Doslovno izvješće

Utorak, 19. svibnja 2015. - Strasbourg

9. Provedba zajedničke sigurnosne i obrambene politike - Financiranje zajedničke sigurnosne i obrambene politike - Sigurnosni i obrambeni kapaciteti u Europi (rasprava)

  La Présidente. – L'ordre du jour appelle la discussion commune sur la PSDC (article 36 du traité UE) sur:

- le rapport d'Arnaud Danjean, au nom de la commission des affaires étrangères, sur la mise en œuvre de la politique de sécurité et de défense commune (selon le rapport annuel du Conseil au Parlement européen sur la politique étrangère et de sécurité commune) (2014/2220(INI) (A8-0054/2015),

- le rapport d'Eduard Kukan et d'Indrek Tarand, au nom de la commission des affaires étrangères et de la commission des budgets, sur le financement de la politique de sécurité et de défense commune (2014/2258(INI) (A8-0136/2015), et

- le rapport d'Ana Gomes, au nom de la commission des affaires étrangères, sur l'incidence des évolutions des marchés européens de la défense sur les capacités de sécurité et de défense en Europe (2015/2037(INI) (A8-0159/2015).

  Arnaud Danjean, rapporteur. – Madame la Présidente, Madame la Haute représentante, jamais depuis le lancement de la politique européenne de sécurité et de défense commune, il y a maintenant 16 ans, l'Europe n'avait été confrontée à autant de crises simultanées à ses frontières et sur son sol, ainsi qu'à des menaces multiformes contre sa sécurité extérieure et intérieure: conflits régionaux, guerres civiles, terrorisme, drames migratoires, prolifération nucléaire et conventionnelle.

L'immense recomposition géopolitique en cours pose à notre continent, en particulier dans son voisinage oriental et sur son flanc sud, des défis sans précédent, sinon dans leur nature – les guerres et le terrorisme, nous les connaissons depuis longtemps – mais, en tout cas, dans leur ampleur.

Face à ces évolutions dramatiques, l'Union européenne et les États qui la composent ont le double devoir d'agir: agir pour se protéger et agir dans notre environnement pour réduire l'instabilité. Il faut malheureusement reconnaître que l'impression qui prévaut parmi nos concitoyens mais aussi hors de nos frontières est celle d'une impuissance européenne: en Ukraine, en Syrie, en Iraq, au Proche-Orient, en Libye, dans la Corne de l'Afrique, au Sahel. Il y a vraiment peu de crises et de conflits aujourd'hui dans lesquels l'Europe, collectivement ou par l'intermédiaire de ses États membres, joue un rôle réellement décisif à la mesure de ses intérêts, de ses valeurs et de son poids diplomatique, économique et militaire. Même là où l'action de certains Européens semble la plus affirmée et la plus robuste, comme celle de la France au Sahel, l'ampleur de la tâche diplomatique, militaire et économique, nos contraintes budgétaires et nos limites capacitaires ne laissent aucune illusion sur l'impact très relatif de ce qui est entrepris par quelques-uns. Dans ce contexte, la politique de sécurité et de défense commune pourrait et devrait être un instrument majeur pour que l'Europe assume enfin ses responsabilités pour sa propre sécurité et pour celle de son environnement.

Je suis un réaliste, je ne dis donc pas que cette politique commune est la seule possible car les politiques nationales ainsi que les partenariats multilatéraux comme l'Alliance atlantique sont durablement des structures essentielles à la défense du continent et de nos nations. C'est d'ailleurs reconnu dans les traités. De même, la politique de sécurité et de défense commune n'est pas et ne sera pas dans un avenir proche une véritable politique de défense. C'est un instrument, une politique de gestion de crise, et nous devons bien la considérer d'abord comme telle.

Le problème, c'est que les crises sont là. Elles sont toujours plus intenses, toujours plus proches, et notre "gestion" est de moins en moins à la hauteur de ces enjeux.

Les orientations que vous proposez, Madame la Haute représentante, avec les ministres de la défense que vous avez réunis hier, à Bruxelles, en vue du Conseil européen de juin, vont dans le bon sens, et je vous félicite de l'action déterminée que vous avez entreprise dès votre entrée en fonction.

Ces orientations se basent d'ailleurs sur le même constat que celui que je viens de dresser, d'insatisfaction, d'insuffisance et d'urgence. Vous avez souligné que l'Union européenne déploie actuellement onze missions civiles et cinq opérations militaires. Le professionnalisme et le dévouement de nos personnels civils et militaires sont remarquables, et nous devons les saluer. Mais le respect que nous devons à ces personnels, qui sont déployés sur des théâtres difficiles au nom de l'Union européenne, nous oblige aussi à reconnaître que ces missions et ces opérations deviennent, bien trop souvent, des formes d'alibi de notre présence. Je dirai que notre visibilité prend parfois le pas sur notre efficacité dans le jugement que nous portons sur ces missions. Par conséquent, j'espère que vous allez mener à bien ce travail d'évaluation.

Pour conclure, parce que le temps est compté et qu'il y aurait beaucoup de choses à dire également sur le plan industriel et capacitaire, naturellement, je voudrais simplement vous indiquer qu'aujourd'hui, nous n'avons besoin ni de créativité, ni d'inventivité, ni d'imagination. Nous avons besoin de savoir lire. Tout ce dont nous avons besoin sur le plan de la sécurité et de la défense est dans le traité: coopération renforcée, coopération structurée permanente, flexibilité avec l'article 44, mécanismes de financement et de solidarité, tout cela est dans le traité.

Nous comptons sur vous, Madame la Haute représentante, pour le rappeler aux États membres.

  Eduard Kukan, spravodajca. – Dnešná rozprava o spoločnej bezpečnostnej a obrannej politike (SBOP) sa koná v čase bezprecedentných výziev a rizík pre našu obranu a bezpečnosť. Dnes viac ako kedykoľvek predtým môžeme cítiť dôsledky konfliktov a nestability v bezprostrednej blízkosti našich hraníc. Diskutujeme v čase, ktorý nie je najpriaznivejší pre Úniu. Okrem toho vieme, že výdavky na obranu a bezpečnosť sú v rámci EÚ dlhodobo limitované. Musíme sa preto pozrieť na to, ako môžeme s týmito prostriedkami nakladať efektívnejšie, pružnejšie, ale taktiež transparentnejšie. Treba, aby sme sa začali seriózne zaoberať víziou európskej obrany zlepšením koordinácie našich vojenských a civilných misií, otvorili otázku pružnejších finančných procedúr a zlepšili nastavenie štruktúr zodpovedných za vysielanie a operovanie našich misií. V tomto zmysle smerujem tiež výzvu Vám, pani vysoká predstaviteľka, a zástupcom členských štátov, aby dali možnosť plnému využitiu príslušnej časti Lisabonskej zmluvy, predovšetkým článku 44 o poverení vykonávania misie skupinu členských štátov a článku 46 o stálej štruktúrovanej spolupráci. Pokiaľ ide o šetrenie a zlepšenie efektivity, chcel by som uvítať fakt, že niektoré finančné procedúry týkajúce sa civilných misií boli skrátené. Podarilo sa tiež identifikovať opatrenia, ktoré povedú k šetreniu. Mnohé situácie si však vyžadujú rýchle vyslanie a operatívnosť misií, pri ktorých je potrebná finančná flexibilita a efektívnosť. V tom sú stále ešte problémy. K zlepšeniu by mohlo prispieť stredisko spoločných služieb – shared service centre – spolu s integrovaným systémom manažovania zdrojov – integrated resource management system. V rámci možností by sme mali taktiež rozšíriť fungovanie trvalého skladu SBOP – CSDP warehouse – a umožniť existujúcim misiám jeho plné využitie. Ďalšou výzvou je väčšia súdržnosť a komplementárnosť v otázkach fungovania civilných a vojenských misií a operácií. Potrebujeme zlepšiť koordináciu v oblastiach logistiky, dopravy, zdravotného zabezpečenia a ochrany misií. Zároveň by sme mali venovať väčšiu pozornosť koordinácii a prepojeniu oblastí ako priemysel, spoločný trh, výskum a vývoj. Pokiaľ ide o financovanie vojenských operácií cez mechanizmus Athena, je nevyhnutné, aby sa postupne zmenila filozofia jeho fungovania. Potrebujeme prejsť k lepšiemu rozloženiu finančnej záťaže medzi členské štáty a určite zabezpečiť dlhodobé financovanie vojenských operácií. Ukazuje sa, že je čoraz problematickejšie rýchle nasadenie misií a ich efektívne fungovanie. V záujme zlepšenia ich financovania sa musíme začať zaoberať otázkou otvorenia Atheny pre príspevky z tretích krajín a medzinárodných organizácií. Najbližšia Európska rada, ktorá sa bude zaoberať otázkami bezpečnosti, by sa mala tiež využiť na to, aby sa zreformovalo a zlepšilo nastavenie finančných mechanizmov týkajúcich sa misií a operácií. Na záver, vážená pani vysoká predstaviteľka, SBOP je čoraz pálčivejšou otázkou. Je potrebné, aby ste ju mali plne pod kontrolou a zabezpečili jej lepšiu koordináciu medzi členskými štátmi, európskymi inštitúciami a organizáciami, ako je NATO. Určite sama dobre viete, že v súčasnosti si jednoducho nemôžeme dovoliť zanedbať kľúčové otázky európskej obrany a bezpečnosti.

  Indrek Tarand, rapporteur. – Madam President, let me first of all inform you and Vice-President Mogherini what a great pleasure it was to work with a connoisseur like Mr Kukan. Everything we wanted to say is written in the report. Please allow me to paint a small illustration about the things we are really talking about, knowing very well that security threats to Europe are triangular. They come from the south, the east and the south-east.

I will concentrate on the Baltic Sea. In recent months, Russian military ships have been harassing and sabotaging the crews that are laying the NordBalt power cable between Sweden and Lithuania. This cable would enable the Baltic states to reduce their dependence on Russian energy, which clearly is not in Russiaʼs interests, not only for financial reasons but because Russia likes to wield energy as a political weapon. This is a prime example of how the absence of an effective CSDP has negative spillover effects into other important European policy areas such as the energy union. Russia is effectively sabotaging European energy security and the energy union by disrupting the creation of new energy interconnections.

We are also in a situation in which France has two Mistral-class warships that have been built but are now collecting dust as their delivery to Russia would constitute a significant security threat to the EU. Due to underfunding and lack of political will up to now, the European Union has not yet been able to purchase these ships. This must now change.

These ships would make an effective contribution to the CSDP naval branch and could be used in a variety of ways. For instance, they could be of critical help in solving the crisis in the Mediterranean, particularly close to the coast of Libya, or they could patrol in the Baltic Sea and offer support to the crews laying the NordBalt cable. This does not mean that the ships would need to engage with the Russian vessels currently harassing the crews. Their mere presence would be enough.

Right now it is the mere absence of any European forces that allows Russian warships and fighter planes to perform these demonstrations of force whenever they please. So actually what we have discovered is that the European Union’s budget is an incredibly useful tool. If we create a budget line, the political goals will eventually be achieved, and that is why we suggest bringing a lot more order to the current financing of the common security and defence policy.

Let us be brave and forget about the dogmas. The European Union’s common defence will be based on physical facts, one of them – most importantly – being the European common defence force. That is why I am one of the supporters of Mr Juncker’s new proposals. So let us create the budget line and start with the things which need to be done. Otherwise our children will have little reason to be grateful to us.

  Ana Gomes, relatora. – Senhora Presidente, Senhora Alta Representante, a decisão do Conselho, ontem, de lançar uma missão naval no Mediterrâneo no âmbito da Política Comum de Segurança e Defesa é um passo decisivo e no bom sentido, mas tem de ser justificada pelo imperativo de salvar vidas e assim impedir que se afundem também os princípios e os valores fundadores do projeto europeu. Só depois para desmantelar as redes esclavagistas que instrumentalizam as tragédias que impelem refugiados e imigrantes para a Europa.

É deplorável, neste contexto, que alguns governos recusem aceitar cotas para o acolhimento de pessoas necessitadas de proteção. Esta é uma missão que tardava, a tragédia do Mediterrâneo não começou ontem e é um problema de todos na Europa e não de apenas alguns Estados na linha da frente.

É com sentido estratégico e coerência entre todas as políticas de segurança interna e de ação externa, incluindo as políticas de desenvolvimento, comerciais e de aprovisionamento energético, que a União Europeia tem de agir em todas as frentes para ajudar povos a resolver conflitos, a livrar-se de regimes opressivos e para atacar outras causas dos fluxos migratórios, como a miséria.

Abrir vias legais para migrantes é indispensável para retirar o lucro aos traficantes e dar oportunidades a quem desespera por elas, e a Europa, em declínio demográfico, tem de assumir que precisa de imigrantes.

Impõe-se não demorar mais e pormos no mar a EUNAVFOR Mediterrâneo. Impõe-se também fazer o trabalho de segurança de desenvolvimento e de apoio à governação na vizinhança, a Sul nomeadamente, na Líbia, na Síria e no Iraque. É chocante a inexistência de coordenação entre os europeus, com fornecimentos militares a forças no Iraque e na Síria, para formar combatentes contra o Estado Islâmico.

Noutra frente, urge preparar um compromisso que terá de ser de longo prazo. Falo da Líbia onde temos especiais responsabilidades por ação e omissão e onde temos interesses estratégicos e até temos, hoje, o interesse vital de não deixar que se transforme num santuário de terroristas à nossa porta.

Importa programar o empenho europeu no apoio à capacitação, inclusive na organização do sector da segurança, no pressuposto que o representante especial das Nações Unidas, Bernardino Léon, consegue forjar um acordo para um governo de unidade nacional. Mas se não conseguir e a falência do Estado na Líbia se prolongar e agravar, convenhamos que precisaremos de intervir para nossa própria segurança e defesa, devendo, desde já, trabalhar para buscar respaldo pelo Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas.

Para esta missão no Mediterrâneo, avançamos sem mandado do Conselho de Segurança e, apesar dos esforços da Sra. Alta Representante, recentemente em Nova Iorque, está em causa, de facto, como disse, a responsabilidade de proteger, salvando vidas e combatendo os esclavagistas.

Mas esta falha evidencia a necessidade premente de uma reforma do Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas. Isto tem que ser colocado na agenda europeia: está na hora de exigirmos a reforma do Conselho de Segurança e revindicarmos um mandato, um lugar de membro permanente para a Europa.

Para a EUNAVFOR Mediterrâneo estar operacional quanto antes, como quer o Conselho, é preciso que os Estados-Membros disponibilizem os meios humanos e equipamentos, porque a União não tem recursos civis ou militares próprios.

Ora, no relatório de que eu sou autora e que hoje analisaremos, exigimos justamente uma mudança drástica de cultura dos nossos governos. É fundamental que os Estados-Membros, sob a orientação da Sra. Alta Representante, cooperem mais no domínio da aquisição de material e equipamento militares. É fundamental que articulem as suas políticas e opções de armamento. É fundamental que invistam no pooling e no sharing, e que seja traçado um plano de necessidades e objetivos, em matéria de equipamento militar conjunto, que responda, de facto, às necessidades e que nos permita, enquanto União, cumprir as nossas obrigações.

Reconheçamos que de nada servem boas intenções quando sabemos, de antemão, que levará meses até que a EUNAVFOR Mediterrâneo esteja operacional. O preço a pagar é demasiado caro. Não podemos deixar que a ilusão soberanista e a opacidade protecionista de alguns governos refreiem a ação da União Europeia numa matéria tão fundamental para a segurança coletiva e para a credibilidade da União.

Por isso, pedimos que a Comissão invista na vigilância da implementação das duas diretivas do mercado interno, no domínio da aquisição e das transferências de material e equipamento de defesa, e que exija o cumprimento das novas regras por parte dos Estados-Membros.

Para que tenhamos um mercado interno funcional nesta área, é crucial que se purguem as práticas corruptas e opacas que minam o sector, que vedam possibilidades de cooperação, de competição e desenvolvimento tecnológico e constituem, de resto, um mau retorno para o dinheiro dos contribuintes investido nos orçamentos nacionais de defesa.

A boa aplicação destas diretivas é fundamental para a base industrial e tecnológica de defesa que, como também identificou ontem o Conselho, é a peça-chave da estratégia da União para a segurança e a defesa coletivas.

  Federica Mogherini, Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. – Madam President, let me start by thanking everyone, and in particular the four rapporteurs, for the excellent work done on the reports – this is my personal opinion – but also for the very clear, determined way in which you have worked and also presented the reports today, but even more than that, for the ambitious approach.

This is what we need at this moment. We all start by saying never before have we needed a more ambitious approach than we do now. Well, I think it is time to translate this analysis, which is right, into action and I find your words, your work, your reports, and the overall attitude of this Parliament in this respect extremely helpful in supporting an ambitious approach, including openly addressing some of the shortcomings that are the basis for changing and for delivering more of this sense of openness, of frankness, concerning the shortcomings and the needs we have to increase our level of ambition. It is also my approach, and that level of ambition that your reports are expressing is also my level of ambition in this field.

As Members have said, Europe is facing multiple security challenges today and there is no doubt that we need to step up our common efforts in Europe. I would say, in one sentence, that we need more defence in our European work and we need a more European approach in defence. This is the substance of what we are discussing here this afternoon.

CSDP and defence cooperation are crucial, yet they only work fully, they only unfold their full potential, if they are part of a comprehensive strategy, of a comprehensive policy, using all the instruments that we have as Europeans, linking the external and internal dimension of our policies in an intelligent way. Not only that – this is not the issue for debate this afternoon – we also need to use the tools that we have, including CSDP, not only in reaction to events, but also in a strategic way to build security.

Building security is not only defence, it is also building the conditions for security worldwide and in particular in the regions around us: conflict prevention, development cooperation, promotion of human rights and democracy, coherence, economic and trade policies, including our own ones, even prevention and management of natural disasters and climate change. All of this is building security in the world, in the key areas in our neighbourhood and, at the end of the day, our own citizens’ security. This is going to be tackled in a systematic way when we discuss, in the European Council at the end of June with Heads of State and Government, not only CSDP but also our need for a new strategy, our strategic review. I will present in June the assessment I was asked and tasked to present on the global challenges we have in front of us, on the EU role in facing this. I hope that from there we will define and decide whether – or rather how – we need to develop a new European strategy to tackle the different and more challenging environment facing us.

I think that the need to put together all the instruments we have is more obvious than ever in the challenges that we are facing in tackling the human tragedies that we see in the Mediterranean Sea. Some of you mentioned that. Finally we have started to mobilise all our efforts to prevent further loss of life at sea. I say finally, and I say finally in the European way.

As one of these efforts, the European Council at the end of April asked me to prepare a CSDP operation to disrupt the business model of human trafficking networks across the Mediterranean. Yesterday, at the Joint Council meeting of Foreign and Defence Ministers which I chaired, all Member States agreed to establish a CSDP operation to disrupt trafficking and smuggling networks. We took the decision yesterday to activate an operational headquarters and appoint an operational commander.

There is still obviously some work to be done before the launch of this mission, namely on operational planning and on force generation. But let me say that the decision on establishing the operation being taken less than one month after the European Council was asking, or tasking, for preparation on that is an absolute record. I was told that it normally takes six to ten months to take the decision to establish an operation. I know that time is not in itself an element of evaluation, but in this case time is an element of urgency that we need to face, especially when summer is coming.

So I have to say that I think that this is the best way of addressing the issue of better and more effective CSDP in Europe, specifically using the instruments we have on the basis of the situations we are facing on a day-to-day basis. Let me remind you in this Hemicycle that it is exactly one month today since we faced that tragedy in the Mediterranean Sea when 700 to 800 hundred people died.

It is still not enough, we still have a lot more work to do in different areas, but I think that for the first time we can say that we have a quick and European response to this crisis.

Still, the preparation of a CSDP mission in the Mediterranean and the reinforcement of the existing CSDP mission, especially the one in Niger that was decided last week, are only two elements, important ones but only two elements of our strategy to tackle this challenge.

Last week the Commission presented the European Agenda on Migration – which this House will be debating tomorrow – outlining the immediate measures to respond to the crisis in the Mediterranean, both on the humanitarian and on the security side, and the steps to be taken, both immediate ones and the long-term ones. Let me stress here that no Member State can be left alone – should not be left alone – to face the huge migratory pressure, as this is a European responsibility. I think that finally we are beginning to realise that. The way forward is, and will still be, hard and long, but we are probably now starting to realise that.

We are finally proposing a European response which has never been the case before: combining internal and external policies, working together as Europeans on the immediate humanitarian emergency, on the security situation, as well as the root causes in countries of origin and transit. Tackling the root causes means tackling poverty, unequal access to resources, be they natural or financial, tackling conflicts, crises and the violation of human rights; conflicts and crises, starting obviously with Libya, and the support we are giving to the dialogue led by Bernardino León.

This is specifically what ‘comprehensive approach’ means. To me the point is to make this comprehensive approach – which I understand is also sometimes criticised in the Danjean report – real, to make it happen, to make it work, using all the instruments that we have – and they are many – and achieving more coherence among the different instruments and the way we are using them. We need that more than ever.

Since December 2013, when the European leaders took some decisions on security and defence, you have all said that the security situation in and around the European Union has changed dramatically. It has clearly not changed in a positive way. The concurrency, intensity, frequency and complexity of conflicts and crises in our neighbourhood is unique and the speed with which this has happened is even more unique. That is also why we need to seriously rethink our way of building security while we manage the urgency of current crises. That is also why we need a strategy to move ahead.

The demand for the European Union to act as a provider of security is increasing and will, most probably, continue to increase. We will only be able to respond to this demand in a credible way if we make the CSDP more effective and if we make sure we have the right kinds of capabilities, which in turn needs a solid, defence industrial base. The European Council in June will be an occasion to take stock of progress in this regard and to show the way ahead.

I have just presented my report to the Foreign Affairs Council, ahead of the June Council, and simultaneously the Commission delivered its report on the implementation of its 2013 Defence Communication. Both documents register progress in most areas where the European Council in 2013 set tasks, and point to areas where we need, and we can have, further progress. I would say we need, we can and we must have further progress.

We worked on this just yesterday, as you mentioned, with the defence and foreign ministers together, putting together – this is also a comprehensive approach – different sides of our CSDP work. Among the achievements I can mention, we have the adoption of the EU’s first comprehensive maritime strategy and action plan, or the cyber policy framework. I would like to mention specifically one element: the security development nexus.

On this, I think we learned an important lesson from the CSDP training missions in Somalia, in Mali and in Niger, which is that the troops we train must often be supplied with equipment – tents, uniforms, radios, basic infrastructure. At the end of April the Commission adopted a joint communication based on my proposal to enable the European Union to train and equip the forces of local partners. It was addressed to the Council and to Parliament and I count on your support to take this forward, as it would be an extremely relevant and precious step.

Being completely frank, as you are, there are also areas where the picture is much less encouraging. I am thinking of rapid response where the lack of political will has so far made it impossible to move. I know this is frustrating for many Members of this Parliament. It is frustrating for me, as well. Force generation, too, is problematic. I raised this with Ministers yesterday in a very clear and open way. If we take decisions then we need to translate them into action. This is a matter of being operational, this is also a matter of credibility, and this means taking responsibilities in the Member States with concrete decisions to follow up on force generation.

I also know that some of you are very eager to see the full potential of CSDP-related articles of the Lisbon Treaty fully used. The relevant sections of Mr Danjeanʼs report are very precious in this regard and let me say that I am completely determined to work with your support, with your help, to build the political conditions for having this done.

Progress has also remained limited on CSDP financing more broadly. Indeed, the tension between our level of ambition and the level of resources has grown even bigger. The Kukan and Tarand report rightly raises a number of issues for both civilian and military CSDP financing. On cost saving and efficiency measures in civilian missions: we will continue working with the Commission to facilitate a faster deployment of civilian missions and improvements in the financial management. In that context, I would like to stress the importance of sufficient payment appropriations for the CFSP budget.

On financing of military operations, the review of the Athena mechanism took place recently. A new Council decision was adopted at the end of March. While largely inconclusive, these debates will continue. I am ready, and most of all I am willing, to support and to lead the debate among Member States and, I hope, to lead it to some results. This is going to be key.

The question of burden-sharing among Member States, which is what this question is, is crucial and needed if we are to face a future – and hopefully also a present – CSDP that really works. As the demand for CSDP will remain high, we also need to fill our defence capability gaps. At a time of reduced public spending, the pooling and sharing of capacities and resources, especially of high-end capabilities, is more than ever a recipe that can reconcile possibilities and needs in this regard.

We have made some important steps toward implementing collaborative projects. We agreed back in 2013 on air-to-air refuelling capacity, remotely piloted craft systems, satellite communications and cyber. Their development, notably on the first of these projects, is now in an advanced stage but I made it very clear to the Ministers yesterday that we also need to embark on new collaborative projects. We have to bring forward the ones that we already have, and we need to put new ones on the table.

This Parliament has calculated – as you said, we do not need to be imaginative, we need to read the things that we already know and make them real – that the cost of non-Europe in defence amounts to some EUR 26 billion per year, an enormous amount of money, especially in these times, and more than that, as we are all politicians in this room, 70% of European citizens support more integration in defence. This is the clearest call for action that we could receive and I count on your support. Count, please, on my full determination to make this real, to have more European integration in defence.

We also need to spend better, and better together. This is a crucial point, especially in these times of austerity, and we need to focus on the output. We need to invest too in our partnerships. The one with NATO – that is essential. Hybrid, non-linear risks: I have put a premium on enhanced cooperation and contingency planning. If the old debate on a NATO-EU rivalry ever had any sense it does not anymore; it does not make any sense in these times.

I was happy to welcome the NATO Secretary-General, Jens Stoltenberg, yesterday at our ministerial meeting, just as I was happy to be at the Foreign Ministers NATO meeting last week in Antalya. Our cooperation is increasing, not only our cooperation at the highest political level, but staff-to-staff cooperation is also going on very well. We are different in nature, but we have some common points on the agenda that we can coordinate and cooperate on.

The other extremely relevant cooperation we have to invest in is the one with the United Nations. All Member States have just agreed on a new action plan to announce EU support for UN peacekeeping, and the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon will be at the Foreign Affairs Council on 22 June. We need to work on different aspects on different levels, as your reports clearly identify.

The Gomes report on the impact of developments in European defence markets on the security and defence capabilities in Europe indicates that the competitiveness of the European defence industry is a priority, and I fully support this. A strong competitive European defence industrial base needs more cooperation between Member States, a more efficient internal market, more robust security of supply guarantees, competitive and integrated supply chains, and support for research and innovation.

A healthy industrial base is indeed key in support of any credible defence policy as, among others, it generates cutting-edge programmes, innovation with spillover effects into the civilian domain and vice versa, and a highly skilled workforce that accounts for 400 000 direct and 960 000 indirect jobs across Europe. At the same time, our industry faces a wide range of challenges both at the global and at the European level: increasingly globalised supply chains, increased defence of said demands, global shifts in defence spending.

Our ratio regarding R&D investment is 1:7 as compared to the US but, and this is the news, 1:3 in comparison with the so-called BRICs. The plunge in defence R&D since 2006, more than 29% in real terms, is detrimental to much needed innovation in Europe and puts at risk our capability in producing defence equipment and the competitiveness of our industry.

The European industrial landscape remains characterised by a fragmented demand side, a plethora of national programmes and variance of equipment, generating high costs for industry. Increasingly integrated civilian military supply chains with a growing reliance on civilian technologies means that companies more and more rely on civil production in terms of turnover and revenues. If nothing is done, we could face the risk in the longer term of having a lower level of technological sophistication due to slower rates of innovation. We could also face decreasing competitiveness with the ultimate loss of production capacities and jobs and thus increasing dependence on foreign supplies – and we are talking about the European Union.

The Gomes report also highlights the need for a full and correct implementation of the two Defence Directives of 2009 with a view to opening up the defence market chains for companies from all over Europe. An open and transparent European defence equipment market is a precondition for our defence companies to access European supply chains in view of building strategic and sustainable alliances with European partners.

I fully share the objective to ensure the effective implementation of the Defence Procurement and the Defence Transfers Directives. The Commission has started evaluating the Defence Directives and in 2016 will report to Parliament and Council on their implementation and on whether they have achieved their objectives.

In December 2013, Heads of State and Government called for more investment in cooperative research programmes, more synergies between defence and civil research, as well as for a preparatory action on CSDP-related research to be set up. Here we have three avenues. First, collaborative defence R&T. The European Defence Agency (EDA) has a longstanding track record in defence R&T projects and programmes. Second, dual-use research, and third, the establishment of the preparatory action on CSDP-related research, a potential game-changer testing the viability of defence-oriented and CSDP-related research at European Union level.

The Commission has the lead here, but the EDA, having long experience in defence R&T, can provide support. Joint Commission-EDA workshops with stakeholders to discuss the modalities, content and the process to establish such a preparatory action, are paving the way.

Another potential game-changer could be the Council mandate on developing a European Union-wide security and supply regime. Security of supply is essential for the sustainment of operations, the development of long-term planning and cooperation, and the functioning of the internal market for defence. We expect the roadmap for the comprehensive EU-wide security of supply regime in early 2016.

To conclude, let me thank you for the work you have done, for the work of this Parliament in general on CSDP, and also on the preparation for the June Council. I know you have been working very hard and intensively on this and this is extremely helpful.

Let me conclude by mentioning those 7 000 men and women who are currently deployed under the EU flag in military and civilian missions under dangerous and difficult conditions, from Afghanistan to Somalia, from Mali to the Central African Republic. I want to end my comments today by saluting the work of men and women deployed in the field under the EU flag and thank them for what they are doing. This is what we should remember all the time: that our discussions, our decisions, are then translated in their work on a daily basis, in very difficult conditions, for the security of our citizens, the stability of the regions where they are deployed and peace in our world.

(Applause)

  Ildikó Gáll-Pelcz, a Belső Piaci és Fogyasztóvédelmi Bizottság véleményének előadója. – Köszönöm a Főképviselő Asszonynak is a gondolatait. Valóban fontos kérdés a védelmi politikai kérdés, és a migrációs kérdés már nem is az ajtón kopogtat, hanem már a nappaliban van, és megválaszolásra vár.

Ennek ellenére engedjék meg, hogy ne ezzel a kérdéssel foglalkozzak, hanem pontosan azzal, hogy a védelem feltételeiről, és ennek a megteremtésének a fontosságáról beszéljek, úgy is, mint az IMCO-nak a rapportőre ebben a kérdésben, kifejezetten a témára fókuszálva. Főképviselő Asszony a beszédének a végén érintette, hogy milyen nagyon fontos kérdések vannak, például a honvédelmi irányelvnek az átültetése. Maximálisan egyetértek ezzel, nagyon fontos, hogy a tagállamok átültessék ezt az irányelvet. Csak ezzel a módszerrel tudjuk elérni azt, hogy integrált belső piacról tudjunk beszélni, és ez a széttöredezettség, ami volt, az csökkenthető legyen. Annál is inkább, mert valljuk be őszintén, hogy a kereslet egységesítésére tett korábbi intézkedéseink nem voltak túlzottan sikeresek.

Azt is mondhatom, hogy például az Európai Védelmi Ügynökségnek a képességfejlesztési terve sem állt elő eredménnyel. Várom a júniusi csúcsnak a határozatát, a következtetéseit és a tényleges munkát.

  Γεώργιος Κύρτσος, εξ ονόματος της ομάδας PPE. – Νομίζω ότι προκύπτει μία ανάγκη ενίσχυσης της ευρωπαϊκής αμυντικής βιομηχανίας μέσα από την ενίσχυση της ενιαίας αγοράς. Έχουμε μια δύσκολη κατάσταση με μείωση των αμυντικών δαπανών - νομίζω ότι σε αυτό το θέμα η δημοσιονομική αυστηρότητα έχει ξεπεράσει κάθε όριο, έχει δηλαδή γίνει αντιπαραγωγική - έχουμε μία κακή κατανομή των μειωμένων αμυντικών δαπανών σε βάρος της έρευνας και σε βάρος της προμήθειας οπλικών συστημάτων, μένουμε πίσω από τις Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες Αμερικής και έτσι χάνεται ή περιορίζεται η στρατηγική μας αυτονομία. Συμφωνούμε βέβαια στα περισσότερα θέματα, αλλά υπάρχει πάντα η πιθανότητα διαφωνίας ή η πιθανότητα λαθεμένων επιλογών τις οποίες αναγκαζόμαστε να ακολουθήσουμε.

Επίσης προβληματιζόμαστε για νέες απειλές: για παράδειγμα, στην Κοινοβουλευτική Συνέλευση του ΝΑΤΟ η οποία διεξήχθη στη Βουδαπέστη και στην οποία πήρα μέρος. Ο προβληματισμός ήταν γύρω από το αμυντικό πρόγραμμα της Ρωσίας, το οποίο είναι εξαιρετικά φιλόδοξο. Έχουμε επίσης νέους παγκόσμιους παίκτες, όπως είναι η Λαϊκή Δημοκρατία της Κίνας.

Επομένως, πιστεύω ότι έφτασε η ώρα - και αυτό είναι το μήνυμα και από την έκθεση Gomes αλλά και από όσα ακούσαμε σήμερα από τους αξιόλογους εισηγητές - για μία καλύτερη κατανομή των ευρωπαϊκών αμυντικών δαπανών, για μια στοιχειώδη ευρωπαϊκή προσέγγιση και δυνατότητες και στους πρωταγωνιστές αλλά και στις μικρομεσαίες επιχειρήσεις.

  Ioan Mircea Pașcu, on behalf of the S&D Group. – Madam President, the judgement that, in view of the deterioration of the current security environment both around and within Europe, the EU will have to appeal more and more frequently to the CSDP is both correct and the realistic. The problem is that the CSDP, as mentioned by Mr Danjean, is only a crisis management instrument conceived for use primarily outside Europe and in obvious need of more flexible implementation procedures. It does not provide for the defence of either the EU Member States, who rely for that on NATO, or the EU non—NATO Member States who, in absence of NATO membership, have to rely exclusively on the EU for their defence.

The truth is that in view of the intensity, complexity and localisation of the current crisis, the UN and NATO have a mutual need of each other more than at any time before. Past mistrust, and even competition between the two organisations, is not warranted any longer. These have to be replaced by substantive cooperation across the board. I am glad to hear that just confirmed by the High Representative.

  Anna Elżbieta Fotyga, w imieniu grupy ECR. – Pani Przewodnicząca! Pani Wysoka Przedstawiciel/ Wiceprzewodnicząca Komisji Europejskiej! Chciałam podziękować wszystkim paniom i panom sprawozdawcom za ich ciężką, innowacyjną pracę, która niewątpliwie stanowi cenny dorobek w debacie przed ważnym posiedzeniem Rady Europejskiej w czerwcu, która ma być poświęcona wspólnej polityce bezpieczeństwa i obrony. Trudno się odnieść do wszystkich podniesionych zagadnień, proszę więc pozwolić mi skupić się na ustępie 42 sprawozdania Arnaud Danjeana, w którym podniesiona jest konieczność zwiększenia wydatków, podniesienia ciężarów obronnych przez państwa członkowskie Unii Europejskiej w realizacji celów wyznaczonych przez NATO, czyli dojścia do 2% PKB (w przypadku kilku państw jest to już w tej chwili więcej niż 2% PKB), ale również przeznaczania 20% ponoszonych wydatków na ważne cele obronne, na główne uzbrojenia i również na badania i rozwój.

Mój naród, moi rodacy, ale i przedstawiciele społeczeństw innych państw Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej integrację w Unii Europejskiej postrzegali nie tylko jako przystąpienie do sfery dobrobytu, ale również dodatkowy aspekt powiększenia bezpieczeństwa. Więc zależy nam również na tym komponencie funkcjonowania Unii Europejskiej, sądzimy jednak, że potrzebna jest wyższa kultura, wyższa chęć współdziałania w ponoszeniu obciążeń, wspólne postrzeganie zagrożeń, z którymi mamy do czynienia – czy jest to Południe i terroryzm, który zagraża naszym terytoriom, czy Federacja Rosyjska. Te sprawy muszą być przede wszystkim przedmiotem naszych rozważań.

  Jozo Radoš, u ime kluba ALDE. – Gospođo predsjednice, gospođo Visoka predstavnice, kolegice i kolege, na početku želim čestitati gospodinu Danjeanu, gospodinu Kukanu, Tarandu i gospođi Gomes na vrlo jasnim i otvorenim izvješćima, a mislim da je važno napomenuti da slične stavove koji su sadržani u izvješćima iznosi i Vijeće Europske unije u svojim jučerašnjim zaključcima o čemu je govorila i gospođa Visoka predstavnica, kojoj u isto vrijeme čestitam na otvorenoj i poticajnoj komunikaciji koju ima unutar Vijeća Europske unije.

Navesti ću samo najvažnije zaključke Vijeća, a to je da su se sigurnosne okolnosti u Europi u zadnjim godinama dramatično promijenile, da postoji potreba za snažnijom i efikasnijom europskom sigurnosnom i obrambenom politikom, i Vijeće naglašava važnost novog strateškog pristupa europskoj vanjskoj i sigurnosnoj i obrambenoj politici. Navest ću samo jednu praktičnu, konkretnu točku zaključaka Vijeća koji se tiču ciljeva koje je 2007. godine postavila Europska obrambena agencija u pogledu suradnje na području zajedničkih i ukupnih nabava i istraživanja. Treba naglasiti da ni jedan od tih zaključaka i ciljeva Europske obrambene agencije u pogledu zajedničkih i ukupnih nabava i ulaganja u istraživanja nije postignut.

Prema tome, sve je rečeno i sve se već dugo govori. Stoga bi trebalo očekivati da se na sastanku Europskog vijeća u studenom 2016. godine postave temelji za snažniju, novu i efikasniju europsku obrambenu i sigurnosnu politiku.

  Sabine Lösing, im Namen der GUE/NGL-Fraktion. – Frau Präsidentin! Alle drei Berichte skizzieren eine stetige Verschlechterung der Sicherheit weltweit, ganz besonders in den Nachbarstaaten Europas im Süden und im Osten. Hier scheint es dann nur eine Konsequenz zu geben: mehr Aufrüstung, mehr Geld für die Waffenindustrie und Rüstungsforschung, mehr sogenannte robuste EU-Einsätze und am besten alles bezahlt aus dem EU-Budget.

Doch was ist Ursache, was ist Wirkung? Wenn man über Ursachen und den eigenen Anteil daran nicht debattiert – klar, dann ist das Spektrum der Konsequenzen folgerichtig klein, ist ein Politikwechsel kein Thema. Kein Thema sind z. B. die Auswirkungen der EU-Außenwirtschaftspolitik, die zu desaströsen Handelsbilanzen unter anderem in den Ländern der südlichen Nachbarschaftspolitik führte. Die Verfolgung eigener geostrategischer Interessen, die Schaffung von Absatzmärkten, der Zugang zu Ressourcen: Wenn das eigene Interesse ganz oben steht, wenn Länder sogar als die machtpolitischen Hinterhöfe betrachtet werden, dann entstehen Konflikte. Um dem zu begegnen, braucht es dann militärische Ressourcen.

Eine weitere Folgerung aus den Bedrohungen finden die Berichterstatter in einer Verschränkung der inneren und der äußeren Sicherheit, was somit auch Militäreinsätze im europäischen Inland ermöglicht. Das ist ein riesiges Problem für die Demokratie. Es geht um mehr Rüstungskooperation, um mehr Ausgaben für Verteidigung und um die Nutzung ziviler Gelder für militärische Zwecke, z. B. für die Entwicklung von Drohnen, mit der Begründung, damit gäbe es mehr Sicherheit und es würde auch noch Geld gespart.

Falsch! Ständige strukturierte Zusammenarbeit, pooling und sharing und battlegroups, all das dient nicht der Entlastung von Staatshaushalten. Mit diesen Maßnahmen – und das wurde nachgewiesen – wird kein Geld gespart. Und die Vetorechte der Parlamente bei den Entscheidungen über Kriege und Rüstungsausgaben werden ausgehebelt.

Eine Friedensunion schafft kein riesiges Subventionsprogramm für die Rüstungsindustrie z. B. durch die Befreiung von der Mehrwertsteuer, sondern rüstet ab.

  Bodil Ceballos, för Verts/ALE-gruppen. – Fru talman! Fru Mogherini, jag håller ofta med er, men när det gäller den militära insats som rådet tog beslut om häromdagen för att få stopp på människosmugglarna, så gör jag verkligen inte det. Att militarisera migrationspolitiken är helt fel väg att gå. Det enda vi kan uppnå med en sådan insats är att människor dör någon annanstans och att smugglarna hittar nya vägar. Så länge deras marknad finns, kommer de att fortsätta att sko sig på människors olycka.

Det enda sätt som vi har att slå ut deras marknad är att bekämpa grundorsakerna till att människor flyr. Det är bättre att få ett beslut i säkerhetsrådet för att få stopp på konflikten i Syrien än att försöka få till ett beslut om att få gå in på libyskt vatten för att sänka båtar. Det är inte värdigt att som Nobels fredspristagare se mer till de egna interna intressena än att arbeta för en fredligare utveckling i vår omvärld. Det är inte människorna som flyr till oss som är ett säkerhetsproblem, utan det är krigen i våra grannländer som är det.

När det sedan gäller de betänkanden som vi talar om i dag menar vi gröna att de har alldeles för stort fokus på det militära i stället för det civila. De talar mer om territoriell säkerhet i stället för mänsklig säkerhet. Inte minst har vi ett stort problem med förslaget att alla medlemsstater ska lägga två procent av sin BNP på försvaret. Kvantitet är inte detsamma som kvalitet.

Vi kan ha många flygplan, fartyg, tanks och annan krigsmateriel, men om vi inte har råd att bemanna dem, eller ens personal till dem, så finns det bara en vinnare, nämligen vapenindustrin. Vi menar att vi måste blir mycket bättre med pooling and sharing och bättre samarbete.

Vi är också kritiska till vissa väldigt luddiga skrivningar som kan tolkas som att även militära insatser till del ska kunna finansieras via biståndet. Det är punkt 25 i Arnaud Danjeans betänkande.

Vi har lagt fram ett antal förslag på förändringar. Vi har inte fått igenom särskilt mycket av dem. Vi får se hur vi ställer oss i morgon, men vi kommer att försöka driva igenom de strykningar av punkter som vi tycker är felaktiga.

  Janusz Korwin-Mikke (NI). – Pani Przewodnicząca! Biorąc pod uwagę, że Unia nie posiada żadnych wojsk, te rozważania przypominają porady impotenta, jak należy robić dzieci. Na szczęście od dawna nie ma żadnych zagrożeń: we wszystkich znanych mi krajach uzbrojenia są robione pod kątem, jak rozwinąć gospodarkę jakiegoś regionu, jak wziąć możliwie dużą łapówkę za zbrojenia. Nawet w tych sprawozdaniach, jak spojrzymy, nie ma ani słowa o tym, jak dać najlepszą broń żołnierzom. Widzimy tylko, który region ile na tym zarobi i co się rozwinie. To byłaby hańba, na szczęście nic nam nadal nie grozi. Oczywiście, jeżeli któregoś dnia Włodzimierz Putin zmieni politykę z imperialnej na narodową albo nacjonaliści obalą pana Putina, no to Estonia, Łotwa, może nawet Litwa mogą czuć się zagrożone, ale to jest problem dla NATO, a nie dla Unii Europejskiej. Dlatego więc sądzę, że Unia Europejska powinna zostać zniszczona.

  Michael Gahler (PPE). – Frau Präsidentin! Vielen Dank, Frau Hohe Beauftragte, dafür, dass Sie sich den level of ambition des Europäischen Parlaments in Sachen europäische Verteidigung zu eigen machen. Hätten doch die Außen- und Verteidigungsminister den gleichen Ehrgeiz! Schade, dass sie gestern im Rat eine weitere Chance vertan haben, das Tun und das Unterlassen der eigenen Verteidigungsbürokratien und der Kommission stärker zu hinterfragen.

Persönlich bin ich mit einer Sache zufrieden, nämlich mit der vorbereitenden Maßnahme zur GSVP-Verteidigungsforschung. Das läuft recht gut. Parlament und Industrie werden aber nicht müde, die Kommission aufzufordern, endlich klarzustellen, dass wir uns mit der EU-Finanzierung von Verteidigungsforschung auf einer rechtlich einwandfreien Grundlage bewegen.

Unzufrieden bin ich, wenn ich zum wiederholten Mal lese, man begrüße das Policy Framework for Systematic and Long-Term Defence Cooperation. Dieses Papier beschreibt leider nur bestehende Verfahren. Ich frage: Wo bleibt der mutige Schritt, den Weg hin zur Etablierung einer ständigen strukturierten Zusammenarbeit aufzuzeigen, wie im Vertrag von Lissabon vorgesehen?

GSVP-Finanzierung: In den aktuellen Schlussfolgerungen lese ich: „There is scope for further discussion on the issue of GSDP financing.“ Diese Äußerung ist doch äußerst dünn. Ich frage: Was haben denn unsere Regierungen und unsere Verteidigungsbürokratien unternommen, um in der Frage der gemeinsamen Finanzierungen voranzukommen? Es ist eben nicht ausreichend, wenn uns der Rat verkaufen will, dass die Überprüfung des Mechanismus Athena abgeschlossen sei. Diese Überprüfung hat nur hervorgebracht, dass bestehende Beschlusslagen auch tatsächlich angewendet werden sollen. Ich vermisse ein klares Bekenntnis der Mitgliedstaaten zur stärkeren Solidarität und Etablierung gemeinsamer Finanzierung als Regelfall für gemeinsam beschlossene GSVP-Missionen.

  Tonino Picula (S&D). – Gospođo predsjednice, prije svega želim se zahvaliti kolegi Danjeanu na odličnoj suradnji na izvješću. Dramatično izmijenjeno sigurnosno okruženje duž 15 000 km europskih granica stavlja sve veću odgovornost pred Europsku uniju da osigura stabilnost i sigurnost u svom okruženju, bez traženja daljnjih alibija i prebacivanja ili izbjegavanja odgovornosti.

Trebamo efikasniju koordinaciju unutarnjih i vanjskih politika, nadogradnju postojećih instrumenata i inovativnu obrambenu tehnologiju. Ukratko, krajnje je vrijeme za bolju zajedničku sigurnosnu i obrambenu politiku koja je dosada najčešće bila prostor dilema.

Pozdravljam spremnost Vijeća, izraženu u jučerašnjim zaključcima, na intenzivniju suradnju među državama članicama i s međunarodnim partnerima. Nadam se da će odlučnost izražena na papiru prerasti u konkretne akcije u praksi.

U ovim turbulentnim vremenima kada lokalne krize vrlo brzo mogu prerasti u regionalne pa i globalne, imamo jedinstvenu priliku revidirati i ojačati našu zajedničku vanjsku i sigurnosnu politiku. Globalni sustav sigurnosti utemeljen u San Francisku 1944. i u Helsinkiju 1975. traži novu nadogradnju.

  Charles Tannock (ECR). – Madam President, mention of the CSDP invariably leads to a heated discussion of national sovereignty, particularly in my country the UK, which is a major military power. Such debate is, of course, legitimate considering the importance of defence and sovereignty.

We must not let ideology blind us to the potential benefits of the CSDP and should instead seek to take a more pragmatic approach. I have always argued that the CSDP must not be pursued to the detriment of NATO by causing duplication of effort or the decoupling of European defence from that of the United States or Canada – rather it should be developed as a complementary alternative in scenarios for which NATO is ill-suited.

For instance, the successful anti-piracy EUNAVFOR Atalanta naval mission was able to coordinate with the Indian navy which, as a non-aligned movement country, was unable to contribute meaningfully to NATOʼs Operation Ocean Shield, also in the Indian Ocean. This is one example where CSDP can offer real added value without, of course, undermining NATO. But defence resources are scarce in the climate of austerity today, so smart defence and pooling and sharing are great ideas, but ultimately, our priority is for every EU Member State to spend 2% of their national budgets on defence.

  Anneli Jäätteenmäki (ALDE). – Arvoisa puhemies, kannatan eurooppalaisen puolustusyhteistyön lisäämistä, siihen on useita hyviä perusteluja ja yksi perustelu on myös se, jonka korkea edustaja Mogherini mainitsi, eli sillä voidaan säästää myös rahaa.

Tarvitsemme oikeudenmukaisempaa taakan jakoa operaatioiden rahoittamisessa. Nyt rahoituksesta huolehtivat pääasiassa ne, jotka näihin operaatioihin osallistuvat. Tämä johtaa siihen, että muun muassa pienten valtioiden – jos ne joutuvat operaatiot pääasiassa itse maksamaan – on vaikea osallistua näihin operaatioihin. Toiseksi yhteiset operaatiot ovat koko Euroopan turvallisuuden hyväksi, joten silloin yhteinen rahoitus pitäisi myös järjestää.

Toiseksi haluan korostaa sitä, että siviilikriisinhallinnan ja sotilaallisten operaatioiden välillä pitäisi tehdä enemmän yhteistyötä. Tiedän toki, että sotilasoperaatioilla on monta kertaa vähän erilainen luonne kuin siviilioperaatioilla, mutta varmaan on mahdollisuuksia myös katsoa, mitä asioita voidaan tehdä yhdessä.

Kolmanneksi ihan lyhyesti: rahoitusprosessia kannattaa nopeuttaa, mutta operaatioiden rahoituksen läpinäkyvyys pitää säilyttää myös tulevaisuudessa.

  Pablo Iglesias (GUE/NGL). – Señora Presidenta, señora Mogherini, echo en falta en el informe una valoración crítica de la participación de la Unión o de países de la Unión Europea en operaciones militares, en particular en el mundo árabe, que han traído como consecuencia para nosotros la llegada tanto de refugiados como de migrantes, así como un incremento de la inseguridad dentro de las fronteras de la Unión Europea.

Dadas las circunstancias, me conformaría con que ustedes aseguren que en el futuro las operaciones en las que participen la Unión o países de la Unión se acojan a los principios de la Carta de las Naciones Unidas y a la legalidad internacional, porque, como todos sabemos, no siempre ha sido así.

  Reinhard Bütikofer (Verts/ALE). – Frau Präsidentin! Frau Hohe Beauftragte, Sie haben mit Stolz von der gestern beschlossenen EU-Militäraktion im Mittelmeer berichtet. Mich dagegen treibt die Sorge um, dass es sich hier eher um ein militärisches Abenteuer handelt als um einen Beitrag zur Bekämpfung der Flüchtlingskatastrophe.

Statt Klarheit zu schaffen, Frau Mogherini, haben Sie an verschiedenen Punkten um das Problem herumgeredet. Sie spiegeln eine Geschlossenheit der Mitgliedstaaten über drei Eskalationsstufen vor, von der wir alle wissen, dass es sie nicht gibt. Sie ignorieren, dass es jetzt schon möglich ist, aufgebrachte Schmugglerschiffe auf hoher See zu zerstören. Deswegen braucht man keine Militäraktion. Sie haben nicht eindeutig die Festlegung getroffen, dass in der Phase zwei und allen weiteren Phasen unbedingt ein Mandat des UN-Sicherheitsrates erforderlich wäre. Und Sie haben völlig ignoriert, dass Aktionen direkt an der Küste Libyens oder gar an Land die EU auf die schiefe Ebene einer Verwicklung in den libyschen Bürgerkrieg bringen würde. Wenn wir EU-Militärpolitik machen wollen, dann mindestens mit Klarheit!

  Jean-Luc Schaffhauser (NI). – Madame la Présidente, nous parlons de politique européenne de sécurité et de défense commune. Les termes sont déjà faussés. Il s'agit, en fait, d'une politique de défense et de sécurité partagée – le rapport le sous-entend – avec l'OTAN et avec l'Amérique.

Ce rapport souhaite voir les autorités européennes prendre au sérieux les questions de défense à l'approche du sommet du mois de juin. Mais qu'y a-t-il de sérieux à vouloir une politique de défense commune quand nos options géopolitiques sont décidées ailleurs?

La politique européenne de défense est devenue celle des États-Unis, ce n'est plus celle des citoyens européens dans sa dimension commune. Les vrais patriotes français refusent actuellement cette politique de sécurité européenne, qui est une politique d'insécurité européenne et de chaos.

  Elmar Brok (PPE). – Frau Präsidentin, Frau Vizepräsidentin, Kolleginnen und Kollegen! Ich glaube – wenn ich das als Vorbemerkung sagen darf, Frau Vizepräsidentin –, dass ich Ihre Versuche im Zusammenhang mit der Tragödie im Mittelmeer sehr unterstütze und auch die Versuche, die Banden, die Menschen auf ihre Boote locken, in ihrer Arbeit zu behindern und dem ein Ende zu bereiten.

Und zum Bericht selbst: Ich bedanke mich beim Kollegen Danjean für seinen Bericht, und ich glaube, dass er zu einem wichtigen Zeitpunkt kommt, nämlich in Vorbereitung auf den Europäischen Rat im Juni. Wenn ich mir die Diskussionen in einigen Mitgliedstaaten anschaue, wenn ich mit den Diplomaten diskutiere, habe ich den Eindruck, dass es nicht sehr ambitioniert vorangeht. Ich sehe kein klares Engagement in den Vorbereitungen für eine permanent structural cooperation – das ist ein Vertragsauftrag, der bisher nach fünf Jahren noch nicht in Gang gesetzt worden ist, um eine Koalition der Willigen zustande zu bringen. Und ich glaube, dass es wichtig ist, dass das in den Vordergrund gerückt wird und nicht weitere fünf Jahre liegenbleibt, und möchte Sie bitten, dass in dem Bereich etwas geschieht und das deutlicher zum Ausdruck gebracht wird – bei allen Begrenzungen, die für die endgültige Entscheidung notwendig sind.

Aber auch bei den Fragen, die in vielen Einzelheiten vorgetragen werden, mit pooling und sharing, vielen Kooperationen, auch nationalstaatlichen Kooperationen mit gemeinsamen Verbänden, müssen wir sehen, dass die Verbindung noch nicht wirklich vorhanden ist und dass die wirklichen Synergieeffekte nicht geschaffen werden können. Diese Forderung der NATO nach 2 % hört sich an wie eine Litaneifrage beim Millenniumziel: Es ist nicht glaubhaft! Wir geben als europäische Nationen 186 Milliarden Euro für Verteidigung aus – mit sehr geringem Ergebnis. Und wenn wir hier keine gemeinsamen Positionen erreichen, verschwenden wir das Geld unserer Steuerzahler. Und das muss, glaube ich, auf dem Gipfel zum Ausdruck gebracht werden.

  Doru-Claudian Frunzulică (S&D). – Madam President, I would like to focus on some important issues.

Commissioner and High Representative, we are facing some old peculiarities, which I might call strange. I am referring to the European Defence Agency, and this is mentioned in one of the reports. While this European Defence Agency is headed by you, it remains under the authority of the Council and is fully funded from outside the Union budget. These kind of things have to be settled in the end, because this mechanism does not function in reality. At the same time, I am referring to the cooperation between the European Union and NATO. Considering the current challenges and threats to our common security and defence, we need by all means to strengthen cooperation between the two organisations.

  Marek Jurek (ECR). – Polityką i rozwojem Unii Europejskiej powinna rządzić prosta zasada: tyle wspólnych kompetencji instytucji, ile wspólnych wartości interesów. Paradoks polega na tym, że w czasach, kiedy tak dużo mówiliśmy o wspólnej polityce bezpieczeństwa i obrony, o wspólnej polityce zagranicznej, rezygnowaliśmy jako wspólnota z tych przedsięwzięć, które miały wzmacniać nasze bezpieczeństwo. Mówię o takich sprawach jak na przykład rezygnacja z budowy rurociągu Nabucco. Było to przedsięwzięcie europejskie, które miało uniezależnić środkową Europę od zależności od rosyjskich surowców energetycznych.

Musimy zawsze pamiętać, że jedyną racją naszej współpracy jest wzmacnianie niepodległości naszych państw. Bez tego pozostanie tylko ich ubezwłasnowolnianie. Dziękuję bardzo.

  Fernando Maura Barandiarán (ALDE). – Señora Presidenta, la situación geopolítica de la Unión Europea ha cambiado drásticamente en los últimos años. Los graves acontecimientos que se suceden cada día en nuestras fronteras desafían nuestros valores y principios fundamentales, y ponen en peligro el carácter liberal y abierto de nuestra sociedad.

No podemos mantenernos al margen y seguir defendiendo ideas y conceptos individualistas en los tiempos que corren; tenemos que dar un paso adelante en la integración de nuestra política exterior y de seguridad y defensa.

Debemos definir las amenazas comunes; fortalecer la posibilidad de anticipación de ataques contra nuestro territorio; reforzar nuestra capacidad de estabilizar nuestra vecindad. En definitiva, debemos trabajar de manera solidaria sobre la base de los principios del proyecto europeo.

Solo unidos podremos hacer frente a la situación actual. Sin embargo, estamos muy lejos de la tan necesitada coordinación. Nuestras deficiencias estructurales en el desarrollo de una verdadera política común de seguridad y defensa deben ser corregidas y encaminadas hacia un plan para la creación de una defensa común de la Unión Europea, una defensa común que nos conduzca a unas fuerzas armadas europeas e integradas en un ejército europeo.

Europa ha postergado la idea de la defensa común durante más de cincuenta años. No podemos posponerla más.

  Javier Couso Permuy (GUE/NGL). – Señora Presidenta, para mí es triste leer las conclusiones del Consejo sobre política común de seguridad y defensa. Triste, porque me parece irresponsable la actitud europea en la crisis de vecindad; irresponsable, por buscar soluciones de seguridad y defensa para problemas políticos. Estamos pagando haber preferido la amistad estadounidense a la confianza de nuestros vecinos; estamos pagando haber ayudado a destruir grandes países como Irak, Siria o Libia. En el Sahel, en Ucrania o en Libia tenemos responsabilidades en problemas que hemos ayudado a crear. Y no vamos a resolver esos problemas con más militarización, denunciando guerras híbridas donde hay caos inducido, con grupo de batalla o con una OTAN que amenaza a los vecinos. No vamos a acabar con el drama de la emigración a cañonazos. La solución está en un nuevo enfoque regional de cooperación entre iguales, que debería empezar, sobre todo, por no bombardear ni amenazar a nuestros vecinos.

  Κωνσταντίνος Παπαδάκης ( NI). – Οι εκθέσεις που συζητιούνται, όπως και η απόφαση του Συμβουλίου Εξωτερικών Υποθέσεων, αποτελούν κυριολεκτικά πολεμικά ανακοινωθέντα της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης και των κυβερνήσεών της ενάντια στους λαούς. Στόχος σας είναι η ενίσχυση της διασύνδεσης με το ΝΑΤΟ, οι αυτοτελείς επεμβάσεις της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης με τη συγκρότηση τακτικού ευρωστρατού και η ενίσχυση των στρατιωτικών δυνάμεων για διεξαγωγή επιθετικών πολέμων στον ανταγωνισμό για τα συμφέροντα των μονοπωλίων.

Η άμεση αύξηση των εξοπλισμών στα επίπεδα του ΝΑΤΟ τα λέει όλα: είναι σκέτη υποκρισία οι συμμαχίες προθύμων ενάντια στους τζιχαντιστές που το ΝΑΤΟ, οι Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες της Αμερικής και η Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση εξέθρεψαν, ή η λεγόμενη καταπολέμηση των δουλεμπόρων στις χώρες που η Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση και οι σύμμαχοί της έβαλαν φωτιά.

Καταδικάζουμε αυτή την πολιτική, την οποία συνυπογράφει πλήρως η ελληνική κυβέρνηση και ζητά και από πάνω νέα νατοϊκή βάση στο Αιγαίο για τις ευρω-Νατοϊκές ανάγκες. Μόνο οι λαοί με την πάλη τους μπορούν να ματαιώσουν αυτά τα εφιαλτικά ιμπεριαλιστικά σχέδια για να μην τα πληρώσουν πανάκριβα με το αίμα τους.

  Andrej Plenković (PPE). – Gospođo potpredsjednice, Visoka predstavnice Mogherini, kolegice i kolege izvjestitelji Danjean, Kukan, Tarand i Gomes, zahvaljujem vam na inputu koji ste napravili proteklih mjeseci kojem sam i sam pridonio kao jedan od izvjestitelja u sjeni.

Smatram da je današanje emancipiranje teme Zajedničke europske sigurnosne i obrambene politike pravi trenutak s obzirom na brojne globalne, sigurnosne i političke izazove kriza koje su ne samo na razini cijeloga svijeta već naročito neposrednog susjedstva Europske unije gdje se čitava vjerodostojnost našeg političkog projekta stavlja u pitanje ukoliko nismo učinkoviti prema krizama u području našeg istočnog susjedstva i onoga na Mediteranu.

Stoga ovu pomorsku misiju koja je jučer osnovana na razini Vijeća, pozdravljam. Smatram da pitanje ilegalnih migracija moramo najoštrije spriječiti i to što bliže izvoru onog problema - to je južna obala Mediterana, a isto tako želio bih čuti od naše Visoke predstavnice kakva su daljnja razmišljanja u okviru Vijeća na inicijativu ukrajinskog ministra vanjskih poslova koji je vrlo jasno i eksplicitno tražio moguće osnivanje misije europske sigurnosne i obrambene politike u Ukrajini - ne možemo to pitanje ignorirati s obzirom na okolnosti u kojima smo danas i moguću korelaciju s misijom OESS-a.

Pozdravljam sve ono što smo rekli u ovim izvješćima o učinkovitijem finaciranju europske sigurnosne i obrambene politike i razvijanja naše industrijske i tehnološke baze.

  Marju Lauristin (S&D). – Madam President, it is very important that the High Representative has really strong support from this Parliament before the summit. The spirit of readiness for more solidarity and more decisive action is very important.

I want to stress the other side. We are now facing, from the east – from Russia – and from the south – from ISIS – forces which are using not only military, but also so-called soft policies. We know that they are addressing young people and minorities in countries. They are preparing them for provocations and participation. We need Europe to have a stronger soft policy and a stronger information policy. In this situation we have to have our messages. We have to have our value-based understanding and our readiness to protect democracy and human rights. This has to be visible and understandable, not only among ourselves but also, more and more, outside. I very much hope that we will also have a common information policy in this context.

  David Campbell Bannerman (ECR). – Madam President, I would like firstly to thank my colleague, Geoffrey van Orden, who has important defence meetings today, for his tireless work opposing an EU single army.

Regrettably, the reports on integrating defence policy and defence industries seek again to invent EU defence roles that are not wanted and not desirable. Yesterday’s Council agreed ambitious operations in the Mediterranean. Of course, it is right to make every effort to save lives, but the question is what are the consequences of such well-intentioned but flawed measures. Certainly they will not end mass migration. For that you may need an Australian approach: they turn boats around after giving them food, water and ensuring they will not sink. They went from 800 boats and 50 000 migrants a year to zero now. But in the light of what was agreed there are two major questions: firstly, why was the major NATO Joint Force headquarters at Naples – already very well equipped for operations in the Mediterranean – not involved? Why must the EU always duplicate and undermine NATO? Secondly, what is the cost of this duplication and who will pay?

  Florian Philippot (NI). – Madame la Présidente, le rapport sur la politique de sécurité et de défense européenne réclame à cor et à cri l'uniformité des positions de politique étrangère des pays européens. Aucune politique étrangère commune efficace n'a pu se mettre en place. Les pays européens ont chacun leur Histoire avec un grand H, leur géographie, et donc une perception des intérêts et une compréhension différentes du monde. Par conséquent, une telle politique étrangère a besoin d'un fédérateur extérieur, comme l'avait prophétisé le général de Gaulle, ce qui explique la citation de l'OTAN dans ce rapport.

Les positions irresponsables et va-t-en-guerre de ce Parlement nous montrent à quel point une armée européenne nous mènerait au désastre. Qui contrôlerait une telle armée et pour défendre quels intérêts? Peut-on penser raisonnablement envoyer nos soldats français se faire tuer dans une guerre si mon peuple y est opposé? On peut mourir pour sa patrie, mais on ne peut pas mourir pour la Commission de Bruxelles. Peut-on raisonnablement imaginer qu'une puissance nucléaire comme mon pays, la France, délègue cette responsabilité à des technocrates irresponsables? Déléguer l'esprit de défense, c'est tuer la raison d'être des nations et, cela, la France ne l'acceptera jamais.

(L'orateur accepte de répondre à une question "carton bleu" (article 162, paragraphe 8, du règlement))

  Arnaud Danjean, rapporteur, question "carton bleu". – Madame la Présidente, Monsieur Philippot, la grandiloquence est une chose, la précision en est une autre.

Je voudrais simplement vous demander, puisque nous discutons d'un rapport précis aujourd'hui, à quel chapitre de ce rapport faites-vous référence quand vous parlez d'"armée européenne" puisque, sur les 56 articles de ce rapport, cette expression n'est mentionnée nulle part?

  Florian Philippot (NI), réponse "carton bleu". – Quand on parle de défense commune et si on écoute attentivement les discours des uns et des autres, jusqu'à des propositions extrêmement concrètes et précises d'armée européenne qui sont venues récemment des institutions européennes, vous savez très bien que ce projet est dans les tuyaux. Il avait été heureusement rejeté au début de la construction européenne, avec la CED en 1954, et je crains qu'il ne revienne aujourd'hui, pour le plus grand malheur des peuples européens.

  Tunne Kelam (PPE). – Madam President, it was five years ago that Robert Gates observed that demilitarisation of Europe, where large sections of the general public and political elites are unfavourable to military force, has changed from a blessing in the 20th century to an impediment to providing reliable security in the 21st century.

We have entered a completely new, volatile international situation, and it is a matter of utmost urgency to adequately address the newest security challenges which will, in all likelihood, become more powerful and threatening. I am very much encouraged by your address, Ms Mogherini, and also the message from yesterday’s Foreign Affairs Council. I feel that we have a strong common ground on mutual understanding and complementarity. We face the situation as it is and it gives hope to all of us.

Our message to the European Council should be, first of all, to take practical steps – no more declarations. Instead of abstaining from further cutting of defence expenditure, we must have a clear decision to increase. The European Council should encourage – to put it mildly – recalcitrant Member States to put more resources into defence. I am encouraged that the Foreign Affairs Council has reached a conclusion that a sufficient level of expenditure is needed.

  Victor Negrescu (S&D). – Madam President, in the amendments that I tabled to the different reports, I underlined my belief that we need more transparency in the common European security and defence policy. This also means more responsibility by the Member States, which have to respect their financial engagements which are needed to fulfil EU ambitions and objectives.

In order to implement European actions in terms of security and defence, we need more coherence and complementarity between EU operations and financial resources, as well as more efficiency and new ideas for initiatives that can generate the support of Member States.

Personally, I believe that today we need more awareness by the Member States that we need a true common European policy. Today we can no longer be undecided and hesitant. We have to be prepared to act against those who attack the European democratic model. We need to be coherent and fair with our international and transatlantic partners. We need the EU to respect its civil engagements. We need a common security and defence policy, and for that we need a common financing system supported by all Member States.

  Ελευθέριος Συναδινός ( NI). – Κυρία Πρόεδρε, μελετώντας τη συγκεκριμένη έκθεση για την κοινή πολιτική ασφάλειας και άμυνας, απογοητεύτηκα. Οδηγούμαι δε στο συμπέρασμα ότι συντάχθηκε από ανθρώπους χωρίς στρατιωτικό υπόβαθρο, και μάλλον χωρίς συγκεκριμένο στόχο. Υπάρχει τεράστια σύγχυση σε πλήθος θεμάτων, βασικών εννοιών και αντικειμένων, με αποτέλεσμα την απώλεια των στρατηγικών μας επιδιώξεων.

Αναφέρω ενδεικτικά τη σύγχυση μεταξύ στρατιωτικών και μη αποστολών και τις επιχειρήσεις στρατιωτικής υποβοήθησης και άμεσης ενέργειας. Οι απορίες πολλές και ουσιώδεις. Επιτρέπουν οι υφιστάμενες συνθήκες την εφαρμογή των όσων αναφέρει η έκθεση; Μπορούν τα κράτη μέλη να υλοποιήσουν τις δεσμεύσεις που προτείνονται, λαμβάνοντας υπόψη ότι δεν είναι όλα τα κράτη της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης και μέλη του ΝΑΤΟ;

Είναι λάθος να πιστεύουμε ότι τα οικονομικά μέσα για διπλωματία είναι ικανά από μόνα τους να επιτύχουν αποτέλεσμα. Δεν υπάρχουν οι κατάλληλες υποδομές για συγκέντρωση και κοινή χρήση εξοπλισμού, καθόσον υφίσταται πανσπερμία υλικών, προβλήματα διαλειτουργικότητας αλλά, κυρίως, διαφορετικές ειδικές ανάγκες, προτεραιότητες και επιδιώξεις. Απαιτείται στρατηγικός επαναπροσδιορισμός, ενωσιακή αλληλεγγύη, προσγειωμένη σχεδίαση και κοινή δράση, έννοιες ανύπαρκτες επί του παρόντος αν αναλογιστούμε την περίπτωση της Κύπρου όπου μέρος της κατέχεται ακόμη παράνομα από την Τουρκία.

  Lorenzo Cesa (PPE). – Signor Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, il dibattito di oggi ci certifica quanto la politica estera e di sicurezza comune è uno dei pilastri dell'Unione europea e che in questi tempi di crisi, con la guerra in Ucraina, i conflitti in Siria e in Iraq, l'avvento dell'Isis e la crisi in Libia, la responsabilità dell'Europa e quindi la nostra responsabilità come parlamentari europei è più forte che mai.

Sappiamo benissimo, però, che il Parlamento non può fare da solo. Occorre che anche il Consiglio affronti questa emergenza con la massima determinazione possibile. Nel dicembre 2013 il Consiglio ha riconosciuto la necessità di potenziare la capacità di difesa e di rafforzare l'industria. Purtroppo, però, concretamente non è stato fatto molto, le missioni dell'Unione europea sembrano un fatto formale, a volte un fatto ideale. Questo deve cambiare.

Abbiamo bisogno di più finanziamenti: senza soldi è difficile essere efficaci. Dobbiamo coordinarci con le altre istituzioni internazionali – l'ONU, la NATO, l'Unione africana, l'OSCE – se vogliamo avere possibilità di successo.

Sappiamo tutti che la sicurezza di tutta l'Europa è messa a rischio. La guerra è ai nostri confini e quindi non è possibile che alle operazioni militari condotte dall'Unione europea partecipino solo pochi paesi. Noi come parlamentari europei discutiamo oggi, e poi approveremo, spero, l'ottima relazione presentata dai colleghi Danjean e altri che contiene alcune di queste preoccupazioni.

Ci aspettiamo, Vicepresidente Mogherini, che il Consiglio prenda finalmente delle misure concrete in maniera tale da far diventare questa politica estera e di sicurezza comune una realtà e non solo parole al vento. Conoscendola, so che invertirà questo, già lo ha fatto in questi giorni, lo farà nei prossimi giorni, conosco la sua concretezza e speriamo davvero di essere concreti.

(L'oratore accetta di rispondere a una domanda "cartellino blu" (articolo 162, paragrafo 8, del regolamento))

  James Carver (EFDD), blue-card question. – Are you seriously suggesting, sir, that the security of continental Europe is at stake if it is left in the hands of NATO, as opposed to this move for a common security and defence policy?

  Lorenzo Cesa (PPE), risposta a una domanda "cartellino blu". – Io sto dicendo che c'è bisogno, l'ho detto con molta precisione, di coordinare maggiormente le istituzioni mondiali per affrontare il tema della sicurezza.

Ma parliamoci chiaramente: serve maggiore concretezza in Europa, perché in questo periodo, in questi ultimi anni davvero non abbiamo visto concretezza. Io la concretezza l'ho vista in questi giorni, nell'azione del Vicepresidente Mogherini nel mettere in piedi in pochi giorni una missione e comunque nel rispondere a un problema enorme che noi abbiamo, che riguarda soprattutto alcuni paesi del Mediterraneo. Forse non riguarda il suo paese, ma riguarda noi.

Quindi penso che un coordinamento tra Europa e le altre istituzioni sia essenziale.

  Afzal Khan (S&D). – Madam President, common security and defence policy plays an important role in realising EU international security goals. To date, we have not realised its full potential.

The EU has never before faced such a convergence of security crises on its doorstep. Therefore, the CSDP needs to be improved to enable Europeans to shoulder their international security responsibilities more effectively. Although defence policy remains a matter of national sovereignty, we can make European defence more efficient through European solidarity.

The future of European defence is to have the real capability to prevent and respond to crises as part of a comprehensive and bold EU strategy: a strategy that comprises diplomatic, development, humanitarian and defence expertise; a strategy that applies to all phases of the conflict cycle – preventing, managing and stabilising; and a strategy that is done in tandem with other partners, having a complementary and mutually reinforcing role. They should not be in competition with each other. Let us work together for a safer Europe.

VORSITZ: ULRIKE LUNACEK
Vizepräsidentin

  Sophie Montel (NI). – Madame la Présidente, ce rapport s'émeut de la faible mutualisation et solidarité des pays de l'Union européenne en matière de défense. Mais le caractère modeste des opérations militaires relevant de la politique de sécurité et de défense commune n'est que le reflet des profondes divergences d'intérêt qui existent entre les différents États membres.

L'idée d'une armée européenne fédéralisée est donc un songe que seuls les esprits européistes peuvent croire prémonitoire. Les divisions sur la guerre en Iraq ou même sur l'intervention en Libye en témoignent. En outre, cette mutualisation est motivée par les coupes dans les budgets de défense nationale. C'est à se demander si Bruxelles n'impose pas l'austérité pour promouvoir l'armée européenne et satisfaire ainsi l'attitude du belliqueux M. Juncker, dont les idées n'ont pas décongelé depuis la fin de la guerre froide. Les seuls intérêts qu'une armée européenne servirait sont ceux du fédéralisme extérieur, dénoncé en son temps par le général de Gaulle, je veux parler des États-Unis et de son bras armé, l'Otan.

Il est, par ailleurs, scandaleux que ce rapport propose de financer les interventions militaires sur le budget de l'Union européenne, alors que ceci est clairement prohibé par l'article 41, paragraphe 2, du traité sur l'Union européenne.

Ce rapport est donc l'œuvre d'européistes pour qui il ne peut y avoir de salut en dehors de l'Union. Face à ces lubies, il faut d'urgence ramener la part du budget de la défense de la France à 2 % du PIB et favoriser comme il se doit les coopérations bilatérales, ciblées et temporaires.

  Alojz Peterle (PPE). – Pred dvajsetimi leti sem prisostvoval razpravi o skupni varnostni in obrambni politiki v konvenciji o prihodnosti Evrope.

Žal smeri in dinamiki takratne razprave po uveljavitvi Lizbonske pogodbe ni sledila primerna dinamika implementacije, pač pa so se vmes bistveno spremenile varnostne razmere v naši soseščini.

Izkazalo se je, da smo imeli o marsičem napačne strateške predpostavke in ocene ter da nismo bili dovolj močni v preventivnih dejavnostih. Srečala sta se koncept mehke in trde moči.

V Ukrajini imamo že konflikt na evropskih tleh. Če ne bomo prav in pravočasno ukrepali, bomo dobili naslednjega na Zahodnem Balkanu. Tam niso na delu samo Evropski zvezi naklonjene sile.

Zahvaljujem se gospe podpredsednici/visoki predstavnici in poročevalcem za tako bogato podlago za današnjo razpravo.

Predsednik je privolil, da se v skladu s členom 162(8) poslovnika postavi vprašanje z dvigom modrega kartončka

  Ivan Jakovčić (ALDE), pitanje koje je podizanjem plave kartice postavio. – Poštovani gospodine Peterle, samo ste u jednoj rečenici spomenuli ono što sam namjeravao govoriti kasnije ako dobijem „catch the eye”, ali to nije nikada sigurno, i zato vas želim pitati da li se zaista slažete sa mnom da i ovu sigurnosnu i obrambenu politiku trebamo na neki način koordinirati i sa zemljama zapadnog Balkana ili ako ništa drugo barem ozbiljno razmatrati sve ono što se dalje na nestabilnom Balkanu dešava u obliku sigurnosne politike Europske unije.

  Alojz Peterle (PPE), odgovor na vprašanje, postavljeno z dvigom modrega kartončka. – Gospodu Jakovčiču bi odgovoril, da se seveda strinjam, da je to treba delati v tesni povezavi, v institucionalnem okviru, ki je na razpolago, da v skupnem interesu razvijamo tisto smer, ki mora seveda vsebovati kredibilno evropsko perspektivo vsem državam tega območja, in v tem kontekstu je treba biti posebej pozoren do varnostne in obrambne politike.

  Victor Boștinaru (S&D). – Doamnă Președinte, când discutăm astăzi aceste rapoarte, constatăm că tot ceea ce știam și credeam despre strategia de securitate și apărare a Uniunii Europene este profund afectat de crize majore de securitate și nu numai, în vecinătatea estică imediată a Uniunii Europene, ca și în vecinătatea sudică a Uniunii noastre. Dacă acesta este contextul, trebuie să recunoaștem că, până de curând, Uniunea noastră a răspuns slab, vag, ezitant și, în orice caz, nu la nivelul așteptărilor cetățenilor noștri. Pentru susținerea unor acțiuni eficiente ale Uniunii Europene în domeniul politicii de securitate și apărare comună avem nevoie de noi capacități civile și militare, dar și de investiții coerente în cercetare și dezvoltare, precum și de creșterea, repet, creșterea rolului statelor mijlocii și mici în definirea acestei politici. Închei cu o remarcă - nu retorică - trebuie să răspundem onest la întrebarea: cât de comună este politica noastră de securitate și apărare și cât de multă securitate și apărare produce pentru Uniune?

  Aymeric Chauprade (NI). – Madame la Présidente, Madame la Haute représentante, chers collègues, ce rapport d'Arnaud Danjean encourage, en fait, le dépouillement de nos souverainetés au profit d'une chimère d'armée européenne. Que le terme soit utilisé ou non d'ailleurs, c'est bien l'objectif.

La sécurité européenne doit, au contraire, reposer sur la volonté des États de développer leur propre armée. La France, le Royaume-Uni, l'Italie aussi, font encore un effort particulier. Ils doivent maintenir cet effort, l'augmenter même s'agissant de la France, qui voit son armée déstabilisée année après année. Quand l'Allemagne annonce vouloir faire un effort de défense particulier, je ne peux que m'en réjouir car, en effet, on ne peut accepter que les Européens baissent la garde face à l'Asie et au monde islamique de plus en plus militarisés quantitativement et qualitativement.

Mais la défense européenne ne doit pas consister à ériger un nouveau mur à l'est de l'Union face à la Russie, elle ne doit pas avoir comme objectif la constitution d'une armée transatlantique à la place des armées européennes.

Toute autre logique fera de l'Union européenne non pas une promesse de paix mais une promesse de guerre.

(L'orateur accepte de répondre à une question "carton bleu" (article 162, paragraphe 8, du règlement))

  Liisa Jaakonsaari (S&D), sinisen kortin kysymys. – Te puhuitte valtioiden vastuusta ja halusta puolustaa omaa aluettaan. Ettekö Te ole huomannut sitä, että juuri tämä on johtanut suureen tuhlaukseen ja siihen heikkouteen, jota Euroopan unioni on aikaan saanut turvallisuuden alalla, ja siihen, että meillä on paljon tuhlausta nimenomaan asehankinnoissa, käyttämissämme varuskunnissa ja niin edelleen.

Eikö juuri yhteinen politiikka toisi enemmän lisäarvoa?

  Aymeric Chauprade (NI), réponse "carton bleu" à Liisa Jaakonsaari. – Madame, actuellement, il y a 500 millions d'Européens dont le budget de défense globale représente seulement un tiers de l'effort de défense alors que les États-Unis, nation souveraine, y contribuent à eux seuls à hauteur de 50 %.

Ce que je veux dire simplement, c'est que ce sont les nations qui, de manière efficace, peuvent organiser la défense globale de l'Europe grâce à des coopérations renforcées et à des coopérations à géométrie variable.

Aujourd'hui, en tout cas, la logique de la défense européenne est en plein échec et le rapport de M. Arnaud Danjean, malgré sa bonne volonté et sa connaissance stratégique, ne fera qu'amplifier cette défaite.

  Bogdan Andrzej Zdrojewski (PPE). – Pani Przewodnicząca! Pani Wysoka Komisarz! Bezpieczna Europa to raczej dziś postulat niż stan faktyczny. W pierwszej kolejności ten postulat wynika z faktu, iż przez lata Europa była bezpieczna: dobrze rozwijała się gospodarczo, nie miała bezpośrednich zagrożeń. Po drugie to też czas kryzysu, który wywołał oszczędności, najczęściej te oszczędności w pierwszej kolejności czyni się właśnie w obronności, ale także na przykład w kulturze. Dziś wiemy, że szukanie oszczędności w bezpieczeństwie, w obronności to błąd.

Nie przekonują mnie takie bardzo proste postulaty, aby zwiększyć wydatki na obronę do dwóch procent PKB. To nie wystarczy. Ważne jest, na co będą przeznaczane te środki finansowe i jak będzie wyglądała kooperacja pomiędzy europejskim przemysłem obronnym, a właśnie obronnością, ale także istotne jest, jak te wydatki będą budowane w poszczególnych krajach europejskich.

Bardzo dziękuję panu Arnaud Danjean, gdyż jego sprawozdanie według mojej oceny jest niezwykle konkretne, niezwykle celne, bardzo oszczędne, jeżeli chodzi o słowa, ale bardzo precyzyjne, jeżeli chodzi o diagnozę. Cieszę się także, że jeden z moich postulatów znalazł się w tym sprawozdaniu – ten postulat, który dotyczy uwzględnienia istotności systemów satelitarnych Galileo i Copernicus. Dla mnie dziś istotne jest, aby od tych sprawozdań przejść do działań.

  Jens Geier (S&D). – Frau Präsidentin, sehr geehrte Frau Vizepräsidentin Mogherini, liebe Kolleginnen und Kollegen! Ich äußere mich hier heute als Mitglied des Haushaltsausschusses. Auch ich wünsche mir mehr europäische Zusammenarbeit in der Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik. Aber ich befürchte, dass die Mitgliedstaaten auch künftig nur in Ausnahmefällen dazu bereit sein werden. Aber ich befürchte auch, dass die Mitgliedstaaten gern auf das Finanzierungsangebot eingehen werden, das der Bericht von Kukan und Tarand in den Artikeln 26 und 27 macht.

Der EU-Haushalt ist chronisch unterfinanziert. Alljährlich kämpft der Haushaltsausschuss dieses Hauses weitgehend einig um die Finanzierung der zivilen Prioritäten des Europäischen Parlaments. Die Zahlungskrise der Europäischen Union hat in den vergangenen zwei Jahren die humanitäre Hilfe der Europäischen Union beinahe handlungsunfähig gemacht. Und in dieser Situation wollen wir dem Rat einen Blankoscheck ausstellen, um die Gemeinsame Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik zu finanzieren? Ich glaube, dafür ist der EU-Haushalt nicht da, dafür reichen die Mittel nicht aus, und das ist für die deutschen Sozialdemokratinnen und Sozialdemokraten schlicht nicht zustimmungsfähig.

  Jeppe Kofod (S&D). – Madam President, if we are to achieve a true common security and defence policy within the European Union, we need at least two things. We need a vision and we need a new strong common security strategy to guide and deliver upon that vision. In my view, Russia once again constitutes a primary security and defence challenge for Europe. It is a challenge to the fundamental value of Europe whole and free, where the sovereignty of every country is respected and where every country can freely choose its partners and pursue membership of the EU and NATO without a veto or even violent attacks from Russia.

I therefore ask you, Madam Vice-President, how is the work on the unified EU-Russia strategy progressing? When will you be able to present it to Parliament? How and to what extent can we push for even harder, enhanced NATO-EU cooperation within the strategy? NATO remains the backbone of European defence and security, but Europe can also take a more active and dominant role.

  Gilles Pargneaux (S&D). – Madame la Présidente, Madame la Haute représentante, je voudrais tout d'abord saluer le travail de notre rapporteur, Arnaud Danjean. Oui, son rapport va dans le bon sens: il nous faut développer une politique de sécurité et de défense commune compte tenu du contexte que nous connaissons. Oui, il faut une ligne claire, une stratégie limpide, comme le rapport l'indique, pour renforcer l'Europe de la défense. Rappelons que deux Européens sur trois sont en faveur du développement d'une véritable politique de sécurité et de défense commune.

Nous constatons malheureusement que les missions de la PSDC sont aujourd'hui tragiquement faibles. Prenons l'exemple de la nouvelle mission EUMAM RCA, qui est trop faible: ce sont seulement 60 personnes, dont 20 proposées par la France. Cette mission ne porte pas sur la formation mais seulement sur le conseil.

Madame la Haute représentante, nous comptons sur vous. Vous avez créé un mouvement que nous saluons tous depuis ces derniers mois. Le sommet européen de juin est important et nous comptons sur votre pugnacité pour permettre aux chefs d'État d'aller dans le sens de la proposition que vous faites et que nous faisons dans ce Parlement avec le rapport d'Arnaud Danjean.

  Jonás Fernández (S&D). – Señora Presidenta, señora Mogherini, estamos debatiendo esta tarde la política común de seguridad y defensa en un informe al que he presentado varias enmiendas. Y querría focalizar este debate en la auténtica crisis humanitaria que estamos sufriendo en el Mediterráneo, donde miles de personas están muriendo diariamente en busca de un futuro mejor en Europa.

Apoyo, sin duda, su iniciativa para luchar contra el tráfico ilegal de personas, pero no podemos olvidar que lo que hace a esas personas confiar sus vidas, y muchas veces las de sus hijos, a auténticos traficantes, no es otra cosa que la huida de la guerra, de la desesperación y del hambre. Y, por lo tanto, la política de seguridad tiene que incorporar una visión clara, solidaria y de fraternidad con África y con el sur del Mediterráneo para poder dar un futuro estable a esos países.

Quiero también apoyar el sistema de cuotas para asilados que la Comisión ha propuesto y lamentar profundamente la posición insolidaria del Gobierno de España, que está cuestionando el pequeño número de personas que tenemos que acoger.

  Nicola Caputo (S&D). – ... Grazie Presidente, non dei conflitti armati di crisi e di stabilità. Le diffuse violazioni dei diritti umani registrare anche in prossimità dei confini dell'Unione Europea destano non poche preoccupazioni. C'è poi la minaccia terroristica ed e quindi facilmente desumibile che la sicurezza dell'Unione europea nel suo complesso. A rischio non è europea, non riesce ancora ad operare quale attore unico decisivo risolutivo. Le nuove sfide che l'Europa si trova ad affrontare evidenziano un'assoluta necessità che gli Stati membri lavorino insieme nell'ambito di un'azione comune realmente coordinata nel quadro della politica di sicurezza e di difesa comune. Mi auguro dunque del il Consiglio Roberto la difesa di giugno riesca a fare dei passi avanti concreti in questa direzione, migliorando la capacità di difesa delibera dell'Unione europea e la sua capacità di contribuire alla gestione delle crisi ulteriori fattori che versano preoccupazione deriva dalla mancanza di coordinamento dei bilanci della difesa degli Stati membri e dalla frammentazione del mercato. La difesa, che determina una crescente dipendenza dell'indusse europea di questo settore dal esportazioni extra. Il consiglio dovrebbe impegnarsi per arrivare ad un mercato maggiormente integrato che consentirebbe di limitare la duplicazione dei programmi e delle attività di ricerca nel campo della difesa e di aumentare la competitività europea in questo settore.

  Die Präsidentin. – Beim nun folgenden Catch-the-eye-Verfahren werde ich aus Zeitgründen jeweils nur eine Rednerin oder einen Redner von jeder Fraktion zu Wort kommen lassen.

Catch-the-eye-Verfahren

  Milan Zver (PPE). – Danes je nestabilnost v naši soseščini vse večja.

Povzročajo jo države, ki ogrožajo finančno stabilnost Evroregije in posledično Evropske unije.

Povzročajo jo teroristi, ki jim je Evropa postala vse bolj dejanska in potencialna tarča njihovih napadov.

Povzroča jo novi ruski imperializem, ki v posmeh mednarodnemu pravu anektira del sosednje države.

Povzročamo jo tudi mi sami, ker se ne odzovemo pravilno in pravi čas na krizna žarišča v soseščini, ne na vzhodu ne na Balkanu.

Na primer, Makedoniji ne damo datuma za začetek pogajanj za vstop v Evropsko unijo že deset let. In smo jo pustili na samem, postala je ranljiva in nekateri akterji, ki so že pred sto leti stegovali svoje kremplje po njej, so se spet aktivirali.

Glede eskalacije konfliktov torej nosimo tudi krivdo mi sami, kot da se nismo ničesar naučili iz zgodovine.

Spoštovani, da Balkan ne bo spet sod smodnika, zasluži ves naš aktivni angažma. Spoštovana visoka predstavnica za skupno varnostno in obrambno politiko, poteza je na vaši strani.

  Michela Giuffrida (S&D). – Signor Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, gli equilibri mondiali sono in rapidissima evoluzione. I mutamenti geopolitici in Africa, l'instabilità mediorientale, la crisi ucraina impongono all'Unione un'azione ormai urgente, concreta e ferma sulla politica di sicurezza e sulla difesa comune. Perché siamo in ritardo, dobbiamo dire la verità, e strategicamente puntare alla prevenzione poteva incidere efficacemente dove ora i focolai di crisi sono più che infiammati.

Senza una strategia di lungo periodo la politica di sicurezza europea sarà blanda come la nostra futura credibilità internazionale e io mi sento di ringraziare l'Alto rappresentante per la fermezza con cui ha portato avanti in questi giorni la necessità di una missione nel Mediterraneo.

Ma una politica di sicurezza europea deve avere una condivisione nei fatti e non solo nelle parole, un approccio che non sia ostaggio di veti e di bracci di ferro o di una finta indifferenza che è strategica e che nemmeno centinaia di morti intaccano.

Quanto sta accadendo sulla questione quote dell'agenda immigrazione purtroppo si commenta da sé.

  Ruža Tomašić (ECR). – Gospođo predsjednice, stanje utvrđeno u ovim izvješćima odgovara realnosti i nemoguće ga je osporiti. Europa doista jest podbacila u realizaciji svoje želje i ambicije da bude nezaobilazan dionik u rješavanju svjetskih sigurnosnih kriza.

Sukob u Ukrajini ogoljava poražavajuću činjenicu da europska vanjska politika u posljednjih 25 godina uopće nije napredovala. Države članice u ovom su se slučaju prema ruskom osvajaču ponašale kao i prema agresoru na Hrvatsku početkom 90-ih godina prošlog stoljeća – neusklađeno, sebično i prije svega neodlučno.

Jasno je da velike države brane svoje interese kad je riječ o odnosima s bivšim kolonijama ili trgovinskim partnerima. Mogla bih reći i da je to razumljivo i prirodno, ali nemojmo se onda pretvarati da smo nešto što nismo i trošiti ogroman novac poreznih obveznika na programe koji će, dok je karakter ove zajednice ovakav kakav jest, uvijek nuditi samo parcijalna rješenja.

  Petras Auštrevičius (ALDE). – Madam President, Europe does not belong to federalists or Eurosceptics. It belongs to Europeans, and they need peace and security. We must act accordingly and reflect real needs. Indeed, the European Union needs to take practical and effective steps towards a well-functioning common space of security and defence. We need to be able to react properly and in a timely way to tackle emerging risks and especially to prevent them from happening.

There is no risk that the EU, by strengthening its common security and defence policy, will become a hard power and a risk to its neighbours. The European Union is a democratic structure and is run by the rule of law. I believe our discussion today will help us to go in this direction, and indeed to build this common space of security and defence on our continent.

  Κώστας Χρυσόγονος ( GUE/NGL). – Θεωρώ σκανδαλώδες το γεγονός ότι η έκθεση που συζητούμε σήμερα για την ευρωπαϊκή πολιτική άμυνας και ασφάλειας μνημονεύει, ανάμεσα στις προκλήσεις που αντιμετωπίζει η Ένωση, την τρομοκρατική απειλή στο Κέρας της Αφρικής και ξεχνάει την κατοχή από ξένα στρατεύματα μέρους του εδάφους της Ένωσης, δηλαδή της Βόρειας Κύπρου. Επίσης, ξεχνάει την τουρκική απειλή σε βάρος της Ελλάδας για πόλεμο σε περίπτωση που ασκήσει το κυριαρχικό της δικαίωμα, κατά το διεθνές δίκαιο, για επέκταση των χωρικών υδάτων στα 12 μίλια.

Υπό τέτοιες συνθήκες, η δήθεν "κοινή άμυνα" είναι κακόγουστο αστείο. Το ακόμη χειρότερο είναι ότι, οι υπέρογκες αμυντικές δαπάνες Ελλάδας και Κύπρου για την αντιμετώπιση της τουρκικής απειλής, αφενός μετατρέπονται σε υπερκέρδη της αμυντικής βιομηχανίας άλλων ευρωπαϊκών κρατών και, αφετέρου, καταλογίζονται σε βάρος του δημοσιονομικού ελλείμματος και του δημόσιου χρέους.

Σας καλώ να σταματήσετε αυτή την υποκρισία και να επιδείξετε πραγματική αλληλεγγύη απέναντι στα απειλούμενα από την τουρκική επιθετικότητα κράτη μέλη της Ένωσης.

  Bronis Ropė (Verts/ALE). – Nepaisant pastaraisiais metais priimtų svarbių sprendimų, akivaizdu – šalys narės iki šiol stokoja didesnio susitelkimo šiuo klausimu. Būkime atviri – beveik visos šalys narės šiuo metu dairosi viena į kitą ir tikisi, kas jų saugumu pasirūpins. Arba galvoja tik apie savo šalies saugumą. Mes negalime laukti, turime jau šiandien žinoti kokių konkrečių priemonių kartu imsimės kilus bet kokiems vidaus ir išorės iššūkiams. Tinkamas koordinavimas, aiškus planavimas, didesnis dėmesys krizių prevencijai ir pasirengimui, pakankamas saugumo ir gynybos politikos įgyvendinimo finansavimas – štai ko mums trūksta. Be abejonės, skiriant didesnes lėšas būtinas ir didesnis skaidrumas, todėl visiškai pritariu, kad turi būti atliktas septyniolikos užsienyje vykdomų Europos misijų efektyvumo vertinimas. Bet ne tik finansavimas yra problema. Iškalbingas faktas: į Sąjungos vykdomas karines operacijas yra įsitraukusios ne visos valstybės narės. Laikas baigti rengti skambias deklaracijas, o pradėti iš esmės dirbti Europos saugumo ir gynybos užtikrinimo srityje.

  Gianluca Buonanno (NI). – Signor Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, cara signora Mogherini, l'ultima volta che ho parlato con lei il Presidente Schulz mi ha dato 7 giorni di sospensione perché ho detto la verità: avevo detto che lei non contava un emerito "..." – non dico la parolaccia sennò ne prendo altri 7. Quindi mi ritrovo qui a dirle che, visto che lei proviene dal partito comunista – era iscritta al partito comunista fin da bambina, no? – allora forse lei ha in mente quello che diceva Mao Tse-tung e cioè che se sotto il cielo c'è tanta confusione la situazione è perfetta. Vuole forse dire che la confusione che c'è in Europa, che non ha una politica giusta, dove non c'è niente di definitivo e non c'è la sicurezza per noi europei, è la sua strategia comunista presa da Mao Tse-tung?

Io penso che a voi comunisti piacciono tanto la povertà, l'insicurezza, il disastro, forse talmente vi piace tanto che volete riprodurlo ancora in questa Europa. Allora io le dico – e non dico più la parolaccia perché l'ho garantito a Schulz – non è che lei non conta un emerito c..., lei non conta una beata minchia.

  Die Präsidentin. – Danke. Danke auch dafür, dass Sie keine Schimpfwörter mehr verwenden.

(Ende des Catch-the-eye-Verfahrens)

  Federica Mogherini, Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative. – Madam President, as I spent a lot of time at the opening of our debate, I will now just take the opportunity to comment on some of the very relevant issues that were raised and make more general remarks.

Firstly, on defence spending, I think those who raised this matter are quite right. There is not only the target, for those Member States which belong to NATO, of 2% of GDP, there is also the fact that 12 Member States have already increased – or are currently planning to increase – defence spending. However, there is a need to focus not only on how much has been spent. I think many of you were right to raise this. The other real point is how we spend, if we manage to spend together in a coordinated way, and how we manage to spend the money we invest in defence better. This means looking at the output of our investments in defence. This is obviously very much a national debate, but there are components of this debate which are European – especially when we look at incentives on defence spending. There is work on the way, especially in view of the June Council.

Many of you raised the issue of EU-NATO cooperation, and some of you raised the need to strengthen the relations or the coordination. Let me say that this is already being done in a very fruitful way. I see no risk, at this historical time, that increasing our own defence and security policy can in any way be to the detriment of NATO. On the contrary, we have a complementarity on which we can work even more, especially when we tackle the hybrid threats.

Strategic communication was mentioned. There are a variety of tools in respect of which putting together different elements of our work can be extremely helpful for us both, keeping in mind the fact that we are completely different in nature – as I said several times – and that we obviously have different decision-making and agendas on many issues. But still, strong cooperation is not only a need for the future – it is also already a reality. I do not see the danger of duplication that someone mentioned. I see rather the need to fill the gaps we have in common. This is a problem the European Union has, but also one that NATO has.

One timely question was raised by Mr Plenković about the possible CSDP operation in Ukraine. Let me say that we discussed this at length inside the European Union with the Member States and obviously with the Ukrainian authorities. We already have a civilian mission in Ukraine, which is assisting with the reform of the security sector. We are ready to increase that kind of support which is, as I said, civilian work and a non-executive mission on security sector reform. We will also continue to channel our support for the full implementation of the Minsk Agreement through the OSCE. We commonly believe that this is the path we have to follow in full support of the efforts that, especially in the Normandy format, are continuing to be made.

Let me close with some general remarks. Many of you in this room – and I mention them in good faith and with no purely domestic audience purposes – referred to the need to move on, to go beyond mere declarations and take concrete steps. Some, quite rightly, made reference to the fact that not all the instruments in the Lisbon Treaty are being used, and that the security situation calls for this. I think I was the first, on 6 October 2014, in my hearing in front of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, to mention this. To me, one of the challenges of my mandate in these five years is to make full use of the instruments of the Lisbon Treaty. It requires hard work to create the political conditions for doing this.

Let me also say that when we in this room – or outside of this room – translate this, it rightly highlights that there are still gaps and still limits in our action. I am the first to recognise this. When we move this to the point of saying that Europe does not have a policy, that Europe is divided, that Europe is not acting, that Europe is not Europe – as someone said in this room – I understand that this is a narrative we are used to. But sometimes this does not reflect reality.

I said in my opening remarks that today we are talking about CSDP, as yesterday the 28 – united in less than a month – took the decision to establish an operation. The two things, the narrative and the reality of these days, do not match. This does not mean that we have solved all the limits that we still have in our CSDP – not at all – but to me the most concrete way of having a real CSDP, a real common security and defence policy, is by specifically using the instruments, by specifically building the political conditions for making decisions in the Council, and by having the operations and the missions we need, when we need them and in the way we need them. This is work that we have to do together, because Europe is not an abstract entity existing somewhere.

Europe is what we make of it, all of us – the Member States, the European Parliament. Each of you has a political family, a political party, a Member State of nationality, and we have a common responsibility to build the political conditions for making full use of all the instruments we have, and to recognise – when we are taking steps that are going in that positive direction – to say that this is a step, take responsibility and move forward with the difficult work of realising what the European dream, but also need, is about.

This means a lot of consistency. I will not go back over many of the details that I discussed in my opening remarks, especially about the last decisions we have taken, except for one point. Pablo Iglesias mentioned the need for all our missions and operations to fulfil the requirements of international law. For me, that is the basic starting point and is natural. For me, the reference to international law obviously means full respect for, and working fully in, the framework of the United Nations. That is why we are developing such strong cooperation with the UN and with the UN system, and, particularly in this case, when we talk about the situation in the Mediterranean, the work with the UNHCR. This is the basis for our work, because these were the principles and the values on which Europe was based. These are the principles and values that have to be at the basis of the European Union missions and operations around the world.

  Arnaud Danjean, rapporteur. – Madame la Présidente, Madame la Haute représentante, permettez-moi de vous dire que les mots que vous venez de prononcer sur l'aspect concret de ce qui doit nous inspirer sont parfaitement en phase avec la philosophie du rapport que j'ai présenté et que mes collègues – je les en remercie – ont bien voulu enrichir de leurs contributions. Je crois que le débat l'a globalement bien montré, aujourd'hui, à travers l'accueil positif qui lui a été réservé.

La question à laquelle nous devons répondre aujourd'hui, c'est comment faire mieux en commun par rapport à des défis de sécurité qui sont d'une ampleur et d'une complexité inédites?

Permettez-moi de vous dire que ceux d'entre nous qui sont intervenus sur un mode très idéologique, avec des postures parfois totalement dénuées de réalité par rapport à ce qui figure dans ce texte, se trompent. À ceux qui redoutent ou à ceux qui espèrent une armée européenne, par exemple – il en a été question aujourd'hui –, je dis qu'ils se trompent de débat. Ce n'est pas le but de ce rapport et de cette discussion, ni même du Conseil qui aura lieu au mois de juin. Le but, c'est de savoir comment à vingt-huit nous pouvons collectivement faire face à des défis. Parce que ces défis, aucun État membre, seul, ne peut y faire face. C'est aussi simple que cela. Les réponses sont, effectivement, d'abord dans le traité.

J'apprécie le fait que vous utilisiez votre influence institutionnelle et politique pour pousser cette philosophie, qui est une philosophie pragmatique, de flexibilité. C'est ce dont nous avons besoin aujourd'hui. Nous ne pourrons pas tout faire à vingt-huit. Nous ne devons d'ailleurs peut-être pas tout faire à vingt-huit en matière de sécurité et de défense parce que la réalité en Europe est hétérogène. Mais nous devons à vingt-huit, politiquement, faire en sorte que ceux qui veulent faire plus et aller plus loin en matière d'intégration de la politique de défense, puissent le faire.

Je pense que les pistes que vous proposez et celles que nous proposons sont tout à fait compatibles, complémentaires, et vont dans la même direction. J'espère qu'elles seront entendues par les États membres.

  Indrek Tarand, rapporteur. – Madam President, in the beginning I was speaking in the capacity of rapporteur, but now I would like to draw attention to some of the thoughts of my Group, the Green Group. We have some problems. Firstly, reducing Horizon 2020 money does not seem such a good plan to us. Secondly, we do not think it is a good idea to use the EU budget to compensate European defence companies who cannot export their production on account of sanctions and embargos against third countries. Finally, there is the idea of value-added tax reductions or exemptions for defence capability cooperation. So you can see that we will have a very interesting vote tomorrow, and therefore I urge everyone in this Chamber to look at the big picture, forget about dogmas and vested interests, and if possible, colleagues, please share the big picture proposed by a modest MEP who comes from a very small country whose airspace is from time to time policed by the Italian air force, and share the picture or vision that an EU common defence is a must and not a nuisance, and it will bring us closer together than we can ever imagine.

  Ana Gomes, rapporteur. – Madam President, I would like to thank the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Ms Mogherini, for her substantive comments on our reports, and mine in particular on the Defence Markets Directive implementation. I would simply like to urge a strategic direction – in the College of the Commission as well – in implementing these Directives, in order to avoid totally contradictory decisions, such as Commissioner Vestager’s recent one.

On the implementation of these directives, which enable a country like mine, Portugal, to go on with the dismantling of crucial Portuguese shipyards that have been producing for our navy, and then rubber-stamping that in a very distorted interpretation of the Directive. They also allow, or give the ‘Amen’ of the Commission to the selling of critical defence technology companies or even critical infrastructure, such as the Port of Piraeus, to companies controlled by other foreign powers, namely China.

We in this Parliament definitely support your endeavours to push the Member States to deliver on the common financing of CSDP missions, namely military missions, because this is not just about facilitating fairer burden-sharing, it is about the only way to encourage the generational forces.

Equally important is overcoming the bureaucratic and political barriers which prevent cooperation between Member States and the Union, and even among EU specialised agencies, to ensure a more synergetic use, by civilian and military CSDP operations, of the existing capacities. Do you know, High Representative, that the European Maritime Safety Agency, which is based in Lisbon, is actually providing very crucial information for the Atalanta mission? It could also do this for the Mediterranean mission. Yet they do not have a mandate for that. Is this not stupid? Should we not actually acknowledge and actually make full potential of that contribution? Ultimately, I just want to make your point. Indeed, we need more defence, more European defence, because facing the challenges we have no single country...

(The President cut off the speaker)

  Die Präsidentin. – Die gemeinsame Aussprache ist geschlossen.

Die Abstimmung findet am Donnerstag, 21. Mai, statt.

Schriftliche Erklärungen (Artikel 162 GO)

  Λευτέρης Χριστοφόρου ( PPE), γραπτώς. – Στηρίζουμε την Κοινή Πολιτική Αμυνας και Ασφάλειας της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης όμως θεωρούμε ότι αυτή η πολιτική πρέπει να ενισχυθεί και να μετατραπεί σε πιο ουσιαστική πολιτική ασφάλειας και άμυνας που δεν πρέπει να περιορίζεται μόνο σε μικρής κλίμακας αποστολές και χρηματοδότηση ειρηνευτικών επιχειρήσεων. Όντως, ο μετριοπαθής χαρακτήρας παρεμβάσεων ΚΠΠΑ δεν αποτελεί ουσιαστική συνεισφορά στη διατήρηση και επιβολή της ειρήνης. Η ΕΕ πρέπει να είναι ικανή και αποτελεσματική να παρεμβαίνει σε όλα τα επίπεδα διαχείρισης μιας κρίσης και να μην περιορίζεται να παρεμβαίνει μόνο μετά την οποιαδήποτε κρίση. Η ΚΠΠΑ αποτελεί πράγματι μέρος της ευρύτερης εξωτερικής πολιτικής και διάστασης της ΚΕΠΠΑ ,όπου απαιτείται αυτός ο βασικός βραχίονας να μετεξελιχθεί σε πραγματική και αποτελεσματική Κοινή Εξωτερική Πολιτική Ασφάλειας και Άμυνας για την ΕΕ. Πιστεύουμε ότι είναι η ώρα η ΕΕ να επικεντρωθεί στην προσπάθεια ολοκλήρωσης του στόχου για ΚΠΠΑ γιατί Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση δεν νοείται, όσο και αν εκφράζει άλλες κοινές πολιτικές ,όταν υστερεί στο σημαντικότερο τομέα που είναι η Κοινή Πολιτική Ασφάλειας και Άμυνας. Η Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση, μέσα από μια ισχυρή ΚΠΠΑ, έχει υποχρέωση να διασφαλίζει και να εγγυάται τα σύνορα της ΕΕ καθώς και τον εναέριο χώρο και τις ΑΟΖ των χωρών μελών της.

  Jarosław Kalinowski (PPE), na piśmie. – Obserwujemy coraz więcej sytuacji skutkujących pogorszeniem się poziomu bezpieczeństwa zarówno wewnątrz Unii, jak i w jej bliskim sąsiedztwie. Niestabilność polityczna i gospodarcza krajów na Wschodzie i Południu Europy, a także wzrost zagrożenia terrorystycznego wewnątrz Wspólnoty wywołują niepokój wśród jej mieszkańców. W tej sytuacji zasadne jest zwiększenie wysiłków prowadzących do wzmocnienia Wspólnej Polityki Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony (WPBiO).

W ciągu ostatnich lat spadł poziom finansowania misji w ramach WPBiO, pojawiają się opóźnienia w realizacji zamówień, a także trudności z rekrutacją nowych i utrzymaniem doświadczonych, wykwalifikowanych pracowników. Dlatego niezbędne jest stworzenie odpowiednich ram strategicznych, które będą uwzględniać skuteczną współpracę między państwami członkowskimi i umożliwiać planowanie skoordynowanych, długoterminowych działań oraz szybką reakcję na potencjalne zagrożenia.

Należy także pochylić się nad kwestią funkcjonowania przedsiębiorstw działających w sektorze obronności: odpowiednie systemy prawne i finansowe umożliwią poprawę ich konkurencyjności i sprawną realizację projektów. Zwiększenie przejrzystości zamówień pozwoli na ich demokratyczną kontrolę i zwiększy wiarygodność władz. Zgodnie z zapisami art. 21 Traktatu o funkcjonowaniu Unii Europejskiej obywatelom Europy należy zapewnić pokój i bezpieczeństwo. Wzajemne zaufanie i harmonizacja działań, zrównoważony system gospodarowania zasobami, bezpieczeństwo dostaw – to podstawowe elementy sprawnego i spójnego rynku obrony. Solidarność i wspólne inicjatywy to największa siła UE.

  Илхан Кючюк (ALDE), в писмена форма. – Уважаеми колеги, настоящата степен на несигурност по границите и в непосредствено съседство на ЕС е безпрецедентна от края на 90-те години на миналия век насам.

С големия брой трайни и нововъзникващи предизвикателства по отношение на сигурността е ясно, че никоя държава членка не може да се справи сама, а това изисква укрепване на ОПСО. Съюзът и държавите членки трябва спешно да се приспособят към новите предизвикателства чрез ефективното използване на съществуващите инструменти на ОПСО и чрез сътрудничеството в областта на сигурността и отбраната с другите международни институции, по-специално ООН, НАТО и ОССЕ.

Разбира се, не можем да пренебрегнем факта, че финансовата криза се отрази сериозно върху националните бюджети за отбрана, но държавите членки трябва да поемат повече отговорност за колективната сигурност и да работят за укрепване на европейската отбранителна промишленост и европейската отбранителна и индустриална база. Трябва да се инвестират повече ресурси в отбраната и да ce съсредоточим върху тези области от управлението на кризи, в които ЕС може наистина да добави стойност.

Необходимо е държавите членки да изразят по-голяма готовност във връзка с военните операции на ЕС. Да дадат съответен принос от ресурсите и способностите, които притежават, за да подобрят сътрудничеството и координацията, особено в сферата на борбата с тероризма, организираната престъпност, кибернетичната отбрана и миграцията.

  Monica Macovei (PPE), in writing. – In critical times such as the ones we face today, the EU and its Member States must act together in order to counter all security threats. We must respond with one voice and robustly to conflicts in our neighbourhood. I strongly believe that the economic crisis cannot be an obstacle and lead us to abandon our defence policy efforts. I urge Member States to meet NATO spending targets: 2% of their GDP for defence. The intensity of the current military crisis has only proven that EU and NATO are in mutual need. The competition between EU and NATO should be replaced by cooperation! We have postponed our common security defence plan for more than 50 years after the failure of the European Defence Community. It is now time to step forward, and to use all the legislative instruments laid down in the Lisbon Treaty, such as the solidarity clause and the mutual defence clause. The clear sign of support is that 75% of our citizens want EU integration in defence! What other better incentive are we waiting for? The EU belongs to its citizens, so let us be responsible and ensure them peace and security!

  Ramona Nicole Mănescu (PPE), in writing. – In order to create and apply a common pro-active strategy regarding security and defence in Europe, it is of utmost importance for there to be enhanced cooperation and coordination among EU Member States and between Member States and partner countries with regard with security and defence matters, on counter-terrorism and on combating organised crime. Having in view the current international context, characterized by international groups and interreligious conflicts, especially in the Middle East area, and terrorist actions carried out including inside European states’ territory and apparently motivated by religious reasons, we urgently need to constructively cooperate between the Member States and also with external partners against any target implied in terrorist actions. A greater coordination on analysing and disseminating EU intelligence and information will improve our capacity to prevent and react to crises with more efficient results.

  Vladimír Maňka (S&D), písomne. – Ozbrojené sily EÚ, aj napriek spoločnej účasti na rôznych kontingentoch, sú organizované na prísne vnútroštátnom základe. Ak by krajiny užšie spolupracovali na európskej úrovni v oblasti spoločnej bezpečnostnej a obrannej politiky, usporili by od 26 do 130 miliárd eur ročne. Vyššie náklady vyplývajú z nedostatku nadnárodne integrovaného trhu obstarávania v oblasti obrany, pre ktorý neplatí spoločný trh. Existencia 28 rozdrobených národných trhov, z ktorých každý je regulovaný oddelene, bráni konkurencii a výsledky sú premárnenou príležitosťou na administratívne úspory z rozsahu pre priemysel a výrobu. Je potrebné zlepšiť transparentnosť a otvorenosť v oblasti obranného trhu a zlepšiť synergie medzi civilným a vojenským výskumom a vývojom. Tu treba hľadať úspory, ktoré by mohli byť zdrojom pre kvalitnejšiu spoločnú bezpečnostnú a obrannú politiku.

  Urmas Paet (ALDE), kirjalikult. – Venemaa agressioon Ida-Ukrainas ning konfliktid Süürias ja Iraagis koos terroriorganisatsiooni ISIS esilekerkimise, Liibüa kriisi ja terrorismiohuga ohustavad otseselt Euroopa Liidu julgeolekut.

Eelkõige vajavad kõrgendatud tähelepanu terrorismi- ja organiseeritud kuritegevuse vastane võitlus, küberkaitse ja rände valdkond. Euroopa Liit peab ergutama liikmesriike lähtuma NATO eesmärgist eraldada vähemalt 2% SKPst kaitsekuludeks. Kaitse-eelarvete langustrend ELi liikmesriikides peab murduma, sest see ei kajasta enam tegelikku julgeolekupoliitilist olukorda. Samuti tuleb ELil tugevdada nii tsiviilmissioone kui ka olla valmis sõjalisteks missioonideks, muu hulgas ELi lahingrühmade kasutamiseks, mida ei ole siiani tehtud.

Toetan täiendavaid samme tsiviilmissioonide rahastamise kiirendamiseks ning rakendamiskorra lihtsustamiseks, et EL oleks paindlikum kriisidesse õigeaegselt sekkumisel. Ja loomulikult tuleb lõpuks normaliseerida NATO ja ELi koostöö.

  Dubravka Šuica (PPE), napisan. – Brojne vanjskopolitičke teme bile su na dnevnom redu ove plenarne sjednice, no ipak poseban naglasak bih stavila na sigurnosnu i obrambenu politiku Europske unije s obzirom da okupacija Ukrajine još nije prestala, a još uvijek su aktualni i sukobi u Siriji i Iraku koji su izravna prijetnja sigurnosti Unije. Moramo biti spremni adekvatno odgovoriti na suvremene sigurnosne izazove tako da uspostavimo koordiniranu zajedničku sigurnosnu politiku u kojoj bi sudjelovale sve članice EU-a, bez obzira na veličinu i ekonomsku snagu. Ujedinjeni u različitosti geslo je Unije još od 2000. godine, a bez obzira na naše različitosti uvjerena sam da postoji puno više sličnosti koje povezuju narode EU-a koje su ključ suradnje i uspostave zajedničkog stava kada je riječ o Uniji. Sigurnost naših građana i sigurno okruženje prioritet je Unije iako je u turbulentnom okruženju vrlo teško razgraničiti vanjsku i unutarnju sigurnost, stoga moramo biti dosljedni pri koordiniranju naših strategija unutar i izvan EU-a korištenjem postojećih instrumenata kako bismo efikasnije odgovorili na humanitarne zahtjeve jer borba protiv terorizma i organiziranog kriminala nema granica.

  Tomáš Zdechovský (PPE), písemnĕ. – Jsem velmi znepokojen bezpečnostní situací v EU a v jejím východním a jižním sousedství. Tato území jsou v důsledku velkého počtu migrantů a tím vznikajícím bezpečnostním problémům čím dál méně stabilní. Konflikt na východě Ukrajiny, konflikty v Sýrii a v Iráku spolu se vzestupem Islámského státu, libyjská krize a teroristická hrozba v Africe nepochybně přímo ohrožují bezpečnost hranic EU a tím i evropské občany samotné. Je nutné, aby EU a její členské státy převzaly odpovědnost za svou vlastní bezpečnost a obranu. Chtěl bych tímto upozornit na nutnost posílit společnou bezpečnostní a obrannou politiku a zefektivnit a zintenzivnit rozvíjení kapacit. Vyzývám vysokou představitelku Federicu Mogheriniovou, aby se ujala vůdčí role při vyvíjení snahy o další posun v SBOP. Velice bych v tomto smyslu ocenil větší snahu vytvořit efektivní propojení mezi institucemi a agenturami EU v oblasti vnitřní bezpečnosti, jako jsou Frontex, Europol, ENISA.

  Janusz Zemke (S&D), na piśmie. – Wspólna polityka bezpieczeństwa i obrony jest prowadzona od 16 lat. Wspólna – niestety głównie w deklaracjach. Nie było to groźne w stabilnej Europie i w stabilnym otoczeniu Europy. Niestety w ostatnich latach otoczenie to zmienia się bardzo dynamicznie. Co więcej, zmienia się na niekorzyść. Pogłębiający się kryzys na południu i na wschodzie stanowi coraz większe zagrożenie dla Unii Europejskiej. Problem polega na tym, że reakcja UE na te zagrożenia jest zbyt słaba i z zasady następuje z opóźnieniem, co dobitnie widzimy dzisiaj, gdy każdego dnia fala nielegalnych migrantów stara się dotrzeć do Europy. Poszczególne państwa tworzące Unię Europejską nie są w stanie w pojedynkę sprostać tym zagrożeniom. Zdecydowanie opowiadam się za zwiększeniem roli i środków finansowych na wspólną politykę bezpieczeństwa i obrony. Potrzeba mniej deklaracji, a więcej współdziałania, więcej rzeczywistych zdolności wojskowych i cywilnych, które byłyby w dyspozycji Unii Europejskiej.

VORSITZ: MARTIN SCHULZ
Präsident