concerted legislative effort the euro area, and the EU as a whole, has been put on a more stable footing. Your institution has made a decisive contribution to this effort. The establishment of the Single Supervisory Mechanism represents probably the most significant change to the European Union since the establishment of the single currency, and I am happy to report the internal preparations are well underway. I strongly welcome the political agreement on the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive you reached with the Council last night.

Swift agreement on the other key component of Banking Union – the Single Resolution Mechanism – is of paramount importance. I trust you will succeed in adopting the relevant legislation before your term comes to an end. These institutions are essential to implement the single rulebook in the years to come. Looking ahead we will have a stronger set of rules for capital and liquidity. We will also have a new toolbox for the resolution of financial institutions and we will have stronger national deposit guarantee schemes.

Banking union, however, is not a panacea for eliminating financial market fragmentation and fully stabilising the European Monetary Union. It is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition to break the bank-sovereign nexus and restore sustainable economic growth. Equal borrowing conditions can only be ensured through the joint implementation of other measures. This not only includes continued fiscal consolidation and implementation of structural reforms but also progress on the other unions; only then can we say we have created a genuine European Monetary Union. Let us seize the opportunity of the next European Parliament elections to have an open public debate on the further steps needed to strengthen the architecture of the European Monetary Union.

  Olli Rehn, Vice-President of the Commission. − Mr President, I would first like to thank the rapporteur, Mr Gianni Pittella, and the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs for their very valuable work on this important report. This ex-post assessment of the ECB’s activities by Parliament is an essential element of the democratic accountability of the ECB and a necessary complement to the ECB’s independence.

The Commission shares Parliament’s view that the ECB has reacted decisively in a challenging environment and played an active role in stabilising financial and bond markets through the LTROs and the OMT decision. The Commission has confidence in the conduct of monetary policy by the ECB and fully respects its independence. This implies that the Commission does not comment on the ECB’s monetary policy decisions.

Let me comment instead on some issues touched on in your report which fall under the remit of the Commission’s mandate.

First, regarding the banking union, the setting up of the single supervisory and resolution mechanisms is a major step towards completing economic and monetary union and of course building confidence now in the short and medium term. Maintaining the reform momentum is key to further progress. The SRM will have to ensure that bank resolution will be orderly and that the European taxpayers will be protected. We need to finalise the work in time – the political agreement next week and the legislative work before the end of the current parliamentary term.

Another issue which is essential – even crucial – for opening up the bottlenecks to growth in Europe is access to finance by SMEs. Mr Pittella’s remarks on this matter were certainly to the point. We have worked very hard to put together a truly bold initiative to counter the fragmentation of the financial markets and reduce the borrowing costs of European SMEs because there is no economic growth without credit growth.

As always, let me be frank with you about this. The prospective decisions of the European Council next week do not seem to go far enough, nor to be concrete and bold enough in this regard. We as the European Union – that is both the EU institutions and the EU Member States – must do better and step up a gear to boost affordable lending to SMEs for the sake of sustainable growth and job creation in Europe.

What does this mean in practice? First the EU Member States should be bolder when allocating structural and investment funding for the purpose of leveraging SME lending. The Commission is fully committed to this as regards the EU budget.

Secondly, the European Investment Bank and the European Investment Fund should consider increasing their budgets for lending to SMEs, which calls for the support of EU Member States as owners or shareholders of the EIB and the EIF.

Thirdly, the ECB could benchmark the Funding for Lending Scheme of the Bank of England which has substantially supported SME lending in the UK. As we know, the UK now has a higher rate of growth than the euro area.

I trust that Mr Draghi will do his utmost to convince his fellow members of the Governing Council and succeed in this. It is only a matter of repairing the monetary policy transmission mechanism. You can be sure that the Commission will support you on this and so will the SMEs in Europe as they need affordable lending to create jobs and make the European economy grow. Indeed we need to boost sustainable growth and job creation in Europe by all possible means.

Let me conclude by stressing that I see much common ground between your views and those of the Commission. It is reassuring indeed to know that I can count on your support in building the sustained recovery we need, the foundations for sustainable growth and job creation.

I agree with Mr Draghi that the next European elections should be used to discuss and design the way forward in regard to how we complete the reconstruction of the economic and monetary union by building on EMU 2.0, which will look very different from the EMU 1.0 of 15 years ago with all its systemic shortcomings. We need to complete the work on the reconstruction of the economic and monetary union.

I look forward to having a constructive and productive debate with you here today.

  Ildikó Gáll-Pelcz, a PPE képviselőcsoport nevében. – Először is szeretnék gratulálni Mr. Pitellának, az előadónak, mert kiváló munkát végzett, és szeretném megköszönni az irodájának is a munkát és azt a koordinációs tevékenységet, ahogy a jelentéskészítésben együtt tudtunk működni. Fontosnak tartom megjegyezni, hogy egy olyan jelentés áll előttünk, egy olyan jelentésről fogunk szavazni, amely nemcsak kiválóan és hitelesen értékeli az EKB 2012. évi tevékenységét, hanem nem feledkezik meg arról a tényről sem, hogy mi az EKB-nak a szerződésekben rögzített mandátuma, mi az alapvető szerepe, és ennek az árstabilitási mandátumnak a tekintetéből, szempontjából vizsgálja meg az EKB 2012. évi tevékenységét. Erre való tekintettel fontosnak tartom megemlíteni és helyénvalóként értékelni a 2012. júliusi kamatcsökkentést, különös tekintettel az Európai Unió gazdaságának gyenge teljesítményére. Ki szeretném emelni azonban egyéb tevékenységeit is, amelyeket helyénvalónak, bár átmenetinek tartok. Ilyen az LTRO és az OMT műveletek terén végzett tevékenység, amely, ha nem tett volna meg, – úgy gondolom – sokkal nagyobb árfolyam-ingadozással kellett volna számolnunk. Ezen túlmenően pedig akár olyan pénztöbblet alakulhatott volna ki a piacon, amely esetleg rossz részvények formájában ölt testet, és így inflációs növekedést eredményezhetett volna vagy árfolyam-növekedést.

Azonban meg szeretném említeni, hogy az értékpapír-műveletek terén végzett tevékenység csak átmeneti lehet. Nem lehet szerepe az EKB-nak sem az államadósság megoldása, sem a nemzeti központi bankok feltőkésítése vagy ezáltal az államkötvények kamatlábának a befolyásolása. Fontos, hogy e tekintetben ezt a tevékenységet szigorú követelményekkel kapcsoljuk össze, feltételekkel, az ESFS vagy az ESM programokhoz való kapcsolással. A bankunió bevezetését én magam is támogatom, örülök, hogy sikerült a szanálási alapok tekintetében is előrelépést mutatni, ugyanakkor egy utolsó gondolatot engedjenek meg. Azt gondolom, hogy sem a megnövekedett feladatok, sem az új tevékenység, sem a nagyobb figyelem nem akadályozhatja meg az együttműködésünket, jelesül azt, hogy az Európai Parlament és az ECON bizottság megvalósítsa a bank demokratikus elszámoltatását tevékenységéről.

  Elisa Ferreira, em nome do Grupo S&D. – Senhor Presidente, Senhor Presidente do Banco Central Europeu, eu saúdo mais uma vez a presença de Mario Draghi entre nós, repito que o Banco Central Europeu fez durante a crise aquilo que era devido. Foi talvez a única instituição europeia que teve a coragem de reagir à crise com as medidas não standard que a crise requeria e penso que tem encontrado no Parlamento um colaborador leal e construtivo nessa reconstrução que é preciso fazer-se permanentemente do projeto europeu.

No entanto, é verdade que estamos ainda na Europa confrontados com uma situação gravíssima de estagnação económica e de desemprego e que, neste momento, é evidente que reduzir as taxas de juro é uma medida insuficiente se não houver dinâmica económica, tal como o meu colega Pittella e os seus colaboradores reconheceram no texto que está agora disponível. É importante que neste momento nós sejamos capazes de ouvir do Banco Central Europeu uma reflexão mais profunda sobre a crise, precisamente pelo papel que desempenhou até agora na contenção dos estragos e, em particular, eu gostava de o ouvir sobre quatro pontos.

Primeiro, o Banco Central Europeu foi um dos atores da troica e isto parece-me uma das contribuições menos interessantes durante a crise. Que reflexão faz o Banco Central Europeu sobre essa participação e as consequências das receitas que foram impostas aos países?

Em segundo lugar, eu acho que estamos num momento em que temos de refletir mais a longo prazo. Poderá a União Europeia continuar a funcionar com um Banco Central cujas funções e competências estão preparadas para uma situação de inflação, quando vivemos o risco de uma deflação e de uma recessão profunda?

Em terceiro lugar, é verdade que terminamos ontem as negociações para a resolução sobre a nova legislação de resolução dos bancos. É importante que o mecanismo de resolução única seja um sistema assente no método comunitário, em que os bancos não corram risco de sofrerem as consequências de jogos políticos no seu processo de resolução. Mas não esqueçamos que a união bancária tinha três pernas e a gestão em comum dos depósitos, das garantias de depósitos é uma perna que continua a faltar.

E, por último, termino já, Senhor Presidente, queria apenas pedir-lhe que nos desse também a sua opinião sobre a gestão da dívida soberana, onde a Comissão iniciou um processo de reflexão porque vamos sair desta crise com níveis de dívida soberana completamente incomportáveis e as OMT não chegam para suster a especulação sobre ela.

  Nils Torvalds, on behalf of the ALDE Group. – Mr President, I want to start by congratulating Mr Draghi and the ECB on the good work, not only for the year 2012 – which the report covers – but also for the work this year. ECB does not stand for ‘Easy To Be’!

The two statesmen met in July 2012 to do whatever was necessary to stabilise the euro zone, to keep interest rates low, and to give us much needed stability. However, it is important to keep in mind that we cannot leave all the problems on the doormat of the ECB and then lean back and think of better times to come. The most crucial thing – as has already been said here – is to create the Banking Union. The appointment of a new Head of the Single Supervisory Mechanism yesterday marked another milestone in this respect. There is, however, no time to rest on our laurels. The next phase will be to straighten out a lot of question marks regarding the recovery mechanism. We do not want to see more unconventional methods and measures from the ECB. Instead, the Banking Union must be combined with structural reforms.

We do not get back on the growth track through austerity or the lavish spending of borrowed money: we need structural reforms. There has been a lot of discussion regarding the term ‘too big to fail’, and this week the US also released their Volcker Rule. But here we need to be careful. Banking differs very much from country to country, and a categorical rule regarding this could impact smaller banks negatively and be counterproductive. Many thanks to Mr Pittella for his great work, and we hope that Mr Draghi will keep up the good work in his office.

  Eva Joly, au nom du groupe Verts/ALE. – Monsieur le Président, Monsieur le Commissaire, Monsieur le Gouverneur, chers collègues, chaque année, la commission ECON rédige un rapport d'initiative sur les activités de la Banque centrale européenne. Ce rapport est la pierre angulaire du travail de suivi des activités de l'une des plus importantes institutions européennes mené pour notre Assemblée, à défaut de contrôle démocratique. Le rapport annuel sur les activités de la BCE 2012 aurait dû permettre à notre Assemblée de prendre une position forte sur les développements récents en matière de politique monétaire.

Malgré de bons éléments concernant le rôle de la BCE dans la construction de l'union bancaire, le compte n'y est pas. Certes, il est difficile de trouver des compromis ambitieux entre des familles politiques fortement divisées sur les leviers de sortie de crise. Néanmoins, au nom des Verts, je ne peux que regretter la faiblesse globale d'un texte parfois déconnecté des réalités.

Tels des prêcheurs monétaristes, nous devrions continuer à nous inquiéter de l'inflation, alors qu'aujourd'hui, le niveau de l'inflation se situe bien au-dessous de deux pour cent. C'est bien l'ombre déflationniste, annoncée par de nombreux économistes, qui devrait nous alerter. Alors que les coupes budgétaires se multiplient en Europe, il me semblait normal de demander aux institutions ayant bénéficié d'un soutien de trésorerie de la BCE d'augmenter le volume des crédits accordés à l'économie réelle. Pourtant, cet amendement a été rejeté en commission.

En l'état actuel nous, les Verts, nous abstiendrons sur le texte afin de signifier notre déception, sans écarter d'un revers de la main les quelques parties du texte moins controversées et parfois même positives. Parmi ces éléments positifs, le souhait émis d'une prise de distance de la BCE dans le processus décisionnel de la troïka est l'un des éléments les plus significatifs. S'il venait à être supprimé durant les votes, les écologistes seraient amenés à voter contre le rapport final et j'en serais désolée.

  Ivo Strejček, za skupinu ECR. – Pane prezidente, dovolte mi, abych začal zamyšlením, kterým svým způsobem začal také pan zpravodaj Pittella, který mimochodem zvládnul svoji zprávu s obvyklým italským šarmem. Řekl, že hospodářská situace v Evropské unii, pokud si dobře vzpomínám, je katastrofální. Myslím, že bychom si měli položit otázku, proč tomu tak je. A to mě vybízí k tomu, zdali náhodou k této situaci nepřispívá již zřejmě neufinancovatelný a drahý evropský sociální model a také existence jednotné měny euro, která vytváří tlak na homogenizaci zcela odlišných regionů a zemí, což vyvolává ztrátu jejich konkurenceschopnosti. To tedy na začátek, k čemu mě vybídl pan zpravodaj.

Nyní ke zprávě – já považuji za velmi vážné několik bodů, kterými se zpráva zabývá, a to jsou problémy úvěrového financování malých a středních podniků. V Evropě tradičně získávají podniky kapitál na svůj další rozvoj a investice z bankovního sektoru, nikoliv z kapitálového trhu tak, jak je to běžné v anglosaských zemích. Zdravý bankovní sektor je proto pro evropské podniky zcela klíčový. Naopak nejistota v bankovním sektoru a přesouvání pozornosti od žádoucího, já bych řekl nezbytného, financování inovací a investic k financování bezpečnějších státních dluhů negativně poznamenává produkci malých a středních firem, jejich investice, které jsou pro celoevropské hospodářské oživení nutné, což konečně postihuje negativně i zaměstnanost.

Dále sanace národních bank prostřednictvím Evropské centrální banky je z mého pohledu velmi problematická. Je to pouze přenášení problémů na vyšší úroveň, na které není jasně definováno, kdo ponese náklady. Evropská centrální banka se snadno může dostat do situace skládky bezcenných aktiv, což může být pro její dlouhodobý vývoj problematické.

Zpráva rovněž předjímá nutnost měnově intervenovat na posílení eura. To je nepřijatelné, neboť měnový kurz jakožto tržní cena jedné měny vyjádřená v měně druhé má být určován trhem. Manipulace s kurzem pro posílení konkurenceschopnosti může přinést krátkodobé exportní úspěchy, avšak dlouhodobě vede k inflaci a destabilizaci cenové hladiny stejně jako k omezení důvěry v euro.

  Marisa Matias, em nome do Grupo GUE/NGL. – Senhor Presidente, eu quero começar também por salientar e reconhecer o trabalho que foi feito pelo colega Pittella na avaliação das atividades do BCE, relativamente a 2012.

Mas, dito isto, eu quero também reforçar uma questão que é sempre retirada destes debates ou procura retirar-se, é uma espécie de um elefante que está no meio da sala mas que ninguém o vê. O BCE, em 2012, continuou a afundar-se no modelo da troica, continuou a participar, enquanto membro das troicas, nos diferentes países e parece que, nestes debates, fala-se de taxas de juro, da política monetária e apresenta-se o BCE que se pode apresentar aos amigos mas o outro fica escondido na sala e nem sequer pode ser sujeito a debate.

Ora bem, o BCE que baixa as taxas de juro para tentar combater a crise é o mesmo BCE que esmaga os salários nos países que estão sob intervenção da troica e que não toca no essencial, pelo contrário, agrava o problema essencial, porque o problema essencial é a falta de procura interna e é isso que nos traz à recessão, é isso que nos vai fazer continuar na recessão, e é esse BCE que também existe.

O BCE da troica nunca é julgado democraticamente, nunca é avaliado. Eu penso que esse é um dos maiores problemas daquilo que aqui temos e, para além disso, há ainda o problema da condicionalidade porque associar a ativação das OMT, ou seja, da compra direta de dívida do mercado primário, em função da condicionalidade que é imposta aos Estados, aos países que estão sob intervenção, é uma espécie de troica 2.0.

Portanto, nós já sabemos que a troica fez escola, mas Senhor Presidente, só quero terminar com isto, sabemos que a troica fez escola, mas o BCE tem que prestar contas também por isso, porque o BCE não pode ser apenas essa entidade distante que interfere e faz ingerência quotidiana nos países mas sobre a qual não podemos dizer nada.

  Claudio Morganti, a nome del gruppo EFD. – Signor Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, Presidente Draghi, questa relazione contiene spunti interessanti come la necessità di una netta separazione tra le banche di deposito e quelle di investimento, anche se credo che alla fine avremo una proposta molto debole rispetto all'originale modello della Glass-Steagall americana.

Vorrei tuttavia approfittare della presenza del Presidente Draghi per chiedere cosa pensi delle parole espresse dal suo vice Vítor Constâncio lo scorso maggio ad Atene, secondo cui la crisi non è originata da un problema di debito pubblico dei paesi, bensì dal debito privato. Questo debito dei paesi periferici è stato alimentato principalmente dalle banche di Francia e Germania che poi sono quelle aiutate con i soldi europei e che quindi non hanno perso nulla.

A perdere invece sono stati i cittadini dei paesi in difficoltà, che ora sono in ginocchio come Grecia e Portogallo, ma anche l'Italia rischia di pagare un conto salatissimo. Il nostro paese ha infatti perso ogni autonomia e la BCE detta la nostra linea di politica economica, sostenendo ad esempio la continua necessità di privatizzazioni. Lei Presidente Draghi ha alle spalle una discreta esperienza nel settore, come la colossale svendita sullo yacht Britannia nel '92, "il grande sacco d'Italia".

In Grecia si è scelta questa strada, in Italia probabilmente faremo lo stesso, perdendo così importanti settori per l'autonomia in una nazione. L'altro giorno ha affermato a Roma che non è tempo per tornare a nazionalismi e protezionismo. Io la penso in maniera opposta e per me sarebbe la soluzione migliore, forse l'unica possibile.

  Martin, Hans-Peter (NI). - Herr Präsident! Sie haben sicherlich einen der spannendsten Jobs derzeit auf diesem Erdball, der mit extremer Verantwortung verbunden ist.

Ich hatte Gelegenheit, mit einer Person ausführlicher zu sprechen, die Ihnen sehr nahesteht und die Grundsituation der EZB so dargestellt hat, dass man sie sich wie einen riesigen Tanker vorstellen muss, wo Sie der Kapitän sind, dass es aber kein Logbuch gibt und immer noch sehr viel Nebel. Trotzdem ist es in den vergangenen Jahren immerhin geglückt, diesen Riesentanker – soweit wir das jetzt erkennen können – nicht auf einen Eisberg aufzufahren.

In diesem Rahmen, also im Rahmen dessen, was Ihnen da jetzt zugemutet wird – weil Sie ja auch versuchen müssen, viele Leute, deren Boote bereits schiffbrüchig sind, mit an Bord zu holen, und das nur noch sehr bedingt mit Ihrer Kapitänsrolle im Sinne der Ursprungsdefinition zu tun hat – möchte ich Ihnen trotzdem eine Warnung mit auf den Weg geben: Es ist nicht nur das große Deutschland, in dem es weiterhin große Sorge und Unruhe um die Instabilität des Euro und Ihres Tuns und Nichttuns gibt, sondern auch das kleine Österreich, aus dem ich komme. Da gibt es rote Linien.

Sie sind gut beraten, wenn Ihnen klar ist, dass weder in Österreich noch in Deutschland so etwas politisch kommen wird, was man Eurobonds nennt, dass es keine Transfer-Union geben wird und dass auch der Versuch, – egal über welche politischen Konstruktionen – die Einlagensicherungen österreichischer, deutscher Sparkassen, Genossenschaftsbanken als Abfederung für das große Bankenproblem heranzuziehen, zum Scheitern verurteilt sein wird.

  Corien Wortmann-Kool (PPE). - President Draghi, graag wil ik u danken voor uw inzet om onafhankelijk en fair de monetaire politiek van de eurozone vorm en inhoud te geven.

Gelukkig lijkt de eurostorm te gaan liggen, maar daarmee dreigt ook de sense of urgency te verdampen en dát zie ik als een groot risico. De EVP-Fractie wil niet doormodderen, maar ambitieuze inzet op groei en stabiliteit. Dat vereist structurele hervormingen in lidstaten en het herstel van het vrij verkeer van kapitaal. En voor de goede orde – laat daar geen onduidelijkheid over bestaan – dit Parlement wil het mandaat van de ECB niet wijzigen!

President Draghi, u hebt met de instelling van de OMT uw inzet geleverd en deze terecht gekoppeld aan strikte conditionaliteit, en dat geldt ook voor de LTRO. Een tijdelijke maatregel, want de structurele oplossing is het herstel van het vertrouwen in onze bankensector. Geld moet rollen. Dat is de beste garantie dat banken hun rol als financier van het midden- en kleinbedrijf weer waar kunnen maken.

Voorzitter, de ECB gaat als single supervisor het bankentoezicht overnemen. U ligt op koers met de voorbereiding. Afgelopen maandag zijn we daar in Frankfurt uitvoerig over geïnformeerd. Maar op één been kun je niet lopen. Regeringsleiders hebben beloofd dat er ook een single resolution-autoriteit komt, en wij als medewetgever, zijn gecommitteerd dat ook te leveren. U zult begrijpen dat er bij ons zorg leeft over de koers die de ECOFIN-ministers lijken in te slaan.

Een afsplitsing van het fonds in een intergouvernementeel orgaan kan de effectiviteit van de resolutie-autoriteit aantasten. Wat dreigt is dat de besluitvorming over de resolutie in handen van de lidstaten wordt gelegd in plaats van bij een communautaire autoriteit. En wat niet werkte bij het stabiliteits- en groeipact, wat we daar hebben afgeschaft, zouden we hier dan gaan invoeren. Voorzitter, dat gaat niet werken! Wij bepalen volgende week als Parlement onze positie en zijn klaar voor de onderhandelingen met de Raad.

  Leonardo Domenici (S&D). - Signor Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, Presidente Draghi, "frammentazione" sembra diventata la parola magica che tutti ripetono. Mi sembra un termine un po' eufemistico dietro il quale si nasconde un universo di problemi, di squilibri, di divergenze e di contraddizioni.

È vero che c'è stata una stabilizzazione dopo i fenomeni di sudden stop di flusso di capitali privati verso i paesi in deficit, ma i problemi rimangono anche perché essi preesistevano rispetto alla crisi del 2008. Mi riferisco in primo luogo al fatto che la crisi della moneta unica è anche crisi di bilanci e dei pagamenti dei singoli Stati membri all'interno dell'eurozona, un fenomeno che sembrava non dovesse esistere all'inizio dell'euro.

Il punto è dunque la distribuzione asimmetrica di liquidità nell'ambito dei paesi dell'euro e questo riguarda anche l'efficacia della trasmissione della politica monetaria della BCE. Come può la Banca centrale europea fare in modo che le proprie operazioni di rifinanziamento siano effettivamente funzionali all'economia reale, come è stato detto soprattutto alle piccole e medie imprese, e servano a finanziare investimenti e attività commerciali e non attività prevalentemente speculative di portfolio investment? Occorrerebbe una sorta di controllo di qualità sulle iniezioni di liquidità.

Penso si debba riflettere criticamente anche sul "Funding for lending" della Banca d'Inghilterra, che in realtà ha favorito in alcuni casi soprattutto investimenti di tipo immobiliare e penso che si debba porre attenzione anche all'uso degli strumenti degli Abs. Lei sa sicuramente che alcuni studiosi hanno proposto, hanno avanzato l'ipotesi di fare riferimento all'esperienza di Target 2 e costituire una sorta di Target 3: un sistema che sia finalizzato a rendere meno onerosi gli interessi sulle attività volte a finanziare l'economia reale rispetto a quelli connessi ad attività puramente finanziarie o speculative.

Posi qualche tempo fa questo interrogativo al ministro Dijsselbloem e mi rispose che questa non è materia di cui si occupano i ministri finanziari, credo che forse da Lei otterrò una risposta anche critica, ma probabilmente meno banale di questa.

  Sylvie Goulard (ALDE). - Monsieur le Président, Monsieur le Président Draghi, d'abord un petit mot à notre président de séance. Je voudrais qu'il demande à M. Schulz de veiller à ce qu'il n'y ait pas, pendant les interventions du président Draghi, en plénière, d'autres réunions qui nous privent de la présence, dans cet hémicycle, des membres de la commission des affaires économiques et monétaires. Je trouve que ce rendez-vous est important et que ce Parlement s'honorerait, quand il demande la transparence, à faire un effort pour participer au dialogue.

Je ne voudrais pas me perdre dans les détails, Monsieur Draghi, je voulais juste vous demander une chose. En juin 2012, pour la première fois, le Conseil européen avait adopté une approche globale. On voulait aborder, à la fois, les questions budgétaires, économiques, bancaires et l'union politique. Vous étiez chargé, avec d'autres – je sais bien, avec d'autres – de réfléchir à l'évolution à moyen terme de la zone euro.

Je voulais vous demander où ce beau travail est parti. Depuis l'année dernière, nous avons l'impression que tout ceci s'est envolé et qu'on a oublié l'approche large qui était, à mon avis, la seule véritablement intelligente.

  Elnök. − Köszönöm szépen, Goulard asszony megjegyzését följegyeztük.

  Philippe Lamberts (Verts/ALE). - Monsieur le Président, Monsieur Draghi, pour beaucoup, vous êtes un héros, le héros de l'euro, et il est indéniable qu'au fil de la crise, vous avez fait preuve à la fois d'un sens des responsabilités et d'un certain volontarisme qui vous honorent. Pour cela, je tiens à vous le dire, nous vous sommes reconnaissants.

Je dois cependant vous faire part de mon inquiétude croissante à votre égard et concernant la Banque centrale européenne. Inquiétude quand je lis vos déclarations sur l'inéluctable fin du modèle social européen. Inquiétude de vous entendre, en commission ECON, dire que les impôts sont trop élevés en Europe. Inquiétude encore de lire les admonestations que vous vous permettez d'adresser, par écrit, à des chefs de gouvernement élus, pour les pousser, en particulier, de manière très précise, à flexibiliser le marché du travail et, donc, à précariser les travailleurs. Inquiétude, encore, de vous voir utiliser, à votre gré, les moyens de pression dont la Banque centrale européenne dispose pour défendre certaines institutions financières aux dépens des États, comme nous l'avons vu en Irlande.

Monsieur Draghi, je suis très attaché à l'indépendance de la Banque centrale européenne dans la conduite de la politique monétaire. Mais je suis plus attaché encore au respect de la souveraineté politique du peuple et de ses élus.

Monsieur Draghi, quelles que soient les idées personnelles que vous avez à ces sujets, les politiques budgétaire, fiscale et sociale ne sont pas de votre ressort. Vous direz sans doute que toutes ces politiques affectent la stabilité de la monnaie et qu'à ce titre, vous pouvez vous exprimer. Je vous dirais qu'à ce compte, il faudrait faire de vous le super-ministre des affaires économiques, financières et sociales de toute la zone euro et il ne saurait en être question. Si vous voulez entrer dans l'arène politique, vous êtes le bienvenu, faites-vous élire, rejoignez-nous et nous aurons le plaisir de débattre de ces choses-là avec vous.

Monsieur Draghi, l'Union européenne est en train de confier à la Banque centrale européenne, qui est déjà la plus puissante au monde, de nouveaux pouvoirs. Je ne saurai trop vous encourager à les exercer avec discernement et modestie, si vous voulez garder ou retrouver la confiance de nos concitoyens et de nos démocraties.

  Bastiaan Belder (EFD). - De ECB heeft in 2012 ongebruikelijke beleidsmaatregelen genomen vanwege de uitzonderlijke omstandigheden. Nu dienen verdere stappen richting een bankenunie zich aan. Ik teken ernstig bezwaar aan tegen de volgende stap: een gemeenschappelijk afwikkelingsfonds voor banken. De rekening van de slechte leningen op de balansen van zwakke banken wordt uitgesmeerd over de Europeanen, zonder dat de omvang van de rekening duidelijk is. Dit problematische proces waarbij de ECB is betrokken, wordt niet graag benoemd, en waarschijnlijk staat het daarom ook niet in dit verslag over de ECB.

Naast bezuinigen en hervormen ligt de juiste aanpak van de eurocrisis uiteindelijk bij het gedeeltelijk kwijtschelden van leningen aan overheden en het afschrijven van leningen van banken. Het zal veel vergen van de ECB om dit te begeleiden met het juiste monetaire beleid. Toch moet zij, nu de onrust wat is getemperd, zo spoedig mogelijk terug naar haar kerntaak: prijsstabiliteit. Die notie had ik graag als centrale boodschap in het verslag gezien.

  Auke Zijlstra (NI). - Voorzitter, het Verdrag bepaalt dat de Europese Centrale Bank politiek onafhankelijk móet zijn en uitsluítend monetaire stabiliteit moet nastreven. Het Verdrag laat geen ruimte voor andere overwegingen.

Maar de bank heeft sinds de financiële crisis het Verdrag stelselmatig overtreden, bijvoorbeeld door overheidsobligaties te kopen (artikel 123), bijvoorbeeld door de rentestanden te verlagen om de staatsschulden van de zuidelijke lidstaten financierbaar te houden ten koste van alle spaarders in Europa. Ook heeft de heer Draghi aangekondigd onbeperkt zwakke landen te zullen financieren. En daarmee bedrijft de ECB politiek en gaat de bank dus zijn mandaat te buiten.

Dit Parlement staat echter te juichen bij deze schending van de Verdragen. Tegelijkertijd eist het Parlement dat het de Centrale Bank gaat controleren. Een centrale bank, Voorzitter, kan niet worden gecontroleerd door toevallige politieke meerderheden. Monetaire stabiliteit is geen politiek speeltje.

Voorzitter, de Europese Unie kan alleen gestoeld zijn op het vertrouwen dat de Europese instituten zich houden aan wat is afgesproken. Anders, Voorzitter, is er geen rechtsstaat meer.

  Burkhard Balz (PPE). - Herr Präsident, Herr Kommissar Rehn, Herr Präsident Draghi! Die Europäische Zentralbank hat auch im vergangenen Jahr eine wesentliche Rolle bei der Stabilisierung der Finanzmärkte und des europäischen Bankensektors übernommen. Die Liquiditätsmaßnahmen der EZB waren und sind sehr umfassend. Die Maßnahmen müssen daher unter dem Vorbehalt einer strikten Konditionalität und auch einer fortlaufenden Überprüfung stehen. Dies ist uns Christdemokraten im Europäischen Parlament besonders wichtig, und unsere Forderung wird ja auch in der Stellungnahme zum Jahresbericht deutlich.

Die haushaltspolitische Konsolidierung trägt bereits ihre ersten Früchte. Es wird erwartet, dass die Haushaltsdefizite im kommenden Jahr schrumpfen und sich der Schuldenstand im Euro-Währungsgebiet stabilisiert. Wir befinden uns sicherlich auf einem langwierigen und mühsamen Weg aus der Krise, aber es ist der richtige Weg.

Eine große Sorge sind und bleiben die anhaltenden Niedrigzinsen. Private Ersparnisse schrumpfen, und Investoren suchen händeringend nach Investitionsmöglichkeiten.

Die europäischen Gesetzgeber versuchen nun, mit Vorhaben zur Langfristfinanzierung wieder neue Anreize zu schaffen. Diese Vorhaben waren jedoch nicht dafür gedacht, Löcher zu stopfen, sondern sollten eine wichtige Ergänzung zu mehr Wachstum in Europa sein. Deswegen ist für mich klar: Wir müssen hier wieder zu einem ganzheitlichen Ansatz kommen. Und das heißt: solide Haushaltspolitik, gestärkte Wettbewerbsfähigkeit, eine ausgewogene Geldpolitik und mehr Stabilität durch mehr Finanzmarktregulierung. Dazu gehört auch die Stärkung der Aufsichtsstrukturen, insbesondere für die großen und grenzüberschreitenden Banken. Die Vorbereitungszeit zum Start der EZB-Bankenaufsicht im November nächsten Jahres muss engagiert und zielgerichtet genutzt werden. Dazu gehört auch, dass Sie, Herr Präsident Draghi, dem Parlament nun endlich einen Vorschlag zum Vizevorsitz der Bankenaufsicht vorlegen.

Die EZB und Sie persönlich als Präsident der Organisation tragen eine große Verantwortung. Als Europäisches Parlament werden wir unsere Funktion als wesentliches Kontrollorgan wahrnehmen.

  Anni Podimata (S&D). - Mr President, in this year’s report we have worked on the non-standard monetary operations carried out by the Bank, the LTROs and the OMT, which played a very critical role in averting the contagion of the crisis. However this is not enough to get us out of the woods. At the moment, when the European economy is still desperately struggling for growth, and unemployment is reaching unacceptable levels, the ECB could and should do more.

Let me give you two examples: in our debates we have consistently raised the issue of the credit crutch in the real economy, along the line that the cheap liquidity you are providing for banks has never reached the real economy but was instead used by banks for profits and capital formation. As you know, the problem is extremely acute in crisis countries like Greece where rates have increased, not decreased, and where healthy SMEs are suffering because of lack of liquidity and large corporations often have to leave the country in order to get access to cheap credit.

Mr Draghi said last week that if he were to do an operation similar to the LTRO he would want it to be used for the real economy and this is absolutely the right approach. But I am wondering, Mr Draghi, what you are waiting for before using this tool and making sure that your monetary policy is transmitted effectively across all the euro area, to help struggling but healthy SMEs survive and to help them preserve existing jobs and create new ones.

Finally, a last point about what the ECB could do. One of the conclusions of the independent Annual Growth Survey is that an aggressive monetary policy to reduce sovereign spreads would, together with institutional advances, have an accumulated effect of 3% of GDP in Ireland and 8% of GDP in Spain and Greece, not only helping in the recovery from the crisis but also contributing considerably to the sustainability of public debt. So why does this option remain excluded?

  Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE). - Mr President, according to the latest data from the Troika’s report, banking credit to non-financial corporations in Spain is falling again this year at a rate of 11%. At the same time, Spanish banks are increasing lending to the Spanish Government at a rate of 10%. After two LTROs and having thrown billions of euros in state aid to the banks, in some Member States this money is being used to finance government deficits instead of credit to the real economy.

The Bundesbank recently reported that Spanish banks today have EUR 300 billion in Spanish government debt. In 2009 this was only EUR 70 billion. Is this sustainable? I would like to ask Mr Draghi: is the ECB giving incentives to create huge crowding out effects? We do not want Mr Draghi to become ‘Mr Crowding Out’. In the next LTRO, money must not be used to fund government deficits while solvent SMEs in the south of Europe agonise without credit at a reasonable cost.

  Andreas Mölzer (NI). - Herr Präsident! Damit konventionelle Währungen funktionieren, bedarf es bekanntlich großen Vertrauens – Vertrauens darauf, dass Banken unser Geld aufbewahren und gut verwalten. Wie die Finanz- und Wirtschaftskrise, die in Wahrheit eine Bankenkrise war und ist, aufgedeckt hat, wird indessen hemmungslos spekuliert. Daran haben sämtliche Änderungen der Finanzmarkt- und Bankenaufsicht nichts ändern können.

Die erneut anstehenden Bankenstresstests sind keinesfalls dazu angetan, das Vertrauen der Menschen wiederherzustellen, kamen doch zahlreiche Banken mit gutem Zeugnis im letzten Test kurz darauf in Bedrängnis.

Keinesfalls darf es zu einem Feldzug gegen virtuelle Währungen kommen. Immerhin ist das oft das Einzige, was in krisengebeutelten Staaten noch funktioniert. Ebenso würde der Erwerb von Portfolien, von Staatsanleihen der Euro-Mitgliedstaaten nur immense ökonomische und juristische Probleme verursachen.

Um eine neue Finanzkrise zu verhindern, müssen Systemfehler – wie die Vermengung von Investmentbanking und traditionellem Bankgeschäft – beseitigt werden. Wenn Banken weiterhin ungehindert spekulieren können, ist es nur eine Frage der Zeit, bis wieder Kreditinstitute am Rande der Pleite stehen, und das wollen wird nicht.

  Theodor Dumitru Stolojan (PPE). - Domnule președinte Draghi, dumneavoastră personal, împreună cu Banca Centrală Europeană ați salvat euro și pentru aceasta vă mulțumim. Doresc însă acum să ridic în fața dumneavoastră o problemă care creează îngrijorare în statele membre din afara zonei euro. Ca să nu generalizez, voi da exemplul României.

După cum știți, peste 80% din activele bancare din România sunt deținute de băncile mamă din statele membre din zona euro.

Ce se întâmplă în prezent? Asistăm la o creștere an de an a creditelor neperformante, ca urmare a boom-ului creditelor de până la sfârșitul anului 2008. Aceste bănci stau cu creditele neperformante în bilanțuri an după an și asistăm, pur și simplu, la retragerea banilor de către băncile mamă din noile depozite constituite din economiile populației și ale firmelor din România.

Cu alte cuvinte, în timp ce creditul practic nu descrește, deoarece creditele neperformante nu sunt scoase din bilanțuri, băncile mamă pun o presiune formidabilă pe fiicele lor din România, pentru a retrage fluxurile de credite pe care le-au acordat în timpul boomului.

Aș dori ca această problemă să stea în atenția Băncii Centrale Europene în anul viitor, când se va face evaluarea activelor celor mai importante bănci din zona euro.

  Mario Borghezio (NI). - Signor Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, Presidente Draghi, il vento di rivolta che spira in Italia è conseguenza diretta delle scelte sbagliate dell'euro e delle politiche restrittive imposte dall'Unione europea e dalla BCE.

Voglio solo ricordare come finanziare a tassi irrisori l'acquisto del debito pubblico dei paesi deboli da parte della BCE per immettere quindi l'acquisto da parte dei paesi forti sul mercato primario; comperare poi la stessa BCE questo stesso debito sul mercato secondario a quotazioni più elevate: errori gravissimi. Lei dice "attenti ai nazionalismi e ai protezionismi", ce lo dice da anni, ecco i risultati. Le nostre piccole e medie imprese mangiate dalla concorrenza cinese. I dati ci volevano, eccome.

Un'ultima domanda: era così difficile prevedere che rifinanziare la BCE senza imporre loro impieghi nell'interesse dei paesi si sarebbe tradotto in impieghi sui mercati speculativi senza un solo euro a favore della BCE? Quanto ci costa la nuova BCE? Altro che spending review! Quanto ce la fate costare questa nuova faraonica costruzione della BCE?

  Werner Langen (PPE). - Herr Präsident! Ich möchte dem EZB-Präsidenten Dank sagen, denn seine Institution war die einzige, die in den letzten Krisenjahren voll handlungsfähig war.

Der Finanzministerrat und die Mitgliedstaaten waren dazu nicht in der Lage, Sie aber haben nicht nur die Lücke genutzt, sondern Sie haben im Sommer 2012 durch Ihre Äußerung, dass sie alles gegen die Spekulation tun werden, dazu beigetragen, dass sich die Lage deutlich beruhigt hat und der Euro tatsächlich nicht mehr in Existenzgefahr ist. Das möchte ich ausdrücklich hervorheben und die Kritik des Kollegen Lamberts zurückweisen.

Ich habe allerdings auch vier Probleme, kritische Punkte, die ich kurz nennen möchte. Das Ziel, Banken und Staaten zu entflechten, ist durch Ihr Programm nicht erreicht worden, im Gegenteil: Die Banken haben im Süden Europas mit dem billigen Geld der EZB weiter Staatsanleihen aufgekauft, statt die Kredite an kleine und mittlere Unternehmen zu geben.

Zweitens: Nicht erreicht wurde bisher auch die notwendige Reduzierung des Bankensektors und die nähere Heranführung an die Realwirtschaft – im Gegensatz etwa zu den deutlichen Erfolgen in den USA.

Drittens: Die Bankenunion nur für das Euro-Währungsgebiet unter der Führung der EZB wird keine Dauereinrichtung sein können, nicht zuletzt, weil der Finanzplatz London außen vor bleibt und der Finanzbinnenmarkt gefährdet wird.

Viertens: Negativzinsen, die offensichtlich innerhalb der EZB diskutiert wurden, wenn ich den Berichten trauen darf, sind nicht geeignet, die Probleme zu lösen. Ich möchte an das Beispiel von Japan erinnern, das mit dieser Politik seit 1997, also seit über 16 Jahren, in der Deflation gelandet ist. Das sollte auch der EZB ein warnendes Beispiel sein.

  Ivana Maletić (PPE). - Gospodine predsjedavajući, pozdravljam povjerenika Rhena, gospodina Draghija, i čestitam na kvalitetnom poslu i trudu. Zahvaljujem izvjestitelju, kolegi Pittelli. Uloga Europske središnje banke u kontekstu stanja u eurozoni, ali i čitavoj Europskoj uniji od posebnog je značaja te se od Europske središnje banke očekuje i više mjera usmjerenih na kreiranje povoljnih uvjeta za ekonomski rast, otvaranje novih radnih mjesta i financijsku stabilnost.

Eurozona u 2012. bilježi pad bruto društvenog proizvoda za 0,6 posto, u 2013. se pad procjenjuje na 0,4 posto. Stopa nezaposlenosti iznosila je u 2012. 11,4 posto s tendencijom rasta na 12,2 posto u 2013. Tijekom 2012. godine posebno se osjetila potreba za zajedničkim djelovanjem država članica kroz koordiniranje ekonomskih fiskalnih i financijskih politika kako bi se izbjegla neodrživa kretanja u pojedinim državama koja ugrožavaju i čitavu monetarnu uniju. Upravo zato je važno i uključivanje Europske središnje banke u mehanizam Europskog semestra, u utvrđivanje preporuka koje se daju državama članicama, a koje ukazuju na strukturne reforme koje treba provesti.

Česta prepreka rastu i razvoju jest dostupnost izvora financiranja srednjim i malim poduzetnicima koji su nositelji i pokretači rasta i novog zapošljavanja što smo čuli iz vaših izlaganja. Upravo to je jedan od rizika za postizanje rasta i razvoja i u Republici Hrvatskoj. Uz osiguranje dostupnosti kredita, važno pitanje je i visina kamatnih stopa po kojima dobivaju te kredite, a koje se značajno razlikuju u državama članicama. Ta činjenica stvara nejednakosti na jedinstvenom tržištu i dovodi poduzetnike u neravnopravan položaj. Izuzetno je važno da u sljedećim razdobljima pronađemo načine i odgovorimo na ovaj izazov u svim državama članicama, a ne samo unutar eurozone.

  Gay Mitchell (PPE). - Mr President, first of all can I say that I join with those who raised concerns about SMEs. Ninety per cent of all businesses are directly associated with SMEs and two thirds of all employment in the euro area, and the survey ʻAccess to Financeʼ published by both the ECB and the Commission, finds that 13% of SME loan applications were rejected in 2013, 16% of SMEs received less than they originally applied for and 7% of SMEs were too discouraged to even apply for a loan.

So what can you do about that? Let me suggest what you can do about that. Make it a condition in LTRO II that the banks you are going to finance actually have bank managers. What got us into this mess is ticking automatic boxes. We need bank managers who look at your track record, your business model, your character and then take a calculated risk, not a gamble but a calculated risk, and I ask that that be made a condition.

May I say this as well: what will history say of this era? They will say: gone are the times of the Romanovs and the Hohenzollerns and the Ottomans and the Habsburgs. Gone are the times of Stalin and Hitler, gone is the Berlin Wall, and then they will say that, true, it was the worst crisis since the 1920s and 1930s – and we weathered it!

Why did we weather it? We weathered it because we had the institutions, we had the Central Bank and we had the Commission and let us not forget that. In times gone by nationalism beggared our neighbours. Why we have survived is, with all their imperfections, because of these institutions.

  Pablo Zalba Bidegain (PPE). - Señor Presidente, señor Gobernador, señor Vicepresidente de la Comisión Europea, permítanme, en primer lugar, felicitar al señor Pittella por el gran informe que ha hecho, sobre todo en todo lo referente a las pequeñas y medianas empresas. Ya tenemos acuerdo con el Consejo para crear el segundo pilar de la unión bancaria, el Fondo y la Autoridad. No tengo ninguna duda de que quien gana es Europa.

El segundo pilar de la unión bancaria —estoy de acuerdo con el Presidente Draghi— no es la panacea, pero no tengo ninguna duda de que servirá para impulsar el crecimiento económico a medio y largo plazo; a corto plazo todos reconocemos que no hay correcta transmisión de la política monetaria y las medidas adoptadas hasta ahora han tenido un impacto muy limitado en lo que se refiere a la financiación de la economía real, especialmente de pequeñas y medianas empresas y familias.

Estoy totalmente de acuerdo con el discurso de Olli Rehn. Creo que tenemos que hacer algo más. Yo creo que el Banco Central Europeo puede —y, en mi humilde opinión, debe— hacer algo más al respecto, para que el crédito llegue en condiciones similares a las pequeñas y medianas empresas que, sin duda alguna, serán el motor del crecimiento y de la creación de empleo.

Yo, señor Draghi, solo quiero acabar diciéndole que confío plenamente en usted.

„Catch the eye”

  Roberta Angelilli (PPE). - Signor Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, Presidente Draghi, in un momento critico Lei ha detto una frase storica: "pronti a tutto per salvare l'euro".

Già la frase, insieme ovviamente ad azioni forti, bloccò l'aggressione speculativa, ma ora i cittadini ci chiedono di più, ci chiedono di uscire dalla crisi, quindi non solo la stabilità finanziaria, ma la crescita, lo sviluppo, il lavoro. I cittadini ci chiedono a cosa serve un euro forte quando abbiamo, al netto del Suo grande impegno, una Banca centrale debole e limitata nel ruolo.

È tempo quindi di andare oltre, di avere una Banca centrale europea che diventi prestatore di ultima istanza, la banca dello sviluppo europeo, una banca al servizio di un progetto industriale, al servizio delle famiglie e delle imprese e dell'economia reale. I cittadini ci chiedono accesso al credito, opportunità, non solo salvare le banche.

  Phil Prendergast (S&D). - Mr President, the SMEs are our biggest collective employers who create the bulk of value in our economy and they remain in extreme financial difficulties. It entails the loss of growth opportunities and is felt most acutely by the euro area countries that were the hardest hit by the crisis where our SMEs face much higher default risks and borrowing costs.

The European Central Bank has been providing the euro area financial sector with unprecedented levels of assistance, as was seen with the emergency liquidity assistance channelled through the national central banks, and yet the financial sector, reprieved due to ECB and taxpayersʼ unconditional support, has failed to yield by way of growth and job creation. Public purses, small businesses and homeowners have all been treated like delinquents by a sector they had to save from itself and they face stringent conditions to make ends meet.

We need credit lines for our businesses. The ECB and the Troika have shown very little appetite for forcing banks to pass on the liquidity they get at the cheapest rates from the European Central Bank. I would say to Mr Draghi: please extend a modicum of the decisiveness and generosity you have shown to others to our SMEs and provide direct credit lines to fund their potential and contribute to the real economy.

  Jaroslav Paška (EFD) - Vážený pán predseda Európskej centrálnej banky, vo vašom vystúpení ste zdôraznili, že pre fragmentované prostredie eurozóny, v ktorom využívame spoločnú menu euro, je ťažké definovať menovú politiku tak, aby vyhovovala aj industrializovaným krajinám na severe Európy a súčasne aj dlhmi zaťaženým štátom zápasiacim s hospodárskym úpadkom.

Vaše úsilie sanácie národných bánk predĺžených krajín výmenou prostriedkov Európskej centrálnej banky za bezcenné papiere znehodnocuje portfólio ECB a vyvoláva oprávnenú otázku, dokedy bude takáto prax udržateľná bez zrútenia systému.

Preto, vážený pán prezident, bolo by, myslím si, dobré postupne sa vecne zamerať priamo na podporu aktívnych podnikateľov produkujúcich reálne hodnoty a menej sa zaoberať sanovaním stále pribúdajúcich dlhov v rozpočtoch niektorých krajín.

  Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris (PPE). - Signor Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, grazie Presidente Draghi per la sua relazione, per ciò che ha detto, ma soprattutto per ciò che ha fatto in tema di riduzione dei tassi.

Ringrazio anche il Commissario Rehn che ha chiesto più fondi per il credito alle imprese e ringrazierei ancora di più il Commissario Rehn se non si impicciasse dell'odiosa tassa sulla prima casa che il parlamento italiano intendeva abolire e non è compito suo né dell'Europa, signor Commissario, sindacare sulle imposte che un parlamento nazionale impone o su quelle odiose che un parlamento sovrano vuole abolire. Comunque, Commissario, il governo di corte intese l'ha accontentata perché in una notte hanno tolto l'IMU sulla prima casa e hanno introdotto la TASI sempre sulla prima casa.

Signor Presidente Draghi una domanda velocissima: il mio e il Suo paese, l'Italia, garantisce il debito privato; oggi in caso di fallimento di una banca i piccoli e medi risparmiatori otterrebbero la rifusione dei loro depositi fino a 100 000 euro, ma l'accordo raggiunto e siglato l'altra notte in sede Ecofin ha reso molto più blando questo sistema di garanzia. Presidente Draghi, cosa accadrà ora?

Lei si sente di garantire i piccoli risparmiatori, anche quelli italiani, e dar loro certezza sul fatto che non perderebbero nulla dei loro risparmi nell'ipotesi di fallimento della banca cui li hanno affidati? Anche alla luce dell'accordo Ecofin dell'altra notte, i risparmiatori possono essere tranquilli?

  George Sabin Cutaş (S&D). - Domnule președinte Draghi, Uniunea Europeană nu a ieșit din criză, atâta timp cât politicile sale economice și monetare nu se vor axa în jurul luptei împotriva șomajului și nu vor urmări stimularea creșterii cererii interne, așa cum sublinia ieri doamna Christine Lagarde.

Spre deosebire de Statele Unite ale Americii, care au înregistrat progrese pe drumul redresării economice, Uniunea Europeană nu dispune de o bancă centrală care să acționeze în mod direct pentru stimularea creșterii economice.

Măsurile de politică monetară adoptate de BCE sunt binevenite. Cu toate acestea, consider că Banca trebuie să aibă în vedere recurgerea la măsuri neconvenționale, precum injectarea de capital, finanțarea datoriei publice și programele de cheltuieli în domeniul inovării, educației, infrastructurii de transport, de tehnologie și, de asemenea, pentru a contribui la dezvoltarea întreprinderilor mici și mijlocii.

În final, aș vrea să subliniez faptul că cred că mandatul Băncii trebuie să includă două componente importante: stabilitatea prețurilor și, în egală măsură, ocuparea integrală a forței de muncă.

  Erik Bánki (PPE). - Tisztelt Elnök Úr, Képviselőtársaim! Az euróövezet GDP-je az előző évben 0,6%-al csökkent, és sajnos az idei évben is 0,4%-kal csökkenni fog. Az Európai Központi Bank, helyesen, a kamatláb csökkentésével igyekezett elérni azt, hogy több pénz kerüljön a gazdaságba. El kell érni azonban, hogy a reálgazdaságban végre érzékelhető folyamatok induljanak el, a mai helyzet ugyanis az, hogy a vállalkozások a pénzügyi szektorból nehezen vagy egyáltalán nem tudnak forrásokhoz jutni. Kulcskérdés lesz a következő időszakban az, hogy a kis- és középvállalkozói szektort meg tudjuk-e élénkíteni, fel tudjuk-e frissíteni, hiszen ők adják az euróövezet vállalkozásainak 98%-át, ők foglalkoztatják az alkalmazottak háromnegyedét és ők állítják elő GDP 60%-át. Nagyon remélem, hogy a tagállamok nemzeti bankjai is kapcsolódni fognak ezekhez a programokhoz. Magyarországon a Magyar Nemzeti Bank rendkívül sikeres, közel 7 milliárd eurós hitelprogramot indított a vállalkozók segítésére és támogatására. Ez más tagállamokban is jó példa lehet.

  Αντιγόνη Παπαδοπούλου (S&D). - Κύριε Πρόεδρε, κύριε Draghi και κύριε Olli Rehn, σας μεταφέρω τη φωνή απογοήτευσης από την Κύπρο και από τους αγανακτισμένους Κύπριους συμπατριώτες μου, που νιώθουν πως υπήρξαν τα πειραματόζωα για ένα πρωτοφανές πείραμα κουρέματος των καταθέσεων.

Σας μεταφέρω τα ερωτήματα που μου θέτουν καθημερινά: Γιατί εφαρμόσατε στην ημι-κατεχόμενη Κύπρο για πρώτη φορά μια τόσο αυστηρή λύση όπως το κούρεμα καταθέσεων; Γιατί εφαρμόσατε αυτή τη μέθοδο αντί για το κούρεμα χρέους; Γιατί ήταν τόσο ανεπαρκής η εποπτεία της Ευρωπαϊκής Κεντρικής Τράπεζας; Γιατί τα λάθη των τραπεζών καλούνται να πληρώσουν οι απλοί πολίτες; Τι γίνεται με τις καταθέσεις κάτω των 100.000 ευρώ; Πραγματικά θα διασφαλίζονται στο μέλλον; Πώς θα αξιολογείτε τη δράση της Τρόικας; Πιστεύετε πως μόνο με αυστηρές πολιτικές λιτότητας, χωρίς ανάπτυξη και χωρίς επενδύσεις δώσατε λύσεις; Η ανεργία καλπάζει, το ίδιο η ύφεση και αποπληθωρισμός.

Δυστυχώς αποτύχατε να δώσετε λύσεις. Πότε και πώς επιτέλους θα σταματήσετε αυτόν τον κατήφορο;

(„Catch the eye” vége)

  Olli Rehn, Vice-President of the Commission. − Mr President, the European Parliament plays a very important role in the debate on European economic policies and I am indeed encouraged to listen to such an engaged and substantive debate today. The Commission fully supports the active role of Parliament in the dialogue with the ECB, which is an important component of the ECB’s transparency and democratic accountability.

Let me conclude with two brief comments. Firstly, several Members – or at least Ms Ferreira and Mr Matias – commented on the work of the Troika. We will come back to that in the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) when you prepare your own-initiative report with a focus on how to improve the democratic accountability and transparency to which we are fully committed. Let me just say that the ESM Treaty assigns the principal role to the Commission in the designing and monitoring of the economic adjustment programmes. Last Monday, the Euro Group supported the exits of Ireland and Spain from their programmes and I am very confident that both countries, Ireland and Spain, are now heading towards a successful conclusion of their programmes and a safe return to market funding. This demonstrates that there is a beginning and an end to these programmes and it demonstrates that the programmes can bring about an economic turnaround, provided that they are effectively implemented.

Secondly, I want to thank you for your strong support for the Commission’s work on freeing up the necessary and affordable lending to SMEs in Europe. We must now do whatever it takes to get credit flowing into the real economy, to the households and businesses – especially to SMEs – for the sake of sustainable growth and job creation. Your message has been loud and clear and I trust it will be heard not only in the EU institutions, but also in the capitals of the Member States of the Union. I count on your continued support and I suggest we work together for this very important objective.

PRESIDE: MIGUEL ANGEL MARTÍNEZ MARTÍNEZ
Vicepresidente

  Mario Draghi, President of the European Central Bank. − Mr President, let me thank the rapporteur, Gianni Pittella, Vice-President Rehn, and all the speakers for their contributions. Some of them have been praising the ECB’s actions and some of them have been critical, and I will thank you for both. But, as someone said, the outcome of this discussion is that the ECB has once again found in the European Parliament a loyal ally. We will certainly do everything for this to continue in the future.

Let me make a few statements about our monetary policy. First of all, our monetary policy is not run with one country in mind, but it is run for the whole of the euro area. So in doing this, we have the objective of our primary mandate, which is maintaining price stability in the medium term. When we talk about price stability, we talk about price stability in both directions: above 2% and below 2%. Right now we have had a low inflation rate, on the low side of 2%, for a protracted period of time.

So we have to be aware that we have the same objective as the central banks working in one country having this mandate, but we have a completely different institutional set-up, with 17 – and soon 18 – countries. So the instruments of our monetary policy must be different. We do not see deflation in the euro area today. Our situation is different from what it was in Japan in the 1990s and early 2000s.

Inflation expectations in the medium and long term are firmly anchored; the monetary stimulus that we have injected in the euro area in the last two years – as many of you have acknowledged – was not there in Japan at that time. The situation of banks’ balance sheets and the private sector balance sheets is better today in the euro area than it was in Japan at that time. So there are various reasons. We have asked ourselves this question and the answer we gave ourselves is that we are not in that situation.

However, inflation is to stay low for a protracted period of time and we are, therefore, well aware of the downside risk that this might entail; that is why I said in the last press conference that we stand ready to act and we are able to act. As I said last time, we have plenty of instruments that we can mobilise to react to the situation. But let us keep something in mind: we cannot supplement governments in their structural reform policies. Ultimately it is only these reforms that yield sustainable growth in the medium and long term. We cannot supplement banks if they lack capital. We cannot supplement governments or systems that are politically broken.

There are many things that central banks cannot do, and very often these many things add the real engines for growth. Let me talk about two considerations in this regard: one obtains neither growth nor equity out of endless debt creation. At the same time, it is well to keep in mind that this is not the time – and I repeat it – to go back to nationalism. If one does not carry out the structural reforms, one would have to do them anyway – whether in the euro or outside the euro. So let us keep in mind that it is not the fault of the common currency if there are certain weaknesses in the euro area, but it is again a lack of action.

Should the ECB speak about taxation? I think the ECB should speak up against anything that could threaten the independence of its monetary policy, and policies that penalise growth ultimately tend to threaten the independence of the ECB monetary policy. That is why the ECB speaks in favour of growth-friendly budget consolidation, rather than simply consolidation tout court that says ‘let us look at the bottom line no matter how this consolidation is being achieved’. But as I said more generally, this is not the time to return to nationalism and protectionism.

Having said that let us not forget that if we look back two years ago or even one year ago, there has been a substantial improvement in the euro area on all fronts: on the structural reforms, on the fiscal consolidation, even on growth. As the baseline scenario of the ECB has stated for about a year and a half now, we are now in the middle of a modest gradual recovery which was previously not there. What are the drivers of this recovery? There are several, but if I have to look at the ECB certainly it is our monetary accommodation, which is gradually finding its way through the economy. Second is the much lower uncertainty that we face today if compared to two years ago. But it is also due to a less hard fiscal pressure as time goes by, and also to a gradual pickup in external demand.

There are also improvements in fragmentation, and I will not take your time here going through the various details, but the financial markets and the banking markets work better today. However, I am fully aware that the SMEs, which account for almost 80% of employment, are struggling. They are struggling both because they do not have credit, but also because they do not ask for credit, because overall demand is weak and unemployment is unacceptably high.

So we have been thinking about various ways. As I said at the last press conference, if and when we do another LTRO, this time the situation is completed different from what it was two years ago and this LTRO will have to be geared and designed in such a way as to increase the probability that this money will actually reach the real economy. But when people make comparisons with other countries’ LTROs, let me say one thing: the main features of the funding for lending scheme are its long maturity, wide collateral and wide set of counterparties, and all these last three features have been present in our LTROs from the very beginning. So that is why I am saying we have to think further and reflect more deeply to find out which is the right instrument.

One development that is taking place precisely at this time and which will accompany us for this coming year is the AQR. I have very little doubt that shedding more light and making the balance sheets of the banks more transparent will actually help to restore credit flows to greater levels than today.

Finally, two points. One is on sovereign debt. Let me make this point quite clearly. There are two issues here. Some ongoing discussions have suggested that we should have different risk weights on sovereign debt. This is not the task for us or for now. This is a global task that will be discussed by the Basel Committee at the proper time. A totally different issue is how we will treat sovereign debt in our stress test. That has nothing to do with different risk weights. Sovereign debt is going to be stressed like all other categories in the bank’s balance sheets.

On the Troika, I will simply follow what Vice-President Rehn has said and we will have a discussion in the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs. On the SRM and the upcoming accord agreement, I only have one plea: let us make sure that this new mechanism actually works. The situations in which this mechanism will be used are going to be emergency situations. If the design is cumbersome, it will not work.

Finally, on the four Presidents’ report. I hope the next European Council which will take place this week will be an adequate follow-up to that report and the enthusiasm that accompanied it at the time.

  El Presidente. − Gracias, profesor Draghi. Déjeme, en todo caso, reconocer y apreciar su disponibilidad para comparecer ante el Parlamento Europeo, toda vez que es nuestro Parlamento quien cumple la función de control y quien tiene la posibilidad de ejercerla, una función que no corresponde a los Parlamentos nacionales, aunque es evidente que la actuación del Banco afecta directamente a la realidad de casi todos, de todos nuestros países. Por lo tanto, me parece importantísimo el hecho de que, desde el Parlamento Europeo, se pueda ejercer esta labor, cuando menos, de control parlamentario a lo que está realizando el Banco, y tenga usted presente que estimamos extraordinariamente su disponibilidad para comparecer ante nosotros y contestar de la manera absolutamente abierta a la que usted nos tiene acostumbrados.

Muchas gracias, profesor.

  Gianni Pittella, relatore. − Signor Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, ringrazio e apprezzo gli interventi e ciò che ha fatto in questi anni il Presidente Draghi, ringrazio il Commissario Rehn, ringrazio tutti i colleghi intervenuti, in particolare i colleghi relatori ombra per l'ottima collaborazione.

Riprendo e rilancio l'affermazione della collega Ferreira: una banca nata in un contesto totalmente diverso dall'attuale deve saper riconfigurare la sua missione alla luce della drammatica situazione in cui vive l'economia europea, attivando quelle misure non standard capaci di dare ossigeno all'economia reale, alle famiglie e alle imprese.

Condivido le preoccupazioni espresse dai colleghi circa il carattere intergovernativo del Fondo di risoluzione; bene i passaggi del Presidente Draghi sulla trasparenza, sulla parità di genere con l'obiettivo del 2019; anch'io credo che la troika sia stata un problema più che un rimedio e che abbia posto a rischio la credibilità della stessa BCE; bene l'itinerario proposto dal Presidente Draghi che è anche il nostro: unione bancaria, unione economica, unione fiscale e unione politica; attenzione al tempo. Non abbiamo molto tempo, abbiamo pochissimo tempo ed io non vorrei che "dum Europae consulitur, Saguntum expugnatur".

  El Presidente. − Se cierra el debate.

La votación tendrá lugar hoy, jueves 12 de diciembre de 2013.

Declaraciones por escrito (artículo 149 del Reglamento)

  Zuzana Brzobohatá (S&D), písemně. – Nacházíme se stále v hospodářské krizi, což potvrdily i prognózy útvarů Komise z jara 2013, podle kterých se HDP v eurozóně snížil v roce 2012 o 0,6 % poté, co v roce 2011 zaznamenal 1,4% nárůst, a v roce 2013 poklesne o 0,4 %. Tyto čísla znamenají, že se stále nedaří řešit velkou nezaměstnanost a zejména nezaměstnanost mladých lidí v EU. Podle stejné prognózy stoupla v eurozóně nezaměstnanost z 10,2 % na konci roku 2011 na 11,4 % na konci roku 2012 a v roce 2013 se může ještě zvýšit na 12,2 %. Přičemž mezi zeměmi eurozóny byly zaznamenány velké rozdíly, neboť se u nich nezaměstnanost pohybuje mezi 4,3 % a 25 % a nezaměstnanost mladých lidí, která se v tomto období výrazně zvýšila, dosáhla dokonce ještě vyšších hodnot. V tomto smyslu vítám opatření, která přijala ECB v roce 2012 a jež přispěla ke stabilizaci bankovního sektoru a pomohla přerušit spojení mezi bankami a státním dluhem. Současně je však evropský bankovní systém stále křehký a je třeba reformovat jeho strukturu a konsolidovat jej prostřednictvím vytvoření skutečné bankovní unie. Myslím si, že evropská ekonomika by měla být více orientována na růst a nejen na úsporná opatření, která tento ekonomický růst ohrožují.

  Franz Obermayr (NI), schriftlich. – In ihrer Satzung bekennt sich die EZB zur sozialen Marktwirtschaft. In einer Marktwirtschaft bestimmt der Markt – durch Angebot und Nachfrage – die Preise und somit die Verteilung der Güter. Auch Geld hat einen Preis: den Zins. Da nun aber der EZB die Zinssätze, welche die Krisenländer am Markt bezahlen müssen, nicht gefallen, schreitet sie ein. Mit allen Methoden, ob erlaubt oder nicht, versucht sie die Zinsen der Krisenländer künstlich zu drücken und den Kapitalmarkt zu unterbieten. Eine zentrale Behörde setzt also auf Gedeih und Verderb die Preise für Geld durch, welche sie für angemessen hält. Herr Draghi, Sie haben aus der EZB eine planwirtschaftliche Institution gemacht, welche das Geld nach Belieben durch Europa schickt. Wen wundert es da noch, dass der Transmissionsmechanismus in den Krisenländern nicht mehr funktioniert? Wen wundert es da noch, dass der private Kapitalmarkt damit verschreckt wurde? Kein Kapitalmarkt legt sich mit einer Gelddruckmaschine an. Keiner weiß, was der nächste Trick der EZB sein wird. Nichts ist fix, nichts ist sicher! Nur eines ist sicher: Ihre Arbeitsplätze bei der EZB sind bis auf weiteres gesichert worden.