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Utorak, 12. travnja 2016. - Strasbourg Revidirano izdanje

14. Glavni aspekti i osnovna opredjeljenja zajedničke vanjske i sigurnosne politike i zajedničke sigurnosne i obrambene politike (članak 36. UEU-a) (rasprava)
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  El Presidente. – El punto siguiente en el orden del día es el debate a partir de la Declaración de la Vicepresidenta de la Comisión y Alta Representante de la Unión para Asuntos Exteriores y Política de Seguridad sobre los aspectos principales y opciones fundamentales de la política exterior y de seguridad común y de la política común de seguridad y defensa (artículo 36 del TUE) (2016/2564(RSP)).


  Federica Mogherini, Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Let me start by quoting Article 36, which says that ‘the High Representative of the European Union Foreign Affairs and Security Policy shall regularly consult the European Parliament on the main aspects and the basic choices of the common foreign and security policy and the common security and defence policy and inform it of how those policies evolve’. It goes on to say ‘he’ – so probably not me – ‘shall ensure that the views of the European Parliament are duly taken into consideration’.

Let me start by saying that I believe that in the last year we have managed to successfully do this, by having regular consultations and listening to updates, developments and the implications for our policies, in constant dialogue. But for the sake of clarity and frankness, let me also say that I find it hardly acceptable that we are having five debates this evening in this Hemicycle. We have 2.5 hours. I think this is not respectful to your work and to my work.

Having said that, let me say that this year has been a very demanding one for our foreign policy. The deal with Iran has opened an intense phase for our European diplomacy, especially on Syria. After the attacks in Paris, a Member State invoked Article 42.7 for the first time in our history, an issue that we debated the last time we met in this Hemicycle.

Our response to the refugee crisis has put together an unprecedented number of foreign policy tools, from operation Sophia in the Mediterranean to the new trust fund for Africa, from financing schools or health care inside the refugee camps to the economic compact for Jordan and Lebanon, which we remarkably put together for the London conference.

The months ahead will be just as challenging. The foreign policy community is sometimes tempted to look at the electoral years in the United States as years of transition, but this is not a sabbatical year, especially not for the European Union. On the contrary, in some cases we face a window of opportunity that could soon close, and in others inaction can make things terribly worse.

In this debate I will focus on the immediate priorities of our foreign policy, as we will have time for a broader conversation on the medium and long-term in our debate on the EU global strategy later in the night. By the way, let me repeat once again that I see no particular reason for holding two debates in a row on topics that are completely similar. So I would ask you once again to avoid this kind of repetition, and spend our time more logically and efficiently.

Back to our priorities: ending the great civil war in the Middle East and North Africa remains our most urgent commitment. It is a war that is being fought on different fronts, from the border between Syria, Iraq and Turkey to Yemen and Libya. Each of these fronts has its own history and its own actors, and probably also its own development. But in each one, the solution to the conflict has to come through national reconciliation. The defeat of Daesh, Al Qaeda and all terrorist groups can only go hand in hand with these political processes.

We are working hard for this to happen, and we are beginning to see some fragile first results. For them to consolidate, regional powers will need to stop feeding the war, support and encourage reconciliation and head towards some kind of cold peace. What is happening in Syria seemed impossible just a few months ago; the ceasefire is fragile but it is largely holding. Humanitarian aid has reached a number of besieged areas, even if it is far from perfect. Staffan de Mistura is touring in the region to build support for the talks. We are in constant contact, and I was in Geneva with him last month as I was also meeting the parties in the talks. We coordinated our position on Syria with the G7 Foreign Ministers just yesterday in Japan.

We need progress and we need it quickly. Peace has a huge number of enemies. That is why a strong sense of urgency has to drive our engagement, and at the same time we will need the same patience that has led us here. The negotiations will not be easy, but perseverance has always paid off.

The same will go for Libya. Most of the Presidency Council is finally in Tripoli after months of hard work to build a fragile consensus around it. But this is only a starting point; all actors have to facilitate a peaceful transfer of powers to the new government. On our side we are ready to help, and we are working with the Presidency Council and Fayez Sarraj on this because – let me be very clear on this, as I always have been – whatever we do, we will do it with the Libyans. If they ask for support, we will give them the support they need and want, be it on humanitarian aid, training, security forces, the judiciary or border management. But the future of the country is in their hands. The stability and prosperity of Libya and defeating Daesh depends first and foremost on national unity. The solution to the conflict in Libya can only be political and can only be Libyan. Our responsibility is to consistently support it.

The third point on the region concerns Yemen. Our focus in the coming months will obviously have to be on Syria and Libya, but we cannot afford to close our eyes to other crises, even if they do not make the headlines. The conflict in Yemen has caused a humanitarian tragedy at a massive scale, with 80% of the population that is now in need of humanitarian assistance. Instability is a breeding ground for terrorist groups at the very crossroad, among the Middle East and the Horn of Africa, the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean.

I met the UN special envoy last week, and we are working together on the ceasefire that began last Sunday, accompanying this process with our concrete support for the preparation of negotiations and with a massive regional outreach. Let me finish on this first priority on the Middle East peace process because – despite the lack of media attention – we cannot forget the conflict in Israel and Palestine. With no progress towards peace, it is only a matter of time before the next escalation comes. Together with the rest of the Quartet and with our Arab partners’ involvement we are working on a report with substantive recommendations on how to move beyond the deadlock towards a two-state solution. To sit and wait is simply not an option, and our work has never stopped; it is sometimes quiet but always ongoing. Public opinion is not currently focusing on it, but this does not mean we are stopping our work. Putting an end to this conflict in Libya and Syria and Yemen – as well as in the Middle East as a whole – building strong partnerships with our neighbours, but also with key actors in Africa and in Asia, will be the best way to respond to the threat of terrorism in the region, the world and the European Union.

We can close the vacuum that Daesh uses in territories with no government, and we can prevent radicalisation in partnership with Muslim-majority countries that are promoting coexistence and respect for diversity. We can increase the security of Europe by increasing and improving the security of our partners: in the Middle East, in North Africa, in the Sahel, in South-East Asia, in the Western Balkans.

The second broad issue we need to deal with has much to do with conflicts in the Middle East, and yet the issue of refugees and migrations will not stop even with peace in Syria and Libya. Let us face it: big movements of people are the new normal, and again this is something we discussed recently in this room.

Walls will not stop the flows; they can only make the situation worse: opening new routes, destabilising more countries and creating an incentive for human smugglers. We can only manage this together with our neighbours, not against them. For this reason, I was in Lebanon and Jordan last month and in Africa last week. At the end of this week I will board one of our Operation Sophia vessels that just yesterday rescued hundreds more lives.

The third field where we need to urgently engage is self-evident if we want to manage the two priorities I have just mentioned. This is launching multilateralism as the privileged format for dealing with all international issues. This might sound less urgent if you do not think about the concrete meaning of multilateral diplomacy. Multilateral diplomacy led to COP21 and to the Sustainable Development Goals. Multilateral diplomacy made our deal with Iran possible. It is the comprehensive approach: win-win solutions and the rules-based scenario. It is the European way for foreign policy. We will need more of this in the coming months, including in the field of non-proliferation.

The international community has shown unity in responding to North Korea’s new tests. I have just attended two important events on disarmament and nuclear security: in Washington with President Obama and in Hiroshima at the G7 just yesterday. For the first time ever, we and the rest of the G7 honoured the memory of the victims of the atomic bomb. The discussion was positive, and it is in our common European interest to work for closer and deeper cooperation at international level on the issue of nuclear security, non-proliferation and disarmament.

Let me include, under the same headline – multilateralism and international cooperation – the issue of our relationship with Russia. On most of the files I have mentioned so far – on Iran, on Israel and Palestine, on Libya and partially on Syria – the Russian leadership has shown some interest in cooperating with Europe and with the rest of the world. We decided, together with the European Union foreign ministers, a few weeks ago that we will engage with Russia in the fields where we have an interest to do so. A few days ago a new meeting of the NATO-Russia Council was announced – and today the date was confirmed, I believe – after having been suspended for some years. Does this mean that our relations with Russia can go back to normal? My friend Jan Stoltenberg explained the NATO position with these words that, I believe, reflect very well where we are: ‘there will be no return to business as usual until Russia again respects international law’.

Our European position was agreed unanimously in the Foreign Affairs Council just one month ago. We have all signed off on five principles of our policy towards Russia. Selective engagement goes together with the implementation of Minsk, our relationship with our eastern partners, the strengthening of our own resilience and support for Russian civil society. I chaired the Foreign Affairs Council one month ago, and let me tell you that all Member States are now on the same page. On Russia, as on most other topics, we will need more of the same unity to make our way through these difficult times.

I believe that we as Europeans all share the exact same interests on all the issues I mentioned tonight. Our governments are starting to understand that, but our citizens already do. They know that we will either have a common European foreign policy or no real foreign policy at all, because it is only together that we have the tools and the weight that are needed in today’s world, and this is the best answer to our people’s need. I count on the continued support of this Parliament to manage to shape that effective common foreign security policy now and in the years ahead.


  Elmar Brok, im Namen der PPE-Fraktion. Herr Präsident, Frau Vizepräsidentin, Hohe Beauftragte, Kolleginnen und Kollegen! Herzlichen Dank für Ihre Darlegungen, mit denen ich in vielen Punkten übereinstimme. Aber ich möchte nach den Terrorakten in Brüssel auch zum Ausdruck bringen, dass wir verstärkt über eine neue Definition von Sicherheitspolitik nachdenken müssen. Das ist nicht mehr das Klassische. Der Islamische Staat führt einen Landkrieg in Syrien und in Irak, er führt einen Wirtschafts- und Terrorkrieg in Nordafrika, in Tourismusbezirken, um die Wirtschaft lahmzulegen, um recruitment haben zu können von arbeitslosen jungen Leuten, und er führt einen Terrorkrieg in Europa. Das ist ein einheitliches Konzept. Und ich glaube, diese Einheitlichkeit der Antwort darauf – die Zusammenarbeit zwischen Innen- und Außenpolitik, aber auch, wenn wir über Afrikapolitik reden, der Außen- und Entwicklungspolitik –, ich glaube, dies müssen wir in einer größeren Dimension betrachten, weil es auch wegen der Herausforderungen heute anders zu betrachten ist, als das in der Vergangenheit der Fall war.

Dazu gehört natürlich insbesondere auch eine Stärkung unserer Nachbarschaft und die Kooperation aus Gründen des Friedens – des Friedens, den Sie richtig angesprochen haben, in Syrien und Irak, aber auch des Friedens in der Ukraine. Das heißt, wir müssen in all diesen Fällen deutlich machen, dass wir auf der Seite derjenigen stehen, die einen Frieden schaffen wollen, und dass wir unseren Einfluss möglich machen sollten, dies zu tun. Da dies in bestimmten Fällen auch mit Migration zu tun hat, ist dies auch wiederum Bestandteil eines gesamten größeren Sicherheitsbegriffes, den wir nehmen sollten.

Kolleginnen und Kollegen! Ich muss auch sehen, dass wir in der entscheidenden Frage des Waffenstillstandes in Syrien gesehen haben, dass das die Russen und die Amerikaner erst einmal allein gemacht haben. Das bringt mich zu der Überlegung, ob die soft power, bei der wir besser sind als viele andere – 60 % der Entwicklungshilfe dieser Welt wird von der Europäischen Union und ihren Mitgliedstaaten geleistet –, ob die soft power oftmals auch nur dann erfolgreich ist, wenn man auch weiß, derjenige, der die soft power hat, hat zur Not auch hard power, und ob wir deswegen nicht ehrgeiziger sein müssen mit den Möglichkeiten des Vertrags von Lissabon, wie wir eine verstärkte Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik auch auf europäischer Ebene aufbauen können, die notwendigen Synergieeffekte schaffen, um auf diese Art und Weise auch hier Stärkeres vorweisen zu können. Wir verschwenden Geld.

Eine letzte Bemerkung, weil meine Zeit abläuft: Frau Mogherini, Sie haben vorhin die Frage der multilateralen Diplomatie angesprochen. Dem stimme ich zu. Aber ich glaube, wir müssen uns auch ernsthaft darüber unterhalten, welche Rolle Europa in einer multipolaren Welt spielt. Da haben wir uns, glaube ich, unsere eigene Definition an dieser Stelle noch nicht ausreichend vorgenommen.


  Knut Fleckenstein, im Namen der S&D-Fraktion. Herr Präsident, Frau Vizepräsidentin! Lieber Herr Brok, Ihre Zeit ist noch nicht abgelaufen – Gott sei Dank, umso mehr, da ich Ihnen in vielen Punkten Recht geben möchte.

Wer eben gut zugehört hat, hat auch gesehen, wie sich unser Sicherheitsumfeld verändert. Neben den regionalen Konflikten in der Nachbarschaft sehen wir uns heute mit Bedrohungen konfrontiert, die eben nicht nur auf einzelne geografische Regionen beschränkt sind. Bedrohungen wie Terror und Cyberkriminalität lassen zudem die Grenzen zwischen innerer und äußerer Sicherheit verschwimmen.

Wenn die Mitgliedstaaten in den Bereichen der Rüstungsplanung und der Beschaffung zusammenarbeiten würden, könnten wir kostspielige Überschneidungen vermeiden. Es bedarf der Koordinierung und der Steuerung auf EU-Ebene und damit auch der Stärkung der europäischen Verteidigungsagentur. Gemeinsame Verteidigungspolitik heißt ja nicht automatisch mehr Rüstung, sondern heißt: Eine intelligentere Ausstattung unserer Armeen wird möglich.

Wenn die EU in den Bereichen der Friedenskonsolidierung, der Konfliktprävention, des Krisenmanagements ein ernsthafter globaler und autonomer Partner und Akteur sein will, dann müsste es eben eine gemeinsame Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik geben, denn Sicherheitspolitik und Diplomatie gehören zusammen. Nur wenn beides erfolgreich betrieben werden kann, können wir insgesamt auch unsere Interessen durchsetzen.


  Geoffrey Van Orden, on behalf of the ECR Group. Mr President, I shall confine my remarks to CSDP, and I must say from the outset that the ECR Group attaches great importance to the transatlantic Alliance, to NATO; indeed that attachment is among our founding principles. The EU, however, seems to imagine that it is bearing the world’s problems on its shoulders, minimising the effort of others. In fact, in the military field, the European Union has no special requirements and no capabilities different to NATO.

There is no need for the European Union to be militarily involved, and it is a complete distortion to imagine that CSDP might somehow reinforce NATO. It could complement NATO with civil capabilities, but this ignores the very reasons for CSDP: to create autonomous European military structures and decision-making processes in which the United States is not involved, and to make the EU an actor on the world stage.

Actually, this obsession with CSDP is a distraction from NATO at the very time when the Alliance needs fresh vitality and commitment in the face of some very real threats. And I have to say: why is it that just four European countries are engaged with the United States and its other allies in the battle against ISIS when ISIS is shown to be the most immediate threat to European security and our wellbeing?

Instead of the continental European countries investing in increased defence capabilities and showing real political resolve, they prefer the pretence of military activity offered by the EU and they mislead the United States into imagining that European allies are thereby pulling their weight.


  Jozo Radoš, u ime kluba ALDE. Gospodine predsjedniče, kolegice i kolege, gospođo Visoka predstavnice, u ime ALDE grupe zahvaljujem na objektivnom izvješću i sigurno bi i svijet i Europa bili u težoj situaciji da nema zajedničke vanjske, sigurnosne i obrambene politike, no ta politika ima dva velika problema.

Prvi je da je ona vrlo malo zajednička. Naime, od 190 milijardi ukupnih troškova za obranu u Europi, zemlje članice, tek oko pet milijardi se troši na zajedničke investicije i oko sedam milijardi na zajedničke misije, što znači zapravo da se svega oko 6,3 % ukupnih troškova za obranu troši zajednički i to je velika slabost zajedničke sigurnosne i obrambene politike.

Druga je poteškoća te politike što ona nema pravne instrumente djelovati na krize koje ih se tiču. Niti jedna velika sila, neeuropska velika sila, članica Vijeća sigurnosti, neće donijeti odluku da Europska unija, i kada bi imala snage, intervenira tamo gdje to nije njihov interes, a njihov interes nužno ne mora biti niti stabilnost na Bliskom istoku, a često puta može biti i destabilizacija prostora i poteškoće koje Europska unija može imati.

Stoga gospođo Visoka predstavnice treba se nadati da će rat na Bliskom istoku i krizna žarišta u sjevernoj Africi i u subsaharskoj Africi doprinijeti tome da brže dođemo do više zajedničke sigurnosne i vanjske politike.


  Sabine Lösing, im Namen der GUE/NGL-Fraktion. Herr Präsident! Die Frage der Verteilungsgerechtigkeit, sowohl innerhalb von Gesellschaften als auch zwischen den Regionen der Welt, ist die wichtigste Frage, wenn es um Frieden und Sicherheit geht. Das betrifft auch die Nachbarschaftspolitik der EU. 2004 wollte man noch einen Ring aus Freunden bilden. Geschaffen wurde ein Ring aus Feuer. Evaluation heute hier in der Debatte? Fehl am Platze. Und wenn es dann nicht klappt mit den Nachbarn? Mehr Geld für Waffen und Rüstungsschmieden. Kein Thema sind die Auswirkungen der aggressiven EU-Außenwirtschaftspolitik, die zum Beispiel zu desaströsen Handelsbilanzen in den Ländern der EU-Nachbarschaft führte. Die steigenden Rüstungsexporte in die MENA-Region sind zwar Thema, aber deshalb wird kein Rüstungsunternehmen daran gehindert, das große Geschäft zu machen. Im Gegenteil: Es gilt die strategisch verbesserte Verfolgung und Durchsetzung der eigenen Interessen.

Und immer öfter stört die Demokratie – wie gerade in den Niederlanden – oder stören die Vetorechte von nationalen Parlamenten. Weg damit! Damit es noch schneller geht, schneller mit Militäreinsätzen, vorgeblich im Namen von Demokratie und Menschenrechten. Und dann vergrößert sich in der Folge rasant die Gerechtigkeitslücke, die Sicherheitslage wird wieder angespannter, und die Spirale dreht sich weiter und dreht sich weiter und dreht sich weiter. Doch damit nicht genug! Nun soll auch noch die Nutzung ziviler Gelder für militärische Zwecke missbraucht und umgeleitet werden.


  Bodil Valero, för Verts/ALE-gruppen. Herr talman! Det finns ett antal områden som vi gröna prioriterar. Jag kommer bara att nämna ett antal av dem.

Det långsiktiga konfliktförebyggandet arbetet är ett av dessa områden. Med det menar jag inte bara diplomati eller säkerhetssektorreformer, utan jag menar att vi också ska bekämpa klimatpåverkans konsekvenser, fattigdom, förtryck, orättvisa handelsvillkor m.m. Klimat-, handels- och utvecklingspolitik är viktiga för att nå en rättvisare och fredligare värld.

EU:s huvudfokus måste också vara mänsklig säkerhet och också fredsbyggande. I det perspektivet skulle vi vilja uppmuntra medlemsländerna att faktiskt delta mer i FN:s fredsbevarande insatser. Det är det nämligen väldigt få som gör i dag.

EU måste också vara garanten för respekt för internationell rätt, mänskliga rättigheter och andra gemensamma värderingar. I det perspektivet tycker jag inte att överenskommelsen med Turkiet lever upp till det, och inte heller den militära insatsen Eunavfor MED Sophia.

Kommissionären talade om nedrustning. Jag tycker att det är mycket bra. Vi måste arbeta aktivt för en global nedrustning. Vi ska emellertid också vara försiktiga när vi exporterar vapen till tredjeland. Vi lever i en helt ny säkerhetspolitisk situation, där den som i dag är vän i morgon kan vara fiende.

Vi ska också bekämpa terrorism på ett sätt så att vi inte skapar fler terrorister eller uppmuntrar konflikter. Det bästa sättet är att förebygga radikalisering. Sedan måste vi också värna det öppna Europa, till skillnad mot ett alltför militariserat Europa.


  James Carver, on behalf of the EFDD Group. Mr President, I welcome the High Representative’s presence in the Chamber tonight to inform not just all of us, but – equally as important – our constituents back home over development in the European Union’s common foreign and security policy and common security and defence policy. Most EU citizens are unaware of the extent to which the European Union’s powers in this area have matured since the Lisbon Treaty and where the ideologues within the European Commission intend to take it next, all without the direct consultation or full information provided to the public.

The EU intergovernmental structures for foreign affairs and defence are already in place. We have before us a representative who determines and guides European Union Foreign Policy, whilst representing the EU’s interests – not on the basis of the 28 Member States but as its own independent political entity throughout the world. She is, of course, supported by the European External Action Service and European Defence Agency – if you like, the EU’s very own Foreign Office and Ministry of Defence. Currently, the High Representative is reviewing the foreign and defence policy of the EU, with her bolder and far more intrusive policy expected to be announced in the Foreign Affairs Council timed to take place not before, but shortly after, the British referendum on my country’s continued EU membership at the end of June.

In last week’s referendum, the Dutch people democratically rejected the EU’s foreign policy ambitions in Ukraine. I urge the British people to bravely follow suit and reject this entire failing project outright, thus protecting us from ever-closer Union and, not least, eventual European Union armed forces.


  Mario Borghezio, a nome del gruppo ENF. – Signor Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, Alto rappresentante, Lei ci dipinge sempre un quadro molto ottimistico della situazione, ma la realtà stride. Sicurezza e difesa: un grande fallimento.

In termini anche solo propagandistici l'Isis ha raggiunto una serie di pesanti e schiaccianti vittorie, che nelle comunità islamiche di tutto il mondo produrranno solo nuove adesioni, reclutamenti, finanziamenti, mentre in quelle comunità, non in tutte, si festeggia la mattanza dei cristiani. Le sfide erano diverse e andavano rafforzate le leadership laiche dei paesi mediterranei e nel combattere senza pietà i movimenti estremisti e terroristici, non rafforzare al-Nusra contro Assad solo per eliminare un supposto sostenitore di Putin.

Tutti sanno che la Turchia ha alimentato un flusso di armi e non solo verso i gruppi terroristici anti-Assad. E Lei non dice niente al riguardo. Beh, noi riteniamo che la sicurezza venga invece dal controllo millimetrico dei confini e laddove questi non siano controllati dall'UE siano gli Stati membri a occuparsene seriamente. Chiediamo un approccio diverso, colpendo l'estremismo che genera i terroristi e non solo il terrorismo già manifesto e quindi gli Imam, le moschee, chi diffonde il verbo terrorista in mezzo ai nostri paesi e alle nostre case.


  Γεώργιος Επιτήδειος ( NI). Κύριε Πρόεδρε, επί δεκαπέντε περίπου χρόνια, η Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση συζητά την αναγκαιότητα να υπάρξει κοινή εξωτερική πολιτική και κοινή πολιτική άμυνας και ασφάλειας. Όμως, όσες εργατοώρες και αν καταναλωθούν, όσοι τόνοι μελάνης κι αν χαθούν, δεν πρόκειται να υπάρξει κοινή εξωτερική πολιτική στην Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση.

Ο λόγος είναι προφανής: όσο η Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση ήταν ένωση οικονομική, τα συμφέροντα των κρατών μελών συνέπιπταν ή, εν πάση περιπτώσει, υπήρχε η δυνατότητα να βρεθεί ένας τρόπος αυτά να συγκλίνουν. Από τη στιγμή κατά την οποία η Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση αποφάσισε να γίνει και πολιτική ένωση, τα συμφέροντα των κρατών άρχισαν να γίνονται αντικρουόμενα. Έχασε η Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση τη συνοχή της. Η αλήθεια αυτή απεδείχθη πρόσφατα: προκειμένου να αντιμετωπίσουν το τσουνάμι των προσφύγων και των παράνομων μεταναστών, πολλά κράτη έκλεισαν τα σύνορά τους, αδιαφορώντας εάν με αυτό τον τρόπο καταργούσαν ουσιαστικά τη Συνθήκη Σένγκεν. Και το έκαναν αυτό, διότι αυτό επέβαλε το συμφέρον τους.

Η Μεγάλη Βρετανία επισείει την απειλή του Brexit διότι αυτό επιβάλλει το συμφέρον της. Ακόμη χειρότερα, η Γερμανία έχει κατορθώσει να κυριαρχήσει σε όλη την Ευρώπη, με αποτέλεσμα να υπάρξουν κράτη τα οποία αντιδρούν επειδή θίγονται τα συμφέροντά τους. Άρα, λοιπόν, όση καλή θέληση και αν θέλουμε να επιδείξουμε, όση προσπάθεια και αν καταβάλουμε...

(Ο Πρόεδρος διακόπτει τον ομιλητή)


  Cristian Dan Preda (PPE). Monsieur le Président, tout d'abord, je suis triste de ne pas pouvoir débattre sur ce point dans le cadre du rapport Kalniete, comme notre groupe l'a proposé, car nous n'avons malheureusement pas reçu l'appui des autres groupes politiques.

C'est un thème extrêmement important, cela été dit. Les attentats terroristes, y compris récemment à Bruxelles, nous amènent à nous interroger une fois de plus sur l'efficacité de nos choix de politique étrangère et de sécurité et puis, comme Elmar l'a dit également, sur cette frontière entre menace intérieure et menace extérieure.

C'est pour cela, d'ailleurs, qu'en ce moment, nous sommes obligés de réclamer une solution en Syrie et en Libye et que, par ailleurs, nous souhaitons un renforcement de la coopération entre nos polices, une centralisation des politiques de contrôle aux frontières, de collecte et de partage du renseignement, tout simplement parce que les deux aspects, interne et externe, sont terriblement liés dans le dossier central du terrorisme.


  Victor Boştinaru (S&D). Domnule președinte, doamnă Înalt Reprezentant, acum, când discutăm, contextul față de dezbaterea din 2014 s-a schimbat considerabil. Și acest context diferit pune în discuție capacitatea de a anticipa și capacitatea de a răspunde a Uniunii Europene. Mă voi referi punctual la câteva elemente din politia de securitate și apărare. Cred că în momentul de față este necesară o cooperare extinsă în vederea securizării frontierelor externe ale Uniunii Europene și contribuția în acest sens a tuturor statelor membre, fără diferența între statele membre Schengen și non-Schengen. În al doilea rând, cred că, în contextul amenințărilor teroriste crescute, este vitală definirea unui cadru instituțional de cooperare în domeniul inteligence sharing, ca și a unor mecanisme contraterorism bine definite, nu doar ad hoc și subiective. În sfârșit, implicarea concretă în soluționarea conflictelor din zona MENA care trebuie să fie realizată, cum ați menționat și dumneavoastră, prin implicarea statelor din regiune, prin regional ownership-ul care poate asigura mai multă stabilitate. Având în vedere escaladarea și diversificarea provocărilor de securitate, colaborarea cu NATO nu mai poate fi opțională. Statele vecine răsăritene și sudice trec printr-un nou val de violențe, la care nu putem răspunde decât printr-o abordare concertată cu NATO.


  Anna Elżbieta Fotyga (ECR). Pani Wysoka Przedstawiciel! Warunkiem niezbędnym skutecznego prowadzenia obydwu polityk jest zbliżone postrzeganie wyzwań i zagrożeń. Takie wspólne postrzeganie zagrożeń znacząco podważyło w odniesieniu do Wschodu, do Rosji, referendum w Holandii, wynik tego referendum. Niestety muszę zauważyć, że również język, który Pani stosuje, opisując te wyzwania, uległ znaczącej zmianie od ostatnich konsultacji. Ten opis jest znacząco rusocentryczny, Pani Wysoka Przedstawiciel. Przecież nawet ani razu w tym kontekście nie została wymieniona Ukraina. Musimy poważnie przeanalizować zagrożenia, z którymi mamy do czynienia. Również powody, dla których społeczeństwo Holandii wyraziło swoją wolę w taki sposób. Czy to przypadkiem nie był rosyjski StratCom?


  Reinhard Bütikofer (Verts/ALE). Herr Präsident, Frau Mogherini, liebe Kolleginnen und Kollegen! Die Bürger erwarten, dass die EU sicherheitspolitische Verantwortung übernimmt. Soweit wir das nicht tun oder zu wenig tun, untergraben wir damit unsere eigene Legitimität. Allerdings, glaube ich, müssen wir bei der Einschätzung unserer sicherheitspolitischen Rolle realistisch sein und sie im Rahmen des multilateralen Gesamtgefüges definieren. Da sympathisiere ich – es wird Sie vielleicht überraschen – durchaus mit einigen der kritischen Bemerkungen, die Herr Van Orden vorhin gegenüber anderen Kollegen in diesem Hause gemacht hat.

Und ich glaube, wir brauchen nicht nur eine multilaterale Diplomatie, sondern wir müssen auch gezielt multilaterale Institutionen stärken, wenn wir nicht wollen, dass dieser Grundgedanke der internationalen Herrschaft des Rechts abgelöst wird durch eine neue Polarisierungsphilosophie, die von anderen Mächten vertreten wird.

In aller Kürze will ich drei Aspekte nennen, die mir im Rahmen dieser multilateralen Politik besonders wichtig sind. Erstens: Ich stelle fest, der Barcelona-Prozess ging noch von einer gemeinsamen Mittelmeerpolitik aus. Inzwischen betrachten wir das Mittelmeer als etwas, was uns scheidet und schützt. Ich glaube, das müssen wir neu bedenken.

Zweitens: Wir brauchen eine strategische Partnerschaft, insbesondere mit Subsahara-Afrika. Und drittens: Wir sollten unsere Kooperation mit ASEAN aufwerten, und ich würde hoffen, dass es eine klare Stellungnahme gibt noch vor dem Sommer zu der Entscheidung …

(Der Präsident entzieht dem Redner das Wort.)


  Jonathan Arnott (EFDD). Mr President, the European Union is reviewing its foreign and defence policy. It might actually come as a surprise to many people in the United Kingdom that the European Union has a foreign and defence policy, so I thought, in the interests of transparency, that I would point out some of the things that are being said out here. Last year, for example, Commission President Juncker called for the creation of an EU army, but at least he said: ‘you wouldn’t create a European army to use it immediately’. In September, Angela Merkel told David Cameron that he would not get any meaningful reform to the UK’s relationship with the European Union unless he dropped opposition to an EU army. Well David Cameron has gone awfully quiet about it, hasn’t he? Maybe he caved in. Maybe he sold our birthright for a pot of stew, coming back from Brussels giving us three things we already had and one we did not want, but now perhaps plans to give up the defence of the realm in exchange.

I wonder how many people in the UK know that there is a European Defence Action Plan coming in June, very soon after the referendum, for example, or that the ultimate aim is an EU army. But if they knew that we were being threatened with the creation of an EU army, I do not think that they would risk staying in the EU. I think they would vote to leave on 23 June.


  Franz Obermayr (ENF). Herr Präsident! Gemäß Artikel 24 und 21 des EU-Vertrags sind die Ziele einer Gemeinsamen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik die Förderung der Demokratie, Rechtsstaatlichkeit und Menschenrechte. Mit viel Getöse hat die Union also mit der Türkei dieses Rückführungsabkommen abgeschlossen, und diejenigen, die sich als die Hüter der Demokratie, der Menschenrechte fühlen, die immer mit erhobenem Zeigefinger hinweisen und auf die europäischen Werte zeigen, gerade die waren sehr froh, dass nun jemand anderer die europäischen Außengrenzen schützt und diesen unbequemen Schutz übernimmt. Doch man hat sich den Falschen ausgesucht: Erdoğan ist ein Despot, der Presse- und Menschenfreiheit mit Füßen tritt, Minderheiten ignoriert, der die Türkei mehr und mehr islamisiert und sogar gegen die eigene Bevölkerung einen Bürgerkrieg führt.

Meine Damen und Herren! So sieht keine glaubwürdige Politik aus! Unsere Bürger können diese hohlen Phrasen, was man alles tun müsste, nicht mehr hören. Statt die Verantwortung abzuwälzen, müssten wir selber Europa schützen und Politik mit Rückgrat machen und nicht mit Scheckbuch.


  Janusz Korwin-Mikke (NI). Nawiążę do tych ostatnich słów, mianowicie normalne imperia prowadzą swoją politykę przy pomocy armii. My nie mamy armii, my robimy to przy pomocy książeczki czekowej, czy kupując polityków: a to w Polsce, żeby ją przyłączyć do Unii, a to polityków w Turcji, na Ukrainie. Ta polityka poniosła klęskę po ostatnim referendum w Holandii.

Natomiast mamy, jak wiadomo, do czynienia z innym zagrożeniem. I tu chcę powiedzieć jedno: w tej chwili całe grupy terrorystów na świecie rywalizują o to, kto pierwszy doprowadzi znów do łez panią Federikę Mogherini, bo nic tak nie zachęca do agresji, jak pokazywana słabość, jak pokazane łzy. I to Pani, Pani Mogherini, jest zagrożeniem dla Unii Europejskiej, okazując słabość. A poza tym sądzę, że Unia Europejska powinna zostać zniszczona.


  Sandra Kalniete (PPE). Mr President, I welcome the recent steps towards a closer EU—NATO cooperation, such as the practical cooperation between Frontex and NATO in the Aegean Sea and the closer cooperation with NATO on countering hybrid threats as envisaged in the newly-adopted ‘Joint Framework to counter hybrid threats and foster the resilience of the EU’. I encourage you, Madam Vice-President, to work towards the implementation of this document, both in the area of closer cooperation with NATO and the other 21 action items. We are looking forward to adopting the necessary legislative and political measures for their implementation.




  Richard Howitt (S&D). Madam President, in this last annual debate on common foreign and security policy before the British referendum, let us say Britain is stronger in Europe and helps make Europe stronger in the world. Europe’s anti-piracy mission on the Horn of Africa was controlled from the UK Forces command headquarters in Northwood. Britain formed the EU 3+3 that led to the Iran nuclear deal. The London Donor Conference for Syria was made a success because the EU leveraged the three billion raised.

EU foreign policy has a veto for all, but where we do agree, we all exercise more influence. Britain leaving the EU would carry more international burden. According to the Director of Europol and the former Chief of British Special Forces, my country would be less secure. And as has been argued today, it would harm the whole international order. In the modern world of partnerships, the US and Chinese Presidents, the Indian Prime Minister and Commonwealth allies including Australia and New Zealand all say that it is better for Britain to remain in the EU. As Chancellor Merkel has said, only Vladimir Putin would be happy if Britain left.

Throughout history, from the Congress of Vienna to the end of the Napoleonic Wars, to the Locarno Pact at the end of the First World War to the great Labour Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, who forged the relationship between America and Europe at the end of the Second World War, Britain has engaged in Europe to secure peace. I do not believe British Eurosceptics know better than the Nobel Prize Committee, which says that the EU is the most successful peace process in history. My parents fought the war in Europe to win the peace. I will fight the referendum to keep it.


  Marek Jurek (ECR). Pani Przewodnicząca! Ostatnio władzom Unii Europejskiej o wiele łatwiej przychodzi atakowanie państw Europy, niż ich bronienie w konkretnych sytuacjach. Rzeczywiście przez ostatnich kilka lat łatwiej było atakować bez przerwy Węgry, niż na przykład wystąpić w obronie prawa Polski do uczciwego śledztwa po śmierci naszego prezydenta w katastrofie smoleńskiej, czy do zwrotu materialnych dowodów potrzebnych w tym śledztwie. Od dwóch lat, Pani Wiceprzewodnicząca, współpracujemy z Panią (no prawie o dwóch lat), mimo że w tym czasie Parlament Europejski wystąpił z poparciem praw Polski w tych sprawach, nie usłyszeliśmy żadnych konkretów. Tak jak przez parę lat Pani poprzedniczka nie zrobiła nic w tej sprawie, żeby nam pomóc, tak samo teraz nawet nie słyszymy o tym problemie. Rzeczywiście łatwiej jest robić taki rajd dookoła świata – Jemen, Libia, rozwiązywanie wszystkich problemów na świecie, niż wspomóc konkretne państwo Europy, które ma prawo do pomocy ze strony Unii Europejskiej.


  Krisztina Morvai (NI). Mogherini Asszony! Szeretnék tényszerű és számszerű felvilágosítást kérni Öntől arról, hogy mi a pontos jogi helyzete azoknak, akik Európából elmennek az Iszlám Állam kötelékében harcolni, és utána visszatérnek Európába? Hány ilyen személyről tudunk? Bűncselekménynek minősül-e az, hogy valaki ezt teszi, vagy pedig meg kell várni, amíg megöl valakit, amíg terrorcselekményt követ el, és majd csak akkor vonják felelősségre? Ha ez idő szerint nem bűncselekmény, akkor nem kellene-e bűncselekménnyé nyilvánítani – úgy nevezett sui generis – saját képi bűncselekménnyé – azt, hogy ha valaki egy terrorszervezet kötelékében külföldön harcol? Ha visszajönne Európába, mehetne a börtönbe, ha meg nem európai állampolgár, akkor ki is lehetne utasítani. Megfontolás alatt van-e ez a kérdés, illetőleg tévednek-e azok, akik hozzám hasonlóan úgy gondolják, hogy itt valami nagyon-nagyon nincs rendben? Várom a válaszát, köszönöm.


  Michael Gahler (PPE). Frau Präsidentin! Frau Mogherini, ich danke Ihnen zunächst für Ihren kontinuierlichen Dialog mit unserem Parlament. Wir erleben gemeinsam, dass wir dann, wenn wir als Europäer zusammenstehen, auch etwas erreichen können. Das Abkommen mit dem Iran und die gemeinsame Haltung gegenüber Russland in Sachen Ukraine seien hier genannt.

Ich wünsche mir aber mehr EU-Engagement jetzt im syrischen Friedensprozess. Denn wenn er scheitern würde, wären wir als Europäer von neuen Flüchtlingsströmen und anderen Effekten viel mehr betroffen als die USA und Russland. Aber um ernst genommen zu werden, müssen wir soft power und hard power können. Wenn wir als EU militärisch nur im NATO-Rahmen handeln könnten, würden wir uns jederzeit von einem möglichen Veto, zum Beispiel von Herrn Erdoğan, abhängig machen.

In Sachen Libyen sollten wir uns alle Optionen offenhalten, vorzugsweise die Kooperation mit der neuen Regierung, aber auch die Möglichkeit, mit Sophia direkt gegen IS, Al-Qaida und die Schleuser in diesem Land vorzugehen. Ich hoffe, dass die neue globale Strategie, die Sie im Juni vorstellen, auch eine neue europäische Sicherheitsstrategie beinhalten wird.


  Ioan Mircea Paşcu (S&D). Madam President, with defence and security clearly in national hands, the CSDP has been in effect a crisis management instrument rather than a real tool for our common defence. Common defence in the face of external aggression has been entrusted to NATO, as the Treaties clearly state in Article 42.7 and Article 222.

Today, however, if we ask European citizens what they are most afraid of, they will answer that they fear for their lives following the guerrilla warfare brought to our streets by the terrorists. Consequently, common defence and security have a clear internal connotation which now overshadows its traditional external dimension.

Even if we did achieve more in respect of our internal security – see the number of agencies and strategies – there is ample room for improvement, especially in respect of cooperation between national authorities and the EU agencies and even between the various branches of the national authorities. Indeed, even if the police, special forces and the military had been deployed simultaneously both in Paris and Brussels after the attacks, they take orders from their respective separate commands.

Therefore, apart from improving the interaction between the national authorities and the EU agencies, to have a more efficient response we need to start integrating the upper part of our internal security toolkit with the lower part of our military toolkit so we would have an integrated response.


  Francisco José Millán Mon (PPE). Señora Presidenta. Gracias, señora Mogherini, por su presentación. El auge del terrorismo del Dáesh, la inestabilidad en nuestra vecindad, desde Libia hasta Ucrania pasando por Siria o Iraq, o la situación en el Sahel, la presión sobre nuestras fronteras y los numerosos retos y amenazas globales nos muestran que una política exterior común, en la que usted se esfuerza, no es una opción, es una necesidad. Juntos, desde luego, somos más fuertes. Y además de una política exterior de la Unión dotada de medios e instrumentos también necesitamos la voluntad política, evidentemente, de los Estados miembros.

Hay otra consideración general: los países de la vecindad deben ocupar un lugar primordial en nuestra acción exterior. Pero la Unión Europea también debe proyectarse en el plano global. En un mundo tan interdependiente, nada nos es ajeno. No cabe el repliegue en un entorno tan interconectado. Espero, señora Mogherini, que el documento que presente al Consejo Europeo de junio sobre la estrategia global de la política exterior y de seguridad esté a la altura de las circunstancias e incluya un capítulo relevante sobre la necesaria profundización en materia de seguridad y defensa.


  Afzal Khan (S&D). Madam President, High Representative, the decision of the EU to lift sanctions against Myanmar in support of the democratic transition was right. Regrettably, since then the situation of Myanmar’s Muslim Rohingya and Christians has not improved. There is now strong evidence that the crimes against the Rohingya could amount to genocide. Last year, in this very Chamber, you said there is no real border between external and internal events, and so there must be no real border between our external and internal action. I agreed with you then, and I still do today.

The people who committed the brutal attacks on Paris and Brussels were radicalised because they saw the world divided between us and them. We must defeat this pernicious ideology, but in order to do so we must shape our actions to demonstrate our values. I urge you today to put the situation in Myanmar back on the agenda. If no progress is made in the coming weeks with the new government, then we must be prepared to reintroduce a tough sanctions policy.


  Arnaud Danjean (PPE). Madame la Présidente, Madame la Haute représentante, vous avez un job impossible, et je suis très attristé de voir que ce Parlement ne vous facilite pas la tâche avec ses séances interminables.

En un mot, puisqu'une minute pour parler de sujets aussi sérieux, c'est quand même assez ridicule, la stratégie globale qui va être élaborée, c'est un exercice indispensable et bienvenu, mais je ne voudrais pas qu'il nous fasse perdre de vue une autre priorité, qui est la mise en œuvre des stratégies déjà existantes.

L'Union européenne et vos services croulent sous les stratégies. Chaque zone géographique, chaque thématique a déjà une stratégie, et nous peinons à les mettre en œuvre efficacement.

Un exemple assez tragique: cet après-midi, la France a perdu un nouveau soldat de 19 ans au nord du Mali, et trois blessés sont gravement atteints.

Nous avons, depuis plus de cinq ans, une stratégie pour le Sahel – une stratégie intelligente, qui combine sécurité et développement. Nous sommes encore loin de l'avoir mise efficacement en œuvre. Donc, je dis "oui" à une stratégie globale, mais, de grâce, qu'il y ait des résultats, de la mise en œuvre, de la flexibilité et des priorités.


  Francisco Assis (S&D). Senhora Presidente, Senhora Comissária Mogherini, a União Europeia só poderá recuperar influência no mundo se se conseguir afirmar como potência capaz de prevenir, dissuadir e proteger. A União Europeia tem de se assumir como um garante da paz e da estabilidade regional e mundial, mas para isso tem de se comprometer com uma política de defesa e segurança comum adaptada aos novos riscos e novos perigos. Em face a dramas atuais como a guerra civil na Síria e a desagregação da Líbia, as ações do Daech e o terrorismo, os conflitos no Sahel e no Corno de África, a União Europeia tem de assumir as suas responsabilidades e não pode transferi-las para outros atores. Até porque, pelos princípios e valores em que assenta, a União Europeia é quem está em melhores condições de garantir uma política comum de segurança e defesa devidamente interligada com as políticas para os assuntos externos, a ajuda humanitária e o desenvolvimento. Trata-se, no fundo, de encontrar um equilíbrio entre a função mediadora e a função preventiva e dissuasora. Isso implica desde logo uma maior cooperação com outras organizações regionais e internacionais, como por exemplo a Liga Árabe e a União Africana.


  Eduard Kukan (PPE). Madam President, I would like to thank the High Representative for her introduction. Now more than ever, we feel the close link between foreign policy and domestic security. Unfortunately, Europe has become quite fragile in this situation. We need to reassure our citizens that we are capable of making both CSDP and CSFP work. If we want them to work, we need to enhance mutual cooperation within the European Union. We need to strengthen our policy where it matters the most: in issues such as security in areas such as our neighbourhood, south and east, or our closest partners in the Balkans. Unfortunately, exactly here we see a rise in crises, conflicts and new security threats reaching Europe. We have to be ready to face these challenges and put the priorities right.

On our external policies, we need to apply common sense. For example, if we are to enhance our energy security and help our eastern partners, we should not become more dependent on Russian gas.


  David McAllister (PPE). Frau Präsidentin! Wir haben es von der Hohen Vertreterin und auch in der Debatte gehört: Die Herausforderungen für Europa sind immens, und mehr denn je lässt sich beobachten, dass eben die Übergänge zwischen äußerer und innerer Sicherheit fließend sind.

Mehr europäische Gemeinsamkeit in der Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik ist eine Notwendigkeit – das haben die Vorredner zu Recht unterstrichen. Ich möchte auch darauf hinweisen, dass die Mehrheit der Bürgerinnen und Bürger in der Europäischen Union hier an unserer Seite steht, denn viele Meinungsumfragen zeigen, dass die Menschen in Europa mehr Gemeinsamkeit in der Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik wünschen.

Unsere neue Strategie, die bis zum Juni vorgelegt werden soll, sollte meiner Auffassung nach die vielfältigen Bedrohungen herausarbeiten, unsere Interessen nach Prioritäten sortieren und die notwendigen Instrumente und institutionellen Abkommen für die EU festlegen. Dafür wünsche ich Ihnen, Frau Mogherini, von Herzen viel Erfolg!


Interventions à la demande


  Henna Virkkunen (PPE). Arvoisa puhemies, Euroopan turvallisuusympäristö on muuttunut entistä epävakaammaksi. Sisäinen ja ulkoinen turvallisuus ovat kietoutuneet yhteen. Cyberuhkat, hybridisodan käynti, ääriliikkeiden nousu, radikalisaatio, terrorismi, maahanmuuttokriisi, kaikki nämä tarkoittavat sitä, että Euroopan unionin on toimittava entistä tiiviimmin yhteen turvallisuuden varmistamiseksi ja tiedonkulun parantamiseksi.

Samaan aikaan kuitenkaan perinteinen sotilaallinen uhka ei ole väistynyt Euroopan rajoilta. Sen osoittaa Venäjän aggressiivinen toiminta Ukrainassa. Edelleenkin Euroopan maille Nato on turvallisuuspoliittinen ja sotilaspoliittinen perusratkaisu, eikä Euroopan unionin pidä lähteä Naton rinnalle rakentamaan kilpailevaa organisaatiota. Mutta on kannatettavaa, että Euroopan unionin maat tiivistävät omaa yhteistyötään osana Naton eurooppalaista pilaria, ja on aivan oikein ja perusteltua, että Eurooppa ottaa itse myös enemmän turvallisuuspoliittista ja sotilaspoliittista vastuuta Euroopasta.


  Νότης Μαριάς ( ECR). Κυρία πρόεδρε, κυρία Mogherini, η βασική αρχή της Κοινής Εξωτερικής Πολιτικής και Πολιτικής Ασφάλειας είναι η αλληλεγγύη της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης προς τα κράτη μέλη της. Δεν είδα όμως καμία αλληλεγγύη της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης προς την Ελλάδα, κατά των παρανόμων ενεργειών των Σκοπίων.

Στις 29 Μαρτίου, σας υπέβαλα γραπτή ερώτηση με προτεραιότητα, με την οποία σας ζητούσα να λάβετε μέτρα κατά των Σκοπίων, διότι στα μέσα Μαρτίου η αστυνομία των Σκοπίων επιτέθηκε κατά προσφύγων που ήταν εντός του ελληνικού εδάφους, στην Ειδομένη, ρίχνοντας δακρυγόνα και χημικά. Όμως, δεν έγινε τίποτε και την προηγούμενη Κυριακή αποθρασύνθηκαν τα Σκόπια. Επιτέθηκαν στους πρόσφυγες, είχαμε πολύ περισσότερους τραυματίες, πυροβόλησαν και έριξαν σφαίρες με καουτσούκ και είχαμε πάρα πολλούς τραυματίες.

Για ποιον λόγο, λοιπόν, γίνονται αυτά; Εάν είχατε απαντήσει έγκαιρα στην ερώτηση που σας είχα υποβάλει με προτεραιότητα, εντός δέκα ημερών, τότε ίσως στις 8 Απριλίου να είχατε απαντήσει και να είχατε «κόψει τον βήχα στους Σκοπιανούς». Περιμένω μια απάντηση έστω και τώρα.


  Andrej Plenković (PPE). Gospođo potpredsjednice, poštovana Visoka predstavnice Mogherini, zahvaljujem na još jednoj prigodi za vrlo intenzivan dijalog koji u okviru vaših aktivnosti vodite s Europskim parlamentom, a vjerujte, svi zastupnici to izuzetno cijene. U našim vanjsko-političkim izborima i zauzimanju važnih pozicija kao globalnog aktera, htio bih izdvojiti tri pitanja koja mi se čine važnima za aktualni kontekst.

Prvo je povezanost vanjske sigurnosne politike i naše unutarnje sigurnosti, gdje su borba protiv terorizma i napor da kontroliramo migracijski val neraskidivo vezani. Drugo je upravo u tom kontekstu specifičan odnos s Turskom, gdje se miješa i stabilnost u regiji i proces proširenja i kontroliranje migracija i nadzor naših vanjskih granica.

A treće je tema koju detaljno pratimo, Ukrajina, gdje smo vidjeli kako u Nizozemskoj jedan nacionalni referendum na europsku temu ima međunarodne posljedice. Svima nama zadaća je da bolje rastumačimo vanjsko-političke implikacije našeg djelovanja nacionalnim javnostima.


(Fin des interventions à la demande)


  Federica Mogherini, Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Madam President, first of all let me say I just checked with my officers and I think I replied to the honourable Member’s letter just today, so he might receive it tonight or tomorrow morning.

Then I would like to underline what many Members have mentioned in this first debate tonight concerning the links between the internal and external security aspects. Indeed today this Chamber discussed two aspects on the internal side of our policies on which we also have an external approach: the response to migration and the refugee crisis, and counter-terrorism after the recent attacks in Brussels. These are two aspects of our policies that have both an internal and an external angle, and we have developed an approach over recent months – especially inside the Commission, but also on the Council side – of integrating more and more our internal and external responses.

All of this will, I expect, be included in our debate in a couple of hours on the global strategy that we are preparing, because the whole exercise about the global strategy is exactly that of merging different strands of policies that we have inside the European institutions to overcome the gaps that today we know are there in the use of internal and external tools.

Let me again underline the fact that the debates in this room show that, at parliamentary level too, we have to develop new ways of thinking and dealing with issues, because we have those that deal with internal aspects of our policies discussing terrorism and migration, and those that deal with external aspects of our policies dealing exactly with the same kind of topics, but in two separate meetings and in two separate debates.

So again, maybe we could look at innovative ways – different ways – of tackling the same issue from different angles, because this is the added value of the European Union. We have so many different tools: internal and external, soft and hard – the so-called comprehensive approach – but then sometimes we are the first ones inside the institutions, including this one, not to have that comprehensive approach.

Many of the things that have been raised here tonight actually fit in other kinds of debates we will have tonight. That is certainly true for the definition of our role in this world that Elmar Brok defined as multipolar. I have my doubts that this world is multipolar anymore; we probably lack the poles to define the world as multipolar – we are living in a changing world. But again, this is a strategic debate we will have in a while, as well as the issue that Mr Danjean raised, which I believe is key, on how we implement the strategies we put in place. Here again I would like to come back to this point in our debate on the global strategy, because implementation is the key element of our strategies. It is not the end of it; it is not the subsequence only but it is an integral part, I believe, of our strategies.

The other issue that was raised is that there are many other policies and many other priorities – key areas – on which I did not focus tonight. This does not mean that they are not priorities for us.

I will name three of them: energy security, which was mentioned just now; our relations with ASEAN, which was mentioned in a previous speech and intervention – I am just back, before being in Japan for the G7, from Jakarta, where we had an excellent meeting with the ASEAN Secretariat for the Member States, deciding precisely to proceed on upgrading our relationship to a strategic one; and thirdly, the work we do with the Sahel, which is key to our security; it is key to our management of the refugee and migrant flows, and it is key to economic development and global issues as such. But again, I am trying to focus on the immediate and ongoing priorities, as this is the purpose of this debate as I understand it.

Let me say some final words on an issue on which many of you have commented, which is the European Union’s added value or non-added value to foreign security policy. Let me say this very clearly: I see a growing awareness among our people, among our European citizens, and even a growing one in our Member States, that not even the biggest Member States are world powers anymore.

I often say that we have two kinds of countries in Europe: the small ones and the ones that have not yet realised they are small. But this is the reality of our history. This is the size of foreign policy and also security policy, and there is nothing that any of our Member States can do better alone than all together. I think that we are going in the right direction now.

I have also heard a lot of this thinking about the United Kingdom’s role in the Union on foreign and security policy, and let me mention an example that Richard Howitt mentioned before.

We met in London two months ago for the London conference on Syria, where the European Union as such, together with the Member States, provided two thirds of the pledges – two thirds – making the London conference a success. But my example goes beyond that. The UK on that occasion put forward an idea for economic compacts for Lebanon and Jordan, with creative ideas on how to make the fact that Jordan and Lebanon are hosting so many refugees, either in refugee camps or in host communities, sustainable in the mid-term.

That idea moved forward, and we are now putting it into practice together because – and simply because – the European Union put at the disposal of that idea the instruments, especially relating to trade, that made it possible to create this compact, which relates to decisions that the European Union, and not one single Member State, has the capacity to take.

This means that the brilliant UK idea that helps all of the European Union and its neighbours has been made possible by a common decision of the Union to implement this idea. This is a win-win – more than that, a win-win-win for the UK, for Europe and for the neighbourhood. Win-win-win: three times, rather than a loss all alone.

Sure, we still have difficulties and limits, and some things that do not work. But the point is that our role is not to say: it does not work. Our role as decision-makers, as policy-makers, is simply to try and make things work, and that is what I believe we are trying to do.


  La Présidente. – Le débat est clos.

Declarations ecrites (article 162)


  Louis Aliot (ENF), par écrit. Nous devons ce jour intervenir sur les principaux aspects et choix fondamentaux de la politique étrangère et de sécurité commune et de la politique de sécurité et de défense commune.

Vos principaux aspects de politique étrangère et de sécurité commune se caractérisent par vos échecs. Jamais l'Europe n'a été aussi inaudible et méprisée dans tous les grands dossiers qui agitent le monde et, pourtant, jamais les périls n'ont été aussi grands. Ce sont les États-Unis, la Russie ou la Chine qui se parlent, agissent, négocient et tirent bénéfice de leurs puissances.

Vos principaux choix en matière de politique étrangère relèvent d'une soumission à des intérêts qui ne sont pas les nôtres et qui nous privent de moyens important pour faire entendre notre voix. Votre structure n'existe que sur le papier. Le haut représentant de l'Union pour les affaires étrangères et la politique de sécurité est une coquille vide qui n'a aucune influence sur les affaires du monde et qui dépense inutilement l'argent des contribuables européens. Nous rappelons que les nations sont souveraines et que la défense et les affaires étrangères relèvent des domaines régaliens de chaque État.


  Bogdan Andrzej Zdrojewski (PPE), na piśmie. W roku 2016 będziemy świadkami istotnych wydarzeń z punktu widzenia wspólnotowej polityki zagranicznej i obrony. W czerwcu Wysoka Przedstawiciel zaprezentuje nową Globalną Strategię Polityki Zagranicznej i Bezpieczeństwa UE. W lipcu odbędzie się szczyt NATO w Warszawie, a jesienią zaprezentowana zostanie nowa Strategia dotycząca Przestrzeni Kosmicznej. W tym kontekście chciałbym podkreślić 3 kwestie.

Ogromnym wyzwaniem i kierunkiem, w którym powinna podążać UE i każde europejskie państwo, jest stałe podnoszenie zdolności obronnych poprzez inwestycje w technologie. Nasza europejska baza technologiczna musi stać się jeszcze bardziej konkurencyjna i powinna otrzymywać stałe impulsy do rozwoju.

WPBiO jest widoczna poprzez swoje działania w różnych miejscach: od Bośni przez Ukrainę po państwa Afryki. Nasze działania muszą podlegać ścisłej i metodologicznej kontroli i być szeroko konsultowane z partnerami z NATO i ONZ, jeśli chcemy, by stanowiły one wartość dodaną.

Jedną z najważniejszych sfer, które wspierają europejskie bezpieczeństwo i obronność, są technologie kosmiczne. Europejskie programy kosmiczne, jak Galileo i Copernicus, mają kluczowe znaczenie dla obserwacji Ziemi, granic, ruchu na morzach czy pozycjonowania. Powinniśmy w przyszłych politykach wspierać je z całą mocą, tym bardziej, że ich planowanie i działanie obliczone jest na wiele lat. Odpowiednie finansowanie zapewni nie tylko żywotność tych programów, ale także nasze bezpieczeństwo.

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