Пълен протокол на разискванията

Вторник, 28 април 2015 г. - Страсбург

15. Фондове на паричния пазар (разискване)

  President. – The next item is the report by Neena Gill, on behalf of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Money Market Funds (COM(2013)0615 – C7—0263/2013 – 2013/0306(COD)) (A8-0041/2015).

  Neena Gill, rapporteur. – Madam President, Commissioner Hill – the Council is absent – colleagues, tomorrow we vote on a critical piece of financial legislation: the regulation of money market funds (MMFs). This is a EUR 1 trillion industry too big to be ignored. The financial crisis has made it abundantly clear that these funds pose systemic risks and can lead to financial instability and recourse to the public purse. During the crisis, the key vulnerability was when investors wanted to liquidate funds quickly. These so-called runs meant that the asset managers had to close them down and the investors lost their money.

The previous Parliament failed to find an agreement on this file. From the beginning, when I took over, it was clear to me that this was an issue that strongly divided this House. Between the supporters of the CNAV MFF and the VNAV MFF, each camp has about 50% of the market, and is supported by at least one Member State and opposed sometimes by another – a bit like when you have two strong football teams in one city.

The divisions experienced in this House are also mirrored in the Council. Therefore, I would like to remind colleagues that it is not our role as legislators to decide which team we should be supporting. Both have their value to different investors. Our role is to ensure that any type of MMF is transparent, liquid and stable so that we do not face the burdens of the 2008 financial crisis again, while recognising that MFFs are of value to many types of businesses, local authorities and non-profits that support our economy and use MFFs as a cash management tool. Salaries and other funds are placed in MFFs as these offer an easy return both in terms of interest and of liquidity. They can, and do, make a positive contribution to the real economy.

However, it would be an understatement if I said that achieving a degree of understanding of each other’s point of view was straightforward when we looked at this report. But I am pleased that we did manage to find a compromise between the S&D, the EPP and ALDE in the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs. What we have achieved, apart from strengthening the viability of the MFF sector, is to introduce three new categories of funds – LVNAV, Retail CNAV and Public Debt CNAV. These solutions would not have been possible had it not been for the cooperation and flexibility demonstrated by many colleagues and especially the shadow rapporteurs.

However, I have to say that I am disappointed that, despite taking many concerns of the GUE/NGL, the Greens and the ECR on board, that they did not support the proposal in committee. I do find it ironic that their preferred positions, for whatever reasons, would result in a totally unregulated MFF sector being allowed to continue, which would put our fragile economic recovery at risk. I do find this baffling. For me it is important to get this on the statute books sooner rather than later. Therefore, I would urge them to reconsider their positions and support this report so we can move to a trilogue stage from a greater position of strength.

On that, I would also say to the Council Presidency – which is absent – that it is being made an offer that it cannot refuse in terms of achievements for the Latvian Presidency. I would thus ask Commissioner Hill to take this up with the Presidency to ensure that it does move forward quickly. I would also like to take this opportunity to thank the earlier Italian Presidency, which made considerable progress on this dossier and was instrumental in introducing me to the concept of LVNAV.

  Jonathan Hill, Member of the Commission. – Madam President, I am very glad to be here today because it means that we have got to the point of a plenary vote and that is an amazing achievement. A huge amount of hard work has been needed to get this far and I am very keen to congratulate publicly Ms Gill on the part she has played in getting us here.

Money market funds are important as a source of short-term financing in our economy, but they also have systemic implications and that is why we need to make money market funds in Europe safer. The Commission proposal stressed the role of safeguards for MMFs, covering authorisation, supervision, transparency and limits on what MMFs can invest in, and most of that is not contentious. It will reduce risks, but also allow MMFs to continue their essential role for Europe’s companies. I know that there are some outstanding issues that still need to be resolved, but I believe that the ECON compromise has helped provide a new impetus and Member States have signalled a fresh willingness to resume negotiations.

In her proposal, Ms Gill has wisely concluded that MMF reform does not have to take a one-size-fits-all approach. MMFs serve many purposes, so to acknowledge that fact we need a variety of types, and that seems to me to be a good principle for us to uphold. I believe that Parliament’s proposal for a low-volatility MMF to replace the current stable redemption MMF is a good basis for discussion with the Council. And as the LVNAV MMF is a direct successor to the CNAV, we will of course monitor how it develops and ensure it both provides a useful service to the economy and deals with risks in an appropriate way. The Commission is examining whether the proposed 20 basis point spread is appropriate to avoid investor runs.

Ms Gill has also proposed two alternative fund models – government and small investor CNAV MMFs – and these two types of MMF will continue operating under the classic CNAV model. I think it is right that we should have a broader range of choices available, including government CNAV MMFs, small investor CNAV MMFs, LVNAV MMFs and VNAV MMFs (try saying that after you have had a drink!) in line with our diverse marketplace and national traditions.

The Commission wants to ensure that MMFs continue to provide a stable, secure tool for our companies to manage their cash without posing a threat to our financial system. We will continue to provide all the technical support that may be needed to both Parliament and the Council. I hope that we can maintain our current momentum. I will certainly work with the Presidency to make as rapid progress as possible, and conclude this important file in the near future by adopting what I believe is a credible MMF reform.

IN THE CHAIR: ADINA-IOANA VĂLEAN
Vice-President

  Brian Hayes, on behalf of the PPE Group. – Madam President, firstly can I congratulate Neena Gill for her work as rapporteur on this very important file, and I would also thank other shadow rapporteurs who worked with me on what has been a difficult and contentious file – not just during this mandate but also under the previous mandate. I think we have a workable compromise that we can now bring forward to the Council in intense trilogue negotiations. I also think it was very important that in the compromise on this file, two distinct parts of this industry are reflected – the CNAV and the VNAV industries. It is crucially important for Europe that we keep the EUR 1 trillion MMF investment in Europe at a time when we are trying to make sure that we have long-term investment in our companies and businesses, big and small, here within the European Union. So that was crucial.

It is also crucially important that we are behind the curve by comparison to the United States which has already regulated in this area. So we do need to get our act together, we do need to regulate, but we need to do it in a proportionate and a reasonable way to ensure that these funds remain within the euro system. In the LVNAV proposal I think we have many new features, additional safeguards, daily and weekly liquidity requirements, regular reporting transparency, fees and gates. A totally new system, a transparent system is now put in place to deal with the systemic shock issues that Commissioner Hill spoke of.

There is one outstanding issue and it concerns the review/sunset clause which I know has been the cause of some contention. In conclusion, I would be interested in hearing the views of Commissioner Hill as he responds to this debate as to the viability of a sunset clause for the new LVNAV product. If we want the LVNAV product to work, to sustain itself, to move forward, we do need to ensure that there is a review after a few years. I would be interested in his view on the sunset proposal contained within the current compromise and the Commission’s position on this issue. Congratulations again to Neena Gill for her work in this area.

  Roberto Gualtieri, a nome del gruppo S&D. – Signora Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, penso che quello che il Parlamento si accinge a votare domani è un buon compromesso, che ha il merito soprattutto di definire un testo che può realmente essere la base per dotare l'Unione europea di una legislazione che disciplini i Money Market Funds, il che è urgente e necessario.

Non occorre che io ripeta gli elementi di questo testo di compromesso che l'onorevole Gill ha illustrato bene. Sono importanti la creazione del VNAV, quel meccanismo che penso possa funzionare per passare da due a quattro cifre, mantenimento che pure avrà una limitata importanza del retail, del debito pubblico e gli altri vari aspetti.

Vorrei sottolineare, anche rispondendo all'onorevole Hayes, che la sunset clause è parte integrante di questo compromesso, è parte integrante del compromesso politico e quindi costudisce un elemento cruciale per avere quel vasto consenso necessario per poi avviare un trilogo con successo.

Infine, accolgo con favore le posizioni del Commissario Hill sulla necessità di procedere dopo il nostro voto con passi in avanti e nella misura del possibile per avviare un trilogo. Quindi, rilancio l'invito al Consiglio di procedere rapidamente, sulla base del testo del Parlamento, per avviare realmente il prima possibile un negoziato su questo testo. Chiedo naturalmente alla Commissione di utilizzare tutta la sua forza di moral suasion verso la Presidenza del Consiglio perché realmente dopo il voto di domani possiamo avere una svolta nei tempi e nel contenuto ed avviare finalmente anche la necessaria regolamentazione dello shadow banking.

  Kay Swinburne, on behalf of the ECR Group. – Madam President, the nearly EUR 1 trillion currently invested in European money market funds serve an important purpose in our economy, providing corporations, governments and public bodies with a short-term investment vehicle that is a trusted alternative to bank financing. At a global level, the FSB has recommended measures to improve the safety of money market funds (MMFs) and to avoid runs through improved rules on transparency and diversification for MMFs, as well as limits on sponsored support.

The initial proposals from the Commission would have seen an end to the CNAV industry, whilst failing to convince anyone that VNAVs offer a wholly better or equivalent option. The ECR has argued consistently for both CNAV and VNAV MMFs to be able to continue, as they offer necessary and different services to our businesses and public bodies. They are not mutually exclusive, and we do not believe that one model is better than another. However, national bias has played an irresponsible role here. The alternative, low-volatility NAV proposed by the rapporteur seems to be a workable compromise, and I thank her for her work on it. However, it is undermined by the review clause calling for an end for this authorisation within five years. That makes such vehicles unviable for providers and investors. Improving diversification and transparency rules while allowing MMFs to function would serve the European economy and should be our sole goal.

  Petr Ježek, on behalf of the ALDE Group. – Madam President, money market funds in the EU have systemic relevance as they are worth approximately EUR 1 trillion, as we have already heard, and constitute around 15% of the EU funds industry. It was thus of crucial importance to allow the European economy and its investors to continue benefiting from both CNAV and VNAV funds.

I am happy to say that this text answers our initial objectives by offering a balanced approach. These new rules will make sure money market funds do not threaten financial stability nor mislead investors by continued financing of the real economy in Europe.

The newly-created category of low volatility NAVs will be able to use the same valuation method as CNAVs as long as the value of the fund does not deviate too much from the market value. This means more transparency for investors and will prevent run risk in the case of adverse market conditions.

The task was not easy at all. Those who followed the files during the previous and current mandate can confirm that. The negotiating team and the European Parliament can be proud of having managed broad agreement on such a polemical and critical file. It is high time that the EU fulfilled its international commitment in this field and provided some answers that are up to the challenge in order to address the possible systemic risk posed by MMFs while offering the industry a workable solution.

Parliament has done its job, I hope. I believe this unexpectedly positive outcome will send a strong signal to the Council that it has now to fulfil its mission and deliver.

  Fabio De Masi, im Namen der GUE/NGL-Fraktion. – Frau Präsidentin! Wenn wir die Banken regulieren wollen, erzählen uns die Lobbyisten: Wenn ihr das tut, wandert das Geschäft zu den Schattenbanken. Schattenbanken waren eine Ursache der Bankenkrise, und nun haben wir die Chance, einen Teil – die Geldmarktfonds – zu regulieren. Jetzt hören wir: Wenn ihr das tut, zerstört ihr die Eine-Billion-Euro-Industrie, oder das Geschäft wandert in die USA.

Aber der europäische Markt ist wichtig und – ja – auch liquide genug, um entschlossen zu regulieren. CNAVs garantieren Investoren jeden Euro ihres Investments. Sie sind aber nicht so sicher wie Cash, sondern riskante Finanzprodukte.

Es kommt wirklich selten vor, dass meine Kollegin Eva Joly oder ich die Positionen unserer Regierungen vertreten. Aber Deutschland und Frankreich sowie internationale Aufsichtsbehörden haben gefordert, CNAVs zu beerdigen oder sie der Bankenregulierung zu unterwerfen. Neena sprach vorhin von einem Angebot, das wir nicht ablehnen können. Das ist ein Zitat von Marlon Brando aus dem Mafiafilm „Der Pate“. Ich sage Ihnen: Lassen Sie sich nicht erpressen.

Ich appelliere daher insbesondere an die deutschen und französischen Abgeordneten der Mehrheitsfraktionen, unseren Anträgen zuzustimmen.

  Eva Joly, au nom du groupe Verts/ALE. – Madame la Présidente, Monsieur le Commissaire, Madame la Rapporteure et chers collègues, les Européens – au sein du G20 – se sont engagés à agir vite et fort pour réguler la quantité grandissante de crédits gérés en dehors du système bancaire classique. Nous nous sommes surtout engagés à limiter le risque systémique né des fonds VLC et de leur fausse promesse d'un remboursement à valeur constante.

Je suis désolée de dire que le texte voté en commission ECON ne répond pas à nos engagements internationaux. Le CSF et l'OICV ont recommandé la conversion des fonds à valeur constante en fonds à valeur variable ou, lorsque cela était trop difficile, d'appliquer à ces fonds les mêmes règles qu'aux banques classiques. La suppression du coussin de fonds propres proposé par la Commission européenne a conduit au rejet de la seconde option. Pour autant la conversion des VLC n'a pas été menée jusqu'au bout. En créant trois nouvelles catégories de VLC, dont une seule serait soumise à une clause de transition, c'est bien le choix de préserver un certain secteur à risques qui a été fait.

Voilà pourquoi, si le texte reste inchangé, le groupe écologique serait amené à voter contre. C'est pour cette raison que nous avons déposé une nouvelle série d'amendements, dont l'un propose d'étendre la clause de transition aux trois catégories de VLC nouvellement créées. Si notre amendement à l'article 27 venait à être adopté, le groupe des Verts, dans son ensemble, serait prêt à voter pour le texte ainsi modifié.

Madame la Rapporteure et chers collègues, je ne crois pas que le texte voté en commission ECON reflète vraiment l'équilibre politique au sein de notre assemblée. La pression des lobbies et la détermination de quelques collègues à ne pas agir a fortement déformé notre perception. Je crois que, dans cette assemblée, une majorité de parlementaires veulent limiter ce risque systémique qui menace à terme l'ensemble des économies européennes.

  Steven Woolfe, on behalf of the EFDD Group. – Madam President, money market funds: not a single one caused a systemic risk during the course of the crash. Money market funds: not a single person lost any money throughout the crash in Europe. Money market funds are essential for the real economy to work.

But if you listen to the people in this Chamber – such as the previous speaker we have just heard – money market funds were the cause of all the crises, the jobs, the unemployment, and the people dying and suffering in Europe today. Nothing could be further from the truth. But what is the truth? It is that in Europe we have a crisis in our economies and we have a crisis of unemployment which is caused, firstly, by the euro itself and the impact it has on our economies and, secondly, the meddling of this Chamber in the financial markets and business as a whole.

We already know that in the United Kingdom HSBC is considering leaving to go to Asia because of EU regulations. Asia is succeeding because Europe is failing.

  Barbara Kappel (NI). – Frau Präsidentin, Herr Kommissar Hill! Die Reform und Regulierung der Geldmarktfonds ist in diesem Haus schon in der letzten Wahlperiode diskutiert worden. Es ist der Berichterstatterin hier sicherlich gelungen, einen Kompromiss zu erzielen, der für weite Teile des Hauses tragbar ist und auch für die betroffene Industrie gangbar ist.

Welche Punkte wurden im Bericht besonders herausgehoben? Das sind die systemischen Risiken – das wurde heute schon angesprochen: die enge Vernetzung von Banken, Versicherungen und der realen Wirtschaft mit den Geldmarktfonds und die Gefahr der Ansteckung, Liquiditätskomponente, Bonitätsbewertung, Portfoliostruktur und die Transparenz. Denn eines ist klar: Nur durch strenge Bankenregulierung und Niedrigzinspolitik verlagern sich systemische Risiken immer mehr zu den Schattenbanken. Deshalb muss hier reguliert werden, und dieses Haus hier hat bei den Geldmarktfonds begonnen.

Die Marktstruktur wurde angesprochen. Ich gehe hier mit Kommissar Hill. Verschiedene Anleger brauchen verschiedene Fonds und verschiedene Strukturen. Hier herrscht Vielfalt im Bericht, und das ist gut so.

Stresstests sind vierteljährlich vorgesehen, das ist tatsächlich richtungsweisend. Sie erinnern sich: Der Vizegouverneur der US-Notenbank, Fisher, hat neulich gesagt, wie wichtig es ist, Stresstests durchzuführen. Das ist für die USA wichtig, das ist für Europa wichtig. Deshalb schaffen diese Fonds Transparenz, Liquidität und Stabilität. Der Bericht ist positiv zu bewerten.

  Burkhard Balz (PPE). – Frau Präsidentin! Zunächst einmal meinen herzlichen Dank an die Frau Berichterstatterin und die Schattenberichterstatter. Sie haben gute Arbeit abgeliefert.

Wir sind sicherlich mit der Regulierung von Banken, Versicherungen und Fondsmanagern in den vergangenen Jahren schon weit vorangekommen. Aber um in der Regulierung erfolgreich zu sein, müssen wir auch mögliche Ausweichbewegungen ins Visier nehmen. Dazu gehören unbedingt die sogenannten Schattenbanken, die sich nicht mehr im Schatten bewegen dürfen. Daher begrüßen wir es sehr, dass das Europäische Parlament mit dem Ruf nach einer erstmaligen europaweiten Regulierung von Geldmarktfonds voranschreitet. Wir sind hier weiter als die Mitgliedstaaten. Für uns ist klar: Die Risiken von Geldmarktfonds müssen zügig und umfassend angepackt werden.

Geldmarktfonds müssen gegen einen unerwarteten Anlegersturm, einen Fondsrun, gewappnet sein. Dafür ist die Werthaltigkeit und Verlässlichkeit in der Anteilsbewertung besonders wichtig. Es muss um eine risikoadäquate Regulierung gehen. Geldmarktfonds brauchen strenge Transparenz und Liquiditätsregeln, die ihre Widerstandsfähigkeit in Stresssituationen sichern können. Sie müssen eine hohe Qualität an Vermögenswerten in ihren Büchern sicherstellen und dürfen nicht auf externe Unterstützung bauen. Es werden Anpassungen in den bestehenden Märkten nötig werden bis hin zur Prüfung, ob bestimmte Produkte fortbestehen können oder nicht.

Aber dafür muss die Regulierung nun in die Startlöcher kommen. Wir stehen nun zu Verhandlungen mit den Mitgliedstaaten bereit und werden weiter auf das Ziel hinarbeiten, Licht in den Schattenbankensektor zu bekommen.

  Jakob von Weizsäcker (S&D). – Frau Präsidentin! Auch wenn es Kollege Woolfe nicht wahrhaben möchte: Nach der Lehman-Pleite waren milliardenschwere Geldmarktfonds ein zentraler Brandbeschleuniger der Krise. Die Geldmarktfonds wollten den Banken aus Angst vor weiteren Bankenpleiten schlagartig kein Geld mehr leihen. Und die Anleger der Geldmarktfonds zogen panikhaft ihr Geld aus den Fonds ab. Am Ende musste der Steuerzahler bei Geldmarktfonds und Banken mit gigantischen Summen bzw. Garantien einspringen. Geldmarktfonds sind also Schattenbanken im engeren Sinne: in den Gefahren so ähnlich wie Banken, aber viel weniger reguliert. Das gilt insbesondere für Geldmarktfonds mit konstantem Nettoinventarwert – den sogenannten CNAV-Fonds. Das müssen wir endlich ändern!

Leider waren die Partikularinteressen der Geldmarktfonds – und wir haben das jetzt im Plenum auch noch einmal gehört – am Verhandlungstisch überrepräsentiert, was die Arbeit meiner hochgeschätzten Kollegin Neena Gill als Berichterstatterin im Sinne der europäischen Steuerzahler nicht gerade erleichtert hat. Ich möchte ihr an dieser Stelle für ihre anspruchsvolle und nervenaufreibende Arbeit herzlich danken.

Im Ergebnis wurde eher weniger erreicht, als eigentlich nötig wäre. Umso wichtiger ist es, dass das Parlament seine roten Linien unmissverständlich definiert. Die gefährlichen CNAVs dürfen keine Zukunft haben, und die problematische Kompromisskonstruktion der LVNAVs muss nach spätestens fünf Jahren ein Ende finden.

(Der Redner ist damit einverstanden, eine Frage nach dem Verfahren der „blauen Karte“ gemäß Artikel 162 Absatz 8 der Geschäftsordnung zu beantworten.)

  Steven Woolfe (EFDD), blue-card question. – You asked me a question, sir. It is very simple. Did one European VNAV fund collapse? Did any investors in any European VNAV funds lose any money? Did any countries lose out or have to bail out VNAV funds? I think you will find that the answer to all of them is no. You are simply creating a problem that did not exist, are you not?

  Jakob von Weizsäcker (S&D), blue-card answer. – I would just like to point out that Lehman was an American bank, very much funded by American money market funds. I just wonder about the counterfactual: what if Lehman had been a European bank funded by European money market funds?

  Bernd Lucke (ECR). – Frau Präsidentin! Ich glaube, es lässt sich schon argumentieren, dass CNAV-Fonds besonders anfällig für Runs sind. Insofern begrüße ich die Arbeit, die im Parlament gemacht worden ist, obwohl ich nicht davon überzeugt bin, dass wir mit den Lösungen bereits der Weisheit letzten Schluss gefunden haben. Insgesamt ist es natürlich so, dass der Grund für mögliche Runs nicht in den Fonds als solchen zu suchen ist, sondern in anderen Eigenschaften der zugrundeliegenden Realökonomien. Was wir haben, ist das Phänomen, dass insbesondere in Europa eine Situation existiert, in der sich die Märkte zum Teil sehr weit von ihrem Gleichgewicht entfernt haben, und Allokationen abseits vom Gleichgewicht sind anfällig dafür, dass schnelle Anpassungen im Bereich der Finanzbeziehungen existieren und entstehen.

Wir haben Zinsen, die so niedrig sind, dass sie private Verschuldung enorm fördern. Wir haben eine Situation der staatlichen Überschuldung in verschiedenen Ländern. Alles das ist etwas, was eigentlich die Krisenursache ist. Und da müssen die Probleme behoben werden!

  Gerolf Annemans (NI). – De kans op besmetting van de reële economie valt, gezien de aard van de geldmarktfondsen, groot uit. Of alweer een uitbreiding van de taken en bevoegdheden van de Europese Unie hier een goede oplossing is, betwijfel ik op principiële gronden, ook al zijn de hier voorziene aanzienlijke buffers, meer transparantie en dies meer, evidente maatregelen.

Maar tegelijk stelt men dat het 'de externe ratings zijn die voor runs kunnen zorgen'. Tja, dit lijkt wel een beetje 'schieten op de pianist'.

Het is naïef te denken dat de interne rating volgens de EU-maatstaven plots alle problemen, zoals asymmetrische informatie en adverse selectie, zal kunnen oplossen. Ik sta hier vandaag dus niet als loopjongen van de bankenlobby, wel als een nuchter parlementslid dat wil waarschuwen voor naïeve opvattingen.

Ik zie het al voor me, de weg die men op wil op lange termijn: een soort socialistisch politbureau, alias EU-ratingkantoor dat ratings van bijvoorbeeld Grieks staatspapier en consorten als 'top' en 'extreem veilig' gaat aanprijzen – conform de officiële EU-politiek – en waarover externe ratingbureaus hun mond moeten houden. Dan zeg ik: Neen bedankt.

  Theodor Dumitru Stolojan (PPE). – Doamna președintă, prin acest regulament urmărim să atingem două obiective majore: în primul rând, să asigurăm o protecție sporită investitorilor în fondurile mutuale, care acționează pe piața monetară investind în active financiare pe termen scurt și, în al doilea rând, să întărim stabilitatea financiară prin faptul că ne adresăm unei industrii de circa 1 000 de miliarde de euro.

Doresc să mulțumesc colegilor care au lucrat la acest raport pentru că, după o lungă negociere, au reușit să ajungă la amendamente de compromis, care permit atingerea acestor obiective. În mod deosebit subliniez amendamentele care limitează aria de aplicare a conceptului de valoare constantă a activelor nete, pe cele care privesc lichiditatea acestora, precum și prevenirea riscului determinat de o fugă neașteptată a investitorilor, standardele cu privire la evitarea concentrării riscante a portofoliului de investiții și transparența necesară.

  Markus Ferber (PPE). – Frau Präsidentin, Herr Kommissar, liebe Kolleginnen und Kollegen! Es geht doch um eine ganz banale Frage, die wir als Europäisches Parlament mit beantworten müssen. Erstens: Brauchen wir solche Instrumente? Wenn ja, wie können wir die Instrumente so sicher machen, dass nicht am Ende der Steuerzahler den Kopf dafür hinzuhalten hat?

Ich will es mal ganz einfach sagen. Da muss man sich natürlich schon die Frage stellen, ob ein Fonds – ein Geldmarktfonds –, dessen Inventarwert kapitalseitig dauerhaft garantiert ist, wirklich Marktgeschehen abbildet. Das ist eine Frage, mit der man sich beschäftigen muss. Und wer steht am Ende dafür gerade, dass auch im Falle eines Ansturms auf eine Bank oder in diesem Fall auf einen Geldmarktfonds hier ausgezahlt werden kann? Wir haben hier einen Ansatz gewählt, um das etwas aufzulösen. Ich bin damit auch noch nicht glücklich, das sage ich ganz offen. Ich hatte im Ausschuss Änderungsanträge eingereicht, die deutlich darüber hinausgegangen sind. Ich weiß noch nicht, ob wir für die Verhandlungen mit dem Rat hier einen ausgewogenen Ansatz haben.

Wir müssen zwei Seiten sehen. Nicht nur diejenigen, die diese Fonds anbieten, sondern auch diejenigen, die ihr Geld in diese Fonds investieren. Von daher sind die flexiblen Fonds sicherlich die leichter handhabbaren. Deswegen ist die Frage der Kapitalpuffer nach wie vor noch zu beantworten. Ich hoffe, dass der Rat hier entsprechende Vorschläge macht. Deswegen sollten wir, was die Überprüfung der kapitalgebundenen Fonds betrifft, insgesamt zu einer zeitlichen Überprüfung kommen.

(Der Redner ist damit einverstanden, eine Frage nach dem Verfahren der „blauen Karte“ gemäß Artikel 162 Absatz 8 der Geschäftsordnung zu beantworten.)

  Doru-Claudian Frunzulică (S&D), blue-card question. – These money market funds have been identified as acting as shadow banks and are, therefore, susceptible to different risks. In fact, the liquidity and diversification requirements for these money market funds have been strengthened, as have transparency and reporting requirements. However, they are not overseen like normal banks. Do you not think that all these funds should be overseen by the national banks – like all the other banks – with the same requirements?

  Markus Ferber (PPE), Antwort auf eine Frage nach dem Verfahren der „blauen Karte“. – Herr Kollege, Sie stellen jetzt mir diese Frage, weil Sie unbedingt Redezeit haben wollten, denn das hat mit meinem Vortrag nichts zu tun. Ich habe ausdrücklich gesagt, dass mir der jetzige Bereich noch nicht zu weit geht. Vielleicht finden wir uns da ja irgendwo.

  Krišjānis Kariņš (PPE). – Godājamie kolēģi, priekšsēdētājas kundze! Manuprāt, mums kā likumdevējiem ir viens galvenais uzdevums — tas ir nodrošināt spēles noteikumus uzņēmējdarbībā tā, lai Eiropas Savienībā kopumā būtu pēc iespējas vairāk investīciju un vairāk jaunu darbavietu. Mums ir jānodrošina Eiropas konkurētspēja faktiski pēc iespējas visas jomās pasaules tirgos — tas nozīmē digitālajā jomā, enerģētikā, rūpniecībā, pakalpojumu sektorā, tai skaitā finanšu sektorā.

Šajā direktīvā mēs runājam par naudas tirgu fondiem. Viens finanšu tirgus sastāvs. Proti, mēs runājam par mainīgiem un nemainīgiem aktīvu vērtības fondiem. Šis priekšlikums un doma, ka vienu šādu fondu Eiropā vajadzētu ierobežot, manuprāt, ir pretēja mūsu nolūkam Eiropai noturēt un attīstīt savu konkurētspēju. Kāpēc? Ja Eiropā mēs ierobežosim, šis tirgus, šī aktivitāte atstās, pametīs Eiropas Savienību, dosies uz Āziju un Amerikas Savienotajām Valstīm.

Tāpēc, manuprāt, kolēģi, doma ierobežot šo fondu darbību Eiropas Savienībā nav produktīva. Mums ir jāaizstāv darbavietas un Eiropas kopējā konkurētspēja. Paldies par uzmanību!

  Frank Engel (PPE). – Madam President, Commissioner, I was marvelling earlier at your juggling with the many abbreviations relating to this file and I will not attempt to do anything akin to that, so I will try to leave the abbreviations out of what I am going to say altogether.

I belong to the category of those who are content with what has been achieved in terms of compromise because the text that we are now contemplating, at least in Parliament, gives us better regulation, gives us encompassing regulation and does not prematurely close doors that need not necessarily be closed.

Many colleagues on the left seem to perceive these instruments as if they were the devil in disguise, if in disguise at all. I do not see that proven. Yes, they may be systemically relevant; but where has the systemic accident been, at least on the European continent, during the last years? I am not aware of one. Yes, there might have been difficulties in the United States with different regulation; but in Europe I do not recall anything like that.

Let us provide for more guarantees and more regulation right now, but let us give the Commission a serious opportunity to re-evaluate a certain type of money market funds in the years to come before we decide out of the blue – or what appears to me to be not totally irrelevant in this matter, because we hate them – to abolish a certain category of money market funds altogether.

  Pervenche Berès (S&D). – Madame la Présidente, le Parlement européen avait fait une tentative dans ce dossier, sous la précédente législature. Manifestement, sa position courageuse n'a pas permis de déboucher sur un accord avec le Conseil. Or, nous sommes ici dans un dossier tout à fait essentiel, qui met l'Europe sur le devant de la scène internationale.

Le traitement des fonds monétaires est une chose sur laquelle nous demandent d'agir toutes les organisations internationales qui s'intéressent à la stabilité des marchés ou à la lutte contre le système bancaire parallèle. C'est le cas de l'OICV et du Conseil de la stabilité financière, mais c'est aussi le cas des institutions européennes membres du CERS.

La position que ce Parlement européen va prendre doit être une position courageuse, qui nous permette de lutter effectivement contre ce pan important du système bancaire parallèle, n'ayons pas peur des mots. Cette position sera d'autant plus capitale que nous allons entrer en discussion avec le commissaire Hill sur la mise en place d'un marché des capitaux. Or, je ne voudrais pas que nous abordions cette discussion sur une future Union des capitaux européens sans avoir une stratégie claire au regard de ces fonds monétaires, dont les caractères volatiles doivent disparaître.

Catch-the-eye procedure

  Νότης Μαριάς ( ECR). – Κυρία Πρόεδρε, σε μια περίοδο όπου η Ευρωπαϊκή Κεντρική Τράπεζα διαθέτει 60 δισεκατομμύρια ευρώ τον μήνα, στο πλαίσιο του προγράμματος πιστωτικής χαλάρωσης, ο Ντράγκι και η παρέα του συνεχίζουν την εκβιαστική τους πολιτική κατά του ελληνικού λαού. Έτσι, ενώ εμείς εδώ στο Ευρωπαϊκό Κοινοβούλιο συζητούμε για τα αμοιβαία κεφάλαια και για τη βραχυχρόνια χρηματοδότηση επιχειρήσεων και κυβερνήσεων, ο Ντράγκι συνεχίζει να εφαρμόζει την πιστωτική ασφυξία κατά της Ελλάδας. Στις αρχές Φεβρουαρίου, ο Ντράγκι παράνομα απέκλεισε τα ομόλογα του ελληνικού δημοσίου από τις πράξεις του ευρωσυστήματος, όπου οι ελληνικές τράπεζες τα χρησιμοποιούσαν ως εγγύηση ("collateral") για την χρηματοδότησή τους από την ΕΚΤ. Στη συνέχεια η ΕΚΤ απαγόρευσε στις ελληνικές τράπεζες να αυξήσουν τις αγορές εντόκων γραμματίων T-Bills του ελληνικού δημοσίου. Στη Ρίγα, ο Ντράγκι προανήγγειλε ότι θα σφίξει ακόμη περισσότερο τη θηλιά γύρω από τις ελληνικές τράπεζες.

Στόχος του Ντράγκι και της παρέας του είναι να αναγκάσει την Ελλάδα να υποχωρήσει στις απαιτήσεις των δανειστών. Δεν θα τα καταφέρει όμως, διότι ο ελληνικός λαός θα νικήσει και θα πετάξει την Τρόικα έξω από την πατρίδα μας.

  Paul Rübig (PPE). – Frau Präsidentin! Ich glaube, dass diese Debatte nicht nur für die großen internationalen Akteure wichtig ist. Die haben natürlich sehr oft ihre eigenen Bankensysteme und tun sich in der Finanzierung oft deutlich leichter, weil sie ganz andere Konditionen haben als kleine und mittlere Betriebe. Ich glaube, für uns ist es besonders wichtig, dass wir daran denken, dass kleine und mittlere Betriebe, um wachsen zu können, Risikokapital brauchen. Und die Kernfrage ist: Wie können wir den kleinen und mittleren Betrieben helfen, dass sie Risikokapital bekommen, dass sie Haftungen übernehmen können? Wie gehen wir mit Bürgschaften um, die von der Familie, von Freunden gegeben werden? Wie können wir das steuerlich auch organisieren? Wie können wir das Wachstum – gerade bei denen, die gute Produkte haben und Dienstleistungen, die sich weltweit verkaufen lassen –unterstützen? Da spielen die Fonds eine ganz besondere Rolle. Die Kernfrage ist: Wie können wir sie formatieren, dass sie in Zukunft besser unterstützen können?

  Ivan Jakovčić (ALDE). – Gospođo predsjedavajuća, poštovani gospodine povjereniče, da trebaju nam novčani fondovi, trebaju nam mogućnosti za kratkoročno financiranje našega gospodarstva i naravno da će bez njih, i ako oni odu, biti teže za europsko gospodarstvo.

Ali nam istovremeno treba i europsko zakonodavtsvo, jer europsko zakonodavtsvo mora jamčiti oko novčanih fondova odgovarajuću stabilnost da bi ti fondovi zaista mogli funkcionirati na odgovarajući način. I slažem se da nam posebno trebaju takvi novčani fondovi koji će omogućiti malim ulagačima i zato podržavam ova dva osnovna principa, princip jasnosti ili transparentnosti, kako se voli reći i princip diversifikacije.

Ja mislim da će upravo temeljeći se i polazeći od ovoga da imamo europsko zakonodavstvo, transparentnost i diversifikaciju novčani fondovi biti, na način na koji su zamišljeni, opće prihvaćeni i na dobrobit europskog gospodarstva.

  Gianluca Buonanno (NI). – Signora Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, vorrei chiedere al Commissario Hill, che è inglese, visto che la City di Londra, i broker sono il fulcro dell'economia e della finanza, se lui è veramente indipendente rispetto a queste cose perché si è fatto tanto parlare, ma avete solo dato una mano ai grandi gruppi, alle banche e i piccoli li avete bastonati.

In Italia c'è un detto che dice: "le banche ti offrono l'ombrello quando c'è il sole, quando piove l'ombrello lo richiedono indietro". Cioè, quando non serve l'ombrello te lo offrono e quando invece ti serve te lo tirano via. Allora credo che in realtà voi, qua, dovete fare una cosa ben diversa, aiutare i piccoli, le famiglie, le imprese piccole e non pensare solo ai grandi gruppi perché l'unico ombrello che i cittadini vi fanno è questo. Questo è l'ombrello che vi possono fare perché l'Europa non fa assolutamente gli interessi dei piccoli e delle piccole imprese e delle famiglie. Questo è l'ombrello che vi fa l'Europa e l'Italia.

(End of catch-the-eye procedure)

  Jonathan Hill, Member of the Commission. – Madam President, it seems to me there is a very clear linkage between the operation of the markets and small businesses, namely: if you can make them work properly, you can get more money in investment flowing to the small businesses that we all want to see growing in Europe.

It has been a very interesting debate, if short. My admiration for Neena Gill has been increased through listening to the divergence of views that we have heard here, articulated very clearly and with equal passion. It confirms in my mind the importance of trying to make progress on the compromise that has been agreed so far. It is also a reflection of the broader challenges we face in looking at financial regulation as to how we can best balance growth and risk mitigation.

I am confirmed in my support and admiration for the work that Neena Gill has done. I will certainly underline to the Latvian Presidency the importance of making progress with this proposal. We have an opportunity now to get some momentum going, and if we do not take it, I fear that we will find it hard to get it back again.

As far as the specific question I was asked about a sunset clause is concerned, it is the case, obviously, that the phasing out of CNAV funds was not something that the Commission included in its original proposal. The most important issue for us – our bottom line, if you like – is that we get a sufficiently robust regime in place to deal with credit and interest rate risks for all money market funds, including CNAVs. If we can get the risk management regime right overall, that would deal with the question of the sunset clause. That is something we will be monitoring closely in the Council process, and obviously during the trilogue process that will follow.

We need to get a deal on money market funds. It would represent a significant step in moving closer to finalising the post-crisis reform agenda. A positive vote in tomorrow’s plenary would itself be a significant step towards securing that final deal.

  Neena Gill, rapporteur. – Madam President, I would like to thank Commissioner Hill and all my colleagues for their remarks. I strongly believe that we do have a sound and stable agreement.

On the clause: we have to recognise that this agreement is the result of lengthy negotiations which entailed give and take by all. I have stated from the beginning that this clause is a red line for my group. I am not convinced that it will prevent the LVNAV (low-volatility net asset value) from taking off. I think the financial sector is very innovative and I am sure they will make it work.

I also wanted to raise the issue the Greens and the GUE/NGL Group have pointed out. I think they have a very fundamentalist view on this file. It is all about their point of view and nothing else. When you look at it broken down, it means protection of one part of the industry and not the other. What really concerns me is that this approach will lead to nothing at all and a continued unregulated MMF sector. Even if I have sympathy with some elements of your proposals, I do not believe this is the place where they should be included. On other issues, I am frustrated by the inconsistent approach because earlier you wanted a clause at ten years and then it came down to five years, which is what we have at the moment.

I want to take this opportunity to thank everybody who has been involved. I want to start by thanking Brian Hayes, Petr Ježek, Eva Joly, Fabio De Masi, Syed Kamall and their teams for spending a huge amount of time in a fishbowl-shaped room for hours negotiating on this. Thank you to them. I would also like to thank my coordinator, Elisa Ferreira, for all the support and engagement that she has had, Roberto Gualtieri for his engagement, Stine and the Secretariat and my own assistant, Jan Moens, for their support. Without you I would not have got here.

  President. – The debate is closed.

The vote will take place on Wednesday, 29 April 2015.

Written statements (Rule 162)

  Evelyn Regner (S&D), schriftlich. – Die vorliegenden Kompromisse schaffen europäische Regeln in einem bisher unregulierten Finanzbereich. Dazu zählen die verstärkte Kontrolle über Schattenbanken, die Erhöhung der Transparenz und strikte Liquiditätsvorschriften. Wir wissen alle, dass die Finanzindustrie nach Ausweichmanövern und Lücken gesucht hat, um ihre Finanzgeschäfte in die unregulierte Welt zu verlagern. So hat sich das Volumen der Schattenbanken seit der Krise mehr als verdoppelt! Mit dieser Verordnung wird eine weitere Regulierungslücke geschlossen. Einziger Wermutstropfen bleibt, dass die Verfallsklausel nicht auf sämtliche Geldmarktfonds ausgeweitet werden konnte. Eine Überprüfung durch die Kommission nach vier Jahren wäre für alle vorgeschlagenen Formen der Geldmarktfonds wünschenswert gewesen!

  Alfred Sant (S&D), in writing. – Many experts have argued that trying to model European legislation on MMFs on that in the US, would be a mistake. Still, it needed to be updated. The financial crisis had demonstrated that MMFs were vulnerable to liquidity problems at tough times. The update would set a framework within which MMFs could operate competitively. It would carry suitable protection for investors during financial crises and ensure ongoing flexible servicing of the short term financial needs of European business. Prudential requirements needed to be strengthened without burdening unduly the financial services on offer in the European economy. The increasing variety by which such services could be packaged needed also to be taken into account. It balances the need for regulation with the need to enhance the competitiveness of financial services. The latter must remain a priority, if the overall aim of stimulating more new investment in Europe is going to be achieved. Equally, there will be a need in coming years to keep a watch on developments worldwide in money market and related funds sectors. Given globalisation, European legislation cannot afford to lag on what is happening elsewhere, in both prudential and competitive terms.