Sanatarkat istuntoselostukset

Keskiviikko 20. tammikuuta 2016 - Strasbourg

17. Keskinäistä puolustusta koskeva lauseke (SEU 42 artiklan 7 kohta) (keskustelu)

  Der Präsident. – Als nächster Punkt der Tagesordnung folgt die Aussprache über die Erklärung der Vizepräsidentin der Kommission/Hohen Vertreterin der Union für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik zur Beistandsklausel (Artikel 42 Absatz 7 EUV) (2015/3034(RSP)).

  Federica Mogherini, vice-présidente de la Commission. – Monsieur le Président, ce n'est pas un temps ordinaire pour l'Europe, c'est clair. Nous faisons face à des défis sans précédent. Nos citoyens nous demandent quel est le sens de notre Union. D'aucuns prétendent que l'Union à 28 est trop complexe et trop plurielle pour prendre de bonnes décisions au cours de cette époque difficile. Je pense que notre réponse, face aux horribles attentats de Paris, a surpris beaucoup d'observateurs. Certains d'entre eux avaient prédit qu'à l'heure la plus sombre, l'Europe aurait été divisée et déchirée par des luttes intestines.

J'ai participé à tous les Conseils et à tous les sommets européens après le vendredi 13 novembre. Laissez-moi donc vous dire qu'à partir du premier jour, la réponse de l'Union européenne a été celle d'une vraie Union. Comme vous le savez, après les attaques terroristes de Paris, la France a demandé le soutien des autres États membres comme cela est prévu à l'article 42, paragraphe 7, du traité sur l'Union européenne. Lors du Conseil des ministres de la défense, le 17 novembre, les États membres ont envoyé un message très fort d'unité et de solidarité à la France.

Beyond the political message, Article 42(7) of the Treaties contains concrete obligations for Member States. Indeed, the Member States have an obligation to – ‘shall’ – provide aid and assistance to the Member State under attack with all the means in their power. This formulation is usually understood as referring to the use of military means, but no doubt Article 42(7) also covers assistance through other instruments or means of support of a non-military nature. The article expresses a high level of commitment. It is up to each Member State to determine the exact nature of the aid and assistance it will ultimately provide, but the framework is European. The core principle is ‘unity in diversity’.

France asked for the support of the European Union and the European Union replied in a united way. The French Minister of Defence presented two specific requests to the Ministers. First, to support any operations that France would be conducting against Daesh in Syria and Iraq, and second, to backfill any lack of resources that may occur in international military missions or operations as a result of French redeployments to fight Daesh.

France has approached Member States bilaterally with specific requests, following the European Council in its defence composition, with the constant involvement also of the EU crisis management structures and my personal constant updates. There are no specific procedures, as you know, for the implementation of Article 42(7) and, as you know, the article has never before been invoked in our European history. The implementation can therefore be adapted to the specific circumstances. While Article 42(7) does not specifically provide for a role of the European Union structures, its instruments and mechanisms may be used in countering the threats to Member States. And as I said, even if this is not specifically provided for in the wording of the Article of the Treaty, we in the Council, at the request of France, agreed on involving the European Union structures all along the path towards the implementation of the provisions.

At the Council meeting I offered EU support from the outset, including, for instance, in coordinating any request that might have had an impact on EU CSDP missions or operations. Accordingly, France provided information on the implementation process both in the Political and Security Committee as well as in the Military Committee. Let me add that until now, French engagement in the fight against Daesh has not had any consequences for the EU missions and operations where France is active.

The flexibility of Article 42(7) would also allow any state invoking it to also have recourse to other complementary international security arrangements. The Article itself refers explicitly to the fact that, ‘commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation for those states which are members of it.’

The mechanism to transform political solidarity into concrete, real action is strong and I think today we all realise that there is no nation state that can stand alone against the threats we face, and that it is our unity, also in this field, that is our strength. The diversity of our defence assets, the specific character of our foreign policies, is far from being a liability. It constitutes the strength of our Union. No other power in the world can mobilise such a variety of foreign policy and defence instruments all together.

Unity in diversity, that is our strength. We can use it without being scared to use all the provisions of the Treaty if and when they serve a national and/or a collective interest. We often complain about our divisions. Let me say that it is also a case of being proud of our unity and strength where we find it.

  Michael Gahler, im Namen der PPE-Fraktion. – Herr Präsident! Frankreich hat als erstes Land nach den verabscheuungswürdigen Anschlägen in Paris die Beistandsklausel nach Artikel 42 Absatz 7 zur Anwendung gebracht.

Wir als Parlament und wir als EVP-Fraktion begrüßen die einhellige Unterstützung aller Mitgliedstaaten als Reaktion darauf. Wir sind uns aber auch bewusst, dass dieser Artikel in erster Linie auch eine politische Angelegenheit ist und dass die Situation für das Land, das als erstes diesen Präzedenzfall geschaffen hat, nicht besonders bequem ist.

Frankreich musste sich also selber darum kümmern zu definieren, was es braucht, und dann von einem zum andern Mitgliedstaat gehen, um Hilfe zu bekommen. Wir hatten als Parlament bereits Ihre Vorgängerin, ich glaube, es war im Jahr 2012, aufgefordert, praktische Maßnahmen und Leitlinien für den Fall vorzuschlagen, dass dieser Artikel in Anwendung gebracht wird, und auch zu untersuchen, wie man konkret reagieren sollte und wer wofür zuständig sein würde. Das ist leider bisher nicht geschehen. Sie haben das ja auch gesagt.

Wir haben wieder einmal eine Situation erlebt, wo die Grenzen zwischen innerer Sicherheit und äußerer Sicherheit verschwimmen. Deswegen wäre es so wichtig, dass wir wirklich alle Möglichkeiten, die der Vertrag uns bietet, auch aktivieren. Im Bereich der inneren Sicherheit ist es doch offenbar, dass die Polizeibehörden, die Grenzschutzbehörden, auch die Inlandsgeheimdienste, ihre Informationen, über die sie verfügen, teilen, dass man sich gegenseitig informiert, dass man nicht erst wartet, bis etwas geschieht.

Im Bereich der äußeren Sicherheit sind wir weiterhin überzeugt, dass die Mitgliedstaaten, die enger zusammenarbeiten wollen, die sich mehr auch gemeinsam engagieren wollen, auch dafür sorgen können, dass durch die Aktivierung der permanenten strukturierten Zusammenarbeit eine bessere Planung und eine bessere Durchführung gemeinsamer Aktionen möglich wird.

  Der Präsident. – Ich hatte zu Beginn vergessen anzukündigen – die Kollegen haben seit der letzten Aussprache gewechselt –, dass wir so weit hinter dem Zeitplan sind, dass auch in dieser Aussprache keine „blaue Karte“, wie schon bei den beiden vorangegangenen Aussprachen, zugelassen sein wird.

  Ioan Mircea Paşcu, on behalf of the S&D Group. – Mr President, after hearing what has been said I can only regret that the report I prepared in 2012 was four years too early. I will not repeat what we asked in that report but received no answer to; there are people here, such as Geoffrey Van Orden, who know the history of this report.

Sadly the invitation, as I say, was ignored. Consequently since France has invoked Article 42(7), instead of Article 222 which deals expressly with terrorism, we need to improvise setting a precedent for all future similar situations. As a former Defence Minister I can see value in sailing in uncharted waters, but who is to guarantee that today’s precedent will prove enough tomorrow?

The situation is one more illustration that the EU is in danger of drifting towards a world of its own, more and more divorced from reality. As we did not assume Article 42(7) would never be invoked, we did not exercise our preventive diplomacy tools when possible, having now to have recourse to crisis management, and even conflict resolution, much more costly solutions, in dealing with the conflicts on our doorstep.

In a world dominated by power politics, the EU cannot rely on the moral superiority of not using military force in its defence. The truth is that the EU is under assault without having solved its internal problems, and its response cannot rely exclusively on soft power. If the EU does continue to ignore the realities surrounding us, I am very much afraid it will suffer the same fate as the League of Nations at the end of the 1930s – something which we all want to avoid.

  Geoffrey Van Orden, on behalf of the ECR Group. – Mr President, at this moment we should be focused on combating a real terrorist threat and, in particular, on assisting France and other close allies that have been under recent terrorist attack, not trying to advance misplaced EU defence ambitions by federalists in this House. The ECR Group therefore strongly opposes the joint resolution calling for permanent structured cooperation in defence, the establishment of a permanent EU headquarters to plan collective defence, and movement towards an autonomous European Defence Union, by definition separate from NATO. This is dangerous nonsense, as realists understand only too well.

We have long warned about the dangers of EU meddling in defence, which can only be at the expense of our national sovereignty and of NATO, the indispensable alliance credible to our potential enemies and deeply reassuring to our allies. Many were dismayed when the Lisbon Treaty included a mutual defence clause – a cosmetic imitation of NATO’s Article 5 but with no foundation. The EU itself has no capability to provide collective defence. In any case, 22 EU countries are NATO members, and the small remainder, with just one exception, have participated in some way in NATO activity. There is no excuse for the inclusion of Article 42(7) in an EU treaty and certainly not for its invocation, unless of course your aim is to be provocative or you want deliberately to see NATO sidelined.

  Urmas Paet, on behalf of the ALDE Group. – Mr President, the activation of the mutual defence clause by France has given us an opportunity, and also an obligation, to define its purpose and benefits. The mutual assistance clause gives us a singular opportunity to establish the grounds for a strong and sustainable European Defence Union, to be ready to face the security threats and challenges. So far, it has been interpreted as a bilateral obligation for states to help the one that needs it.

However, we must make sure that the correct action plan is put in place so that everybody understands their obligations when a state decides to invoke this article. A state in need must be able to get comprehensive help very fast from all Member States. Time is of the essence in these cases. We must also keep in mind that this is not a substitute for NATO Article 5, which has the task of coordinated response to a threat against one Member State. The new paradigm we are facing with increasing terrorist attacks forces us to deal with many aspects that have so far either been left unnoticed or simply ignored. The Schengen system is getting its share right now, with states closing their borders and threatening to demolish the free movement principle that the EU is built upon.

Europe’s internal security must be strengthened and intelligence information shared to fight terrorists and avert terrorist plots. For the intelligence network to be fully functioning and operative we should consider creating a European Intelligence Agency, or at least enable Europol to have more competences to be able to implement, de facto, a transversal intelligence network within the Member States. A proper legal framework to constrain and control arms and ammunitions on the EU market must also be established, as well as tightened export rules.

  Javier Couso Permuy, en nombre del Grupo GUE/NGL. – Señor Presidente, señora Alta Representante, rechazamos la activación de esta cláusula de defensa mutua porque supone errar la respuesta. En vez de solucionar, aviva el fuego y convierte a la Unión Europea en una alianza militar.

Discrepamos totalmente de la interpretación dada por Francia. Por mucho que se empeñen, un atentado terrorista no es un acto de guerra. Esta interpretación es un fraude al Derecho internacional. Es volver a la lógica de la guerra contra el terror donde solo caben respuestas civiles: acción policial, inteligencia, cortar la financiación, cortar el apoyo internacional, y siempre dentro del Estado de Derecho. No podemos perder nuestras libertades. No podemos dedicarnos a matar moscas a cañonazos. Trece años y la guerra contra el terror ha sido un fracaso: ha destruido Estados seculares, ha causado millones de muertos y centenares de miles de refugiados y ha creado un monstruo como el Estado Islámico. No todo vale, parece un atajo pero es un laberinto porque, además, al ser un acuerdo bilateral intergubernamental no ayuda al control parlamentario en el proceso de activación.

Volvamos a las vías más pacientes, al respeto del Derecho internacional, a la Carta de las Naciones Unidas, a la no intervención. Ayudemos a los Estados, ataquemos las asimetrías y la pobreza y hagamos ya un embargo de armas.

  Bodil Valero, för Verts/ALE-gruppen. – Herr talman! Först av allt vill jag än en gång skicka en tanke till alla de offer och deras anhöriga som drabbades i de fruktansvärda terrorattackerna i Paris och på andra platser runtom i världen. Terrorism måste självklart bekämpas, men det viktigaste är att förebygga den och det är viktigt att vi använder rätt verktyg.

Idag diskuterar vi en resolution med både bra och dåliga inslag, och den är ju ett svar på president Hollandes beslut att åberopa den s.k. mutual assistance clause. Hollande kallade attacken mot Paris för en krigshandling och förklarade sedan krig mot terrorismen, precis som Georges W. Bush efter 11 september. Bush krig mot terrorismen har pågått i många år, men med facit i hand så vet vi att det snarare lett till ökade motsättningar och mer terrorism.

I Paris begicks terrorattacken av EU-medborgare som vuxit upp här. Attacken var ett vidrigt brott men inte en attack från en främmande stat. Daesh är inte en stat och därför ska attacken mötas med polisiära metoder. Vi menar att det är en farlig utveckling om vi skapar en praxis där brott beivras av militär istället för polis och på ett sätt så att alla medlemsländer dras in i detta s.k. krig. Vi borde istället använt oss av artikel 222, som de facto handlar om bl.a. terroristattacker.

Vi diskuterar gärna hur EU ska utveckla sin gemensamma säkerhets- och försvarspolitik, men vi vill inte att den sammanblandas med en home-grown terroristattack här i Europa. Vi vill inte se en ökad militarisering av EU på det sätt som vi menar att resolutionen förespråkar och därför har vi valt att inte ställa oss bakom den gemensamma resolutionen, utan hålla fast vi den vi själva skrivit och som mer speglar våra gröna värderingar.

  Mike Hookem, on behalf of the EFDD Group. – Mr President, in the UK we are always being told that we will not have an EU army, but the aftermath of the Paris attacks removed any last traces of doubt anyone might have over where we are heading. Even Tony Blair is now openly calling for an end to national sovereignty by giving control to Brussels of the troops that he, more than any other Prime Minister, sent to war. Personally, whenever Tony Blair says something – particularly about the military – I think that the best advice is to do the opposite. Unlike Mr Blair, I took the oath of allegiance to Her Majesty the Queen when I was a serving soldier. I think you would be hard pressed to find anyone who would do the same for Mr Juncker. We already have the foundations with a mutual defence clause, but what would happen should we have another conflict where Europe is divided? What if Argentina, drunk on the support of Jeremy Corbyn, decided to attack the Falkland Islands again? Would France stop all defence sales and join in a UK-led defence of the islands? The most important role any government plays is to protect its country. That is why, with their support of the Lisbon Treaty, UK MPs did the British people a huge ....

(The President cut off the speaker)

  Franz Obermayr, im Namen der ENF-Fraktion. – Herr Präsident! Als Österreicher bin ich stolz auf die bewaffnete Neutralität meines Heimatlandes.

Wie die Mehrheit meiner Landsleute habe ich kein Verständnis, wenn Schritte unserer Regierungschefs, ob rot oder schwarz, unsere militärische Unabhängigkeit schrittweise aushöhlen. Durch die Beistandspflicht des EU-Vertrags wird Österreich mittelbar zum NATO-Mitglied – allein schon aufgrund der seit 2003 bestehenden strategischen Partnerschaft –, ohne Mitspracherechte, dafür mit Unterstützungspflichten.

So verwundert es auch nicht, dass Österreich mittlerweile fast selbstverständlich Teil der sogenannten EU Battlegroup ist. Soweit zur Analyse der Lagebeurteilung. Solidarität allerdings, unter Wahrung nationaler Eigenheiten, ist nach meinem Verständnis in dieser Bedrohungssituation selbstverständlich ein Fundament Europas. Doch dementsprechend darf auch diese Beistandspflicht keineswegs zu einer militärischen Partnerschaft durch die Hintertür führen. Auch nicht, wenn es sich um eine transatlantisch militärische Partnerschaft handelt.

  Κωνσταντίνος Παπαδάκης ( NI). – Κύριε Πρόεδρε, το Κομμουνιστικό Κόμμα της Ελλάδας καταδικάζει το κοινό ψήφισμα που προβλέπει τη δημιουργία μόνιμου πολιτικοστρατιωτικού αρχηγείου επιχειρήσεων με βάση το άρθρο 42 της Ευρωσυνθήκης. Τόσο η συγκρότηση αυτού του νέου Στρατηγείου της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης όσο και η ίδια η ενεργοποίηση της λεγόμενης ρήτρας αμοιβαίας άμυνας, σηματοδοτούν κλιμάκωση της ιμπεριαλιστικής επέμβασης στη Συρία και στην ευρύτερη περιοχή με θύματα τους λαούς. Αποτελούν ενίσχυση της στρατιωτικοποίησης της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης στην κατεύθυνση συγκρότησης Ευρωστρατού σε σύνδεση με το ΝΑΤΟ. Αιματοκυλάτε τους λαούς για το εάν θα περάσει από τη Συρία ο αγωγός του Κατάρ – σχέδιο των Ηνωμένων Πολιτειών και της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης ή ο Ρώσικος από το Ιράν. Τα ίδια δεν κάνατε και στη Λιβύη ή στο Ιράκ και στο Αφγανιστάν; Τα προσχήματα και τα κηρύγματα αλληλεγγύης Ηνωμένων Πολιτειών, Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης - ΝΑΤΟ και των κυβερνήσεών τους δεν πείθουν. Τα ιμπεριαλιστικά σχέδιά τους έχουν και την ενεργή στήριξη της κυβέρνησης ΣΥΡΙΖΑ/ΑΝΕΛ. Ο ελληνικός λαός πρέπει να εναντιωθεί στους ιμπεριαλιστικούς πολέμους απαιτώντας να μην υπάρξει καμία εμπλοκή της Ελλάδας σε αυτούς. Ο πλούτος ανήκει στους λαούς, αυτοί μόνο μπορούν και πρέπει να τον καρπώνονται.

  Elmar Brok (PPE). – Herr Präsident, Frau Vizepräsidentin, liebe Kolleginnen und Kollegen! Ich glaube, dass es ein unausweichlicher Akt der Solidarität war, dem Wunsch der Franzen zu folgen, die Artikel 42 Absatz 7 als Rechtsgrundlage genommen haben.

Ich finde, dass das auch der richtige Artikel ist. Ich finde, dass es nicht richtig gewesen, wäre Artikel 5 des NATO-Vertrags zu nehmen, weil dies eine Konfrontation des Westens mit der islamischen Welt gewesen wäre und wir diesen Ansatz sehr viel breiter wählen müssen. Der Artikel 222 ist Terror innerhalb der Europäischen Union. Hier ist aber der Krieg außerhalb Europäischen Union. Aber wir müssen feststellen, dass dies natürlich eine Frage der Zusammenarbeit zwischen den Mitgliedstaaten ist – keine europäische Operation der Europäischen Union.

Aber was wir hier tun müssen, ist die Frage, ob wir hier nicht Dienstleister sein können. Dienstleister, dass in einer vernünftigen Weise kooperiert wird: Einer macht das, die Deutschen senden Beobachtungsflugzeuge, die Dänen schicken sieben Fighter. Wer organisiert das? Ich glaube, dass es wichtig wäre, dass wir in solchen Fragen gemeinsame Strategien für just in case vorbereiten, dass wir Hauptquartiere haben, die Koordinierungsaufgaben in Dienstleistung für die Nationalstaaten wahrnehmen, um auf diese Art und Weise schneller handeln zu können, effizienter handeln zu können, mit weniger Risiko für unsere Soldaten handeln zu können und schneller dem Ziel entgegenzukommen, hier einen Krieg zu beenden. Darum geht es nämlich. Um einen Krieg im Mittleren Osten, der für uns alle gefährlich ist.

Wir müssen sehen, dass die Verbindung des Krieges im Mittleren Osten mit dem internationalen Terrorismus ja hier eine völlig neue Dimension ist. Wir haben nicht mehr einen klassischen Krieg zwischen Staaten, wir haben Krieg um Territorien, und gleichzeitig wird in unseren Territorien von Teilen dieser Streitkräfte mit einer anderen Form von Terrorakten Krieg geführt.

Darauf haben wir mit den klassischen Antworten der NATO bisher keine Möglichkeit, etwas zu tun. Ich glaube, dass dies ein Hinweis ist, Frau Hohe Beauftragte, die Fragen von Hauptquartier, permanent structured cooperation, und solche Fragen in den Vordergrund zu rücken. Nicht um mehr Kompetenz zu haben, sondern als Dienstleister zu agieren.

  Ana Gomes (S&D). – Senhor Presidente, a cláusula de defesa mútua invocada pela França depois dos últimos atentados terroristas em Paris abre o desafio de passarmos das palavras aos atos na política comum de segurança e defesa. Basta visitar uma das linhas da frente contra o Daexe, no Curdistão iraquiano, e constatar a desgraça de os países europeus não se articularem sequer no apoio aos combatentes pesmerga.

A ameaça terrorista nunca foi tão sentida pelos nossos cidadãos e globalmente. Exige que, sob a orientação estratégica da Alta Representante, os Estados-Membros adotem procedimentos específicos para aplicar a cláusula de defesa mútua, que reúnam recursos e se coordenem pela segurança dos cidadãos e para defender o interesse estratégico de um mundo regulado pela rule of law.

De nada serve declarar a obrigação de solidariedade se os nossos governos não ultrapassarem conceitos obsoletos de soberania, se não adotarem procedimentos específicos para pôr em prática a cláusula de defesa mútua e para avançar na política de segurança e defesa, que é um instrumento crucial, entre outros, para sermos eficazes no combate ao terrorismo, na Europa e globalmente.

PRZEWODNICTWO: RYSZARD CZARNECKI
Wiceprzewodniczący

  Anna Elżbieta Fotyga (ECR). – Panie Przewodniczący! Ku zaskoczeniu obserwatorów i prawników po atakach w Paryżu Francja przywołała artykuł 42 ust. 7 zamiast przewidzianego dla ataków terrorystycznych artykułu 222. Wyrażając wolę procedowania w dwustronnych negocjacjach z państwami członkowskimi dla takiej procedury Rada wyraziła jednomyślne poparcie Francji. Wszelkie dalsze działania – a już z tej debaty widzimy, że może być z tym związany pewien kłopot – wymagają również jednomyślnej decyzji Rady.

  Hilde Vautmans (ALDE). – Het is voor het eerst dat een lidstaat het artikel 42, lid 7, heeft ingeroepen. Het is bovendien uniek dat het een unanieme ja heeft gekregen van de 27 landen.

Ik wil twee punten onder uw aandacht brengen:

1. Was het niet beter geweest dat de Europese Unie zelf dit artikel had ingeroepen, dat u zelf het initiatief hierin genomen had? Hadden we dan niet een meer échte Europese reactie gehad? Denkt u eraan om een procedure uit te werken, zodat de volgende keer de Europese Commissie hierin zelf stappen kan ondernemen indien het nodig is?

2. Mevrouw Mogherini, voor mij is het echt een momentum, een katalysatormoment. Als we nu, na deze gebeurtenissen, geen stappen voorwaarts kunnen zetten in de uitbouw van een Europese defensie, een echte Europese strijdkracht, dan weet ik niet wanneer het nog zal gebeuren. Dus heel concreet: hoe gaat u gebruik maken van dit momentum om over te gaan tot de uitbouw van een echte defensie-unie?

  Σοφία Σακοράφα ( GUE/NGL). – Κύριε Πρόεδρε, για πρώτη φορά έχουμε ενεργοποίηση της ρήτρα αμοιβαίας συνδρομής. Ειπώθηκε ότι δέχονται επίθεση οι αξίες της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης και ότι απειλείται η ασφάλεια των Ευρωπαίων πολιτών και ότι επιβάλλεται αλληλεγγύη όλων προς όλους, αμέριστη και απλόχερη, γιατί οι ανθρώπινες αξίες δεν έχουν εθνική ταυτότητα. Όμως ποιος είναι εχθρός, κύριοι συνάδελφοι; «Η κόλαση είναι οι άλλοι» έλεγε ο Jean-Paul Sartre, και αυτός είναι ο κίνδυνος: ο τρόπος με τον οποίο υπερασπιζόμαστε τις ανθρώπινες αξίες να τις απαξιώνει και να γίνεται τροφοδότης αυτής της κόλασης.

Ποιος και γιατί βομβάρδισε και διέλυσε τις χώρες αυτές και πνίγονται σήμερα χιλιάδες πρόσφυγες στη Μεσόγειο; Ποιος εξόπλισε τους τζιχαντιστές; Υπάρχει κανείς που να πιστεύει ότι η υποχρέωση για παροχή στρατιωτικής βοήθειας και συνδρομής θα περιορίσει ή θα σταματήσει την κατάσταση αυτή;

Αλλαγή πολιτικής χρειάζεται κύριοι συνάδελφοι και κυρία Mogherini. Αλλαγή που θα αποκλείει πλήρως πολιτικές παρεμβάσεων και αποκλεισμών και θα προσανατολίζεται αποκλειστικά και μόνο στη χρησιμοποίηση μη στρατιωτικών μέτρων με σκοπό τον περιορισμό της φτώχιας, την κοινωνική και οικονομική ανάπτυξη και την συμμετρική συνεργασία.

  Michèle Rivasi (Verts/ALE). – Monsieur le Président, après l'émotion des attentats et des belles paroles convenues, la réalité de notre incapacité collective à lutter durablement et efficacement contre le terrorisme nous rattrape.

Cette clause de défense mutuelle, fondée notamment sur l'article 42, paragraphe 7, du traité sur l'Union européenne, est utilisée de manière aussi inédite qu'exceptionnelle et met en danger le développement d'une véritable politique de sécurité et de défense commune, que beaucoup d'entre nous réclament, tous partis politiques confondus. L'usage de cette clause est d'autant plus hors sujet que les terroristes qui ont frappé la France venaient de notre pays, et nous ferions mieux de nous préoccuper des solutions à apporter en Europe pour lutter contre la désintégration du lien social et du vivre-ensemble.

Ce débat ce soir au Parlement n'est pas à la hauteur. Nous ne sommes pas associés aux décisions, notamment par rapport à cet article, pas plus que la haute représentante, Mme Mogherini. Cette clause est le symbole même de la régression de la construction européenne. Elle privilégie une logique bilatérale au sein d'une organisation communautaire. Il y a donc urgence et, vraiment, la France, qui a œuvré pour la construction d'une défense européenne, et moi, en tant que Française, ne comprenons pas du tout cet article qui va à l'encontre de cette défense européenne.

  Michèle Alliot-Marie (PPE). – Monsieur le Président, je voudrais, au nom du peuple français, remercier d'abord tous les pays qui ont apporté leur soutien à cette clause. Je voudrais les remercier, bien sûr, pour ce que certains ont fait très concrètement et, d'une façon générale, pour le message de solidarité qui a été lancé à cette occasion.

Dans le même temps, Madame la Haute représentante, il est vrai que les interrogations sur la mise en œuvre de cette clause posent aussi la question de savoir ce que nous sommes capables de faire pour nous défendre, parce que – je le répète – tous les pays, mes chers collègues, sont susceptibles d'être frappés par le terrorisme. Certains l'ont déjà été et d'autres le seront malheureusement aussi. Et ce n'est pas l'OTAN qui peut répondre à cela.

Comme ancien ministre de la défense, j'ai beaucoup travaillé au sein et en dehors de l'OTAN. Cette dernière n'est pas la structure adéquate pour cela. Nous avons besoin de défendre nos concitoyens. C'est le premier devoir d'un État, et un État seul aujourd'hui ne peut pas le faire. Quelles que soient les actions, toutes sont internationales. Ce n'est pas un renoncement à la souveraineté, c'est une organisation pratique.

Alors, Madame la Haute représentante, nous avons effectivement besoin de faire avancer l'Europe de la défense très concrètement. Vous nous en avez parlé et nous avez affirmé votre conviction en la matière. Il faut maintenant avancer et nous préciser quels vont être les calendriers. D'abord, les calendriers de mise en œuvre d'un quartier général permanent: nous avons besoin d'anticiper, de prévoir et d'être capables de réagir tout de suite. Aujourd'hui, nous ne le sommes pas tant que nous n'avons pas cet état-major permanent. Ensuite, il est vrai qu'il y a une grande unité dans la diversité ou une grande diversité dans l'unité. Cela signifie, en particulier, qu'il faut développer les coopérations structurées permanentes. Nous pouvons le faire. C'est aussi quelque chose de pragmatique et de concret. Madame la Haute représentante, j'attends vos réponses.

  Gilles Pargneaux (S&D). – Monsieur le Président, Madame la Haute représentante, chers collègues, après les attaques terroristes du 13 novembre 2015, le président français, François Hollande, a invoqué l'article 42, paragraphe 7, du traité sur l'Union européenne lors de son discours prononcé devant le Parlement français en congrès le 16 novembre 2015.

Face à la barbarie, face aux crimes abjects, face à l'envie de mort sur notre territoire, la solidarité européenne était la seule et unique réponse. Aujourd'hui, cette solidarité est symbolisée par cet article 42, paragraphe 7, du traité sur l'Union européenne. Oui, la France a besoin d'une assistance mutuelle de l'Europe, car, bien souvent, elle est seule pour combattre ceux-là mêmes qui nous attaquent. Beaucoup d'États membres ont très rapidement répondu positivement à l'invocation de cet article. Je salue ces décisions, leurs décisions.

Alors que vous devez communiquer une nouvelle stratégie globale de politique étrangère et de sécurité pour l'Union européenne d'ici juin 2016, Madame la Haute représentante, il est important que cette invocation par la France de la clause de défense mutuelle puisse prendre une dimension opérationnelle. En effet, c'est la première fois qu'un État membre utilise cette clause. Alors, faisons du coup d'essai un coup de maître, relançons le chantier de la défense européenne, comme un certain nombre de collègues viennent de l'indiquer. Nous ne pouvons plus nous voiler la face. L'Europe a des défis sécuritaires partagés par l'ensemble de ses États membres et ceci dans son voisinage immédiat: Sahel, Proche-Orient, Moyen-Orient. La conclusion est simple: notre sécurité est commune, elle est régionale, elle ne peut pas être dispersée. Face à cette situation, seule une véritable Europe de la défense sera à la hauteur. L'Europe ne peut pas se reposer seulement sur un pays comme la France, et la France ne pourra pas raisonnablement s'occuper seule de la sécurité de l'Europe. N'ayons donc pas peur de dire à ceux qui veulent toujours moins d'Europe qu'ils se trompent du tout au tout et qu'au contraire, c'est uniquement par plus d'Europe que nous arriverons à mater et à combattre ces terrorismes dans cette guerre qui nous occupe. Voilà la réalité, voilà notre chantier politique majeur qui redonnera à l'Europe le prestige qu'elle a perdu dans ces années de crise.

Je vous remercie, Madame la Haute représentante, chers collègues, de votre attention. Je pense qu'il s'agit d'un débat majeur et que nous devons aujourd'hui, dans notre débat au Parlement européen, en relation avec vous et le Conseil européen, y apporter les réponses qu'attendent non seulement les Françaises et les Français, mais aussi les 500 millions d'Européennes et d'Européens.

  Bernd Lucke (ECR). – Herr Präsident, meine Damen und Herren! Es ist ganz klar, dass Frankreich die Unterstützung, die Solidarität, die aktive Hilfe von allen Mitgliedstaaten der Europäischen Union bei der Abwehr der terroristischen Bedrohung verdient, der Frankreich ausgesetzt ist und der auch wir ausgesetzt sind. Aber dass die Mehrheitsfraktionen in diesem Parlament, die Sozialdemokraten und die Christdemokraten, dies nun zum Anlass nehmen, eine europäische Verteidigungseinheit begründen zu wollen, sozusagen die Vorstufe zu einer europäischen Armee, das ist unangemessen. Es ist nicht der Fall, dass wir deshalb eine europäische Armee brauchen, weil Frankreich einem terroristischen Angriff ausgesetzt ist. Es ist einfach so, dass wir ein funktionierendes Verteidigungs- und Sicherheitssystem mit der NATO haben, und innerhalb der NATO sollten wir allen militärischen Bedrohungen begegnen. Die Solidarität der Mitgliedstaaten zeigt sich dadurch, dass sie freiwillig agieren, indem sie Frankreich ihre Unterstützung mit ihren nationalen Streitkräften, mit ihren militärischen Möglichkeiten anbieten. Mehr als das ist nicht vonnöten.

  Miguel Urbán Crespo (GUE/NGL). – Señor Presidente, Señorías, los atentados de París buscaban instaurar un clima y un régimen de terror entre la población, levantando muros de sospecha y de odio entre vecinos. Si la respuesta a la barbarie es suspender derechos, recortar libertades y encerrarnos en casa, la victoria del terrorismo será total. El problema es que Hollande y la Unión Europea están reeditando la estrategia militarista de la Administración Bush cuando declaró la guerra global contra el terror. Saquemos lecciones de la catástrofe que supuso la invasión de Irak. Catorce años después, las bombas solo han logrado traer más bombas. Por eso, rechazamos la activación del apartado 7 del artículo 42, que convierte a la Unión Europea en una alianza militar.

Combatamos el fanatismo, combatamos la barbarie, combatamos el fascismo con más democracia, negándonos a participar en el falso mercadeo entre derechos y seguridad.

  Francisco José Millán Mon (PPE). – Señor Presidente, gracias señora Mogherini por sus comentarios y explicaciones sobre la aplicación del artículo 42, apartado 7, y las instituciones de la Unión. Desde luego, el ataque terrorista que llevó a la aplicación de la cláusula citada fue un ataque contra todos los europeos y todos debemos hacer frente común a la amenaza yihadista. Yo celebro la unanimidad solidaria de los ministros europeos de Defensa cuando se reunieron pocos días después de los atentados. La coordinación y cooperación entre los Estados miembros, así como con nuestros socios internacionales, incluidos los del mundo árabe, es fundamental.

Hoy por hoy, lo primordial es la lucha contra el Dáesh, y también la solución del conflicto en Siria. La coalición internacional está realizando una importante labor allí, pero la vía militar tampoco es suficiente. Espero que la reunión del 25 de enero sirva para avanzar, pese a las tensiones recientes entre Arabia Saudí e Irán.

Pero junto a Siria hay diversos escenarios en los que juntos debemos seguir luchando contra el terrorismo. Me refiero a Irak, a Yemen, a Libia, al Cuerno de África, al Sahel; en otras palabras: a nuestra inmediata vecindad y a los vecinos de nuestros vecinos. Allí el terrorismo está encontrando espacios donde desarrollar sus capacidades, poniendo así en riesgo la seguridad y la estabilidad local y regional y, en último término, nuestra propia seguridad europea.

Y termino con un último comentario: los diversos atentados en suelo europeo y el incremento de la tensión y los conflictos en nuestra vecindad son un motivo para avanzar ─como ya se ha dicho─ en la profundización de la dimensión europea de la defensa y en la puesta en marcha de los diversos mecanismos que contempla el Tratado de Lisboa.

  Tonino Picula (S&D). – Gospodine predsjedniče, gospođo Visoka predstavnice, nakon terorističkih napada u Parizu prošle godine, francuski ministar obrane se po prvi put u povijesti pozvao na članak 42. stavak 7. Ugovora o Europskoj uniji i zbog „oružanog napada na području Francuske” od svih zemalja-članica zatražio „svu pomoć i podršku, koliko je u njihovoj moći”.

Mnogi pogrešno interpretiraju taj dio Lisabonskog sporazuma kao svojevrsni pandan članku 5. Sjevernoatlantskog ugovora, kojim se, u slučaju napada na neku članicu Saveza, sve ostale obvezuje da joj priskoče u pomoć.

Europski partneri praktično ne mogu odbiti francusku molbu jer to ne bi bilo solidarno. I mnogi su doista odgovorili potvrdno. Istina je da se Francuskoj može pomoći na različite načine i nije nužno da ta podrška bude vojna.

Ali, opet se još zaoštrenije postavljaju mnoga pitanja o unutarnjoj sigurnosti Europske unije koja idu dalje od zaštite nacionalnih država. Najbolji odgovor bi bio kada bi zajednička sigurnosna i obrambena politika prestala biti najslabija karika europskih integracija.

Prijedlog o zajedničkim obrambenim snagama prvi put je izašao u javnost tijekom 2014. kada smo čuli da Europska unija većom sinergijom obrambenih politika i uvođenjem jedinstvenog obrambenog sustava može uštedjeti između 21 i 60 milijardi eura. Međutim, razvitak zajedničke sigurnosne i obrambene politike vrlo često postavlja više pitanja nego što na njih odgovara. Možda treba poći baš od pitanja da ona nije objedinjena ni među općim upravama Europske komisije.

  Николай Бареков (ECR). – Г-н Председател, г-жо Могерини, терорът е сред нас, защото няма кой да го спре на границата, а не защото нямаме обща армия. Вместо единна армия, някой трябва да пази границите на Европа. Европа е изправена пред най-голямата опасност за запазването на мира откакто съществува Европейският съюз.

Престъпните методи на зомбираните от ДАЕШ хора заплашват всяка държава – член на Европейския съюз. Европейските правителства са заставени да водят наистина война, която изисква огромни финансови ресурси. Като представител на Република България, която е външна граница на Европейския съюз с Турция и икономически най-слабата държава в Европа, настоявам страната ми да получи равни възможности за отбрана с тези на западноевропейските партньори.

Не трябва Европейският съюз да дублира НАТО. Защото моята родина е плацдарм на хибридната война на две бивши империи, като Русия и Турция. Вместо единна европейска армия Европейският съюз е длъжен да плати и осигури охраната на своята източна граница, като подкрепи финансово България. Да не разчитаме Турция и ислямът да ни пазят от самите тях.

  Sandra Kalniete (PPE). – Mr President, our debate today is a stark reminder that, six years after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, there are still no implementing arrangements for the mutual defence clause and its invocation has largely been symbolic and political rather than practical. Unlike for Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, there is no contingency planning and no structures at the European level for the implementation of the clause.

The response to attacks in Paris and the whole developments of the last few years have proven that we do need a European Defence Union, which would include countries that wish to cooperate closer on defence matters, to move ahead on the legal basis of permanent structured cooperation. We also need a permanent European civil military headquarters tasked with contingency planning, including for collective defence, in close cooperation with NATO. In fact, closer EU-NATO cooperation is key to defending our States, societies and infrastructures in the future. We do not need to reinvent the wheel, but jointly prepare for all kinds of attacks, be they traditional military or highly sophisticated non-military. This is exactly where the EU has a key role to play.

  Neena Gill (S&D). – Mr President, this is, as you know, the first time the mutual defence clause is being invoked, and how we deal with it will serve as a precedent. We need to take a long-term view and develop concrete guidelines that will allow us to respond fast and effectively in the future.

Let this also be an opportunity to strengthen cooperation on defence and intelligence- sharing. It is difficult to justify to our taxpayers that EU Member States collectively spend many times more on defence than any other major powers, yet are militarily less effective, simply because we do not work together. How can we justify terrorists slipping under the radar because we failed to share life-saving information? How do we tackle the flow of firearms on the black market without blocking cross-border circulation vital to our economy? EU cooperation provides the answer. This does not mean taking sovereignty away from national governments, nor stepping aside of NATO – a point made very clear in article 42(7). It means being smart: supporting clusters, role specialisation, joint research and procurement, increasing market integration. I urge the Council to make defence cooperation a priority.

  Andrej Plenković (PPE). – Gospodine predsjedniče, poštovana Visoka predstavnice Mogherini, nakon brutalnog terorističkog napada u Parizu, Francuska je odlučila pozvati se na klauzulu o uzajamnoj obrani iz članka 42. stavka 7. Ugovora o Europskoj uniji po prvi put i time je stavila u fokus spremnost Europske unije i država članica da u praksi provedu odredbe koje nam ugovor iz Lisabona omogućuje.

Ovaj izbor doživio sam kao način da se prije svega akcentuira bilateralna suradnja i doprinos država članica, o čemu svjedoče informacije o snažnom angažmanu niza članica da pomognu Francuskoj, te da se Francuska rastereti na pojedinim drugim važnim vojnim operacijama diljem svijeta.

Na nama je da na temelju rezolucije i današnje rasprave vidimo kako možemo pojačati mehanizme kontinuirane suradnje koja će uključiti i institucije Europske unije u kontekstu širih napora na kojima Vi, Visoka predstavnice, radite ove godine, a to je izrada globalne strategije Europske unije za vanjsku, sigurnosnu i obrambenu politiku. S obzirom na to zanima me kako ćemo provedbu članka 42. stavka 7., imajući na umu i članak 222. i članak 5. Sjevernoatlantskog ugovora i članak 51. Povelje Ujedinjenih naroda, staviti u kontekst našeg napora da Europska unija bude vjerodostojnija i na području obrane. Stoga su Akcijski plan o obrani i Bijela knjiga o obrani sigurno jedan od prioriteta koji ćemo imati ovih šest mjeseci i u vrijeme nizozemskog predsjedanja.

  Boris Zala (S&D) – Naša rezolúcia správne požaduje rovnaké bezpečnostné garancie pre všetkých občanov Európskej únie a rovnako správne požaduje aj miesto Európskej únie v Bezpečnostnej rade OSN. Ale obe tieto požiadavky a požiadavku Francúzska na základe artiklu 42 Lisabonskej zmluvy, nie je možné naplniť na bilaterálnej úrovni.

Obe tieto požiadavky – bezpečnostné garancie občanom a miesto EÚ v Bezpečnostnej rade OSN – môže umožniť len existencia európskeho velenia a spoločnej európskej armády. Malej, operatívnej, ale k dispozícii Európskej únii ako celku. A to nie je všetko, rovnako potrebujeme európsku spravodajskú službu. Bez týchto dvoch orgánov spoločného velenia a európskej spravodajskej služby, tie úlohy, ktoré Lisabonská zmluva vyžaduje na ochranu našich občanov, nie je možné splniť.

  Tunne Kelam (PPE). – Mr President, the challenge presented by Islamist terrorists is a shared programme for every EU Member State and every citizen. That is why it calls for solidarity and mutual assistance. The Paris attacks and the French invoking 42(7) can be seen as a wake-up call or catalyst for conducting more active and much more coordinated security and defence policies. The point is now to discover and exhaust all security related potential involved in the Treaty on the European Union. The fact is that this potential is still more on a theoretical level. The question is also whether Article 222 TFEU should be used in parallel to 42(7), because this would allow us to put all relevant EU means at the disposal of the victims. There is an urgent need to strengthen EU cooperation with NATO to make both sides’ respective security and defence arrangements compatible, especially in cases of armed aggression on the territory of a Member State. A last practical conclusion: to efficiently use the EU existing capacities, the EU needs a permanent Syrian military headquarters, at both strategic and operational levels. It needs a centre which has to deal with contingency plans.

  Cristian Dan Preda (PPE). – Monsieur le Président, les attentats terroristes qui ont sauvagement frappé la France n'ont pas seulement touché les Français, mais aussi tous les Européens. La seule action possible pour lutter efficacement contre le terrorisme doit donc être une solution européenne. La clause de défense mutuelle est une première étape de cette réponse européenne. Il s'agit d'une disposition cruciale dans notre système de solidarité. Cette obligation de solidarité est aussi un acte politique fort en ces temps de crises et de menaces directes qui pèsent sur notre territoire. Plusieurs pays ont répondu positivement à l'appel de la France, et je tiens à saluer la réactivité et l'engagement de certains États membres.

L'investissement effectif des pays européens est, bien entendu, très diversifié, et il faut que les promesses soient suivies d'actes concrets, mais, même si les contributions individuelles peuvent paraître limitées et additionnées les unes aux autres, elles sont loin d'être négligeables. L'activation de la clause de défense mutuelle offre une excellente occasion pour renforcer la politique de défense et de sécurité. Nous devons nous saisir de cette occasion pour définir une stratégie claire en matière de défense. Mutualiser nos forces et nos moyens n'est plus une option, c'est une nécessité absolue. Nous ne pouvons plus nous permettre d'agir chacun de son côté, selon nos convictions et nos priorités, les priorités étant dorénavant communes: lutter contre Daech, mettre un terme à la guerre en Syrie et stabiliser la Libye. L'Union se doit d'agir comme un seul bloc pour faire la différence.

  Андрей Ковачев (PPE). – Г-н Председател, г-жо Могерини, европейските граждани искат от нас бързи и ефективни решения, защото опасността е тук, при нас. Всяка страна членка трябва солидарно да помогне с това, с което може, а в актуалната криза заедно със САЩ, арабските страни, Иран и под егидата на ООН и започналия Виенски процес, трябва да гарантираме работещо решение за мирното бъдеще на Сирия и Ирак, където да могат да се върнат мигрантите, намиращи се сега на територията на Европейския съюз.

Г-жо Могерини, активирането от страна на Франция на член 42(7) нека да използваме като катализатор и положим основите на силен и устойчив европейски отбранителен капацитет, включително европейска разузнавателна служба, европейска армия и охрана на външните граници, за да можем да посрещнем множеството външни и вътрешни заплахи за Европейския съюз.

Като първа стъпка в тази посока следва да се изгради постоянна европейска гражданско-военна централа на стратегическо и оперативно ниво, която да координира както прилагането на планове за действие при извънредни ситуации, а също така и сегашната, както и бъдещите операции по активирането на чл. 42(7) и чл. 42(2), разбира се, в тясна координация и сътрудничество със структурите на НАТО и в никакъв случай дублиране, а допълване на тези структури.

Не на последно място, успешното решаване на проблеми като миграцията, борбата с тероризма и радикалния ислям, предполага изпълнението на поетите ангажименти. Срамно е, когато лидерите в Брюксел вземат решения и след това, връщайки се в своите столици не ги изпълняват, особено що се отнася до финансовите ангажименти.

Pytania z sali

  Ruža Tomašić (ECR). – Gospodine predsjedniče, vjerujem da je svakome razumnom jasno kako ovu terorističku prijetnju nijedna država članica ne može samostalno ukloniti i da nam treba zajednički koordinirani pristup.

Francuska treba našu pomoć i mi joj je moramo pružiti, ne zato što nas obvezuje članak 42.7 Ugovora o Europskoj uniji, nego zato što je to ispravno i u interesu svih nas.

No, nisam sigurna da je aktivacija članka o uzajamnoj obrani najbolji način jer time priznajemo da je Francuska žrtva oružane agresije, a nju može izvršiti samo druga država. Tako bismo praktički Islamskoj državi sami dodijelili status države, što je u potpunoj suprotnosti s našim dosadašnjim pristupom.

Unatoč naporima terorista da si priskrbe obilježja državnosti, Islamsku državu trebamo nastaviti tretirati isključivo kao terorističku organizaciju. Smatram stoga da aktivacija članka o uzajamnoj obrani nije u interesu Unije i njezinih saveznika, što nipošto ne isključuje nužnu pomoć država članica Francuskoj na dobrovoljnoj bazi.

  Isabella Adinolfi (EFDD). – Signor Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, (signor Presidente, ottimo italiano) la richiesta del governo francese di attivare la clausola di mutua assistenza prevista dall'articolo 42, comma 7, se da un lato è condivisibile, almeno in via di principio visto i tragici eventi di Parigi, dall'altro rappresenta sicuramente un'occasione mancata e forse un errore dal punto di vista giuridico.

A questo proposito l'articolo 222, che disciplina espressamente il caso in cui uno Stato membro sia vittima di un attacco terroristico, appariva e appare sicuramente più corretto da invocare. ISIS, infatti, non può considerarsi uno Stato che è l'unica entità che può compiere un attacco armato a meno di non legittimarlo come tale. Senza considerare poi che tale scelta sancisce la prevalenza del metodo intergovernativo su quello comunitario. Ciò che è avvenuto, infatti, è che la Francia ha unilateralmente iniziato a bombardare la Siria e i vari Stati europei sono stati chiamati singolarmente a darle una mano. L'Europa, invece, non è stata coinvolta, non si è stati in grado di dare una risposta univoca e coordinata. Un'occasione mancata per dimostrare l'unità europea, specialmente nella lotta al terrorismo.

  Νότης Μαριάς ( ECR). – Κύριε Πρόεδρε, σύμφωνα με τη ρήτρα αμοιβαίας άμυνας που ορίζεται στο άρθρο 42 παράγραφος 7 της Συνθήκης και στο άρθρο 222 της Συνθήκης λειτουργίας της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης, προβλέπεται ρητά ότι οι δράσεις υποστήριξης ενός κράτους μέλους που έχει δεχθεί τρομοκρατική επίθεση αφορούν αποκλειστικά και μόνο το έδαφός του, μετά από αίτηση των πολιτικών του αρχών. Τονίζουμε λοιπόν ότι η ρήτρα αυτή δεν μπορεί να χρησιμοποιηθεί για παραβίαση της εθνικής κυριαρχίας κανενός κράτους. Συνεπώς το αίτημα της Γαλλίας για υποστήριξη στρατιωτικών αποστολών σε Αφρική και Μέση Ανατολή είναι νομικά αβάσιμο. Ας σημειωθεί εδώ ότι οι στρατιωτικές αυτές αποστολές στην καλύτερη περίπτωση είναι τυχοδιωκτικές και ουδόλως συνδράμουν στην καταπολέμηση της τρομοκρατίας, όπως ξεκάθαρα φάνηκε στην συριακή κρίση το 2011. Άλλωστε, όπως τονίζει έρευνα ανεξάρτητης δεξαμενής σκέψης, και όπως επιβεβαιώνεται διαρκώς από πληροφορίες που διαρρέουν στον Τύπο, πέραν του Daesh, ένα μεγάλο μέρος της συριακής ένοπλης αντιπολίτευσης την οποία υποστήριξε θερμά η Γαλλική Δημοκρατία αποτελείται από ομάδες ισλαμιστών, γεγονός που φανερώνει το ποιόν των συγκεκριμένων οργανώσεων και γεγονός που προσποιούνται ότι αγνοούν οι ευρωπαϊκές κυβερνήσεις. Τα κράτη μέλη οφείλουν να μείνουν μακριά από εξωτερικές επεμβάσεις και ιμπεριαλιστικούς πολέμους.

  Γεώργιος Επιτήδειος ( NI). – Κύριε Πρόεδρε, το άρθρο 42 παράγραφος 7 της Συνθήκης της Ευρωπαϊκής Ενώσεως σχετικά με τη ρήτρα αμοιβαίας άμυνας αποτελεί μία υψηλού επιπέδου δέσμευση των κρατών μελών να στηρίξουν ένα άλλο κράτος το οποίο, είτε δέχεται σε ενεστώτα χρόνο επίθεση στο έδαφός του, είτε απειλείται με μελλοντική στρατιωτική προσβολή. Αυτή είναι μία πολύ ωραία απόφαση η οποία υπονοεί την αποφασιστικότητα της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης να επιδείξει αλληλεγγύη προς τα κράτη μέλη της. Πόσο όμως πραγματικά πιστεύουμε σε αυτή τη δέσμευση;

Εδώ και πολλά χρόνια, όπως γνωρίζετε πολύ καλά, η Τουρκία απειλεί την Ελλάδα, ένα μέλος της Ευρωπαϊκής Ενώσεως, με πόλεμο (casus belli), εάν ασκήσει νόμιμα δικαιώματά της. Επίσης η Τουρκία δεν αναγνωρίζει την ύπαρξη ενός άλλου κράτους μέλους της Ευρωπαϊκής Ενώσεως, της Κύπρου και την απειλεί ανάλογα.

Ποια είναι η στάση την οποία έχει επιδείξει η Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση απέναντι σε αυτή την προσβολή; Έχει μήπως απαιτήσει από την Τουρκία να πάψει να συμπεριφέρεται κατά αυτό το τρόπο; Εάν σε αυτή την απλή περίπτωση δεν έχει καταφέρει η Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση να επιδείξει αποφασιστικότητα, πώς περιμένουμε να επιδείξει αποφασιστικότητα όταν τα πράγματα είναι δύσκολα και απαιτούν στρατιωτική επέμβαση;

(Koniec pytań z sali)

  Federica Mogherini, Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs. – Mr President, let me first start by saying that here we are clearly facing a kind of threat that probably was not clearly perceived or conceived of even six years ago with the Lisbon Treaty, because it is quite clear that we have an internal threat – let us remember that the terrorists had EU nationalities in this case – but with a clear external link, because there were references, links, training, resources, support that were linked with what is happening in Syria and Daesh. Clearly the line between the external and the internal even only six years ago was much better defined than it is today.

So this is the nature of the threats – and let me underline that this is also a reply to those of you, a couple if not more, who referred to the need to defend our borders. Let us remember that the attacks in Paris were unfortunately perpetrated by people who hold EU passports. So it is not just a matter of defending the territory from the outside, it is also a much more complex issue of how we secure our citizens, how we guarantee the safety of our citizens from a threat that is at the same time internal and external, and we have to put together different kinds of measures there. I think and hope that the global strategy we are working on will also help us to redefine a common direction on how to guarantee the security of our citizens in these times – times that are themselves new and different.

Having said that, let me reply to some specific points that were raised. First of all, the use of Article 42(7) rather than Article 222. Obviously it is for single Member States to take the political decision as to which article they want to invoke in terms of asking for assistance from other Member States. But let me clearly compare the two articles in question.

Article 42(7) refers to ‘armed aggression’ or ‘armed attack’ – we have different linguistic versions in different languages – on the territory of a Member State, while Article 222 refers to a terrorist attack or a natural or man-made disaster. In terms of obligation, in both cases Member States have an obligation to act. In terms of contributions, in the case of Article 42(7) assistance comes from individual Member States while, as some of you have underlined, Article 222 also calls for mobilising EU instruments.

In terms of implementation – and here comes what is I think the most interesting point for our debate in the future – Article 42(7) leaves the implementation process open. Here I observe that the guidelines you were somehow indicating would have been useful in 2012 were not produced. I believe that today we are seeing the implementation of this article, putting together all our resources, all our services and intelligence. This is something that we managed somehow between the decision that we shared with the French Government to use Article 42(7) and the moment when this decision was shared with the Member States in the Defence Council, a period of more of less 24 hours – it was certainly a quick reaction from the European Union services that we were able to gather at very short notice, but I believe the work that both our legal services and our structures that handle this level of assistance worked extremely well, as did the coordination between Member States.

But coming back to implementation, Article 222 on the contrary foresees that the European Union has a coordinating role because of the potential involvement of European Union instruments. But let me say something that I underlined in my introductory remarks: even though the wording of Article 42(7) does not call for any kind of specific role for the European Union in terms of implementation, we decided jointly with France and all the Member States during the Council meeting of 17 December, if I remember correctly, to have all the relevant EU structures and institutions, including myself, directly involved at all stages of implementation. That was a political choice and I believe this political choice demonstrated the willingness of all of us to use this article as a way of strengthening the role of the European Union in this field.

There is one element that might seem technical but is, I believe, important. Elmar Brok mentioned this, namely the location of the requested action is different when it comes to Article 42(7) compared with Article 222, because in the case of Article 222 assistance is in principle provided inside the territory of the Member State to reinforce its capacities during the crisis, while in the case of Article 42(7) France was clearly requesting assistance in external theatres. So I believe this was an element that was considered during those hours.

Indeed, there were other articles that could have been used apart from these two, because you all know very well that we have Article 44 that has never been used and that would have implied EU-CSDP action – a military mission, with some Member States, the ‘willing’ Member States the article says if I remember correctly, taking the responsibility in conjunction with the Council to lead, on behalf of the European Union, a CSDP mission or operation.

My political assessment has always been and still is, and I believe the Council strongly supports this vision, that it is not and it would not be appropriate for the European Union as such to have a military operation or mission against Daesh. This is a political choice. This is not a technical use of the treaties, and I believe that also in this House most of you would agree with me in saying that at the moment – and the situation might change or might have changed years from now – I would not see a CSDP role for the European Union for a military intervention against Daesh in Syria and Iraq. Not while we have other forms of engagement of the European Union, such as the implementation phase of Article 42(7) in all stages, which is somehow an upgrade of the role of the European Union institutions and structures compared with the wording of the article, which is a political sign. And on the other side, as you know very well, we have the diplomatic and humanitarian work and the work of the European Union within the anti-Daesh coalition when it comes to our global commitment against Daesh and against terrorism.

When it comes to the NATO issue, let me say that for those Member States who are also members of NATO, EU mutual assistance is a complementary element to NATO’s collective defence. This is clearly stated in Article 42(7) which says that commitment and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation for those states which are members of it. So no overlapping, no competition, no distance or divergence, simply a complementary possibility. And let me also add in more general terms that in this first year and a couple of months that we have been together in office, in parallel, I as High Representative of the European Union and Jens Stoltenberg as Secretary General of NATO, we have strengthened the cooperation between NATO and the European Union in a very significant way. I would expect this to take even more concrete form as we develop our strategy from now until June, and as NATO prepares for the NATO summit at the beginning of July. The two processes run in parallel. Obviously we have completely different paths, but these are communicating paths, and we exchange views, especially on those fields where our cooperation can be complementary for the benefit of all – for instance, in those fields where the European Union has a clear and specific added value when it comes to cyber threats or cyber security. So there are fields of cooperation that are growing stronger and stronger.

The French decision that the Council has shared to call for Article 42(7) was and is a clear sign, first that the European Union can and should be seen as an effective security provider, first and foremost by its Member States. Second, it is a sign that solidarity is indeed part of our Union. Third, that all articles of the Treaties can be used. And let me say on this that we do not need ideological debates or theoretical debates: first of all, we cannot afford theoretical debates at this time when the security of our continent is at stake; but we do not need ideological debates either, we need to put in place and use the instruments we already have, and we need to create the political conditions for doing this together, united, highlighting the added value of the European Union also in the security and defence dimension where it can be an increasingly precious and vital tool to serve national interests, in some cases in a more effective way than a purely national approach.

The European Union has an added value in this respect. Let me mention the 17 missions and operations we already have around the world that are an instrument and a tool for all the Member States together to act in different theatres where, together, we work better than we would do alone or through other means. Because there are specific dimensions where the EU instruments work better than a NATO instrument or a UN peacekeeping mission or other kinds of missions. This is already something that the European Council unanimously recognises. Both the European Council conclusions, of December 2015 and June 2015, indicate clearly a sense of direction towards investing more in the dimension of CSDP, and I am confident that also with the help of this House the necessary work, the political work we need to prepare, is going to be done to achieve the implementation of the treaty provisions fully and successfully and, let me say, for the safety, the security and the benefit of all European citizens.

  Przewodniczący. – Otrzymałem siedem projektów rezolucji złożonych zgodnie z art. 123 ust. 2 Regulaminu.

Zamykam debatę.

Głosowanie odbędzie się w czwartek 21 stycznia 2016 r.

Oświadczenia pisemne (art. 162)

  Zigmantas Balčytis (S&D), raštu. – Gerbiamas pirmininke, kolegos, Europos Sąjunga išgyvena itin sudėtingą laikotarpį. Nebesuvaldomi imigrantų srautai, ES piliečių radikalizacija, teroristinės atakos ir nuolatinė teroristinių išpuolių grėsmė reikalauja imtis naujo ir ryžtingo požiūrio į Europos saugumą. Pirmą kartą ES istorijoje buvo panaudotas 42 ES sutarties straipsnis prašant karinės paramos, tačiau, kaip matome, Europos Sąjungoje nėra aiškios tvarkos kaip trakuoti šio straipsnio nuostatas. Europos Sąjunga turi kuo skubiau imtis veiksmų bendrosios saugumo ir gynybos politikos srityje. Mums reikalinga labai aiški ES lygmens karinė struktūra, kuri turėtų aiškias strategines užduotis bei tinkamus pajėgumus užtikrinti kolektyvinę gynybą.

  Cătălin Sorin Ivan (S&D), in writing. – For the first time, the mutual defence clause was invoked after the horrendous attacks by Daesh in Paris. Looking into the future, this case must be invoked in all in-depth political discussions on the multidimensional nature of European security and defence. I also welcome the invitation to the VP/HR of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to propose a clear structure for ensuring an effective response in the event that a Member State calls upon the mutual defence clause.

  Bogdan Andrzej Zdrojewski (PPE), na piśmie. – Budujące jest jednogłośne i pełne wsparcie wyrażone wobec Francji przez wszystkie państwa członkowskie UE w obliczu tragedii, która zmusiła ten kraj do przywołania klauzuli wzajemnej obrony. Przywołanie art. 42 ust. 7 TUE jest przede wszystkim aktem politycznym, a Rada Europejska oraz Parlament Europejski są miejscami na debatę polityczną. Każde pierwsze użycie klauzuli wymaga świadomości, że w przyszłości będzie ona stosowana w różnych sytuacjach. Dlatego niezwykle istotne jest, aby obecna sytuacja tworzyła precedens, ale z drugiej strony, aby wyznaczała procedury jej stosowania w indywidualnych przypadkach. Ponieważ żadna analiza ani wytyczne nie były osiągalne w momencie aktywacji art. 42 ust. 7 TUE przez Francję, niezbędne było podjęcie działań ad hoc. Jasno widoczna jest jednak potrzeba określenia praktycznych kroków, wytycznych i procedur dla zapewnienia wspólnej i efektywnej odpowiedzi w przypadku, gdy państwo członkowskie przywołuje klauzulę wzajemnej obrony.

Rola instytucji UE w tej procedurze powinna zostać wzmocniona i obejmować przede wszystkim koordynację udzielanej pomocy. W tym celu UE potrzebuje stałego cywilno-wojskowego sztabu na poziomie operacyjnym i strategicznym, uwzględniając istniejące zdolności państw członkowskich. Struktura ta miałaby za zadanie planowanie strategiczne i operacyjne, włączając w to również wzajemną obronę, zgodnie z art. 42 ust. 7 i art. 42 ust. 2 TUE i ich przyszłe zastosowania w bliskiej współpracy z odpowiednimi strukturami NATO.