Verbatim report of proceedings

Wednesday, 25 February 2015 - Brussels

15. European Central Bank annual report for 2013 (debate)

  President. - The next item is the report by Pablo Zalba Bidegain, on behalf of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, on the European Central Bank Annual Report for 2013 (2014/2157(INI)) (A8-0011/2015).

  Pablo Zalba Bidegain, ponente. - Señora Presidenta, señor Draghi, como siempre es un placer tenerle en esta casa. Señorías, me gustaría empezar dando las gracias a los ponentes, con los cuales ha sido un honor trabajar, y entre todos hemos hecho un esfuerzo por conseguir un informe lo más ecuánime posible.

Analizamos el año 2013, que fue un año complicado para la zona del euro: el producto interior bruto cayó un 0,4 % y el desempleo tocó techo, llegando al 12 % a finales de año. En cambio, en el año 2014 ha comenzado la recuperación económica. El producto interior bruto de la zona del euro ha subido un 0,9 %, y las previsiones para el año 2015 son todavía más halagüeñas.

En lo que respecta a la inflación, en el año 2013 la tasa media de inflación fue del 1,3 %. En cambio, en 2014 acabamos el año con tasas negativas de inflación, esto es, no cumpliendo el objetivo que tenemos marcado de tener una inflación por debajo pero cercana al 2 %.

En cuanto al crédito al sector privado, continúa en terreno negativo, cerrando a una tasa negativa del -2,4 %. Tenemos que ser conscientes de que sin crédito no habrá consolidación de la recuperación económica. Creo que el Banco Central Europeo y su Presidente están haciendo un gran trabajo en conseguir la estabilidad en la zona del euro y están haciendo también un gran trabajo tanto el BCE como su Presidente en conseguir que los actores implicados hagan también su trabajo.

Pero es cierto también que las medidas aplicadas por el Banco Central Europeo podrían haber sido más eficaces y más eficientes en lo referido a restablecer el crédito a la economía real. Somos conscientes de que los mercados financieros en la zona del euro están fragmentados y no hay una correcta transmisión de la política monetaria. Pero también tenemos que ser conscientes de que el Banco Central Europeo ha tenido que enfrentarse a un entorno muy difícil fruto de una crisis financiera, política y económica sin precedentes, y a una unión económica incompleta.

Y no es tarea del Banco Central Europeo completar la unión económica, sino es, precisamente, darnos tiempo al resto de actores implicados en consolidar la unión económica y, en definitiva también, la unión política.

Creo que es de justicia destacar la rápida reacción del Banco Central Europeo. Esa rápida reacción ha conseguido reducir los niveles de estrés en los mercados financieros de la zona del euro, y no solo eso, sino que también ha contribuido a restablecer la confianza en la moneda única. Prueba de ello son los tipos de interés y primas de riesgo a los que se financian los Estados miembros, especialmente aquellos que han sido más ambiciosos en cuanto a las reformas estructurales.

Señorías, es momento de una acción conjunta. Una política monetaria expansiva tiene que ir acompañada de reformas tanto a nivel nacional como a nivel europeo. Buen ejemplo de ello es mi país, España, uno de los países más ambiciosos en cuanto a reformas se refiere y uno de los países que estará, con total seguridad, a la cabeza del crecimiento económico durante este año.

Las medidas anunciadas por el Banco Central Europeo el pasado 22 de enero no tienen que ser un freno, no tienen que ser una excusa, para dejar de seguir haciendo reformas y seguir avanzando en la tan ansiada y necesaria Unión Económica y Monetaria, sino todo lo contrario: las medidas anunciadas por el Banco Central Europeo tienen que ser precisamente el incentivo que necesitamos para seguir haciendo ese gran trabajo que se tiene que hacer tanto a nivel nacional como a nivel europeo.

Porque, Señorías, no llevemos a engaño a los ciudadanos: una política monetaria expansiva por sí sola no puede estimular la demanda agregada. El Banco Central Europeo nos puede dar tiempo, pero somos el resto de actores implicados, tanto a nivel nacional como a nivel europeo, los que tenemos que seguir trabajando.

  Mario Draghi, President of ECB. - Madam President, I am very pleased to participate in this plenary debate. To lay the ground for our discussion, I would like to discuss three topics: the ECB’s monetary policy, focusing on the rationale for our latest monetary policy measures; the ECB’s commitment to accountability and transparency; and the progress towards building a deeper economic and monetary union. I will thereby address most of the issues which the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) highlighted in its first draft resolution.

First, the ECB’s monetary policy. For several quarters now, inflation in the euro area has been on a continuous downward trend. At the same time, in January 2015, market participants were expecting inflation to return to levels closer to our policy aim only over a horizon which stretched well beyond any meaningful definition of medium term. In an environment of weak economic recovery and subdued money and credit developments, risks were increasing that falling inflation expectations would feed back into weakening actual inflation. Such a self-reinforcing process could have posed severe downside risks to our price stability objective.

Against this background, we judged that the degree of monetary accommodation that had been introduced in 2014 was insufficient. A more forceful monetary policy response became necessary. With key interest rates at their lower bound, the Governing Council of the ECB considered outright purchases of public securities to be the only remaining instrument which could be activated on a sufficient scale to broaden and strengthen the measures already in place. Thus, we decided in January to launch an expanded asset purchase programme.

Under the programme, the euro system will continue its purchases of simple and transparent asset-backed securities and of covered bonds. In addition, we will start purchasing on the secondary market investment-grade securities issued by euro area governments, public agencies and European institutions. The purchases will start in March. The combined purchases of public and private securities will amount to EUR 60 billion per month. The programme is intended to last until the end of September 2016. In any case, it will last until the Governing Council sees a sustained adjustment in the path of inflation which is consistent with its aim of achieving inflation rates below, but close to, 2% over the medium term.

As in the case of existing purchases of private sector securities, the purchases of public securities have a high transmission potential to the real economy. They will further support a broad-based easing of financial conditions in the euro area, including those relevant for the borrowing conditions of euro area firms and households. In fact, we have already seen some positive effects of our measures. Financial conditions in money and bond markets throughout the euro area have eased further. Accordingly, lending rates to households and firms have come down considerably. Loan dynamics have continued to recover, with the growth in credit to the private sector turning positive in December for the first time since mid-2012. Also, evidence from the recent January 2015 Bank Lending Survey provides positive signals, showing a further improvement in credit standards for all loan categories in the fourth quarter of 2014. Moreover, most recently, we have also seen a measurable improvement in indicators of business and consumer confidence.

Overall, our measures will support economic activity, underpin the firm anchoring of medium- to long-term inflation expectations, and contribute to a sustained return of inflation towards a level below, but close to, 2% over the medium term.

Let me now briefly comment on the ECB’s commitment to accountability and transparency. Today’s session is also an opportunity to take a wider perspective on ECB policies. In that context, let me touch upon a topic that is of high relevance to you: the ECB’s accountability and transparency. Accountability of the central bank is the essential counterpart to its independence. To this end, the ECB has an elaborate framework to discharge accountability to European citizens and your House, and today’s debate is a key element of this framework. Taking up new tasks in the supervisory field required adding further elements to this framework, and I believe the first months of operation of the SSM have proved our commitment to accountability in this domain as well.

But accountability would not be meaningful without an appropriate degree of transparency. From the start – due also to its unique institutional set-up – the ECB has striven to be transparent. For instance, we were the first major central bank to hold a regular press conference immediately after our policy meetings. The ECB also regularly publishes a variety of data on the execution of its monetary policy operations and the liquidity conditions of the Eurosystem.

But more recently, we have decided to go one step further and to publish regular accounts of Governing Council monetary policy discussions, starting with the meeting of 21-22 January 2015, the account of which was published last Thursday. Through these accounts, we are enriching the communication of the rationale behind our monetary policy decisions and seek to give a sense of the discussion that has taken place among Governing Council members and the main arguments that were exchanged. We believe that this will enable members of the public and markets to improve their understanding of our assessment of the economy and our policy responses in the light of evolving conditions: in other words, our so-called ‘reaction function’. In the current circumstances, it will also underpin our forward guidance on interest rates. It will thereby further enhance the effectiveness of our monetary policy.

Finally, one comment on the future of European Monetary Union governance. The past few years have been challenging for the conduct of our monetary policy in view of the environment of financial fragmentation, which brings me to the topic of the foundation of our economic and monetary union. At the beginning of the European Monetary Union stood a clear commitment by Member States to converge economically and institutionally. Progress has been significant when it comes to common institutions, at least as far as monetary policy is concerned. We now have not only one currency and one central bank, but also one supervisor, one resolution authority, one crisis-management mechanism and, hopefully, one capital markets union. These institutions are built on the principle of shared sovereignty and of strong enforcement of common rules. Together, these institutions clearly set the euro area apart from the arrangements that were in place prior to the start of the European Monetary Union.

But we have not yet reached the stage of a genuine European Monetary Union. Economic convergence has not been as sustainable as was hoped for at the outset. This still puts at risk the long-term success of monetary union when faced with an important shock.

In my view, there are two complementary responses to address this situation. First, the economies of the euro area Member States need to become more resilient. This requires sound public finances, but in particular at the current juncture, decisive reforms of their economic structures. Fully applying the strengthened economic governance framework will support this objective. Second, in the medium to longer term, we need to move from a system of rules and guidelines for national economic policy-making to a system of further sovereignty-sharing within common institutions so as to strengthen our economic policy governance. A common rule is only as strong as the common institution that can enforce it. The discussions on the new Four Presidents’ Report will certainly provide a good opportunity to think further on these matters, and I am looking forward to your views in the upcoming Berès report on the economic governance framework.

  Valdis Dombrovskis, Vice-President of the Commission. - Madam President, let me first of all thank the rapporteur, Mr Zalba Bidegain, and the Committee on Economic and Monetary and Affairs (ECON) and the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL) for their valuable work on this report.

The ex-post assessment of the ECB’s activities by Parliament is an important part of the democratic accountability of the ECB. This is a necessary complement to the ECB’s independence. The Commission shares Parliament’s view that the ECB’s independence in the conduct of its monetary policy, as enshrined in the Treaties, is crucial to the objective of safeguarding price stability.

President Draghi has explained how the ECB has addressed some of the concerns expressed by Parliament during 2013-2015. This has been done in particular through interest rate cuts, the introduction of an expanded assets purchase programme – also called quantitative easing – and the conduct of the series of targeted long-term refinancing operations, or LTROs. With these recent policy measures the ECB has demonstrated a clear commitment to address the risk of too prolonged a period of very low inflation, measures aimed at improving bank lending to the euro area non-financial private sector and fulfilling the ECB price stability mandate. As the measures work through the real economy, they will gradually improve financing conditions, reduce financial fermentation, support growth and jobs and bring inflation closer to the ECB target of below, but close to, 2% in the medium term.

The Commission shares Parliament’s views that we need to use the opportunities that monetary policy and low energy prices are creating to move forward with adequate fiscal and structural reforms and policies. We must act both on the demand and supply side of our economies. On fiscal adjustments, according to the latest Commission forecast, the fiscal stance in the EU is now expected to remain neutral in the coming years, which means that fiscal policy will not wait on growth going forward. But Member States still need to secure long-term control over deficit and debt levels. The pace of fiscal adjustment going forward should be differentiated according to the fiscal challenge faced by different Member States. Those with sustainability challenges should continue adjustment and Member States with fiscal space should use it to support growth.

We agree with Parliament’s view that there is leeway to achieve a more growth-friendly composition of the budgets. The tax burden on labour remains high in many countries. Public investment was the main item targeted for cuts, in spite of its growth-enhancing potential. So there is scope to correct those policies. The Commission has made stimulating investment one of its policy priorities.

The investment plan for Europe will help to reverse the recent downward trends in investment. It will support strategic project and risk finance, especially for SMEs. This will provide an additional boost to job creation and the recovery of the euro area economy. At Member State level, ambitious implementation of structural reforms and product services and labour markets can contribute to increasing productivity, regaining competitiveness and improving the business environment, thereby also fostering investment. This should help to rebalance our growth model. It should lessen the negative impact of the necessary financial deleveraging and should prevent the accumulation of harmful macroeconomic imbalances.

Let me conclude by underlining that I see much common ground between your views and those of the Commission. It is reassuring to know that we can count on your support in building the foundations for sustainable growth and job creation in Europe.

Thank you for your attention, and I look forward to a constructive and fruitful debate here tonight.

  David Casa, Rapporteur għal opinjoni tal-Kumitat għall-Impjiegi u l-Affarijiet Soċjali. - Sinjura President, ippermettili nibda dan id-diskors tiegħi billi nikkongratula lir-Rapporteur għall-inklużjoni ta' ċertu issues pertinenti għall-oqsma tal-impjiegi u l-affarijiet soċjali. Illum aktar minn qabel, fl-isfond ta' dak li għaddejja minnu l-Unjoni Ewropea, l-issues relatati mat-tkabbir ekonomiku u l-impjiegi għandhom imorru id f'id u hu proprju dak li qed jipprova jagħmel dan ir-rapport.

Kollegi, minkejja l-isforzi tajbin kollha li qed jagħmel il-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew biex jinċentiva t-tkabbir ekonomiku fl-Unjoni Ewropea; dan jibqa' joffri sfidi kbar li lkoll kemm aħna għandna nkomplu nippersistu biex negħlbuhom. Dan ir-rapport annwali juri biċ-ċar li l-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew huwa konxju mill-ħtiġijiet tas-settur bankarju, iżda dan mhuwiex biżżejjed u hemm ħafna iktar xi jrid isir. Azzjoni waħda li tista' tikkontribwixxi biex tindirizza dawn l-isfidi hija l Unjoni tas-Swieq Kapitali li bħalissa qed tiġi diskussa. Sabiex tappoġġa aktar il-kreattività u l-innovazzjoni imprenditorjali, l-Ewropa trid timxi lil hinn minn finanzjar bankarju tradizzjonali bħal l-iffinanzjar minn private equity.

Il-maġġur parti tan-negozju fl-Ewropa jsir minn negozji żgħar u medji u l-investiment fl-SMEs iservi biex ikabbar l-ekonomija u jnaqqas il-qagħad. In-numri jitkellmu waħedhom, b'aktar minn 20 miljun SME u bil-qagħad ilaħħaq mal-25 miljun, li kieku kull SME tingħata l-opportunità, b'għajnuna Ewropea, biex timpjega tal-anqas impjegat wieħed magħha, il-benefiċċji jkunu straordinarji.

Biex nikkonkludi, President, l-Ewropa għandha bżonn ukoll l-istart ups. Riċentament qrajt White Paper pubblikata mill-YEPP, il-fergħa taż-żgħażagħ tal-partit tagħna, li turi kemm l Ewropa hija nieqsa f'dan ir-rigward. L-istorja reċenti wriet illi għadna lura f'dan is-settur u allura rridu nagħmlu ħilitna kollha biex ninċentivaw u niffaċilitaw dawn il-proċessi.

  Burkhard Balz, im Namen der PPE-Fraktion. – Frau Präsidentin! Herr Draghi, als EVP-Fraktion begrüßen wir Ihre Anwesenheit heute hier im Europäischen Parlament außerordentlich. Die Situation in Griechenland beschäftigt uns. Wir müssen dabei genauso an die anderen Mitgliedstaaten denken, die in europäischer Solidarität gehandelt und selbst große Reformanstrengungen unternommen haben.

Aber heute sprechen wir über den Jahresbericht der EZB für das Jahr 2013. Die wesentliche Aussage, die wir dort treffen, ist aktuell genauso gültig: Monetäre Maßnahmen sind am Ende kein Ersatz für Strukturreformen und Haushaltskonsolidierung. Unser EVP-Berichterstatter, Pablo Zalba Bidegain aus Spanien, hat zu Recht hervorgehoben, dass die Bewältigung der Schuldenkrise aus einem gelungenen Zusammenspiel verschiedener Maßnahmen besteht. Wir müssen achtgeben, dass weiterhin die richtigen Anreize gesetzt werden. Die Umsetzung von Reformen darf nicht ausgesetzt oder gar verzögert werden. Die Effekte der Geldpolitik sind nicht nur kurzfristig, sondern immer auch langfristig zu bewerten. Mögliche Deflationsrisiken sind sicherlich nicht die einzige Richtgröße. Eine dauerhafte Niedrigzinspolitik erschwert die langfristige Finanzierung auf den Finanzmärkten und entzieht der Altersvorsorge von europäischen Bürgerinnen und Bürgern nach und nach eine wichtige Grundlage.

Wir müssen uns sicherlich auch anschauen, wie die zusätzlich durch die EZB bereitgestellten Finanzierungsmittel tatsächlich genutzt werden. Wenn eine bessere Finanzierung für die Wirtschaft gedacht war, muss sie am Ende auch dort ankommen. Das gilt gerade für die kleineren und die mittelgroßen Unternehmen, die einen wesentlichen Pfeiler in der künftigen Investitionspolitik Europas bilden sollen. Der Transmissionsmechanismus muss ebenfalls besser funktionieren. Auch das stellt der Bericht von Pablo Zalba richtigerweise heraus.

Sehr geehrter Herr Präsident! Die Grenzen und die Zielsetzungen der EZB-Politik sind ein wesentliches Thema für das Europäische Parlament. Das gilt sicherlich auch für die künftigen Entscheidungen der EZB.

  Renato Soru, a nome del gruppo S&D. – Signor Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, Presidente Draghi, è con grande piacere che intervengo oggi in questa discussione, non solo perché ho avuto l'opportunità di partecipare alla stesura della relazione della Banca centrale europea per il 2013 come shadow rapporteur, ma soprattutto perché, insieme a tutti voi, sono stato testimone del ruolo fondamentale che la Banca centrale sta svolgendo nel sostegno del progetto europeo, direi non sempre con l'adeguato supporto da parte di altre istituzioni o di tutti gli Stati membri.

Ringrazio il relatore, l'on. Zalba Bidegain, che ci ha dato la possibilità di discutere in maniera aperta e di poter contribuire alla stesura di questa relazione in diverse parti in maniera condivisa. Il rapporto riguardava il 2013 ma, visto il ritardo, non abbiamo mancato di concentrarci su quanto accaduto anche nel 2014 e in questo inizio del 2015, in questa attività incessante quasi della Banca centrale, che ha cercato di contrastare la discesa del livello di inflazione fino allo stato di vera e propria recessione in alcuni paesi e il rallentamento dell'economia reale fino alla deflazione in alcuni casi, con delle politiche che hanno cercato in tutti i modi di aggiungere liquidità nel sistema e che spesso, come è stato ricordato, si sono scontrate anche con la vischiosità della situazione, che non sempre ha favorito il trasferimento positivo degli effetti delle politiche monetarie, le immissioni di liquidità attraverso le politiche sugli ABS e i LTRO fino a questo inizio del 2015 in cui la Banca centrale ha deciso questa politica importante, anche massiccia, di quantitative easing.

Non credo che questo distolga l'attenzione dei paesi membri dal continuare nel processo di riforme e di attenzione alle loro politiche di bilancio, ma certamente c'era estrema necessità se si voleva trasformare, cambiare in maniera definitiva questo progressivo deteriorarsi del livello di inflazione e del raggiungimento di posizioni di deflazione in alcuni paesi.

Credo che dobbiamo ringraziare il Presidente Draghi per quanto ha fatto finora. Ripenso al famoso discorso del "Whatever it takes" a Londra, che ha dato un segnale importante al mercato sull'irreversibilità della zona euro e penso anche che con Jackson Hole abbia contribuito, insieme anche alla Presidenza italiana, a un cambiamento nelle politiche europee che hanno smesso di guardare solamente al rigore, alla stabilità di bilancio, ma hanno introdotto il tema della flessibilità e della crescita in maniera netta, certo assieme alle riforme a cui continuiamo ad assistere.

C'è un tema però che è l'ultimo punto che il Presidente Draghi ha richiamato oggi.

(Il Presidente ritira la parola all'oratore)

  Νότης Μαριάς, εξ ονόματος της ομάδας ECR. – Κυρία Πρόεδρε, αφού ευχαριστήσω τον εισηγητή, κ. Zalba, θα ήθελα να επισημάνω ότι η σημερινή συζήτηση μάς δίνει την ευκαιρία να θέσουμε ορισμένα σοβαρά ζητήματα για τη λειτουργία της Ευρωπαϊκής Κεντρικής Τράπεζας.

Κύριε Draghi, πώς θα αντιμετωπίσετε τη σύγκρουση συμφερόντων που υπάρχει στο πλαίσιο της ΕΚΤ; Διότι η Ευρωπαϊκή Κεντρική Τράπεζα πλέον έχει μετατραπεί σε κράτος εν κράτει. Η ΕΚΤ είναι δήθεν ανεξάρτητος θεσμός άσκησης νομισματικής πολιτικής, ταυτόχρονα εποπτεύει τις 130 μεγαλύτερες συστημικές τράπεζες της Ευρώπης. Είναι όμως και δανειστής των κρατών μελών της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης, έχοντας αγοράσει, και μάλιστα με σκόντο, στη δευτερογενή αγορά κρατικά ομόλογα αξίας 217 δισ. ευρώ, από όπου και αποκόμισε το 80% των κερδών της για το 2013. Η ΕΚΤ είναι επίσης και μέλος της Τρόικας, που έχει φτωχοποιήσει τις χώρες του μνημονίου.

Ήδη από τον Μάρτιο του 2013, το Ευρωπαϊκό Κοινοβούλιο με ψήφισμά του έχει ζητήσει την άρση αυτής της σύγκρουσης συμφερόντων στο πλαίσιο της ΕΚΤ. Το ίδιο σάς ζήτησε στις 14 Ιανουαρίου ο Γενικός Εισαγγελέας του Δικαστηρίου της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης. Όλα αυτά έχουν οδηγήσει σε μια μετάλλαξη του θεσμού της Ευρωπαϊκής Κεντρικής Τράπεζας. Αυτό που φαίνεται να ενδιαφέρει την ΕΚΤ είναι να διασφαλίσει τα κέρδη ως δανειστής των κρατών μελών της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης. Έτσι η ΕΚΤ ασκεί εκβιαστική πολιτική απέναντι στους ευρωπαϊκούς λαούς και τις δημοκρατικές τους κυβερνήσεις, στο όνομα, δήθεν, της διάσωσης του ευρώ. Αυτό έγινε απέναντι στην Ιρλανδία, έγινε απέναντι στην Κύπρο και πριν λίγες μέρες έγινε και απέναντι στην Ελλάδα με την παράνομη απόφαση της ΕΚΤ να μην δέχεται ομόλογα του ελληνικού δημοσίου στις πράξεις του ευρωσυστήματος από τις 16 Φεβρουαρίου, ενώ γνωρίζατε πολύ καλά, κύριε Draghi, ότι η Ελλάδα μέχρι τις 28 Ιανουαρίου είναι σε πρόγραμμα.

Κύριε Draghi, καταλάβετέ το: δεν είστε ο ανθύπατος της Ευρώπης. Οφείλετε σεβασμό στους ευρωπαϊκούς λαούς. Πάψτε λοιπόν να κερδοσκοπείτε σε βάρος του ελληνικού λαού και επιστρέψτε άμεσα το 1,9 δισεκατομμύρια ευρώ από τα κέρδη που αποκόμισε η ΕΚΤ από τα ελληνικά ομόλογα το 2014.

(Χειροκροτήματα)

  Ramon Tremosa i Balcells, on behalf of the ALDE Group. – Madam President, if the ECB is to expand its balance sheet, it is better if the quantitative easing (QE) enhances the potential of the real economy in Europe. In this respect, Mr Draghi, I am particularly pleased by the ECB commitment to buy European Investment Bank (EIB) bonds in the coming programme of bond purchases. Three weeks ago the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs voted by a very large majority to call on the ECB to buy EIB bonds, especially those related to investment in infrastructures, such as energy and transport interconnections Europe-wide. EIB bonds based on those projects should be prioritised in those buyings, as clear projects with proven European added value and a positive cost-benefit analysis. For instance, it is strategic for Europe to connect by freight transport the Mediterranean ports with the European markets.

This real-economy-oriented bonds purchase is very important because the QE has to operate on different national markets, each with varying degrees of risk. Thus, it is possible that the QE mainly generates a hike in the stock market without effects on the real economy. There is also the risk that buying corporate bonds will only serve for big enterprises to arrange buybacks without an increase in investment. In contrast, I think that buying securitised loans to SMEs is an important step forward. I hope that its relative importance inside your programme will evolve positively as the market grows.

On the other hand, some voices in the financial markets are claiming that they do not want to sell their government bonds to the ECB. It is due to possible losses in the transaction, as most bonds are yielding much less nowadays than the moment when they were bought and a relevant part of bonds today are in a negative territory.

Mr Draghi, one final question. In case government bonds targets are not accomplished due to shortages in the markets, is the ECB ready to buy more bonds from the EIB and ABS?

  Miguel Viegas, em nome do Grupo GUE/NGL. – O BCE foi criado com um mandato específico, numa lógica baseada numa suposta neutralidade técnica acima de qualquer escrutínio político.

Sucede, entretanto, que, confrontado com a realidade objetiva, ou seja, com o prolongamento da recessão e a ineficácia das suas políticas, o BCE foi intervindo, extravasando claramente o seu mandato. Depois de baixar as taxas para níveis mínimos, e perante a falta de resultados palpáveis, o BCE passou de fornecedor de liquidez do sistema para financiador de longo prazo, com maturidades crescentes de três e quatro anos.

De forma direta ou indireta, passou a dirigir as políticas de vários Estados soberanos. Começou a comprar títulos ABS, ou seja, produtos baseados em dívida privada titularizada que estiveram na base da atual crise financeira. Finalmente, o BCE assume, este ano, a supervisão bancária, concentrando assim um conjunto de poderes incomensuráveis, sem que haja as respetivas contrapartidas no capítulo da legitimidade democrática.

Como é evidente, estamos nas antípodas deste modelo que, na prática, coloca ao serviço da finança e da banca e submete os Estados soberanos à ditadura dos mercados.

Tenho algumas questões. Recentemente, a agência de classificação Standard and Poor's foi condenada a pagar uma multa de vários milhares de milhões de euros por ter enganado os investidores sobre a qualidade dos créditos imobiliários. Os ratings desta agência são parte integrante do quadro de avaliação de créditos do eurossistema, pergunto, que avaliação é feita sobre essa situação? Segundo, de acordo com o parecer emitido pelo advogado-geral do Tribunal de Justiça da União Europeia, a compra de dívida soberana no mercado secundário por parte do BCE é incompatível com a sua presença nas equipas que negoceiam os programas de ajustamento, que são impostos aos países beneficiários, ou seja, a troica, pergunto, também, que avaliação faz sobre este parecer?

  Philippe Lamberts, on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group. – Madam President, I welcome Mr Draghi to this House. Mr Draghi, as a committed European I have always had somewhat ambiguous feelings towards the ECB under your leadership and you know that. On the positive side I must say that you have always shown decisiveness, even in uncharted territory, when it came to buying time for policy-makers to take up their own responsibilities and for that I believe that we Europeans should be thankful for your action, and I mean it.

On the other hand, and you know this, I find that frequently you have overstepped your role by actually stepping into political territory, especially when you were advocating and sometimes intimidating governments into taking structural reforms which were politically oriented. Of course I respect political orientations but I have always said that it was not for central bankers to decide on that. But in the latest case, when the Greek Finance Minister declared his country bankrupt, I recognised that you, as the ECB, had little choice but to take the decision that you took: saying, well, if the finance minister says that his country is bankrupt, if I want to keep the credibility of the ECB, which is of course its golden value, we have no alternative but to say we cannot accept this as collateral. So there I recognise that you had no alternative.

I just want to say something about completing the Genuine Monetary Union. You are an independent person and so I would expect you to say the obvious: there has been no monetary union, ever in human history, that has worked without being a true budgetary union, a true fiscal union on the income side of the equation as well as on the expenditure side of the equation. You used to say that. And there is no fiscal union without a democratic union, because there should be no taxation without representation. We do indeed need a federal body that is able to make the necessary transfers to compensate for the macroeconomic imbalances that exist in any monetary union. So I expect you to be courageous enough to say the obvious because at least you are not politically accountable so you are free to say what you really think.

  Marco Zanni, a nome del gruppo EFDD. – Signor Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, Presidente Draghi, ieri Lei ha espresso alcune perplessità sugli impegni presi dalla Grecia. Vorrei chiederle se non le basta aver vinto questa battaglia con Tsipras, ma se vuole vincere direttamente la guerra con la Grecia perché è di questo che stiamo parlando.

Non si tratta ovviamente di una guerra combattuta da eserciti, ma di un conflitto economico e finanziario in cui a rimetterci è il popolo greco e questo noi non possiamo accettarlo. I cittadini greci hanno voluto dare un segnale forte alle ultime elezioni, i partiti antisistema sono ora la maggioranza ed è giusto che sia così perché chi ha governato il paese ellenico negli ultimi vent'anni è sicuramente il primo colpevole della situazione in cui ci troviamo oggi, colpevole ad esempio di aver truccato i conti per entrare nella moneta unica con la complicità di Bruxelles, ovviamente, da qui sono iniziati molti dei problemi che non siamo ancora riusciti a risolvere.

Da più parti si levano voci affinché alla Grecia sia data la possibilità di uscire dall'euro e non si tratta di pericolosi sovversivi. L'ultima autorevole presa di posizione è quella di un'europeista convinto, l'ex presidente francese Giscard d'Estaing. Presidente Draghi, avete riflettuto seriamente su quello che state facendo? Avete privato della libertà di scelta il popolo ellenico e reso le sue decisioni irrilevanti. Mi appello alla poca onestà intellettuale che ancora vi è rimasta e vi invito ad ammetterlo. Lo ha fatto ieri, tradendo le reali intenzioni di questa Europa il Presidente dell'Eurogruppo quando ha affermato che le elezioni di un paese non possono modificare la linea già decisa.

Che voi abbiate ucciso la democrazia proprio nel paese che l'ha creata è dimostrato, del resto, anche dalla sua scelta, Presidente Draghi, di rifiutare non appena insediato, il nuovo governo Tsipras, i bond greci come collaterali, vincolando l'accesso della liquidità all'ELA. Gli interessi delle banche e della finanza sono per voi più importanti delle scelte e della volontà di un popolo. Quale significato date alla stabilità finanziaria se la gente non ha più un lavoro e non riesce più ad arrivare alla fine del mese?

Le operazioni della BCE finora sono state un fallimento, con le centinaia di miliardi di LTRO che non sono serviti a risollevare l'economia, ma solo a proteggere gli interessi delle banche e lo stesso avverrà con i TLTRO e il quantitative easing. Il sistema bancario, così come è strutturato è sicuramente alla base della crisi attuale. L'unica soluzione per uscirne è tornare ad una reale e netta separazione bancaria, non certo alla proposta annacquata rilanciata recentemente dalla Commissione, che non è affatto risolutiva.

Presidente Draghi, Lei è privo di legittimazione popolare ma governa di fatto l'Europa e ne detta tranquillamente le leggi e purtroppo non è una metafora. Spero se ne renda conto e prenda atto che questo gravissimo vulnus democratico ha anche effetti concreti e spesso drammatici sulla vita dei cittadini, costretti a subire assurde imposizioni economiche e drastiche misure sociali. Presidente Draghi, l'Europa non appartiene né a lei, né alla BCE. Vi consiglio di partire da questo punto il giorno che vorrete mettere fine a questo scempio.

  Mara Bizzotto (NI). - Signor Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, in Europa ci sono 25 milioni di disoccupati.

Ci sono 5 milioni di giovani che non hanno un lavoro, famiglie che non riescono ad arrivare a fine mese, imprese in crisi. In Italia ci sono 4 milioni di poveri. Eppure l'Italia ha trovato il modo di finanziare un'altra "euro fregatura" come il fondo salva Stati e ha trovato il modo di prestare 63 miliardi di euro per la crisi greca. È questa la desolante fotografia dell'Europa e anche Lei Presidente Draghi ha contributo o perlomeno non è riuscito ad evitare questo fallimento.

Le chiedo quindi: perché un intervento in campo monetario e finanziario, fatto dalla BCE, dalla Commissione europea e per quanto riguarda l'Italia, dal governo italiano, porta a peggiorare la situazione economica dei nostri cittadini? Chi sbaglia? Di chi è la colpa? Perché il credito concesso dalla BCE alle banche europee non è andato a beneficio delle imprese e dei cittadini? Perché la diminuzione dei tassi introdotti dalla BCE non ha portato nessun beneficio in termini di occupazione e di ripresa economica?

La colpa? La colpa è dell'euro e dei trattati europei che stanno massacrando la nostra economia. Ne prenda atto, sarebbe già un passo in avanti Presidente Draghi.

  President. - I am now giving the floor to Mr Draghi, who I understand needs to leave us before the debate is over.

  Mario Draghi, President of ECB. - Madam President, honourable Members, it is not going to be easy to respond to all these – more than questions, statements really. So I will only say a few words about the interaction between our monetary policy and what is called economic policy: namely structural reforms.

We have two issues here: one of substance, that concerns the interaction between supply and demand, and one of legitimacy. As far as the substance is concerned, we have to see that the present economic situation of low output, big economic slack in the euro area and great cross-country differences, with a decline in potential output as well, is mostly due to declining investment and increased structural employment.

But first and foremost, the crisis that started in 2010-2011 was a combined effect of several things that went wrong in the financial markets, but also a total loss of confidence. When we stabilise financial markets, confidence in the financial markets returns first, but confidence in real investment takes much longer, and now we see the first signs. So, all in all, the outlook is more positive than it was a few months ago. It is pretty natural: to make a financial investment, confidence can be, in a sense, easier to get back than making a real investment that is going to last for many years.

But is monetary policy by itself going to create growth, employment? You seem to give a lot of responsibilities to the ECB; it has far fewer, in fact, than what you seem to be willing to give it. Can monetary policy produce growth by itself? The answer is no. We know that monetary policy can still determine the basic, necessary conditions for growth, but then you have to have an environment that is growth friendly. You have to make the necessary structural reforms.

I often give an example: we have taken unprecedented monetary policy expansion measures which certainly made it easier for the banks to give credit. But if someone, for example a youth, was to open a shop and before opening the shop had to wait nine, ten months for the permit, and having got the permit, had to pay immediately a heavy tax on it, what incentive do you think this person has in borrowing money from the banks? That is what I mean by structural reforms; that is what I advocate, and I do not think I am infringing on other fields of legitimacy when I advocate the need for structural policies, because these policies will make our monetary policy infinitely more effective than it is. So that is why, as a central banker, I feel perfectly right in urging governments to undertake these monetary policies. They are essential and a good complement for our pursuit of the primary objective of price stability.

Certainly, many of you said that we need to reconsider the transmission channels. One lesson from the crisis is certainly that the banking channel upon which this continent has relied for all its history is not enough and has proved to be much more fragile than capital-market-based economies. To some extent this is already happening, and capital markets in fact have expanded; bond issuance on capital markets has expanded greatly in the last two years.

But capital markets are not yet shaped for SMEs. Most of the credit to SMEs still comes from the banks. That is why the ECB, through the creation of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) – and, frankly, even before, by national supervisors – has pursued the objective of strengthening, making the financial intermediaries, the banks, more and more resilient so as to make them able to give credit. But we certainly should work more and make sure that this capital market union that we talk a lot about also has as one of its potential beneficiaries the SMEs: those entities that are not large enough to issue bonds on the capital markets.

Some of you touched on the conflict of interests, and there are different potential conflicts of interest one can touch upon. The first is that we do monetary policy, and we also do supervision. The European Parliament has been heavily involved by many of you in making sure that this proper separation would be designed exactly to avoid these conflicts of interest, and frankly I must say that, since the SSM became operative a few months ago, I do not see much of it now. But that, I should say, is really thanks to most of you, or to those of you who have worked on this.

Someone said that we are subject to the banks and we do the will of the banks. The only answer there is: just ask them; ask them what they feel.

Then there is another conflict of interest: the presence of the ECB in the Troika and how would this square with outright monetary transactions (OMT) and quantitative easing (QE). With the OMT, the opinion that the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has issued says that we should look. It did not say that there is a conflict of interest; it says that we should look further, and we are doing so. For OMT countries we are doing so precisely to see whether our role in the Troika could be in conflict with our role as provider of OMT. So at this stage I can simply say: rest assured, it is not something that we ignore; we are seriously thinking about this.

This conflict of interests does not arrive at all with QE. QE is a broad-based monetary policy expansion that has nothing to do with programme countries or not. It so happens that in certain countries which do not have a programme or do have a programme there are certain restrictions on the amount of bonds that we can purchase. But that is nothing to do with having a programme or not having a programme.

Let me respond to two what I might call popular mistakes. The SMP profits: you still believe that the SMP profits are owned by the ECB and are kept there? That is not so. The SMP profits, like any other profit, have been distributed to all the central banks – members of the ECB – and the central bank members of the ECB have transferred their profits to their national budgets. And the national budgets have transferred their profits to Greece. So they are there, available for financing.

(Interjection from Mr Marias)

No, no, no: agreed to transfer the equivalent of income made by the euro system on the SMP portfolio to Greece as grants out of their own budgets as long as Greece complies with the programme.

(Objections from Mr Marias)

  President. - Mr Marias, excuse me, please.

(Mr Marias continued to express his objections to what Mr Draghi had said)

Mr Marias, I would ask you to show respect for the chair. I gave you a little extra time. You are disrespectful to Mr Draghi. However much you disagree with him, let him finish the point. There are many more speakers to come.

  Mario Draghi, President of ECB. - Madam President, as I said, this is a fairly popular mistake, but it is not true. The ECB transferred these profits to the member banks. The member banks transferred these profits to the national budgets, and these profits are now available as grants out of their own budgets as long as Greece complies with the programme. Therefore this operation reflects a commitment by Member States, not by the ECB. There is no euro system involvement in this operation.

Someone touched on the waiver. Let me make it clear that the issue of the waiver is an issue of rules. The ECB accepts from the banks of all countries bonds, government bonds, as collateral only if these bonds are rated above a certain threshold. In the case of Greece, these bonds were below this threshold, and years ago, when Greece accepted the programme and was complying with the programme, we said that maybe we can waive this threshold and accept these bonds as collateral anyway. The thinking behind this was that maybe with the programme, the economic situation will improve to the point where these bonds become better rated, so we can accept that. But when the waiver decision was taken, the Governing Council clearly stated that if it did not assess the presence of a programme, the waiver would be lifted. You say no; we say yes; we do this. We are the ones who actually wrote the minutes of that decision. At some point we decided that there were no other conditions for a successful completion of the review of the programme. So the ECB had no choice other than to lift the waiver. Having said that, we are ready to reinstate the waiver as soon as the Governing Council decides that the conditions for a successful completion of the programme are in place.

My final comment is about the future genuine monetary union. It is not true actually; I never said anything about that. I said what I thought I could say in a speech given in Helsinki two or three months ago, if I am not mistaken. But here is exactly a field where a central banker can only point out the fragility of the present construction – which, I fully agree, is a fragile construction – and possibly in general terms what the next steps could be. It is pretty clear that an institution-based integration is much stronger than a rules-based integration.

The first type of integration is exactly supplied by the example of monetary policy. There we have successfully, in a sense, integrated our monetary policies. If we go back to the time before the euro, we had a rules-based monetary policy in a sense – you remember that, before the euro? In the budgetary policy we have an integration that is rules-based – and which is the more successful of the two? That is what I basically explored very briefly in the speech given in Helsinki some time ago.

Finally, on fragmentation, I think the ones who said that it has taken time for our monetary policy to go and find its way through the economy are absolutely right. It has taken a long time. We started with monetary expansion – monetary policy – almost three years ago, at the end of 2011, and we have started seeing the first positive signs – I would not say now; we have been seeing this in the last two or three or four months. Having said that, we have got to be aware that not all countries are the same. In some countries monetary policy – our monetary policy expansion – was fully transmitted through the economy and immediately produced good effects, and in other countries it did not. And so we should also ask ourselves: why is this so? What were the initial conditions that made monetary policy effective in one part of the Union and not effective in other parts?

  Sylvie Goulard (ALDE). - Madam President, we are discussing the annual report on the ECB, and this is not against the Commissioner – I perfectly understand that Mr Draghi has to leave – but we need some forward guidance, Madam President, on the way the debate is organised. We had time-slots distributed. If we had known before, we would have given the floor only to one of us; but to say now that we have to discuss with an empty chair – even coming from France, I do not like la politique de la chaise vide. If you allow me, I ask you please to tell the President that either we have the time to discuss and to use our slots, or we close the debate.

  President. - I am informed that the groups were fully aware of the scheduling this evening. Perhaps you could speak to your group. I will communicate your point as you have made it.

  David Coburn (EFDD). - Madam President, is this not an example of the contempt in which the European Commission and Mr Draghi hold this House?

  President. - Let me clarify. The Commission remains with us so I think that charge is not particularly well made.

  Fulvio Martusciello (PPE). - Signor Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, in un contesto di crisi di questo tipo, nonostante gli alti livelli di disoccupazione e una crescita del PIL negativa o pari allo zero e un tasso di inflazione molto basso con rischi deflazionistici, la politica monetaria della BCE è comunque riuscita a ridare fiducia ai mercati finanziari e agli investitori dell'area euro e di questo, Presidente Draghi, tutti gli europei le sono grati.

Bene quindi le politiche per gli investimenti, ma servirebbe davvero maggiore connessione con l'economia reale per limitare la frammentazione dei mercati e soprattutto per supportare le piccole e medie imprese. Oggi, per la prima volta, Lei ha spiegato il contenuto dell'espressione "riforme strutturali" scendendo nel dettaglio: semplificazione amministrativa, quella che in tanti paesi manca e la cui mancanza continua a creare danni e ritardi alla piccola e media impesa.

Il problema principale di questo periodo quindi, più che di politica monetaria è di politica finanziaria. Il contatto politico di questi giorni fra la BCE e il governo greco non può garantire prospettive per una stabilità finanziaria. Stiamo assistendo ad un saliscendi dei mercati ogni giorno. Dal contrasto totale, due settimane fa, con la decisione della BCE di non accettare più i titoli di Stato greci a garanzia dei prestiti, alla crescita delle borse greche, dopo la presentazione delle nuove misure per il rilancio dell'economia e la decisione di estendere fino a giugno il piano di salvataggio, passando poi per la proroga di due settimane del piano di liquidità di emergenza concesso alle banche greche dalla BCE.

È di oggi la notizia che la BCE, il Fondo monetario internazionale e l'Eurogruppo hanno dato il loro benestare al programma del governo greco che, anche se poco chiaro, sembra possa dare chance contro il rischio di fallimento. E poi, nel pomeriggio, la dichiarazione del ministro delle Finanze greco: non avremo problemi di liquidità nel settore pubblico, ma avremo problemi nel ripagare le rate al Fondo monetario internazionale ora e alla BCE a luglio.

Ecco, Presidente, è proprio questo clima di incertezza che va sciolto. Perché Lei sa che su questo tema si gioca la credibilità dell'Europa. Se lei non avrà la capacità e, sono sicuro che l'avrà, di intervenire in maniera netta, l'Europa rimarrà soltanto nella trasparenza della nuova banconota da 20 euro.

  Roberto Gualtieri (S&D). - Signor Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, la relazione del collega Zalba Bidegain è un buon documento che evidentemente, anche per ragioni di tempo, ma non solo per questo, presenta uno scarto tra la preoccupata e giusta analisi sulle tendenze al ribasso dell'inflazione e la relativa prudenza in relazione alla necessità di un salto di qualità delle misure non convenzionali di politica monetaria della BCE.

Fortunatamente la Banca centrale europea ha avuto la capacità, la forza e l'indipendenza necessarie a compiere la scelta di realizzare questo salto di qualità e quindi di fare pieno uso delle proprie prerogative per adempiere al suo mandato, garantendo un aumento credibile del suo bilancio attraverso, appunto, il programma di acquisto di 60 miliardi mensili di titoli privati e pubblici. Una misura opportuna? Una misura che correttamente, è stato detto dal Presidente Draghi, ha un alto tasso di trasmissione all'economia reale e che rientra pienamente nell'ambito del mandato che i trattati assegnano alla BCE.

Naturalmente, misure di politica monetaria non convenzionali sono una condizione necessaria ma non sufficiente per affrontare i problemi macroeconomici che abbiano dinanzi a noi e quindi è perfettamente vero quello che la relazione dice e che esse devono essere inserite in un contesto più ampio, in un policy mix appropriato che deve essere imperniato su politiche di investimento, su riforme strutturali e su una capacità di realizzare un consolidamento di bilancio non prociclico, ma effettivamente amico della crescita. In questo senso devo dire che la recente comunicazione sulla flessibilità e anche le decisioni che la Commissione sta prendendo vanno nella giusta direzione e, insieme al lancio del piano Juncker, mostrano la consapevolezza della necessità di realizzare un effettivo policy mix, in linea con il ben noto discorso di Jackson Hole.

L'indipendenza della BCE richiede, come è stato detto, trasparenza, accountability e l'accountability richiede trasparenza e quindi naturalmente il Parlamento e la commissione ECON salutano con particolare favore la pubblicazione dei verbali delle riunioni del Governing Council di cui apprezziamo l'ampiezza e allo stesso tempo comprendiamo e condividiamo i relativi limiti di riservatezza che ci sembrano necessari.

Il Parlamento europeo è anche pienamente consapevole delle proprie responsabilità di supervisore del supervisore unico, come ci sono assegnate dal regolamento e dall'accordo interistituzionale e cercheremo di esercitare appieno queste prerogative. I primi passi dell'SSM sono incoraggianti e tuttavia occorre anche prestare la dovuta attenzione al rischio, in qualche modo, che il necessario rafforzamento dei requisiti prudenziali non abbia però un effetto prociclico in controtendenza rispetto invece al policy mix che si sta costruendo per riportare l'Europa sul sentiero della crescita.

Infine l'Unione economica e monetaria. Apprezzo molto le considerazioni del discorso di Helsinki, ripetute oggi dal Presidente Draghi, sulla necessità di compiere un salto di qualità da un'integrazione basata sulle regole a una basata sulle istituzioni. Il Parlamento si è espresso su questo e si esprimerà ancora con il rapporto della presidente Berès. Certo, colpisce la scarnezza, diciamo così, del documento presentato al Consiglio europeo e delle relative questioni, vorremmo che non si ricominciasse da zero ma che, anche sulla base del lavoro che abbiamo svolto nella scorsa legislatura con il documento della Commissione e i rapporti precedenti ai quattro Presidenti, questo processo di approfondimento dell'Unione economica e monetaria compia effettivamente il necessario salto di qualità.

PRESIDENZA DELL'ON. DAVID-MARIA SASSOLI
Vicepresidente

  Stanisław Ożóg (ECR). - Panie Przewodniczący! Przyszłość Unii Europejskiej nie przedstawia się niestety zbyt optymistycznie i imponująco. Należy zwrócić uwagę na fakt, że działalność gospodarcza oraz wzrost gospodarczy są nadal bardzo niskie, i, co gorsza, cały czas się obniżają. Nakłada się na to zastraszająco niska stopa inflacji, która może okazać się zabójcza w skutkach dla europejskiej gospodarki. Grozi nam spadek cen, brak napędu gospodarczego, wzrost bezrobocia, co w rezultacie może zakończyć się jeszcze większym kryzysem.

Martwi mnie również sytuacja sektora małych i średnich przedsiębiorstw, który zatrudnia ponad 70% siły roboczej w Europie. Jeśli zabraknie w tym sektorze dostępu do finansowania, nasili to problem z osiągnięciem ożywienia gospodarczego, co w obecnej sytuacji jest dla nas tak dużym zagrożeniem. Apeluję więc do Europejskiego Banku Centralnego, aby szczególnie przyjrzał się właśnie temu sektorowi. I nie chodzi mi tutaj o kolejne regulacje w odniesieniu do MŚP, wręcz przeciwnie, o poluzowanie regulacji już obowiązujących.

Moje pytanie dotyczy także innych niż wykup obligacji (de facto dodruk jednego biliona euro) możliwości pobudzenia gospodarczego. Czy obecne rozwiązanie w postaci tak potężnego zastrzyku finansowego nie okaże się w efekcie zbyt krótkotrwałe i krótkowzroczne? Inną kwestią, na jaką pragnę zwrócić uwagę, jest zagwarantowanie niezależności Europejskiego Banku Centralnego, którą można osiągnąć tylko poprzez odpowiednie rozdzielenie jego funkcji bankowej od roli w zakresie nadzoru finansowego.

  Marisa Matias (GUE/NGL). - Eu acho que, se dúvidas houvesse pela falta de respeito do BCE e do Senhor Draghi relativamente à democracia e ao controlo democrático a esta casa, elas estão desfeitas, porque nós estamos aqui, temos coisas a dizer ao Senhor Draghi e sobre as atividades de 2013, e o Senhor Draghi tem coisas para nos dizer, mas pura e simplesmente recusa-se a ouvir-nos e isso é realmente lamentável porque diz-se que há controlo democrático do BCE e justifica-se com o Parlamento Europeu. Pois, nem no Parlamento Europeu, o Senhor Draghi fica para ouvir os deputados e era bom que nos ouvisse, porque o ano de 2013 foi, de facto, um excelente ano para mostrar o falhanço da política monetária expansionista do BCE. O investimento não só não aumentou como caiu 2 % na zona euro e, por exemplo, em Portugal, caiu 14 %. O BCE poderia, e bem, argumentar que a política monetária foi sabotada por políticas orçamentais recessivas, mas o problema é que o BCE foi parte ativa da imposição dessas políticas recessivas, violando os limites do seu mandato. E qual foi o resultado? O resultado foi que, entre 2009 e 2014, o investimento caiu 16,3 % na zona euro e, apesar de tudo isto, o BCE continua a impor austeridade, como se viu, aliás, agora, nas negociações na Grécia, quer antes das eleições, quer depois das eleições, com manobras de chantagem inaceitáveis, arbitrárias e ilegais. Portanto, o BCE continua a estender o seu mandato, o BCE está por toda a parte, só não está onde a democracia se exerce, como é o caso deste plenário.

  Ernest Urtasun (Verts/ALE). - Señor Presidente, en primer lugar, quisiera decir que ha habido un cambio evidente en la política el Banco Central Europeo a través de, por fin, una política monetaria expansiva atrevida. Lo que tenemos que lamentar es que esta haya llegado, quizá, demasiado tarde, entre otras cosas porque existe ya un riesgo evidente de desacoplamiento entre lo que es la política monetaria y sus efectos reales. Pero, en cualquier caso, las medidas anunciadas por el Consejo de Gobierno del Banco sobre el quantitative easing son bienvenidas, así como la apelación a que, de una vez por todas, esto sea completado con medidas de apoyo fiscal, cosa que, evidentemente, hasta ahora no se ha hecho ni se hará, porque todo el mundo sabe que el plan Juncker no es un plan serio para afrontar esta cuestión. Por lo tanto, bienvenida la medida de expansión cuantitativa del Banco Central Europeo.

Sin embargo, una vez más, y ya se ha dicho en el debate, tenemos que criticar que el Banco Central Europeo está constantemente ejerciendo una injerencia política en cuestiones para las cuales no tiene mandato. Los Estatutos del Banco Central Europeo no encargan a su Consejo de Gobierno opinar y hacer política sobre determinadas cosas, y menos sobre las reformas estructurales. Y no solo eso: el papel que vimos que jugó el Banco Central Europeo en el caso del rescate de Irlanda con la publicación del intercambio de cartas que vimos recientemente… y el último capítulo que hemos vivido sobre Grecia. En relación con este último, tengo que decir que ha sido totalmente inaceptable la injerencia que, en medio de la negociación, ha ejercido el Banco Central Europeo al dejar de aceptar bonos soberanos griegos como garantía para dar liquidez a la banca comercial griega. Esa decisión es una decisión arbitraria del Consejo de Gobierno y que se tomó en plena negociación para poner a Grecia en una situación de debilidad en la negociación, y creo que eso es totalmente inaceptable desde el punto de vista democrático y de lo que es la función del propio Banco Central Europeo.

Desde ese punto de vista creo que hay que celebrar el dictamen del Abogado General del Tribunal de Justicia en el que señala que, en estos momentos, el Banco Central Europeo debería abstenerse de participar en programas de compra de bonos si al mismo tiempo está participando en un programa de asistencia financiera. Creo que eso ha sido una buena noticia. Para terminar, todas estas cosas no están incluidas –evidentemente, muchas de estas referencias- en el informe anual del Banco Central Europeo que hace este Parlamento y, por lo tanto, el voto de mi Grupo será contrario.

  David Coburn (EFDD). - Mr President, the EU no doubt thinks it succeeded last week in kicking the Greek can of worms down the road. But what fundamentals will have changed in four months’ time? We will still be in the same position. In the words of the President of the Commission, Mr Juncker, ‘there can be no democracy against the EU’s treaties’. So the democratically expressed wishes of the Greek people will be denied to them once again.

One might well ask how will they react to that? Well, it just so happens that, about the same time as this four months’ extension of the bailout ends, the EU Member States must vote unanimously to continue sanctions against Russia. So the EU may well have gained four months but it has given the Greek Communist government an opportunity to threaten to use their veto and by so doing end sanctions against their fellow Communists in Russia. The EU has not so much kicked the can down the road but rather rolled the can a few hundred yards towards President Putin’s panzers, inviting both Greeks and Russians to trample all over it, thereby conflating two of the EU’s greatest catastrophes: firstly, unwarranted neo-imperialist interference in the Ukraine and, secondly, the tyranny of the collapsing euro on southern European states.

The EU edges us ever closer to war with Russia, while dictating to the Greek people. Your promise to do whatever it takes to save the euro can only end badly. I was also shocked to see that President Draghi of the ECB did not even stay to hear the views of Mr Gualtieri, the Chairman of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, the committee responsible for the democratic scrutiny of the ECB. This shows the EU and the ECB’s total contempt for the EU Parliament and any form of democratic control.

  Bernard Monot (NI). - Monsieur le Président, chers collègues, je déplore effectivement, comme mon collègue M. Coburn, le départ de M. Draghi, qui montre par son absence le mépris démocratique qu'il a vis-à-vis de l'ensemble des députés élus par le peuple, qui saura s'en rappeler le moment venu.

La BCE a poursuivi en 2014 son programme de prêts à long terme aux banques avec les TLTRO. Officiellement, il s'agit d'aider le système bancaire, par des prêts à taux privilégiés, afin d'ouvrir les financements à l'économie réelle. Les injections de liquidités à hauteur de 1 000 milliards des LTRO avaient surtout permis aux banques d'améliorer leurs résultats financiers en spéculant sur des titres souverains plus rentables. Le constat est pourtant toujours le même: le crédit ne passe pas, les banques ne prêtent pas et c'est particulièrement vrai pour les PME.

Le rapport Bidegain souligne en effet à la fois la difficulté d'accès au crédit et la crise interbancaire, dont les PME font toujours les frais. C'est notamment le cas en France, où la croissance économique est désespérément en berne. La situation est d'autant plus grave qu'en zone euro, plus de 70 % des financements de l'économie se font par l'intermédiation bancaire.

La BCE a donc échoué et on peut s'attendre à ce que le plan d'assouplissement quantitatif de cette année plombe encore le bilan de manière conséquente. Cet effort sera également vain. En effet, aucune contrepartie concrète des banques privées pour financer les ménages et les entreprises n'a été imposée. En définitive, les seuls véritables gagnants sont encore les banques privées et les marchés financiers.

  Presidente. - A nome dell'Ufficio di presidenza ricordo ai parlamentari che la presenza del Presidente Draghi era stata comunicata ai presidenti dei gruppi e lui si poteva trattenere fino alle 19.15 e i presidenti hanno detto però che il dibattito doveva andare avanti.

  Ivana Maletić (PPE). - Gospodine predsjedniče, pozdravljam povjerenika gospodina Dombrovskisa, sve kolege, i čestitam izvjestitelju kolegi Zalbi na izvrsno pripremljenom sveobuhvatnom izvješću.

Eurozona je heterogeno područje s 19 država, a uz potrebno koordiniranje s državama izvan eurozone jer želimo pozitivne efekte i gospodarski rast i razvoj u cijeloj uniji. Imajući to u vidu, moramo priznati da je pred Europskom središnjom bankom veliki izazov postizanja kvalitetne i uspješne kombinacije mjera monetarne i fiskalne politike.

Razlike među državama članicama u predanosti u provođenju strukturnih reformi u fiskalnoj politici koju vode, u produktivnosti, dovode do asimetričnih učinaka mjera monetarne politike na gospodarstvo. Moramo biti svjesni, i drago mi je da je gospodin Draghi to uvijek isticao, da bez uspješne provedbe Europskog semestra mjere monetarne politike mogu imati samo kratkoročne pozitivne efekte, uz rizik da dugoročno efekti budu negativni. Europska komisija, s novim investicijskim planom apelira na države članice da provode strukturne reforme i da sustavno pristupaju osmišljavanju i pripremi projekata u partnerstvu s poduzetnicima.

Na svima nama je da se potrudimo, potaknemo i ohrabrimo vlade na provođenje reformi i uklanjanje investicijskih rizika. Samo tada će proaktivno i kvalitetno djelovanje mjera monetarne politike rezultirati stabilnim i dugoročnim rastom i razvojem naših država.

  David Coburn (EFDD). - Mr President, as a point of order, the contempt that Mr Draghi showed would never be allowed in the House of Commons. If this honourable House allows the same thing here, it is outrageous.

(The President cut off the speaker)

  Pervenche Berès (S&D). - Monsieur le Président, Monsieur le Vice-président de la Commission, puisque M. Draghi a dû nous quitter, c'est à vous que j'adresse ces propos.

Nous évaluons aujourd'hui le rapport de M. Zalba sur la politique monétaire et l'action de la Banque centrale au cours de l'année 2013, année au cours de laquelle, manifestement, la baisse de l'inflation a été peu anticipée, ce qui nous conduit à regarder ce qui s'est passé depuis. Fort heureusement, la façon dont la Banque centrale, en toute indépendance, a décidé de mettre en œuvre un programme de quantitative easing pour lutter contre ce risque de déflation, est une mesure qu'il faut saluer. C'est un mouvement historique, engagé en toute indépendance, dans le respect de la définition, que la Banque centrale, sous l'inspiration d'autres, a pu arrêter, et que nous saluons.

Mais le président de la Banque centrale a aussi marqué la façon dont, pour la première fois, les comptes rendus des réunions des gouverneurs ont été publiés. En tant qu'ancienne présidente de la commission économique et monétaire, je ne peux que saluer cela car c'est une demande permanente de ce Parlement, même si cette bonne nouvelle est manifestement contrebalancée par le départ prématuré de M. Draghi aujourd'hui.

Concernant la question de l'approfondissement de l'Union économique et monétaire, il l'a évoquée comme un élément essentiel pour consolider l'euro et je partage son point de vue. Mais j'ai, je dois le dire, une très grande inquiétude. En effet, normalement, l'enjeu de ce débat était de relancer le travail qui avait été entamé sous la précédente Commission avec le Blueprint, le rapport des quatre présidents, ou le rapport de ce Parlement, sous l'autorité de Mme Thyssen. À ce stade, le document de travail qui est sur la table pour engager cette discussion, auquel M. Draghi, en tant que président de la Banque centrale, et l'un des quatre présidents, a également souscrit, est une note analytique qui conduit à un système totalement corseté de règles, qui ne tient absolument pas compte des enseignements que nous devons tirer de la crise et du besoin de convergence entre les économies de la zone.

J'espère que dans le futur, dans ce débat, nous pourrons avoir des contributions positives de la Banque centrale et des autres présidents.

  Bernd Lucke (ECR). - Herr Präsident! Es geht in der Debatte um ein ganz wichtiges Thema: Es geht um die Stagnation in der Eurozone, es geht um das Risiko der Deflation, es geht um die Schulden und die Überschuldung in der Eurozone. Nun haben viele Redner hervorgehoben, dass sie es beschämend finden, dass Herr Draghi diese Sitzung verlassen hat und sein Platz leer ist. Aber, meine Damen und Herren, wir sollten uns auch ein bisschen an die eigene Nase fassen: Das ganze Parlament ist faktisch leer! Die Wichtigkeit dieser Debatte wird auch von uns nicht wahrgenommen. Wer ist denn hierher gekommen, um sich anzuhören, worüber hier debattiert wird? Wer ist hierher gekommen, um teilzunehmen an dieser Debatte, zumindest durch seinen Applaus, meine Damen und Herren?

Meine Damen und Herren, die Europäische Zentralbank ist gescholten worden und zu Recht. Die Europäische Zentralbank betreibt eine Politik des quantitative easing, sie kauft die forderungsgesicherten Wertpapiere auf, sie betreibt seit geraumer Zeit eine Politik der uneingeschränkten Zuteilung – all das, obwohl diese Art von unkonventioneller Geldpolitik noch vor dem Europäischen Gerichtshof zu beurteilen ist. Die Europäische Zentralbank geht über das demokratische Votum von Völkern hinweg und sagt, ein einzelnes Volk kann den Kurs der Geldpolitik ja nun nicht beeinflussen wollen. Die Europäische Zentralbank setzt Staaten unter Druck, die Europäische Zentralbank prellt Sparer um die Zinsen!

Aber, meine Damen und Herren, wir wollen auch hier offen sein. Die Europäische Zentralbank muss all das tun, wenn man den Euro verteidigen will. Dann ist das die Konsequenz! Aber die richtige Konsequenz wäre eben: Wenn wir das alles nicht haben wollen, so wie es viele Redner hier ausgeführt haben, dann müssen wir auch sagen: Schluss mit diesem Euro!

  Michael Theurer (ALDE). - Herr Präsident, liebe Kolleginnen und Kollegen! Ich finde die Diskussion hier wirklich erschreckend, denn es wird so getan, als ob die Europäische Zentralbank gegen den Willen der Mitgliedstaaten eingeführt worden sei. Das EZB-Statut wurde von frei gewählten nationalen Parlamenten ratifiziert. Die EZB darf nur, was die Nationalstaaten auf die EZB übertragen haben. Und die EZB ist eben unabhängig. Deshalb zu beklagen, dass nicht demokratisch gewählte Parlamente die Geldpolitik machen, ist doch geradezu hanebüchen und unglaubwürdig, denn die demokratisch gewählten Parlamente haben ja die Kompetenzen auf eine unabhängige Zentralbank übertragen.

Die einen kritisieren, die Geldpolitik sei zu locker, Herr Lucke kritisiert, sie sei zu locker, die anderen sagen, sie sei zu strikt. Vielleicht macht die EZB doch die richtige Politik. Wir sollten die Unabhängigkeit der Zentralbank verteidigen und unsere Arbeit machen. Die Geldpolitik kommt an ihre Grenzen. Wir brauchen Strukturreformen, die wirklich wirken. Wir brauchen Parlamente und auch Regierungen, die den Stabilitäts- und Wachstumspakt mit Leben erfüllen, und wir müssen endlich damit aufhören, die Zentralbank für Dinge verantwortlich zu machen, für die sie nichts kann. Das ist unsere Aufgabe!

  Matt Carthy (GUE/NGL). - Mr President, 2013 was the year during which the Irish Government held the Presidency of the EU. It was also the year when the Central Statistics Office in Ireland (SCO) recorded that over 250 people every day were leaving Irish shores in an emigration wave that was a direct result of the austerity policies that were championed by the ECB. When we look at the matter of banking debt it is quite apparent from listening to the discussions today that the ECB has provided no thought to, or indeed mention of, the huge amount of debt that Irish generations are going to be saddled with.

It should be remembered that, despite the fact that Ireland makes up 0.9% of the European population – 1.2% of the EU GDP – the Irish people have paid over 42% of the European banking crisis. It should also be remembered that this was a European financial crisis, not just an Irish one, and the Irish people have suffered beyond all proportion. I again call on the President of the ECB to acknowledge the role that his institution played in bailing out the Irish banks at the cost of billions to our people, and it is simply not good enough to continue to abdicate responsibility. The Irish people need – and deserve – answers.

  Mario Borghezio (NI). - Signor Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, se avessimo avuto dubbi sul fatto che siamo soggetti a una dittatura monetaria della BCE, il comportamento di oggi ce lo avrebbe confermato.

Le iniziative della BCE non possono che cercare di rallentare gli effetti negativi, allora volutamente sottovalutati, dell'euro e delle sue regole, principali cause della mancanza di crescita strutturale dell'Europa. Senza il cambio variabile avete scelto di togliere ai cittadini europei il primo campanello d'allarme nei confronti della crisi di sistema e la prima opportunità di rilancio per le economie nei nostri paesi.

Constâncio ad Atene ammise che quella europea era principalmente una crisi di debito privato e voi avete incentrato sul debito pubblico degli Stati le regole di austerity necessarie al mantenimento di questa gabbia chiamata euro. Ci state cinesizzando! E se anche la BCE non capirà che è giunta l'ora di ridiscutere quel che oggi è considerato irreversibile, la fine dell'Unione europea oltre che dell'Eurozona è vicina, è prossima. Noi semplicemente chiediamo di riavere la nostra sovranità monetaria, di ritornare ad essere popoli liberi e non assoggettati a questa dittatura monetaria, signor Draghi.

  Ева Паунова (PPE). - Бяха обсъдени различни теми. Аз бих искала да се спра върху един доста по-конкретен въпрос – банковото кредитиране. Годишният отчет на ЕЦБ показва подобряване на финансовата стабилност, а с това идва и време да насочим поглед към по-дългосрочни мерки за намаляване на фрагментацията на финансовите пазари и улесняване на кредитирането. Тези мерки са крайно необходими за развитието на бизнеса в Европа, който е изключително зависим от банковото кредитиране. Алтернативните източници на финансиране са недостатъчни, имайки предвид по-слабо развитите капиталови пазари, поради което трябва да се стремим да развием потенциала на банките.

През 2013 г., а дори и сега, ситуацията по отношение на банковото кредитиране в Европа е незадоволителна. Това се дължи на банковата задлъжнялост, отчетена от секторните стрес тестове на ЕЦБ. В началото на септември миналата година ЕЦБ реагира на свитата активност и предприе стъпки, за да стимулира отпускането на нови заеми. Затова приветствам решението на този орган да предостави четиригодишни заеми на банките, при условие че те ще увеличат кредитирането за бизнеса. Вярвам, че тази мярка ще действа като мощен инструмент, за да бъдат улеснени новите кредитни потоци към реалната икономика.

Бих желала да призова ЕЦБ да използва всички инструменти на свое разположение, с цел да изпълни своя мандат за поддържане на ценовата стабилност, като стимулира търсенето и подкрепя инвестициите, които заедно с необходимите структурни реформи са нужни за постигането на растеж на икономиката.

  Bogusław Liberadzki (S&D). - Panie Przewodniczący! Chciałbym nawiązać tutaj do słów, które wypowiedział pan prezes Draghi. Z satysfakcją przyjmuję te 3 punkty, o których wspominał, czyli: polityka monetarna, przejrzystość, a także postęp w kierowaniu pogłębioną Unią Europejską. Myślę, że ta inicjatywa, którą zaczynamy, ofensywa od marca tego roku, jest trochę wzorowana na modelu amerykańskim, i popierając ją, chciałbym tylko prosić, żebyśmy zaczęli wszyscy patrzeć, gdzie może być pewne niebezpieczeństwo, gdzie możemy sobie zafundować – ewentualnie wbrew naszej woli – taką czy inna bańkę spekulacyjną, czy wpaść w kryzys. Sytuacja na początku entuzjazmu może temu sprzyjać.

Po raz pierwszy od dłuższego czasu uzyskałem od bankowca wypowiedź, że oczekuje on reakcji i będzie tę reakcję gospodarki na politykę monetarną obserwował. Dotychczas było odwrotnie. Uważano, że gospodarka ma się dostosować do polityki monetarnej. Powinniśmy to przyjąć z dużym zadowoleniem. Pozostaje oczywiście ważna kwestia, o której tutaj mówiono: MŚP. Jest ich ponad 20 milionów, tyle samo ile bezrobotnych; każde przedsiębiorstwo zwiększy zatrudnienie o 1 osobę. Nasuwa się tylko pytanie, co te przedsiębiorstwa mają produkować? Więcej bułek? Częściej obcinać włosy ludziom? Czyli jest pytanie o kształt, model naszej gospodarki. Innowacyjność, o której mówiliśmy, eksport, konkurencyjność, to jest ważne. Inwestycje, o których wspomniał zresztą pan wiceprzewodniczący Dombrovskis, i ożywienie gospodarki, mają bardzo ograniczony wymiar, dlatego że na budowę autostrad, linii kolejowych i lotnisk możemy wylać ograniczoną ilość betonu, ale nasuwa się pytanie, kto będzie z tego korzystał, gdzie będzie rozwój przemysłowy? I właśnie ta industrializacja jest istotą sprawy, o którą powinniśmy się troszczyć. Wierzę, że Europejski Bank Centralny i plan Junckera mogą zadziałać w całości.

  Sander Loones (ECR). - De Europese Centrale Bank is onafhankelijk in haar beslissingen en daar is wel het een en ander om te doen geweest, ook in het Belgische parlement. Maar onafhankelijk betekent niet dat zij niet verantwoordelijk is voor haar beslissingen en mijnheer Draghi zou over een en ander best wel eens verantwoording mogen afleggen. Daarom begrijp ik ook niet dat mijnheer Draghi dit debat vroegtijdig heeft verlaten.

Want laten we eerlijk zijn, de beslissing om ongebreideld euro's bij te drukken is geen goede beslissing. Het is hoog tijd dat wij verder kijken dan de korte termijn, dat wij verder kijken dan onze neus lang is. Dan zullen wij de negatieve gevolgen van dit beleid van de Europese Centrale Bank zien. Het is een beleid dat slechte gevolgen heeft voor spaarders. Onze euro's worden minder waard. Wij zien onze rentes dalen. Vandaag is ook gebleken dat het een beleid is dat slecht is voor onze pensioeninstellingen. Vandaag heeft een Belgisch pensioenfonds meegedeeld dat het in de problemen komt om de pensioenen uit te keren.

Maar wat mij het meest van al ergert, is dat dit een beleid is dat mensen onnodig aanzet om risico's te nemen. Gewone spaarders moeten experts worden in aandelen. Pensioeninstellingen moeten risico's nemen met onze pensioenen. Dit is een beleid dat wij niet kunnen ondersteunen. Voor ons is het duidelijk: laten we afstappen van deze kwantitatieve versoepeling, laten we stoppen met ongebreideld euro's bij te drukken. De enige weg vooruit is de weg van de structurele hervormingen.

  Marian Harkin (ALDE). - Mr President, I come to this debate from an employment and social affairs perspective. I believe the ECB must make a real contribution to improving growth and boosting employment, creating jobs that will lift people out of poverty. The Commission’s own figures show that this is not happening, with significant increases in part-time work and temporary contracts. Also the employment and economic differences between Member States represent a major risk for both the EU’s economic stability and social cohesion. That is the stark reality and the ECB must take its share of the responsibility.

Earlier this evening Mr Draghi spoke about the ECB’s transparency and accountability measures and they are to be welcomed. Yesterday I received a letter from Mr Draghi to say that the Vice-President of the ECB, Mr Vítor Constâncio, will be available to take part in an informal exchange of views with the Irish banking inquiry. I hope that the accountability and transparency that Mr Draghi boasted about earlier will fully apply to any such exchange of views. If that happens, the engagement will be meaningful. Otherwise it will be meaningless.

  Paloma López Bermejo (GUE/NGL). - Señor Presidente, el señor Draghi ha dejado claras cuáles son sus prioridades: hoy valoro más a la señora Mogherini, que no tiene problemas en estar en los debates hasta el final, mostrando su respeto a este Parlamento.

A pesar de la actuación del Banco Central Europeo, el sector bancario sigue funcionando por vías de emergencia, y el crédito, especialmente a las pymes, sigue sin fluir; su política monetaria, que no contempla el empleo como un objetivo prioritario, tampoco ha evitado que la pobreza crezca en un continente bajo el espectro de la deflación.

Estos fracasos se omiten, y no quieren reconocer que un incremento del gasto público y el control estatal de las finanzas son herramientas más útiles que sus experimentos y sus permanentes recomendaciones de reformas estructurales en una clara extralimitación de sus competencias.

Lo que nunca se cuestiona es que el Banco Central actúa como portavoz del neoliberalismo, que alienta el racionamiento de la liquidez de bancos y Estados y las presiones a Gobiernos legítimamente elegidos, como sucediera ayer con Chipre y hoy con Grecia. Otra Europa: una Europa democrática, exige un cambio, un Banco Central al servicio de las personas y no de los mercados.

  Gerolf Annemans (NI). - Collega's, wanneer men zich vandaag in aanwezigheid van een lege stoel buigt over een document dat handelt over de ECB in 2013, dan merkt men pas echt hoe lang het oeverloze gestrompel van deze eurozone reeds aan de gang is.

In het toenmalige ECB-jaarverslag werd reeds vastgesteld dat de daling van de rente zich niet heeft vertaald in een hogere kredietverlening, economische groei of jobs, en toen noch vandaag heeft men hier lessen uit getrokken. Vandaag, anno 2015, wordt er een zoveelste poging gedaan en wordt er voor 1 100 miljard aan waardeloze staatsobligaties, ook van noodlijdende landen, opgekocht. Ook dit zal economisch weinig zoden aan de dijk zetten. Het probleem is immers het design van een muntunie voor deelnemers die niet gelijk zijn en die men nu probeert te dwingen om tóch gelijk te worden.

In 2013 werd openlijk gesteld dat de ECB zich te buiten ging aan een overschrijding van het eigen ECB-mandaat. Nu gaat de ECB hier rustig mee verder, en overigens verder dan ooit. De noodzakelijke onafhankelijkheid van de ECB is vandaag verworden tot een politiek opererende arm van een mislukte supranationale EU-structuur die een economisch-sociaal en identiteitsgevaar is geworden voor alle burgers van de eurolanden.

  Dariusz Rosati (PPE). - Panie Przewodniczący! W przeciwieństwie do ostatnich mówców chciałbym wyrazić uznanie pod adresem Europejskiego Banku Centralnego. Polityka tego banku zapobiegła w ostatnich dwóch latach bardzo poważnemu kryzysowi. Dzięki niej uniknęliśmy groźby rozpadu strefy euro, ustabilizowano sytuację na rynkach finansowych i przywrócono na nich zaufanie. To dzięki słynnym słowom Mario Draghiego, że zrobi whatever it takes, żeby uratować euro, udało się osiągnąć coś, czego nie udało się osiągnąć szefom rządów i prezydentom państw członkowskich przez dwa lata. Co więcej, Mario Draghi osiągnął to nie wydając ani jednego euro. Chciałbym powiedzieć, składając gratulacje za to osiągnięcie, że strefa euro ciągle znajduje się jednak w trudnej sytuacji. Stopa inwestycji spadła bardziej niż tego oczekiwano, a stopa oszczędności wzrosła. Normalnie w takiej sytuacji spadek realnej stopy procentowej powinien doprowadzić do wyrównania się oszczędności i inwestycji na poziomie zapewniającym pełne zatrudnienie. Niestety mamy teraz stopy procentowe blisko zera i nadal oszczędności są większe od inwestycji. Ta sytuacja skłania niektórych ekonomistów do postawienia tezy, że mamy do czynienia ze zjawiskiem sekularnej stagnacji w Europie. Chciałbym w związku z tym zapytać przedstawicieli Europejskiego Banku Centralnego czy zgadzają się z tezą, że grozi nam sekularna stagnacja, tzn. sytuacja, w której nie ma dodatniej stopy procentowej, która doprowadzi do zrównoważenia inwestycji i oszczędności? Jeśli tak, czy Europejski Bank Centralny wie, jak z tym zjawiskiem walczyć? Wreszcie na koniec pytanie trochę prowokacyjne: czy Europejski Bank Centralny rozważa wariant helicopter money?

  Jonás Fernández (S&D). - Señor Presidente, en primer lugar me gustaría agradecer el trabajo del ponente, Pablo Zalba, en este informe, que creo que hace un resumen razonable de lo realizado por el Banco Central en 2013.

La cuestión es que, probablemente, hoy todos querríamos hablar de las últimas decisiones del BCE, del quantitative easing, de su capacidad para situar la inflación en el objetivo que el propio Banco Central tiene y, por lo tanto, lamento expresamente la ausencia de Draghi a lo largo de todo este debate.

En todo caso, mis preguntas, que iban dirigidas fundamentalmente a Draghi, se las haré por escrito a través de los mecanismos formales, pero no quería desaprovechar esta ocasión para reivindicar el cambio de política económica que la Unión está tomando en los últimos meses; para reivindicar cómo el plan Juncker debería ser un instrumento para movilizar la inversión en el conjunto de la zona del euro y, por lo tanto, aprovechar esa enorme liquidez que el Banco Central Europeo va a poner en marcha; y para reivindicar también la revisión del Pacto de Estabilidad y Crecimiento, que realmente va a permitir una mejor capacidad de actuación fiscal por parte de los Estados.

Hemos visto que no se va a multar a Francia. Hemos visto cómo se ha llegado a un buen acuerdo con Grecia, que debería introducir una rebaja en el objetivo de superávit primario en el mes de junio, en la próxima negociación. Por lo tanto, esto debe encauzarse en una nueva política que no solamente esté centrada en los ajustes -en los recortes, como hemos sufrido en los últimos años-, sino que apueste por el crecimiento con el apoyo de la política fiscal, con el plan Juncker, con la revisión del Pacto de Estabilidad y que vaya unido a un impulso a esa unión fiscal que tanto necesitamos para dar una gobernanza real a la Unión como ha defendido mi compañera Pervenche.

  Karol Karski (ECR). - Panie Przewodniczący! Działalność gospodarcza w Unii Europejskiej, w tym i w strefie euro, jest nadal spowolniona. Towarzyszy temu wysoka stopa bezrobocia. Ponadto brak kapitału i finansowania negatywnie wpływa na gospodarkę nie tylko w strefie euro. Ogranicza zdolność przedsiębiorstw do konkurencyjności i wzrostu. EBC powinien starannie przyjrzeć się przyczynom i skutkom braku dostępu do finansowania, szczególnie dla małych i średnich przedsiębiorstw. Dotykających ich w niektórych państwach członkowskich brak kredytów jest bowiem jednym z głównych czynników opóźniających ożywienie gospodarcze. A przecież małe i średnie przedsiębiorstwa zatrudniają ponad 70% siły roboczej. Dlatego też powinny znajdować się w centrum naszych polityk. Dostęp do finansowania i pobudzenie inwestycji może być przede wszystkim wynikiem odpowiednio przeprowadzonych przez rządy reform strukturalnych na szczeblu krajowym. Apeluję przy tym, aby EBC tak prowadził swoją politykę, aby odpowiadała ona potrzebom gospodarki realnej, szczególnie w przypadku podejścia do małych i średnich przedsiębiorstw, ponieważ to one stanowią rdzeń naszej europejskiej gospodarki.

  Alfred Sant (S&D). - Wiċċ imb wiċċ mal-fatti, hu diffiċli li ma tikkonkludix li l-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew qed isir l-aktar istituzzjoni effettiva fis-sistema tal-euro. Ċertament qed ikun l-aktar korp imħejji biex ivara inizjattivi maħsuba ħalli jilqgħu għall-istaġnar ekonomiku fl-Ewropa. Dawn tassew qed jittellqu minn perspettiva sħiħa Ewropea u mhumiex maqbuda f'xi linja nazzjonali. Għalhekk id-deċiżjoni dwarhom kienet aktar iebsa; aktar diffiċli biex tlestiha; u aktar diffiċli biex twettaqha u tkejjilha.

Taħt il-president attwali tal-Bank, li telaq kmieni minn hawn illum, imma wkoll taħt il-predeċessur tiegħu, il-Bank ħa deċiżjonjiet li pprovdew tmexxija lis-sistema tal-euro. Uħud kienu u għadhom kontroversjali. Imma kellhom jittieħdu.

Madankollu, saret ħaġa ċara li Bank Ċentrali Ewropew ġemma' fi ħdanu poter politiku sostanzjali, anki jekk jibqa' fil-limiti ta' diskors teknokratiku. Wieħed jista' jifhem li dal-poter jeċċedi l-mandat mogħti lilu mit-trattati eżistenti. Hu poter li se jkompli jinfirex b'riżultat tar-responsabbiltajiet mgħoddija lill-Bank taħt il-provvedimenti tal-Unjoni Bankarja. Fl-istess ħin, il-mexxejja tal-Bank mhux qed jaffaċċjaw xi poter ieħor li jista' jibbilanċja lil tagħhom, bħal fil-każ tad-Dipartiment tat-Teżor Amerikan fis-sistema monetarja tad-dollaru.

Il-kwistjoni mhijiex dwar il-kwalità tad-deċiżjonijiet li qed jieħu l-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew. Hi dwar jekk ħallejniex jidħol vojt ta' poter fil-mod kif jittieħdu d-deċiżjonijiet dwar l-euro; jekk dal-vojt hux qed jimtela mill-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew; jekk din hijiex idea tajba; u jekk għandniex infittxu li nibbilanċjaw aħjar il-poter politiku li kiseb il-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew, u dan nagħmluh fl-interess ta' kontabilità demokratika.

  Richard Sulík (ECR). - Herr Präsident! Da Herr Draghi unsere Sitzung verlassen hat, erlaube ich mir zu erklären, warum Griechenland keine Chance hat, in der Eurozone zu überleben. Im Jahre 1970 kostete eine Deutsche Mark 9 Drachmen. Dreißig Jahre später kostete eine Deutsche Mark 170 Drachmen! Das ist die Entwicklung der Konkurrenzfähigkeit, die hier widergespiegelt wird. Dann, im Jahre 2000, hat man gesagt: Ab heute für alle Ewigkeit kostet die Deutsche Mark 172 Drachmen. Aber die Konkurrenzfähigkeit ist weiterhin gestiegen, in Deutschland stärker als in Griechenland. Ohne Euro würde heute die Deutsche Mark 250 Drachmen kosten, und das ist der Grund, warum Griechenland keine Chance hat, in der Eurozone zu überleben. Das einzige, was Sie machen können, ist Zeit zu kaufen. Die ersten fünf Jahre haben 240 Milliarden Euro gekostet.

  Eva Kaili (S&D). - Mr President, I also do not understand why Mr Draghi is not here to answer, but allow me to pretend that he is here, or else that he will try to answer these questions soon.

There was, during the Eurogroup negotiations on Greece, a bank run, which endangered the stability of the Greek banking system. Of course, the support of the ECB was of great importance; however, the outcome of the negotiations left us with a big question about the financing of the short-term liquidity needs that Greece faces for March until April. Nobody has an answer to that, so a possible response to these needs is the use of ELA funds so that the Greek banks can buy Greek government T-bills. But there was a strong ‘no’ from the ECB during the negotiations on Friday, so I was wondering if the ECB was willing to reconsider in the event of extreme severe liquidity problems in March, on the legitimate basis of the independence of the ECB, without any other political affirmation.

Secondly, during the negotiations the opinion was expressed that the ELA provided to Greek banks should be brought down from EUR 65 billion to EUR 42 billion. It was a proposal of Mr Sinn of the IFO: I wonder if you share their views? And lastly, a return of EUR 1.9 billion was requested to be withheld from the ECB from the Greek sovereign bonds that were at our disposal. What is the position on that, and what happens with the liquidity today? Has the bank sector recovered from last week’s shock?

  Ulrike Trebesius (ECR). - Herr Präsident! Zunächst einmal möchte ich mein Bedauern drüber ausdrücken, dass Herr Mario Draghi es augenscheinlich nicht für notwendig befindet, sich die Stellungnahmen der europäischen Abgeordneten anzuhören.

Im Bericht der EZB wird Bezug genommen auf den anhaltenden Prozess der Bilanzanpassung, der ein zentrales Problem für die ökonomische Aktivität in Südeuropa darstellt. Diesen Prozess der Bilanzanpassung versucht Draghi, seit Jahren durch Entlastung der Schuldner mit Niedrigzinsen zu erreichen. Aber hat das funktioniert? Die Ergebnisse aus Italien sprechen eine klare Sprache: Die faulen Kredite im italienischen Bankensektor sind seit Ende 2013 bis zu den neuesten Daten aus dem Oktober 2014 um rund 20 Milliarden gestiegen und wachsen rasant weiter. Wir haben hier eine klare Überschuldungssituation vieler privater Marktteilnehmer vorliegen, die durch die Niedrigzinsen offensichtlich gar nicht verbessert wird. Die italienische Wirtschaft liegt trotz dieser Politik am Boden, und die Indikatoren sind weiterhin mies.

Wir wissen, dass Herr Draghi und Herr Schäuble mit den deutschen Sparern und Steuerzahlern kein Mitleid haben und gerade wieder 70 Milliarden Euro ins insolvente Griechenland gepumpt haben. Aber wie ist es nun mit seinem eigenen Land? Will er nicht wenigstens mit den jungen Menschen Italiens Mitleid haben und diesen wieder eine Perspektive geben?

Procedura catch-the-eye

  Stanislav Polčák (PPE). - Pane předsedající, je těžké v té jedné minutě hovořit o všech aspektech té zprávy a taky je těžké hovořit k prázdné židli. Já nechci zpochybňovat to, že politické frakce o této události jaksi věděly, že zde nebude pan Draghi, ale nemyslím si, že to zvyšuje důstojnost tohoto jednání. Přesto bych se chtěl pouze vyjádřit k otázce deflačního vývoje, která je uvedena i v této zprávě. Je to riziko, se kterým ECB rovněž tedy kalkulovala při přijetí opatření, která mají napumpovat do ekonomiky poměrně ohromné množství peněz, a ta deflační spirála je bezesporu obrovským rizikem, které ohrožuje ekonomiku. Nejhorší možností totiž je, když ceny klesají, protože všichni očekávají, že budou i nadále klesat, tedy i lidé odkládají své investice a nákupy. Nicméně nemám za to, že každá deflace je špatná, nicméně ta, která je teď jaksi na pořadu dne, je skutečně hrozivá. V tomto smyslu bych chtěl podpořit kroky ECB a vyjadřuji podporu i pro dobu následující.

  Tibor Szanyi (S&D). - Bár jómagam is kicsit furcsállom, hogy az Európai Központi Bankról szóló 2013-as jelentés tárgyalásánál pont az illetékes központi bank vezetője nincs itt, de valójában jómagam is a Bizottsághoz szeretnék szólni néhány gondolat erejéig. 2013-ban 21 olyan eset volt, amikor a tagállami kormányok elmulasztották az Európai Központi Bankkal való egyeztetést, miközben törvényeket hoztak, pénzügyi jellegű törvényeket. Négy olyan ország van, amelyik egyébként ezt immár sorozatosan teszi, és a Bizottság, úgy tűnik, hogy ezt eddig jó szemmel nézte. Felkérem a tisztelt Bizottságot, tegyen meg mindent a jövőben, hogy a notóriusan nem egyeztető tagországokat igenis megfelelő módon felelősségre vonja.

  Seán Kelly (PPE). - Mr President, this debate without President Draghi is a bit like Hamlet without the Prince, but we will plough ahead regardless.

When President Draghi was first appointed, I said he was a breath of fresh air. I think he has proven that since, and he has been given credit generally for saving the euro and, possibly, saving the European Union. It took courage and wisdom and initiative. I have three questions for him.

Question one: he mentioned interest rates. I would like to know from him when he thinks they might start to rise and by how much? Question two: he said that quantitative easing was the only remaining measure open to the ECB to deal with the financial crisis. If that fails, what then?

And the third question: he has made Vítor Constâncio available to us for the banking inquiry in Ireland. Would he encourage his predecessor, Jean-Claude Trichet, to do the same? I do not think there are restrictions on him to appear, and maybe he might be able to influence him to do likewise.

(Fine della procedura catch-the-eye)

  Valdis Dombrovskis, Vice-President of the Commission. - Mr President, let me reiterate that Parliament has an important role in the debate on European economic policies and the Commission fully supports the active role of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) in the dialogue with the ECB. This is an important component of the ECB’s transparency and democratic accountability.

The ECB has demonstrated a clear commitment to address the risk of too prolonged a period of very low inflation, and it will continue to play a key role in the overall policy-setting of the euro area. It is also now time for public authorities at all levels to take responsibility within their respective mandates.

Following today’s debate, I note only that most of the questions were addressed to the ECB, and I think it is up to the ECB to find a way to respond to those questions. I will just take up one point which was been raised about Greece. In fact, if you look at Greece’s programme, Greece has already recovered a considerable part of its loss of competitiveness prior to the crisis and, while implementing structural reforms, it keeps recovering those losses. Actually the whole point of structural reforms is to strengthen the competitiveness of the country, and that is exactly what Greece has been doing to deal with its economic problems within the euro area.

Let me conclude by repeating the three main pillars of the EU’s economic and social policy in 2015. First, a coordinated boost to investment; second, a renewed commitment to structural reform; and third, responsible fiscal policies. Simultaneous action in all three areas is critical to restore confidence and to reduce the uncertainty that is holding back investment. The impact of the crisis has not only been cyclical, as highlighted by the weakness in aggregate demand. It also has a significant structural component, which has lowered the potential growth of EU economies. We therefore need to use the opportunities that monetary policy and low energy prices are creating to move forward with adequate fiscal and structural reforms and policies, both on the demand and supply sides of the economies.

  Pablo Zalba Bidegain, ponente. - Señor Presidente, permítame lamentar, en primer lugar, la ausencia del señor Draghi, pero también en su defensa hay que decir que este debate estaba previsto a las cinco y media de la tarde y ha empezado con más de una hora de retraso. Y me consta que el Presidente estaba aquí al lado esperando a que empezara el debate. Por lo tanto, creo que es importante y pido a la Presidencia que haga una reflexión sobre los continuos retrasos en los debates parlamentarios.

Quiero reiterar mi bienvenida a las medidas anunciadas el pasado mes de enero por el Banco Central Europeo, y espero que esas medidas tengan un impacto directo en que el crédito fluya a las pequeñas y medianas empresas y familias que, sin duda alguna, son los motores del crecimiento y de la creación de empleo en la zona del euro. Sin olvidar que, si las medidas anunciadas por el BCE no van seguidas de reformas por los Estados miembros y por la Unión Europea, de nada servirán estas medidas anunciadas por el señor Mario Draghi.

Me gustaría destacar, ya que no lo he dicho en mi primera intervención, el esfuerzo que ha hecho el Banco Central Europeo en la publicación de las actas de sus reuniones, un esfuerzo por dotar de mayor transparencia al Banco Central Europeo. Y, obviamente, quisiera también destacar el papel que el Parlamento Europeo ha tenido en esta cuestión.

Por último, me gustaría, también, enfatizar la importancia de seguir avanzando en la tan ansiada y necesaria unión económica, unión fiscal y, en definitiva, unión política. Porque, si no seguimos avanzando, seguiremos todavía siendo frágiles y débiles con las próximas crisis económicas que nos puedan asolar.

Si de verdad nos queremos inmunizar, no tenemos más opción que seguir avanzando en esa unión económica y unión fiscal y, sin duda alguna, como se ha dicho aquí, el mercado único de capitales es un primer e importantísimo paso que tendríamos que dar en esta legislatura.

  Presidente. - La discussione è chiusa.

La votazione si svolgerà durante la prossima tornata.

Dichiarazioni scritte (articolo 162)

  Dominique Bilde (NI), par écrit. – Suite au rapport annuel de la BCE pour 2013, il est triste de constater la détermination de la Commission pour sauver l'euro alors même que les voyants économiques et financiers sont au rouge et témoignent, jour après jour, de l'inefficacité de cette monnaie unique inadaptée à l’économie de pays qui ont des contextes trop différents.

Le rapport dresse lui-même le constat accablant de la zone euro : chômage élevé, apathie de l'activité économique, risques possibles de déflation ou baisse des crédits accordés au secteur privé (alors que l'UE avait renfloué les Banques lors de la crise).

Pourtant ce rapport préconise de poursuivre toujours plus loin cette fuite en avant. Vouloir soutenir l'investissement et les PME en poursuivant la politique d'austérité est une hérésie. L'UE doit désormais comprendre que pour faire face aux dangers de la mondialisation, plutôt que de prôner un ultralibéralisme fou, il conviendrait de laisser aux États membres leur souveraineté budgétaire et monétaire et rétablir un protectionnisme intelligent aux frontières comme le pratiquent presque tous les États du monde. Tant que l'Europe des banques et de la finance perdurera, les peuples ne pourront définitivement être libres et la croissance ne repartira pas.

  Tamás Deutsch (PPE), írásban. – Üdvözlöm a Gazdasági és Pénzügyi Bizottság jelentését az Európai Központi Bank 2013-as éves jelentéséről. Szeretnék emlékeztetni, hogy az EKB-t is köti az Európai Unió működéséről szóló szerződés 9. cikke, mely kimondja, hogy „politikái és tevékenységei meghatározása és végrehajtása során az Unió figyelembe veszi a foglalkoztatás magas szintjének előmozdítására, a megfelelő szociális védelem biztosítására, a társadalmi kirekesztés elleni küzdelemre, valamint az oktatás, a képzés és az emberi egészség védelmének magas szintjére vonatkozó követelményeket.” Az Unió messze van az EU2020 Stratégia foglalkoztatási célkitűzéseinek elérésétől, az uniós munkanélküliségi ráta 10% felett van, és jelentős különbségek tapasztalhatóak az egyes tagállamok között. A negatív gazdasági és társadalmi hatásokon túl a magas munkanélküliség megingatja az állampolgárok Unióba vetett bizodalmát is. Tekintettel arra, hogy a kkv-k biztosítják a munkahelyek jelentős részét az Unióban, támogatásuk rendkívül fontos a foglalkoztatás fellendítése szempontjából. Ezért lényeges, hogy a kkv-k hitelfelvételi körülményeit megkönnyítsük, hiszen finanszírozási gondjaik egyértelműen gátolják a munkahelyteremtést.

  Mireille D'Ornano (NI), par écrit. – Le rapport annuel qui nous est présenté aujourd'hui aurait mérité une remise en question profonde de l'activité de la Banque centrale européenne et notamment en expliquant le retard pris dans sa réaction vis-à-vis du risque déflationniste qui paraissait pourtant évident depuis 2014 ainsi que l'absence de réformes structurelles et réglementaires dans le domaine bancaire et financier en zone euro. Toutefois, force est de constater que certains éléments ont été relevés à juste titre et j'invite le gouverneur de la Banque centrale et la Commission à mettre l'accent sur ceux-là. La réforme du système bancaire n'a pas été menée et nous demeurons dans une situation grave où les PME connaissent de vraies difficultés d'accès au crédit bancaire cependant que les banques, après avoir pris des risques inconsidérés et favorisé leur endettement, ne sont pas capables de financer les investissements de long terme dont nous avons besoin. Enfin, j'attire votre attention sur un point particulier qui est celui du rôle et de l'action de la BCE: Francfort doit faire preuve de prudence dans ses prévisions optimistes à deux ou trois ans et dans les bas taux d'intérêt qu'elle choisit. La BCE ne doit pas se prétendre l'oracle économique de l'Europe.

  Monika Flašíková Beňová (S&D), písomne – Európska centrálna banka sa zamerala hlavne na znižovanie napätia na finančných trhoch a obnovu dôvery investorov v jednotnú menu. Najmä v období hospodárskej a finančnej krízy treba oceniť, že Európska centrálna banka je pripravená robiť potrebné kroky, ktoré sú nevyhnutné na stabilizáciu situácie a záchranu eura. Na druhej strane však hospodárska činnosť aj naďalej stagnuje, pretože v roku 2013 zaznamenala eurozóna negatívny rast HDP, už druhý rok za sebou a vysoká miera nezamestnanosti v Európe ohrozuje stabilitu európskeho projektu a zvyšuje obavy občanov členských štátov Európskej únie. Mechanizmus prenosu menovej politiky je, bohužiaľ, vážne oslabený a prínos Európskej centrálnej banky znížiť úrokové sadzby je minimálny, čo je problém, pretože veľmi nízke úrokové sadzby vedú v dlhodobom časovom horizonte k vážnym narušeniam podnikateľského sektora a prejavujú sa ako poškodzujúce pre súkromné úspory a dôchodkové plány. Oceňujem však, že Európska centrálna banka opakovane potvrdzuje, že je schopná a kompetentná v rámci svojho mandátu využívať nekonvenčné nástroje a meniť rozsah svojich zásahov v prípade príliš dlhého obdobia nízkej inflácie. Veľmi ma teší, že táto inštitúcia sa otvára kontrole a ide pozitívnym príkladom ostatným inštitúciám svojím rozhodnutím o zverejňovaní zápisnice zo svojich schôdzí, čo určite privíta aj široká verejnosť.

  Igor Šoltes (Verts/ALE), pisno. – Evropska centralna banka vsako leto pripravi letno poročilo, ki vsebuje informacije o aktivnostih na področju evropskega sistema centralnih bank in monetarne unije. Gospodarska dejavnost v državah članicah je še vedno šibka, leta 2013 je bila rast BDP v euroobmočju namreč že drugo leto zapored negativna, pri čemer je visoka brezposelnost v nekaterih državah euroobmočja dosegla raven, ki ogroža njihovo stabilnost ter zmanjšuje javno in politično podporo evropskega projekta. Eden od razlogov za šibko gospodarsko dejavnost je finančna razdrobljenost, saj imajo mala in srednja podjetja veliko višje stroške posojil, še posebej v tistih državah, ki se soočajo s težkimi gospodarskimi pogoji. Zato prihaja do izkrivljanja na enotnem trgu, ki upočasnjuje okrevanje in povečuje razlike med državami. Pomanjkanje kapitala in financiranja slabi sposobnost podjetij, da ostanejo konkurenčna in rastejo ter ohranjajo in ustvarjajo nova delovna mesta. Države članice naj obravnavajo vzroke za finančno razdrobljenost, kot so različne strukture tveganja, zaradi katerih je posojanje v nekaterih državah dražje, in izvedejo ustrezne strukturne reforme za ponovno vzpostavitev ugodnega poslovnega okolja.

  Ildikó Gáll-Pelcz (PPE), írásban. – Az EKB szerepe még inkább felértékelődik, hisz nagyon sok területen kap új feladatot, tehát még inkább nagyobb figyelem hárul majd a bank tevékenységére. Éppen ezért fontosnak tartom a Parlamenttel és a szakbizottságunkkal folytatott még szorosabb együttműködést annak érdekében, hogy megvalósulhasson a valódi demokratikus kontroll. Üdvözlöm, hogy az elmúlt évekhez hasonlóan az ez évi jelentésben is ragaszkodtak annak a Szerződésekben is világosan rögzített ténynek a lefektetéséhez, hogy a központi bank egyetlen és fő szerepe az árfolyam – így a közös valuta, az euró – stabilan tartása, s ezáltal sikerült helyes kontextusba helyezni az EKB politikáját. Fontosnak tartom továbbá elismerni a tényt, miszerint az EKB múlt évben végzett hosszú távú refinanszírozási műveletei nélkül sokkal nagyobb árfolyam-ingadozással kellett volna számolnia Európának.

Ebből következőleg pedig valószínűleg sokkal nagyobb pénzkínálat halmozódott volna a piacokon, adott esetben sokszor rossz részvények formájában, ami inflációnövekedéshez, majd túlzott árfolyam-növekedéshez vezethetett volna. Ugyanakkor azt látom, hogy az EKB-nak azonnal neki kell fognia ezen egyszeri pénzpiaci műveletek kivezetéséhez is, amint csökken a feszültség a bankszektorban, valamint ha az inflációra vonatkozó gazdásági mutatók ezt a döntést lehetővé teszik. A jövő, illetve a formálódó bankunió kapcsán egyetértek a bevezetés fontosságával, amelynek jól kell tükröznie a nemzeti bankszektoron belüli sokszínűséget.

  Ramón Jáuregui Atondo (S&D), por escrito. – Uno de los elementos más importantes de la intervención del Presidente del Banco Central Europeo en el Pleno del 25 de febrero es el relativo a la necesidad de aumentar la soberanía compartida en la zona del euro. La unión monetaria no es sólida a largo plazo si no se acompaña de una unión económica, fiscal y presupuestaria, capaz de compensar las perturbaciones macroeconómicas que se producen en aquella, lo que a su vez requiere una unión política federal. Como bien ha explicado el señor Draghi, la integración basada en instituciones comunes, como la moneda, es más efectiva que aquella que se estructura a través de reglas, como el Pacto de Estabilidad y Crecimiento. Por consiguiente, es preciso dar pasos concretos para la creación de una capacidad fiscal de la zona del euro, alimentada con impuestos tales como la tasa a las transacciones financieras internacionales, y con capacidad de sostener un tesoro que emita deuda pública denominada en euros, lo que a su vez contribuye a aumentar la liquidez y la estabilidad financiera de la unión monetaria.

  Barbara Kappel (NI), schriftlich. – Die Europäische Zentralbank wird alles tun, um den Euro zu stabilisieren, das sagte EZB-Präsident Mario Draghi und startete in der Folge 2012 mit Quantitative Easing I. Im Jänner 2015 wurde Quantitative Easing II im EZB-Rat beschlossen. Unglaubliche 1.130 Milliarden Euro werden ab März d. J. in den Ankauf von gedeckten Schuldverschreibungen und Wertpapieren öffentlicher und privater Emittenten fließen. Mit dieser enormen Geldschwemme und den gleichzeitig sehr niedrigen Zinsen hat die EZB ihre geldpolitischen Möglichkeiten ausgereizt und kann nun nur noch an die Eurozonen-Mitglieder appellieren, ihre Haushalte zu konsolidieren und Strukturreformen umzusetzen. Denn nur mit solider Finanzpolitik – im Gleichklang mit einer soliden Geldpolitik – kann die Krise überwunden, können Investitionen angekurbelt und kann die Wettbewerbsfähigkeit Europas gestärkt werden. Wettbewerbsfähigkeit, die so wichtig ist für Wirtschaftswachstum und die Schaffung von Beschäftigung. Neben der Geld- und Währungspolitik nimmt die EZB für den Euroraum auch wichtige Aufsichtsfunktionen wahr, nämlich den Single Supervisory Mechanism und den Single Resolution Mechanism, die zwei tragenden Säulen der Bankenunion. Bankenstresstest und Asset Quality Review haben aber gezeigt, dass es im europäischen Bankensystem nach wie vor große Schwachstellen gibt. Gleichzeitig zeigen die Stresstests auch die Grenzen des institutionellen Rahmens auf. Hier gilt es nachzuschärfen, seitens des Gesetzgebers, aber auch seitens der EZB.

  Κώστας Μαυρίδης (S&D), γραπτώς. – Είμαι ικανοποιημένος που κάποιοι συνάδελφοι αποδέχονται τώρα ότι τα δημοσιονομικά μέτρα δεν αρκούν για το πρόβλημα της οικονομίας και για να επανέλθει η Ευρωπαϊκή οικονομία σε τροχιά ανάπτυξης. Αυτό αποτελεί ιδεολογική πρόοδο, όταν προέρχεται από όσους θεωρούν ότι η ελεύθερη αγορά μόνη της εργάζεται για το καλό του πολίτη. Ωστόσο, δεν αρκεί μια θεωρητική επισήμανση ότι πάμε λάθος. Δεν αρκεί η υπόδειξη για λάθος πορεία. Απαιτείται να υποδείξουμε και την σωστή κατεύθυνση. Οι ΗΠΑ μπήκαν σε αυτή την οικονομική κρίση πολύ πριν την ΕΕ, αλλά είναι σε σαφώς καλύτερη κατάσταση από εμάς. Τι έκαναν διαφορετικό; Δεν έμειναν σε θεωρητικές επισημάνσεις αλλά η Κεντρική Τράπεζα των ΗΠΑ προχώρησε γρήγορα σε επεκτατική νομισματική πολιτική. Στην ΕΕ για χρόνια κάποιοι έβλεπαν φαντάσματα, όπως ο πληθωρισμός, για να φτάσουμε σήμερα να μιλάμε για το αντίθετο, για τον κίνδυνο του αποπληθωρισμού. Καταλήγω με ένα ερώτημα που αφορά την Ευρωπαϊκή Κεντρική Τράπεζα (ΕΚΤ). Οι προσδοκίες στην οικονομία, όπως αυτές προεξοφλούνται στις αγορές, διαδραματίζουν καθοριστικό ρόλο στην αποκατάσταση της εμπιστοσύνης και κατ' επέκταση στην επαναφορά της ανάπτυξης στην πραγματική οικονομία. Μετά την ανακοίνωση του προγράμματος για ποσοτική χαλάρωση με αγορά ομολόγων από την ΕΚΤ, είδαμε τα πρώτα σημάδια. Είστε ικανοποιημένοι; Είναι αυτό που αναμένατε; Αν όχι, έχετε εναλλακτικό σχεδιασμό;

  Davor Škrlec (Verts/ALE), napisan. – Izvješće Europske središnje banke iznosi kako 2013.godina nije bila povoljna godina za europsku ekonomiju. Naime, u odnosu na 2012. godinu nezaposlenost unutar Europske unije porasla je za 0,7 posto. Predviđanja za 2013. godinu su nametnula očekivanje za smanjenjem nezaposlenosti od 0,2 posto te su se ista djelomično ostvarila. Drugim riječima, nezaposlenost se zaista smanjila, međutim, među državama članicama zabilježene su znatne razlike u stopama nezaposlenosti. Hrvatska je prilikom ulaska u Europsku uniju 2013. godine zabilježila visoku stopu nezaposlenosti od 17,3 posto.

Duboko sam zabrinut zbog veoma malenog pada stope nezaposlenosti mladih. Naime, u odnosu na 2008. godinu, prvo tromjesečje 2014. godine zabilježilo je pad nezaposlenosti mladih od 5 posto, što je izuzetno loš rezultat. Veliki problem također predstavlja i nedostatak kredita za mala i srednja poduzeća u pojedinim državama članicama. Upravo mala i srednja poduzeća okosnica su europske ekonomije i njenog brzog oporavka, stoga je nužno da ESB razmotri mogućnost pokretanja posebnog programa koji bi podržao njihov pristup zajmovima. Svi navedeni rezultati upućuju kako se Europa još uvijek nalazi daleko od ostvarivanja ciljeva strategije Europa 2020 te ovim putem pozivam Europsku središnju banku da provedbom svoje politike u budućnosti taj cilj i osvijesti.

  Dubravka Šuica (PPE), napisan. – Žalosti činjenica da su se prognoze pokazale točne jer je BDP u eurozoni 2013. godine razvidno pao za 0,4 posto, a nezaposlenost je, za razliku od prethodne godine, u 2013.porasla za 6 posto. Jasno je kako postoji rizik da se zbog trendova povezanih sa zapošljavanjem i smanjenjem siromaštva neće dostići nacionalni ciljevi u okviru strategije Europa 2020. stoga je Europska središnja banka tijekom 2013. dva puta smanjila kamatne stope koje nažalost nisu dovele do lakšeg pristupa kreditima za kućanstva i poduzeća, rasta BDP-a niti otvaranja radnih mjesta.

Pozdravljam spremnost Europske središnje banke da poduzme nužne korake za spas eura, iako je gospodarska aktivnost još uvijek usporena uz negativan rast BDP-a u europodručju 2013. gdje je također prisutna visoka stopa nezaposlenosti, posebice mladih. Smatram da je glavni zadatak Europske središnje banke očuvanje stabilnosti cijena, ostvarivanje održivog gospodarskog, društvenog napretka i zaposlenosti što je u velikoj mjeri i ostvareno s obzirom na tešku gospodarsku situaciju.

Zato vjerujem da je ključno stvoriti uvjete za otvaranje investicija u eurozoni, ali i izvan nje te se još odlučnije posvetiti otvaranju visokokvalitetnih radnih mjesta s obzirom na visoku stopu nezaposlenosti mladih koja predstavljaju veliki rizik za gospodarsku i socijalnu stabilnost EU-a.

  Marco Valli (EFDD), per iscritto. – Dopo cinque anni di attesa, la BCE ha sparato l'ultima cartuccia nel disperato tentativo di rilanciare l'economia nell'eurozona, ma il quantitative easing arriva troppo tardi per contrastare efficacemente la spirale deflazionistica.

Come accaduto con i precedenti LTRO, l'esito più probabile è che l'ondata di liquidità immessa rimanga intrappolata nel vortice della finanza speculativa e non arrivi all'economia reale. Questo perché non si sono voluti risolvere i nodi principali che continuano a bloccare credito e investimenti produttivi in Europa, in primis la lotta alla speculazione e la necessità di armonizzazione fiscale, e si è invece puntato tutto su riforme strutturali e austerità.

Affinché la politica monetaria sia efficace, in realtà, l'eurozona ha urgente bisogno di una vera riforma strutturale del sistema bancario, basata sulla separazione tra attività di credito e attività finanziaria, per riportare le banche ad esercitare la raccolta del risparmio con il solo scopo di garantire il credito all'economia reale. Inoltre, la versione europea del QE, misura di politica monetaria non convenzionale per eccellenza, è già diventata il simbolo di un'unione monetaria fallita e di una "banca centrale non convenzionale" che, come dimostrato dalla necessità di limitare la condivisione dei rischi sulla BCE ad un misero 8 per cento, non riesce nemmeno ad esprimere una politica monetaria unica.

  Milan Zver (PPE), pisno. – Svetovna banka je države euroobmočja pred kratkim opozorila, da jim grozi ponovna recesija oz. permanentna stagnacija, ki lahko prinese novo dolžniško krizo v EU. Kvantitativno sproščanje je zadnji možni ukrep Evropske centralne banke, da bi pomagala stagnirajočemu gospodarstvu, saj niti izjemno nižanje obrestnih mer ni uspelo spodbuditi rasti. Enostavnega odgovora na težave evropskega gospodarstva ni, in potrebna bo kombinacija ukrepov. Izjemni ukrepi Evropske centralne banke bodo učinkoviti le, če bodo države dosledno izvajale strukturne reforme, spoštovale pravila pakta za stabilnost in rast ter če bo EU uspela zagnati investicijski cikel v sklopu ambicioznega Evropskega sklada za strateške naložbe.